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THE POLITICS OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN LATIN AMERICA:
A CASE STUDY OF THE ANDEAN GROUP. 1969-1995
by
Julio J. Chan-Sanchez
Adviser: Professor Kenneth Paul Erickson
This dissertation examines and confirms the hypothesis, through the study of the 
evolution of the Andean Group (a subregional economic integration unit in South 
America), that economic integration is a quasi-cyclical process involving phases of 
progress, stagnation, and decline. It is not a smooth linear progression. This quasi- 
cyclical evolution is fundamentally determined by the governments of the member 
countries. As such, the individual governments are the most important actors in setting 
the evolution of the economic integration process.
The integration process will progress when all the governments of the member 
countries find the Andean Group useful for attaining some of their objectives. The 
integration process will stagnate if a minority of the governments consider that 
integration does not further some of their aims. The process will regress if most of the
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member countries find that it does not help them to accomplish some of their national 
interests.
Research guided by this perspective will result in better understanding of the 
process of economic integration, which so far has defled successful explanation. Such 
understanding is especially important to help predict future developments of economic 
integration efforts. A better knowledge of these processes will allow us to entertain more 
realistic expectations about the possibilities and the limits of the integration processes. 
This study will also be of timely and practical use, considering the revival of integration 
processes all over the world. This research project is the first to cover the entire history 
of the Andean Group (1969-1995) and at the same time to present a comparative political 
economy analysis of the Andean countries.
The study focuses on the interactions among the Andean countries to understand 
the evolution of the integration process. It also examines the evolution through changes 
in the strategy of development, economic policies, and external factors influencing the 
governments of the member countries. Although it is important to analyze the domestic 
factors which affect national objectives, this type of analysis is left to other 
investigations.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
A la memoria de mi Papa 
A mi Mama 
A mi Apo
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
vii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
As nearly all Ph.D. candidates will attest, writing a dissertation is one of life’s 
most solitary endeavors requiring a lot of self-discipline. At the same time, this lonely 
task cannot be successfully completed without the help of many others. Mentors, friends 
and colleagues in more than one way have given me their help, support, understanding, 
and good wishes that have made the task somehow less daunting, and have provided 
encouragement, guidance, and support.
Among the many I would like to thank for the above and more, first and foremost 
are all the persons who, thanks to my frail memory, are being omitted here. For this I 
can only ask most emphatic for their forgiveness.
Of the persons whose help remains etched in my mind, I want thanks first and 
foremost to Professor Kenneth Paul Erickson and Professor Caroline Marie Somerville 
for their patient mentoring, and their endurance in reading this text. Both of them have 
provided me with invaluable suggestions and advice to improve this study, my research 
capabilities, and my understanding of political science. My heartfilled thanks also goes 
to the other members of my Dissertation Committee, Professor Howard Lentner, 
Professor Benjamin Rivlin, and Professor Dankwart A. Rustow whose ideas and 
suggestions have only enriched this dissertation.
My deepest thanks to all the professors teaching at the Ph.D. Program in Political 
Science, and professors from other programs, especially those in whose classes I had the 
privilege and opportunity to sit in. I also thank Dee Harrison and other staff members 
of the Political Science Program. Without them, my student years would have been 
undoubtedly less pleasant, amusing, and witty. My gratitude goes also to the sui generis 
academic community which is the Graduate School and University Center 
(administrators, staff and other personnel, as well as my student mates and their 
organizations), and of The City University of New York in general, especially the 
Departments of Political Science at Brooklyn College (where I have gotten my most 
rewarding teaching experience), Queens College, City College, John Jay College and La 
Guardia Community College. All of them have contributed to my education, formal and 
not so formal, and this dissertation is the end product of this phase of my life.
Among the people who patiently read some or parts of the drafts I would to 
mention in the first place, the late Ms. Frieda Prensky. She was the first to revise the 
drafts of each of the chapters until her untimely passing early in the Fall of 1995. She 
and I had managed to read together from chapter I through chapter VII. I thank her and 
I am very grateful not only for this, but above all, for her undeserved friendship, which 
epitomizes one of the most remarkable virtues of the American spirit: generosity. We 
met at the "International Center" in 1984, and since then she followed my "career" at the 
Graduate School. According to her, she was "learning" from the papers I wrote for my 
courses because of my choosing of convoluted constructions and of my use of seldom
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
viii
used words. My papers were rendered into understandable English in great part because 
she ably reviewed and corrected them. To her my utmost thanks for her kindness, help, 
generosity and willingness to freely share her wisdom and advice. She will be in my 
memory forever.
My friends Max Frey and David Blau were more than kind in offering to read the 
dissertation, which they tireless and patiently read from the beginning to end. I am sure 
they did not know the Sisyphian task they were getting into. My philosopher friend 
Martin Brown was kind enough to read some chapters of this opera magna. Professor 
Frances Fox Piven held group meetings for students writing dissertation proposals. These 
sessions were germane in pushing me forward. All of them have made out of this 
manuscript a text which is much more readable and clearer than it otherwise would have 
been.
My "field research" in Lima, Peru (February-August 1993, and July-September 
1994) was fruitful thanks to the invaluable help of many people at the Junta del Acuerdo 
de Cartagena, former colleagues, and long-time friends. Among the first, my special 
gratitude goes to Adolfo Lopez, Eduardo Showing, Guillermo Sarco, Dante Curonisy, 
Guillermo Lecaros, Rosa Balarezo, Maria Luisa Thomberry, Virginia Barboza, Elena 
Cubas, Wenceslao Lopez, Prisea Vflchez, and Manuel Pena. All of them, and others 
working at the Junta, were crucial in-providing access to information, publications, and 
documents that otherwise would have been impossible to get.
Former colleagues Elva Rodriguez, Eduardo Brandes and Pepe Tenorio, were 
more than helpful aiding me in making available "unavailable" documents, and 
publications of the Junta published following the end of my "field trips," especially after 
the second half of 1994 till the end of this task. They were graciously patient in 
answering numerous unanswerable questions, some of them forcing Elva and Pepe to go 
all the way back in their memories of the "good old times" at the Oficina Nacional de 
Integracion, and Eduardo to the times of the Comision de Politico Arancelaria. Based on 
"shared learning experience," they clarified for me countless times, "what this decision 
really means," and what this document was aiming to, knowing that legalese and 
bureaucratese are essential ways of writing in the official spheres, to clearly state what 
cannot be stated in plain language. Their priceless help has been of utmost importance 
to this dissertation.
Ivan Pinto and Ricardo Cruzado, long-term dear friends, were always supportive, 
understanding and encouraging. As important as their support, encouragement and 
understanding, they provided me with comments, and assisted me in gathering and 
organizing the wealth of information I was able to get from the Junta’s Centro de 
Documentacion, as well as other documents and information obtained directly from 
functionaries of the Junta. They have also been invaluable research collaborators who 
have patiently collected newspaper clips about the Andean Group ever since this project 
began in earnest, and making them available to me as soon as possible.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
ix
Last but not least, my thanks to all the members of my family, from my late 
Father whose memory and the shadow of his influence and example has been growing 
in me; to my Mother, who has been endearingly patient with her son’s goal of becoming 
a "Doctor;" to my siblings, Silvia, the late Elia, Gladys, Lily, Jaime y Carlos who have 
been also understanding and supportive of their eldest brother’s crazy pursuit of further 
studies, "at such an old age!;" to my nephews and nieces (Away, Amuy, Uchi, Carlos 
Andres, Gustavo Alonso, and Jaime Daniel) whom I miss a lot; and to my Apo, who at 
her age (nineties), deserves all my love and gratitude of a life lived as a permanent 
example which in many times I chose not to imitate.
To all of you my deepest thanks; all of you are part of this end product which 
culminates a very important phase of my life, crowns a turning point in my life, and 
fulfills one of my goals in life, but only of its good parts; the bad parts belongs to me 
and only to me.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
x
LIST OF TABLES xviii
ACRONYMS, ABBREVIATIONS AND SELECTED DECISIONS
OF THE COMMISSION xxi
MAP: THE ANDEAN GROUP xxv
CHAPTER I 
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION:
A ... GREAT LEAP FORWARD OR A ... LONG MARCH?
1.- THE PROBLEM OF EXPLAINING THE EVOLUTION OF
INTEGRATION PROCESSES 1
1 .1 .-Theories of regional integration 4
1.2.- The practice of regional economic integration 11
1.3.- An alternative explanation for the evolution of economic
integration processes 14
1.4.- The alternative explanation and the Andean Group 22
1.5.- Overview of the political economy of the Andean countries as a
context of the evolution of the Andean process: 1969-1995 25
2.- METHODOLOGY 31
2 .1 .-Indicators 32
2.2.- Three levels of analysis 33
CHAPTER H 
FROM SANTIAGO TO CARTAGENA (1945-1966):
EN ROUTE TO REGIONAL INTEGRATION
1.- INTEGRATION ATTEMPTS FROM INDEPENDENCE UNTIL
THE END OF WORLD WAR H 37
2.- ECONOMIC INTEGRATION BETWEEN 1945 AND 1960 40
2 .1 .-The role of ECLA 41
2.2.- International factors favoring economic integration 42
2.3.- Domestic factors favoring economic integration 47
2.4.- Progress of economic integration between 1945 and 1960 48
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
xi
3.- ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN THE 1960s 49
3.1.- The Central American Common Market (CACM) 49
3.2.- The Caribbean integration: CARIFTA and CARICOM 50
3.3.- The Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) 51
a) The Treaty of Montevideo 51
b) LAFTA’s major problems and obstacles 53
CHAPTER HI 
FROM BOGOTA TO CARTAGENA (1966-1969):
EN ROUTE TO SUBREGIONAL INTEGRATION
1.- THE DECLARATION OF BOGOTA AND THE DECLARATION
OF THE PRESIDENTS OF AMERICA 58
1.1.- The "Report of the Four" 58
1.2.- The Bogota meeting 60
1.3.- The summit of Punta del Este 61
1.4.- "Bases for a Subregional Agreement" 62
2.- THE CARTAGENA AGREEMENT: ORGANS 63
2 .1 .-The Commission 63
2.2.- The Junta 65
2.3.- Other bodies 66
3.- THE CARTAGENA AGREEMENT: AIMS AND MECHANISMS 67
3 .1 .-Policy harmonization 68
3.2.- Industrial programming 68
3.3.- Tariff reduction program 69
3.4.- External tariff 69
3.5.- Special treatment for Bolivia and Ecuador 69
3.6.- Other mechanisms 70
4.- THE ANDEAN INTEGRATION PROCESS AS A POLITICAL
ENDEAVOR 71
4.1.-Negotiating the Cartagena Agreement 72
a) Commercialists vs Developmentalists 72
b) National interests and the negotiation of the Cartagena Agreement 75
c) The Andean Pact: A political endeavor? 78
4.2.- The Cartagena Agreement: an economic or a political instrument? 79
4.3.- The Agreement as a reflection of governments’ interests 81
4.4.- Organs: An assessment 82
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
xii
5.- ANDEAN PRINCIPLES AND MECHANISMS 83
5.1.- Main principles of the Cartagena Agreement 84
5.2.- Main mechanisms of the Cartagena Agreement 86
CHAPTER IV 
FROM CARTAGENA TO CARACAS (1969-1973):
OPTIMISM AND PROGRESS
1.- THE ANDEAN GROUP: 1969-1973 89
1.1.- Overview of its major achievements 90
1.2.- The admission of Venezuela 91
1.3.- Ideological pluralism 92
2.- PROGRESS IN THE ANDEAN PROCESS 94
2.1.- The tariff reduction program 94
2.2.- Common minimum external tariff 98
2.3.- Industrial programming 98
2.4.- Planning coordination and Andean development Strategy 101
2.5.- Policy harmonization 103
2.6.- Common treatment for foreign capital 105
2.7.- Intrasubregional trade 108
3.- VIOLATIONS OF THE CARTAGENA AGREEMENT
AND DERIVED OBLIGATIONS 110
3 .1 .-Violations 110
3.2.- The Junta and the violations 114
4.- UNDERSTANDING THE PHASE OF OPTIMISM AND PROGRESS 116
4 .1 .-General Factors 116
4.2.- The role of the Commission and of the Junta 120
4.3.- Relations among the governments of the member countries,
the Commission and the Junta 124
4.4.- Strategies of development and the Andean integration aims 125
a) Chile and Colombia 126
b) Peru and Venezuela 127
c) Bolivia and Ecuador 129
4.5.- National economic policies and the Andean mechanisms 132
a) Chile and Colombia 133
a.l) The tariff reduction program 133
a.2) Common tariff 136
a.3) Industrial programming 137
a.4) Decision 24 138
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
xiii
b) Peru and Venezuela 139
b.l) The tariff reduction program 139
b.2) Common tariff 140
b.3) Industrial programming 142
b.4) Decision 24 142
c) Bolivia and Ecuador 143
c. 1) The tariff reduction program 143
c.2) Common tariff 145
c.3) Industrial programming 147
c.4) Decision 24 147
d) Conclusion 149
CHAPTER V 
FROM CARACAS TO AREQUIPA (1974-1978):
DOUBTS AND STAGNATION
1.- MAJOR CHANGES IN THE ANDEAN PROCESS 150
1.1 .-Overview 150
1.2.- Changes due to Venezuela’s entry 151
1.3 .-The withdrawal of Chile 153
1.4.- The Protocols of Lima and Arequipa 154
2.- THE ANDEAN INTEGRATION PROCESS BETWEEN 1974 AND 1978 155
2.1.- The common tariff 156
2.2.- The tariff reduction program 157
2.3.- Intrasubregional trade 160
2.4.- Industrial programming 163
2.5.- Common treatment of foreign investment 166
3.- VIOLATIONS AND DELAYS 169
3.1.- Non-compliance with the articles of the Cartagena Agreement 169
3.2.- Non-incorporation in the national legislation of the approved decisions 170
3.3.- Failure to comply with decisions incorporated in the national legislation 172
4.- UNDERSTANDING THE PHASE OF STAGNATION 175
4.1.- General factors 175
4.2.- The international environment at the end of 1960s and early 1970s 182
4.3.- The Commission, the Junta, and the governments, and the relationship
among them 188
4.4.- Disagreements among the governments of the member countries 191
4.5.- Strategies of development and the Andean objectives 197
a) Chile and Colombia 198
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
xiv
b) Peru and Venezuela 200
c) Bolivia and Ecuador 201
4.6.- Domestic policies and the mechanisms of the Andean Group 203
a) Chile and Colombia 204
b) Peru and Venezuela 207
b. 1) The tariff reduction program 207
b.2) Common external tariff 209
b.3) Industrial programming 211
b.4) Decision 24 211
c) Bolivia and Ecuador 213
c.l) The tariff reduction program 213
c.2) Common external tariff 216
c.3) Industrial programming 216
c.4) Decision 24 217
d) Conclusion 218
CHAPTER VI 
FROM AREQUIPA TO QUITO (1979-1986):
PESSIMISM AND REGRESSION
1.- MAJOR CHANGES IN THE ANDEAN GROUP IN THE 1980s 220
1.1.- The debt crisis 221
1.2.- Winds of Democratization 223
1.3.- Regression of the Andean process 225
1.4.- The Quito Protocol 227
2.- THE MECHANISMS OF THE CARTAGENA AGREEMENT
AND THE PHASE OF REGRESSION 228
2 .1 .-The tariff reduction program 228
2.2.- Common tariff 229
2.3.- Industrial programming 232
2.4.- Common treatment of foreign investment 235
2.5.- Other aspects 236
a) Expansion of the Andean integration process 237
b) Common Policies 238
c) Summit meetings 240
2.6.- Trade among the member countries 242
3.- THE VIOLATIONS AND THE ANDEAN INTEGRATION PROCESS
IN THE PHASE OF PESSIMISM AND REGRESSION 245
3.1.- Violations of the articles of the Cartagena Agreement 246
3.2.- Non-incorporation of the Commission’s decisions by the governments 247
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
XV
3.3.- Non-compliance with decisions incorporated into the domestic
legal order of the member countries 249
4.- UNDERSTANDING THE PHASE OF REGRESSION 256
4.1.- The effects of the changes in the international economic system on
the Andean countries and on the Andean process 258
4.2.- The community organs, the governments, the relations among them
and the long march to revitalize the Andean integration process 259
4.3.- The decisions of the Commission between 1978 and 1987 267
4.4.- Changes in the strategies of development, and the regression of
the Andean process 270
a) Colombia 270
b) Peru and Venezuela 271
c) Bolivia and Ecuador 273
4.5.- Economic policies of the member countries and the Andean
mechanisms during the phase of regression 276
a) Colombia 277
a.l).- The tariff reduction program 277
a.2).- Industrial programming 279
a.3).- Decision 24 279
b) Peru and Venezuela 280
b .l).-T he  tariff reduction program 280
b.2).- Industrial programming 282
b.3).- Decision 24 284
c) Bolivia and Ecuador 285
c.l).-T he  tariff reduction program 285
c.2).- Industrial programming 288
c.3).- Decision 24 288
d) Conclusion 289
CHAPTER V n 
FROM QUITO TO .... (1987-1995):
RE-ROUTING SUBREGIONAL INTEGRATION
1.- THE RECENT EVOLUTION OF THE ANDEAN SUBREGIONAL
INTEGRATION PROCESS: 1987-1995 292
1.1.- The two phases during the re-routing of the Andean process 293
1.2.- The new Andean model of economic integration 294
1.3.- Factors influencing the Andean economic integration process
from 1987 to 1995 297
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
xvi
2.- MAIN ASPECTS OF THE ANDEAN INTEGRATION PROCESS
BETWEEN 1987 AND 1995 302
2.1.- The presidential summit meetings 302
a) The "Strategic Design" approved in Galapagos, December 1989 303
b) The "Act of La Paz," La Paz, November 1990 305
c) The "Act of Barahona," Cartagena, December 1991 306
2.2.- The tariff reduction program 306
2.3.- The external tariff 309
a) The common external minimum tariff (CMET) 309
b) The common external tariff (CET) 310
2.4.- Industrial programming 315
2.5.- Common treatment of foreign capital 317
2.6.- Policy harmonization 318
2.7.- Trade within the Andean Group 320
3.- VIOLATIONS OF THE ANDEAN OBLIGATIONS 322
3.1.- Violations of the Cartagena Agreement 322
3.2.- Failure to incorporate the Commission’s decisions into the
domestic legal systems of the member countries 323
3.3.- Violations of decisions already incorporated into the legal
systems of the member countries 325
4.- UNDERSTANDING THE PHASES OF STAGNATION AND PROGRESS 329
4.1.- The first attempts to change economic policies in the Andean
countries (1987-1989) 330
4.2.- The revival of the Andean Pact: The convergence of economic
policies (1990-1992) 331
4.3.- The slow-down of the Andean process (1993-1995) 332
4.4.- The Commission’s output during the phase of stagnation
(1987-1989) and the phase of progress (1990-1994) 340
4.5.- The long-term economic aims of the member countries and
the Andean Group 343
a) Colombia 343
b) Peru and Venezuela 345
c) Bolivia and Ecuador 348
4.6.- The economic policies of the Andean countries 351
a) The case of policy harmonization 352
b) Colombia 355
b .l) The tariff reduction program 355
b.2) Common external tariff 357
c) Peru and Venezuela 358
c .l) The tariff reduction program 358
c.2) Common external tariff 360
d) Bolivia and Ecuador 364
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
xvii
d .l)  The tariff reduction program 364




THE LONG MARCH OF THE ANDEAN INTEGRATION PROCESS
1.- INTRODUCTION 373
2.- PROGRESS, STAGNATION AND REGRESSION IN THE ANDEAN
PROCESS: A COMPARISON OF THE INDICATORS 375
2.1.- Implementation of the mechanisms 376
a) Optimism and progress (1969-1973), progress (1990-1995) 376
b) Doubts and stagnation (1974-1978) and stagnation (1987-1989) 378
c) Pessimism and regression (1979-1987) 380
d) The Output of the Commission as a reflection of the phases of the
Andean integration process. 381
2.2.- Trade among the Andean countries 385
2.3.- Violations of the Cartagena Agreement and of the decisions of the
Commission 385
2.4.- Conclusion 390
3.- EXPLAINING PROGRESS, STAGNATION AND REGRESSION 390
3.1.- The long-term aims of the governments and the principles of
the Cartagena Agreement 391
3.2.- The economic policies and the mechanisms of the Agreement 392
4.- THE EVOLUTION OF THE ANDEAN INTEGRATION PROCESS
IS A LONG MARCH AND NOT A GREAT LEAP FORWARD 394
BIBLIOGRAPHY 404
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
xviii
LIST OF TABLES
1.1 Andean Countries’ Ideologies of Economic Development 31
1.2 Indicators of Integration 34
1.3 Levels of Analysis 35
n . i LAFTA: Trade Indicators 1960-1980
(in millions of us dollars fob and percentages) 55
m .i Andean Group and Andean Countries Statistical Profile 73-74
IV. 1 Andean Tariff Reduction Program 95
IV. 2 Average National Tariffs (May 1969) by Type of Product
and Common Minimum External Tariff (CMET) 99
IV.3 Andean Group Trade: 1969-1973 109
IV.4 Decisions not Incorporated into the domestic legislation by the Member
Countries 1969-1973 111
IV.5 Delays in Implementing Trade Mechanisms by December 1973
(in months) 113
IV.6 Decisions Approved During 1969-1973 119
IV.7 Gross Domestic Product, 1969-1973; rates of growth 121
IV.8 Relationship Between Andean Aims and National Objectives: 1969-1973 131
IV.9 Chile: Andean Trade 1969-1973 134
IV. 10 Colombia: Andean Trade 1969-1973 135
rv . i i Peru: Andean Trade 1969-1973 140
IV. 12 Venezuela: Andean Trade 1969-1973 141
IV.13 Bolivia: Andean Trade 1969-1973 145
IV. 14 Ecuador: Andean Trade 1969-1973 146
IV. 15 Support for Andean Mechanisms 149
V .l Venezuela’s Entry Into the Andean Pact: Some Indicators 152
V.2 Andean Tariffs and Countries’ Position Towards on the Common
External Tariff (Proposal 70) in December 1975 158
V.3 Margin of Preference for Intrasubregional Trade 1970, 1975 and 1980 160
V.4 Andean Group Trade: 1974-1978 161
V.5 Net Private Foreign Direct Investment (millions of US dollars) 168
V.6 Decisions not Incorporated into the domestic legislation by the Member
Countries, 1974-1978 171
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
V.7 Delays in Implementing Trade Mechanisms by December 1978
xix
(in months) 173
V.8 Dutiable Items of the Common Minimum External Tariff,
Common External Tariff and Andean Trade Liberalization 
Program Violated by Member Countries, 1974-1978 174
V.9 Decisions Approved During 1974-1978 183
V.10 Relationship Between Andean Aims and National Objectives: 1974-1978 203
V .ll Colombia: Andean Trade 1974-1978 206
V.12 Peru: Andean Trade 1974-1978 208
V.13 Venezuela: Andean Trade 1974-1978 210
V.14 Bolivia: Andean Trade 1974-1978 214
V.15 Ecuador: Andean Trade 1974-1978 215
V.16 Support for Andean Mechanisms: 1974-1978 219
VI. 1 Governments’ Position in Relation to the CET Proposal 231
VI.2 Andean Group Trade 1978-1987 243
VI.3 Decisions not Incorporated into the domestic legislation by the Member
Countries, 1978-1987 248
VI.4 Claims Made To: 250-251
VI.5 Dutiable Items Violated: 1978-1987 253
VI.6 Trade Situation in the Andean Group in 1985
(excluding oil and derivatives) 255
VI.7 Gross Domestic Product, 1978-1987 (rates of growth) 263
VI. 8 Decisions Approved During 1979-1987 268
VI.9 Relationship Between Andean Aims and National Objectives in 1987 275
VI. 10 Colombia: Andean Trade 1978-1987 278
VI. 11 Peru: Andean Trade 1978-1987 281
VI.12 Venezuela: Andean Trade 1978-1987 283
VI. 13 Bolivia: Andean Trade 1978-1987 286
VI. 14 Ecuador: Andean Trade 1979-1987 287
VI. 15 Support for Andean Mechanisms in 1987 290
VII. 1 Latin America’s Share of World Totals (%) 298
VII. 2 Andean Economic Integration Approaches: 1960s and 1990s 301
VII. 3 Shortening of Deadlines for the Creation of the Free Trade Zone 308
VII. 4 Shortening of Deadlines for the Creation of the Customs Union 311
VII.5 Tariff Average in the Andean Group: 1986-1992 315
VII. 6 Andean Group: Distribution of Dutiable Items (May 1992) 316
VTI. 7 Andean Group Trade: 1987-1994 321
VII. 8 Decisions not Incorporated into the domestic legislation by the Member
Countries, 1987-1992 324
VII. 9 Dutiable Items Violated: 1987-1992 326
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
XX
VII. 10 Claims Made To: 328
V n .l l  Gross Domestic Product, 1987-1994: Rates of Growth 337
VH.12 Decisions Approved During 1988-1994 341
VH.13 Relationship Between Andean Aims and National Objectives 1987-1995 352
Vn.14 Colombia: Andean Trade 1987-1994 356
VII.15 Peru: Andean Trade 1987-1994 359
Vn.16 Venezuela: Andean Trade 1987-1994 361
VII.17 Bolivia: Andean Trade 1987-1994 365
VH.18 Ecuador: Andean Trade 1987-1994 366
VII. 19 Relationship Between Andean Mechanisms and National
Policies 1987-1995 369
Vin.l Decisions Approved During 1969-1994 383
Vm.2 Andean Trade Growth: 1969-1994 386
Vm.3 Violations to the Andean agreement and Its Decisions 388
Vm.4 Support for Andean Aims: 1969-1995 393
Vm.5 Support for Andean Mechanisms: 1969-1995 395
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
xxi
ACRONYMS. ABBREVIATIONS AND 

























Asociacion Latinoamericana de Libre Comercio (see LAFTA) 
Asociacion Latinoamericana de Integracion (see LAIA)
Andean Common Market (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, 
and Venezuela)
Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum 
Association of South-East Asian Nations (Malaysia, Singapore, 
Thailand. Indonesia, the Philippines, and Brunei)
Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (see IDB)
Central American Common Market (Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua)
Corporation Andina de Fomento (Andean Development 
Corporation)
Caribbean Community/Caribbean Common Market (Antigua and 
Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, 
Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, St. Kitts-Nevis, St. Lucia,
St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago. 
Associated members: British Virgin Islands and Turks 
and Caicos)
Caribbean Free Trade Association
Comision Economica para America Latina y el Caribe (see 
ECLAC)
Common External Tariff 
Common Minimum External Tariff
Percentage contributions of the Member Countries to the Junta’s 
Budget 
Bylaws of the Commission 
Bylaws of the Junta
Agricultural Products Exempted From the Tariff Reduction 
Program
Mechanisms and Procedures for Harmonization of Policies, and 
Coordination of Development Plans of the Member 
Countries
Common Regime of Treatment of Foreign Capital and 
Trademarks, Patents, Licenses, and Royalties 
Products Reserved for Industrial Programming 
Products Subject to Automatic Tariff Reduction Program 
Common Minimum External Tariff 
Creation of the Tourist Council 
Agreement to Avoid Double Taxation Among Member 
Countries

































Uniform Regime on Multinational Enterprises and Regulations 
Concerning the Treatment of Subregional Capital 
Directives for the Harmonization of the Legislation on Industrial 
Development
Adoption of the Common Tariff Classification Scheme 
(NABANDINA)
Sectoral Program of Industrial Development of the 
Metalworking Sector 
Creation of the Health Council
Conditions for the Adherence of Venezuela to the Cartagena 
Agreement
Creation of the Physical Integration Council 
Creation of the Agriculture Council 
Industrial Property
Sectoral Program of the Petrochemical Industry 
Authorization to the Chilean Government to Sell its Public 
Enterprises to Foreigners 
Procedure to Approve the Remaining Industrial Development 
Proposals
Cessation for Chile of Rights and Obligations Derived from the 
Cartagena Agreement 
Modification of the Common Minimum External Tariff 
Proposal to the Governments to Adopt the Protocol of Lima 
Modification of the Common Treatment of Foreign Investment 
Considering as Neutral Capital the Investment Done by
International Organizations and Foreign Governments’ 
Entities Devoted to Economic Development 
Andean Automotive Industrial Development Program 
Considering as Neutral Capital the Investment Done by
International Organizations and Foreign Governments’ 
Entities Devoted to Economic Development 
Proposal to the Governments to Adopt the Protocol of Arequipa 
Modification of the Metalworking Program 
Modification of the Petrochemical Program 
Modification of the Metalworking Program and Incorporation of 
Venezuela to it 
Siderurgical Industry Development Program 
Fertilizers Industry Development Program 
Andean Multinational Enterprise 
Creation of the Entrepreneurial Consultative Council 
Creation of the Labor Consultative Council 
Creation of the Industrial Policy Council 
Creation of the Science and Technology Council 
Proposal to the Governments to Adopt the Quito Protocol




































Modification of the Common Treatment of Foreign Investment 
Abrogation of the Automotive Program 
Transition Program to Restore the Observance of the Cartagena 
Agreement 
Scheme to Eliminate Trade Restrictions 
Rules by Which Ecuador will Begin Its Tariff Reduction Process 
Modification of Decision 169 on Andean multinational 
enterprises
Modification of the norms about international road 
transportation.
Implementation of the Strategic Design 
Modification of the Common Minimum External Tariff 
Reduction of the List of Products Reserved for Industrial 
Programming
Modification of the Common Minimum External Tariff 
Deepening of the Strategic Design
Modification of the Common Treatment of Foreign Investment 
Special Norms of Origin of the Merchandises 
Abrogation of the Fertilizers Program 
Modification of the Common Minimum External Tariff 
Peru’s Temporal Withdrawal
Creation of the Andean Free Trade Zone by February 1993, and 
Adoption of the Common External Tariff 
Common External Tariff 
Modification of the Common External Tariff 
Peru’s Scheme to rejoin the Tariff Reduction Process. 
Modification of the Common External Tariff 
Modification of the Common External Tariff 
Common External Tariff 
Peru’s Participation in the Free Trade Zone 
Abrogation of Decision 377
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
European Coal and Steel Community 
European Economic Community
European Community (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom)
European Union (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom) 
Fondo Andino de Reservas (Andean Reserve Fund)
Fondo Latinoamericano de Reservas (Latin American Reserve 
Fund)
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

















Gross Domestic Product 
Grupo Andino (Andean Group)
Inter-American Development Bank 
International Monetary Fund
Instituto para la Integration de America Latina (Institute for of 
Latin American Integration)
International Trade Organization 
Junta del Acuerdo de Cartagena
Latin American Free Trade Association (Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, 
Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela)
Latin American Integration Association (Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, 
Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela)
Mercado Comun del Sur (Common Market of the South) 
(Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay)
North American Free Trade Agreement (Canada, Mexico,
United States)
Relatively Less Developed Countries (Bolivia and Ecuador) 
Sistema Economico Latinoamericano (Latin American Economic 
System)
Sectoral Program of Industrial Development 
World Trade Organization











A ... GREAT LEAP FORWARD OR A ... LONG MARCH?
1.- THE PROBLEM OF EXPLAINING THE EVOLUTION OF INTEGRATION
PROCESSES
In the late 1980s we witnessed profound changes in the international system. 
Chief among them was the end of the Cold War, the new impetus given to regional and 
subregional1 economic integration processes throughout the world, and the formation of 
continental trading blocs.
After World War n, European economic integration was seen as a means to 
create a more peaceful international system. This process was originally assumed to 
contain the seeds leading eventually to supranationalism. Rival member states would
'Subregional economic integration processes denote schemes that encompass part of the generally 
accepted geographically and/or politically and/or culturally defined regions characterized, among others, 
by a sense of historical relations, political, and economic interactions, social similarity, cultural affinity, 
and land continuity. For a discussion of the concept of region see Bossier, 1993; Cantori and Spiegel, 
1970; Kaiser, 1968; Neumann, 1994; Padelford, 1954; Russett, 1967; Thompson, 1973; Vayrynen, 1984. 
Wendt 1994.
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eventually be replaced by larger units after a short period of mutually beneficial and 
increasing cooperation. Time showed that this was not the case. We need to know more 
about what to expect from these processes in the evolving post-Cold War international 
economic environment. One way to do it is to study the evolution of economic 
integration processes. Understanding this will help us, on the one hand, to better assess 
the potential contribution of economic integration in reducing conflict, increasing 
cooperation, improving security, and, possibly, bringing about a more peaceful 
international system. On the other hand, the study of the evolution of the integration 
processes will help us to know better what forces and circumstances shape, define, and 
change the direction taken by the processes themselves.
This dissertation attempts to show, by using the Andean Group as a case study, 
that economic integration is a non-sequential process involving phases of progress, 
stagnation, and regression. Such quasi-cyclical evolution is fundamentally determined by 
the governments of the member countries. As such, the individual governments are the 
most important actors in setting the evolution of the economic integration process, a 
factor which theories of economic integration do not sufficiently consider (see section 
1.1). The phases of progress, stagnation, and regression, can largely be explained by the 
extent to which member governments’ objectives can be achieved through the 
instrumental use of the integration process. Integration processes function more like 
international organizations than supranational units.
In brief, this dissertation attempts not only to reassess the role of the governments 
but to demonstrate their paramountcy in guiding integration processes, and as such to
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provide a more adequate means to understand these processes.
For the purpose of this dissertation, economic integration is defined2 as a 
political-economic process pursued by the governments of the member countries whereby 
they aim to achieve common economic objectives through closer economic relations. The 
most commonly used mechanisms are the reduction and/or elimination of discriminatory 
economic barriers among the member countries; the modification and harmonization of 
economic instruments and institutions, or the creation of new ones; and the intensification 
of their economic interdependence.3
The Andean Group (Grupo Andino* - GRAN) is a subregional economic 
integration process5 whose aim is to contribute to fostering economic development of its 
members by means of trade expansion and economic policy harmonization. It was created 
in May 1969, with the signing of the Cartagena Agreement by the governments of 
Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. Venezuela joined in 1973, and Chile 
withdrew in 1976. This subregional integration process was conceived as the boldest,
■This definition is based on Balassa, (1961: 1); Cohen, (1984: 58); Kaplan, (1957: 98) Keohane and 
Nye, (1975: 366); and; Robson, (1987: 1). For discussions on the definition of integration see Cohen, 
(1984: 50-57); Nye, (1968: 856-860) and; Pentland, (1973: 19-22).
3Integration and cooperation are used sometimes interchangeably. Balassa (1966: 24), however, 
differentiates between the two. He considers that integration tends to eliminate economic discrimination 
(e.g., tariff removals) while cooperation tends to diminish discrimination (e.g., tariffs reductions) or to 
harmonize policies.
4It is also know as Pacto Andino—Andean Pact—and in English it has also been known as the Andean 
Common Market—ANCOM.
T he Andean Group considers itself a "subregional" integration process because it consists of part of 
South America. See footnote 1 for a definition of subregion.
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most innovative, and most ambitious. 6
I.1.- Theories of regional integration
Most of the earlier theories of integration by both economists and political 
scientists have explicitly or implicitly assumed that once economic integration agreements 
were signed, they would progress uninterruptedly towards the final stage of total 
economic or political union. This was based on the assumption that benefits would be 
greater than costs, thereby creating the necessary incentives for a supranationalization 
process (Balassa, 1961; 1966; ECLA, 1965; 1970; Haas, 1958; Mitrany, 1966; Nye, 
1968; 1971).7
In political science there are four discernible schools of thought which have dealt 
with international integration (Pentland, 1973: Part One; Taylor, 1984: chapter 3). These 
are the pluralist (transactionalist), federalist, functionalist, and neo-functionalist schools. 
The common thread of these schools is that they saw economic integration as a means 
to end war. Since rivalry among nation-states was seen as the main cause of World War
II, lasting peace can be achieved by replacing nation-states with larger units 
encompassing former enemies. This was the case of the European Coal and Steel
6Other existing integration processes in Latin America are: the Latin American Integration Association, 
LAIA, created by the Treaty of Montevideo of 1980, which replaced the Latin American Free Trade 
Association, LAFTA, established in 1968; the Central American Common Market created by the General 
Treaty of Economic Integration signed in 1960, in Managua, Nicaragua; the Caribbean Free Trade 
Association (CARIFTA) created by a treaty signed in Antigua in 1965, it was replaced by the Caribbean 
Community (CARICOM) created, in 1972, by the signing of the Treaty of Georgetown; the MERCOSUR 
(Southern Cone Common Market - Mercado Comun del Cono Sur) created in 1985; and the Association 
of Caribbean States established in 1994. There is also a plethora of bilateral and trilateral free trade 
agreements.
7As it will be shown in this section, theories were later modified, to adapt them to the realities.
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Community, which included France and Germany as its main members. Scholars 
espousing this position have teleological and normative reasons to do so. They were 
committed to the construction of a more peaceful international system. The four schools, 
however, emphasized different aspects of it.8
The pluralist-transactionalist view focuses its attention on factors that lead to the 
establishment of a process of integration (Deutsch, 1953; Deutsch et al., 1957). It is 
assumed that there is a basic interest in developing a community of nation-states, and that 
there is some kind of communication (transaction) among interacting nations. As 
communication increases, there is a need to formalize interactions through the creation 
of common institutions with limited, specific, and delegated authority. Over time, this 
authority increases and will eventually lead to political integration, that is, the creation 
of a security community, where its members rule out aggression as a means to solve 
disputes.
The focus of interest of the federalist approach lies in the achievement of the end 
product: political union through the creation of a federal state. It assumes the existence 
of some commonalities, e.g., language, culture, geographic continuity. These features 
are the basis for the adoption of a common constitution and institutions. Consent and 
support of the citizens to the common institutions increase the legitimacy of the latter, 
which gradually evolve into a supranational state (Etzioni, 1965; Friedrich, 1968; Liska,
8The contending school is that of the realist who sees the existing nation-states as the most important 
units of the system and assumes that they are here to stay. For realists, this is the reality to accept and deal 
with. Peace among sovereign states can be achieved through balance of power and international law. As 
with the theories of integration, the realist theory has also been modified. Recently some realists (or 
neorealists) based on the experiences of Western Europe are accepting the possibility that Europe would 
became a new unit, in the sense advocated by the theories of integration (e.g. Waltz, 1993).
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1967).
Functionalism centers its attention on the dynamics and maintenance of the 
process of economic integration. It argues that in present-day society there are many 
technical and non-controversial (functional) needs that cannot be fulfilled by single 
nations. These needs and functions are better met through collective efforts, via the 
transfer of specific and limited powers from the individual governments to a 
supranational executive authority. Success in the accomplishment of the task in one area 
will lead to "ramification" (integration) in other areas. This in turn will automatically 
result in the creation of a loose political community (Mitrany, 1966), political 
integration, then, will be the result of economic integration.
Neo-functionalists also focus on integration as a process. They consider, however, 
that there should be cooperation not only in technical (functional and non-controversial) 
issues but also in politically (e.g., controversial) important areas though with technically 
oriented problem-solution approaches. As in the case of the Functionalist school, this 
school agrees that common institutions must be created to achieve shared objectives. 
According to Neo-functionalism, there is a "spillover" effect9 by which successful 
cooperation in one area will deepen cooperation in that particular area, and expand it to 
other areas (Haas, 1964; Haas and Schmitter, 1964). The key political actors fostering 
integration are the domestic organized groups (e.g., entrepreneurs and political parties) 
that perceive this process as a tool to advance their interests. These groups will pressure 
their governments to relinquish more functions and power to common institutions. This
’This is quite similar to the Functionalist concept of "ramification."
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process will result in the creation of a supranational authority.
Over time Neo-functionalists acknowledged that the creation of a supranational 
authority is not automatic, gradual, continuous, or incremental. The process of economic 
integration is guided by the concept of "fragmented issue linkage" (Haas, 1975: 25, 26; 
1976: 180-189). This means the integration process is fragmented going from one crisis 
to another, dependent on the interests of the actors, and on the possibility to link the 
solution of one problem to another.
Among the other innovations, those proposed by Schmitter (1970, 1971) are 
relevant for this study. He introduced concepts that allow analysts to take into account 
different forms of progress, stagnation, and regression in the integration process. One 
form of progress is "buildup," in which the integration process would only continue to 
deepen in one area. A second form is "spill-around, ” in which the process would only 
expand to some other areas. One form of stagnation is "retrenchment," defined as 
deepening in some areas and withdrawal from others. Another is "muddle-about," in 
which there is a spread into new areas while at the same time the commitment is reduced 
in others. The third form of stagnation is "encapsulation," in which the integration 
process goes into marginal and insignificant changes. Finally, regression for Schmitter 
is a "spill-back" situation in which the integration process reduces the areas it covers, 
and also decreases the depth of the commitments in the areas it still affects.
The main criticism of all these theories is that they consider economic integration 
teleologically, as a process which will eventually reach its final objective, namely
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political integration.10 Perhaps influenced by Modernization theories, international 
integration theories also saw economic integration as a unilinear process. Specific 
interests of the integrating partners and international factors which could jeopardize or 
foster commitments to the integration process are almost completely ignored, as is the 
role of their governments.
Economic integration is a process that, according to economists, can consist of 
different forms, which may or may not be consecutive. These forms are: preferential 
trade areas where the members grant each other some trade advantages on some or all 
commodities; free trade zones in which member countries eliminate all barriers to trade 
among themselves; customs unions where, besides free trade, member countries establish 
a common external tariff; common markets, covering the above, as well as the 
establishment of the free movement of capital and labor; economic unions, in which the 
harmonization of economic policies is pursued; and total economic unions, where 
member countries establish identical economic policies.
These various forms of integration are known as types of market integration. They 
have been classified into "pure market integration," in which trade is the most important 
mechanism (preferential trade areas, free trade zones, customs unions); and in "economic 
policy integration," where policy harmonization constitutes the most important aim 
(Common Markets, economic unions, and total economic unions).11 Another form of
"There are of course other criticisms, much more specific to each one of them. See for instance, 
Pentland, 1973; and Michelmann and Soldatos (eds.), 1994.
“The concept of pure market integration is similar to Tinbergen’s concept of negative integration in 
which barriers to trade are dismantled; while economic policy integration is similar to positive integration 
in which new institutions and their instruments are established (1965: 77-79).
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integration not considered by neoclassical economists is production integration.12 In this 
process industrial production is planned and coordinated. Therefore, the most important 
mechanisms are industrial planning and the specialization of production.
The economics literature has focussed mainly on customs unions and considers 
integration as a field of international trade theory. As such it deals only with market 
integration. Within market integration, this literature concentrates on some effects 
generated by "pure market integration," while the effects created by "economic policy 
integration" have not been considered (Pelkmans, 1980: 333-335). Among the aspects 
economists have been most interested on are the conditions under which the world’s 
welfare would increase or decrease due to the reduction of trade barriers;13 the process 
of policy harmonization; the economies of scale; the increased rate of growth; and the 
changes in the structure of production and efficiency. Important areas of inquiry, such 
as, financial, monetary, labor, and fiscal integration have not been adequately addressed. 
Furthermore, economics completely ignores production integration. Even within the 
narrow effects of pure market integration, it is assumed the benefits originating from the 
reduction of trade barriers could provide the impetus to pursue it until total economic 
union is achieved.
With the pursuit of economic integration in the Third World, analysts employed
,2This was the aim of the now defunct Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). See for 
example, Brabant, 1988.
l3To focus on changes in the world’s welfare due to economic integration is unrealistic. For one thing, 
governments that join an integration process are not concerned at all with the effects this process would 
have on world’s welfare. At most they would be concerned with the effects of integration on the 
integrating countries as a whole. More often than not, governments will be concerned solely with the 
effects of integration on their own country, as shown by US Congress debates, in 1993, surrounding the 
approval of the North American Free Trade Agreement.
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political science and economics theories developed for the European integration processes 
to understand and explain the phenomenon in developing regions. Federalists concluded 
that attempts to create federal states in developing countries have not been a success 
(e.g., the West Indies Federation, the Malaysian Federation, Mali Union, the United 
Arab Republic) due to lack of a political environment conducive to it, and of people’s 
support (Rothchild, 1968: 7).
Functionalists, and more importantly, Neo-functionalists found that the elements 
favoring integration simply did not exist in developing areas. Factors such as a pluralist 
social structure, industrialization, economic diversification, low level of ideological 
politics, high degree of urbanization, and administrative skills were missing (Haas, 1966: 
104-105, 117; 1967: 316). Neo-functionalists expanded their theory to include more 
variables, to make the approach more relevant to Third World countries, and to explain 
changes in the integration processes (Schmitter, 1971; Nye, 1971: Lindberg, 1971). 
Among these variables were: national actors, political leadership, nationalism, external 
factors, foreign capital and technology, political will, economic nationalism, and 
ideological pluralism (Haas, 1975: 3, 72; Hazlewood, 1982: 157; Mytelka, 1979; Nye, 
1971: 207-208; Puyana, 1982: 157-162, 176-178). In the end it seems that, for analysts, 
everything was influenced by integration while integration, in turn, was also influenced 
by many factors. The relation of causality was lost, integration was termed "a 
multidimensional phenomenon" (Lindberg, 1971), and Neo-functionalism cease to have 
analytical relevance for the Third World integration attempts.
Economists also devoted their attention to the conditions, and the special
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circumstances of economic integration in developing regions (Balassa, 1965; ECLA, 
1965; El-Agraa, 1982a, 1989; Hojman, 1981; Morawetz, 1974; Robson, 1987). Most 
economists thought that economic integration was not possible among developing 
countries, because of the similarity of the structure of production in the integrating 
countries, limited, and inefficient industrialization, inadequacy of their infrastructure, and 
underdevelopment of their market economies. Critics argue, however, that integration 
can help: to improve the terms of trade; to favor capital and labor movements; to 
modernize the productive structure; to foster equitable distribution of costs and benefits; 
to favor foreign investment; to promote economic development; to allow policy 
harmonization; to lower transportation costs; to improve infrastructure; and to reduce 
dependency (Andie, Andie and Dosser, 1971; Axline, 1984; Balassa and Stoujesdijk, 
1984; Cohen 1984; Cooper and Massell, 1965; Dell, 1963 and; 1966; Furtado, 1976; 
INTAL, 1988; Kitamura, 1966; Linder, 1966; Martirena Mantel, 1969; Myrdal, 1957).
1.2.- The practice of regional economic integration
The early economic integration processes in Latin America put into practice the 
orthodox theory of international trade as applied to free trade zones and customs 
unions.14 According to this theory (Viner, 1950; Meade, 1955; Tinbergen, 1965; 
Johnson, 1962), an endeavor for economic integration will be more beneficial to the 
world as a whole if it has many participants; if its members have a similar industrial
l4LAFTA’s objective was the creation of a free trade zone, the Central American Common Market 
aimed to establish a common market, but its previous stage was the establishment of a customs union, and 
CARIFTA, tried to create a free trade zone as a step towards a common market.
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production structures; if there is wide margin among the members in their production 
costs of similar or like products; if transportation costs are low; and if the pre-integration 
tariff schedules of the member countries were higher than those after integration. In 
practice, however, "when plans for economic integration moves from the blueprint stage 
to that of implementation, individual and group interests are immediately affected, and 
‘economics’ very quickly becomes ‘politics’ ... " (Hansen, 1967: 97). That is, politics 
cannot be excluded from the process.
From the political and "pragmatic" point of view, economic integration processes 
in the Third World were modeled after the European predecessors. As such, the neo- 
fimctionalist theory served as a guide. For neo-functionalists, successful economic 
integration depends on the existence of three major preconditions: low levels of 
nationalism; economic, social, and political homogeneity and; a well functioning, 
effective, and efficient bureaucracy (Haas and Schmitter, 1964: 1-3). Given that these 
preconditions did not exist in the developing areas, "functional equivalents" were found 
as catalysts in the role of the "technocrats" and in the influence of external factors 
favoring or constraining integration (Haas and Schmitter, 1964: 59; Schmitter, 1970; 
Nye, 1968a; Cochrane, 1964; Denham, 1969; Schmitter, 1972). These "functional 
equivalents," however, together or separately do not explain the process of economic 
integration.
Political science and economics discuss mainly the conditions for successful 
integration processes among developed countries. Since economists and political scientists 
mainly stress, among developing countries, the lack of elements conducive to successful
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economic integration processes, it is necessary to question why these nations pursued 
such an endeavor; and more importantly, "why economic integration has not failed 
altogether in the underdeveloped world" (Lieber, 1972: 45). One answer to this is that 
there is a greater need for economic integration among poor countries than among more 
developed countries because most poor countries have markets too small to industrialize 
adequately (Hansen, 1969: 262-269). This is a compelling reason for pursuing 
integration, even though conditions are not those that theories prescribe for success. 
Insofar as resources are scarcer in developing countries compared to developed nations, 
and the issue at stake is how to better distribute them among the members, the problem 
becomes "one of premature overpolitization" (Nye, 1968a: 335-336). As such, since the 
process depends more on politics than on economics, its evolution is likely to be anything 
but gradual and steady.
Experience shows us that integration processes have not in fact progressed steadily 
or unidirectionally. The most successful have had serious reverses (as when, in 1966, 
France unilaterally imposed a de facto veto in the European Economic Community; and 
the Central American Common Market after the "Soccer War" of 1969), and some of 
them collapsed (e.g., the East African Community, in 1977; and the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance, in 1990). The Andean economic integration process is no 
exception.
The Andean Group’s evolution can be characterized, based on the evidence 
presented in this dissertation, and loosely in the terminology proposed by Schmitter, as 
a process that has gone from a phase of optimism and progress (1969-1973), to one of
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doubts and stagnation (1974-1978), to another of pessimism and regression (1979-1986). 
Between 1987 and 1989 the process stagnated again, and from that year to 1992 a phase 
of progress, and reinvigoration was experienced. Finally from 1992, and up to now 
(1995), progress continued but at slower pace. This evolution could not have been 
foreseen or predicted on the basis of the existing theoretical and empirical studies.
What explains this quasi-cyclical evolution? Why has the process of integration 
not proceeded linearly as predicted by the theorists? Studies on integration suggest one 
or more of the following factors as explanations: lack of political will, economic 
nationalism, fear of losing sovereignty, ideological and political differences, lack of 
political support by the would-be beneficiaries, different levels of development, changes 
in the international environment, influences of foreign capital and multinational 
corporations, uneven distribution of benefits and costs, and negligible economic and 
physical interdependence (Bemales, 1974: 88-90; By water, 1990: 2, 7-16; ECLA, 1987: 
99; INTAL, 1988: 31, 35; Mace, 1988: 420; Mytelka, 1979; Puyana, 1982: 156-164, 
170-178, 272-274). The evidence from the Andean Pact suggests that all or most of these 
factors can be related or encompassed in an obvious, yet ignored, variable, namely the 
interests, policies, and behavior of the member governments.
1.3.- An alternative explanation for the evolution of economic integration processes
There is scant literature, however, devoted to the important role of the 
governments of the member countries in determining the pace, direction, scope, and 
dynamism of the economic integration processes. The writers who have considered
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governments to be the central or most important actors include Puchala, Bemales, Duffy 
and Feld, Tomassini, Tironi, and Moravcsik.15 Their writings will serve to develop a 
hypothesis making the government the central factor.
Puchala (1972) proposes to study international integration schemes as a set of 
routinized processes that states engage in to achieve benefits. He identifies nation-states 
as the major units of the integration process and governments as the central actors, but 
not the only significant ones. Other actors from the subnational, national, transnational, 
and supranational arenas also participate. This constitutes a system very similar to the 
existing international nation-state system, but in successful integration processes it is one 
in which there are common or compatible aims among states rather than conflicting ones. 
When incompatibility of basic aims arises, the system will deteriorate. The existence of 
the integration system can be assured because in an era of globalization of the economy 
and technology, nation-states have recognized that sovereignty can best be preserved by 
pooling resources.
Puchala provides us with the valuable concept of integration process as a system 
similar to the international system. Thus, member countries’ interactions define the 
integration system, and as such shape its characteristics, and its evolution. Puchala also 
contributes to our understanding of progress (existence of common aims), and of 
stagnation or regression (incompatibility of basic aims), but he is not explicit as to when
I3More recently Axline (1994a: 27, 29; 1994b: 217; 1996: 214) argues in a similar vein, however he 
does not elaborate his argument. According to him integration among developing countries is the product 
of negotiations in which national interests of the partners are accommodated. Success, failure and patterns 
of an integration process will depend on the ability of the integration organization to satisfy the national 
interests of the member countries as shaped and influenced by external factors and the international system.
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these incompatibilities will led to stagnation alone, or further, to regression of the 
integration process. A related aspect is, what happens after the system deteriorates? How 
does it transform this deterioration into progress? Puchala takes into consideration the 
international system only marginally when he deals with globalization as the incentive to 
integration. In the case of the Third World countries, however, international influence 
is very important. Lastly, he does not take into account the constituent national systems 
as a factor influencing the evolution of the integration process.
Bemales (1974), in proposing a framework to study the political actors in the 
Andean integration process, considers governments to be the most important ones. They 
are influenced by domestic actors (e.g., industrialists and unions), and constrained by 
their dependence on the international system. Governments’ support of integration will 
depend on how the common political model and its redefinitions reflect the political and 
economic interests of the governments as well of the domestic actors. Bemales argues 
that, should governments adopt national political models that are quite different or 
opposite to the one pursued at the Andean level, the process would be in crisis.
The author correctly suggests the existence of three levels of analysis: the 
international, the regional, and the national. Bemales also provides the basic and most 
acceptable reason for progress and for regression in an integration process. It progresses 
when it reflects governments’ aims and it regresses when it does not reflect the objectives 
of the governments. Bemales also informs us that aims and mechanisms of the integration 
process can be changed in response to changes in the countries. This fact reaffirms the 
pre-eminence of the governments in the integration process, and their use of it as tool.
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The fact that the integration process can be modified provides an explanation of why only 
few integration processes have disappeared. He also suggests rationales for integration 
at the international and domestic levels. To reduce dependency is the reason in the first 
case, and to get political and economic benefits in the second. If  this is so, then the 
government is the most important actor in the process but its acts are constrained by both 
international and domestic actors. Bemales points to crucial aspects with regard to the 
levels of analysis, the possibilities of progress and regression, the rationale for 
governments to integrate. Having said this, like Puchala, he does not take into account 
the most common possibility in the evolution of an integration process, namely 
stagnation—or in Schmitter’s jargon "encapsulation."
Duffy and Feld (1980) propose a pre-theory based upon the idea that nation-states 
pursuing their national interests are the central actors in the integration process, and as 
such, nation-states are able to set the pace of both the scope and level of regional 
integration. These central actors are influenced by three intervening variables: internal 
(the decision-making process), systemic (the intraregional system), and global (the 
international system). For Duffy and Feld nation-states are paramount in defining the 
evolution of the process. They, however, do not provide an explanation of how 
governments determine the evolution of the process or what the factors are which make 
an integration process advance, stop, or go backwards. Nor do they develop any 
reasoning for the interrelations between the three intervening variables.
Tomassini (1985) and Tironi (1976, 1978) consider that economic integration is 
one of the tools available to the governments to achieve goals emanating from their
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strategies of economic development. Tironi also argues that an integration process begins 
when a group of countries identifies the existence of common economic objectives, and 
agrees on the mechanisms to achieve them.
Tomassini and Tironi correctly assert that economic integration is a tool for the 
member countries, and not an end in itself. Tironi develops this pragmatic view of 
integration by asserting that it is a process in which there are aims to be achieved 
through agreed mechanisms. Tomassini, for his part, in agreement with Bemales, asserts 
that changes in circumstances will change the goals of the process. He also says the 
process will be affected when common economic objectives, and agreement on the 
mechanisms disappear. Both, however, fail to say how these factors will influence the 
integration process. Will the process slow down, will it stagnate or decay? Do changes 
in the aims and mechanisms mean a reorientation of the integration process, or could 
they also mean its demise?
Finally, Moravcsik (1991; 1993), analyzing the adoption of the Single European 
Act (SEA) by the European Community, evaluates, and rejects a crucial theoretical 
claim: that supranational institutions and transnational business interests are the most 
important variables. He shows that the role of the negotiating governments and the 
convergence of national interests of the three major countries, Germany, France and 
Great Britain are the most important factors in explaining the adoption of the SEA. This 
phenomenon is called intergovemmentalism by the author. Moravcsik, however, finds 
no convincing explanation as to why the national interests of these three countries 
coincided. Besides, Moravcsik only cursorily analyzes the influence of external
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(international) economic factors. A more closely related issue to the present research is 
that for Moravcsik the European Community has proceeded in fits and starts, or in a start 
and stop process. That is, a sudden great leap forward followed by long or short periods 
of standing still.
Aside from giving primary role to the governments (and not to the supranational 
institutions), Moravcsik sees the process as the functionalists and neo-functionalists in the 
sense that there is progress and at worst stagnation, but he provides no place for 
regression. This may be true, up to a point, in the case of integration in Europe, but not 
in other parts of the world. Furthermore, he considers (in the same vein of Bemales) 
progress or stagnation solely as a function of convergence or not of national interests. 
The author fails in this crucial aspect to point out a more general possibility. Progress, 
stagnation, or regression can be explained by governments’ interests (not necessarily 
coincidental) being reflected or not by aims and mechanisms of the economic integration 
process.
Linking the basic ideas and concepts stated by the aforementioned writers, and 
the criticisms of them, it is possible to propose a framework which can be more useful 
in helping to explain the evolution of economic integration processes and the role of 
governments in it. This approach emphasizes that the governments are the most important 
actors influencing the process, and hypothesizes that their actions are guided by changing 
definitions of national interests. Applied in this study, this approach differs from these 
studies because it enables us to explain the changes in the evolution of the integration 
process.
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This framework can be expressed as follows. With actors from the subnational, 
national, transnational, and supranational arenas, nation-states participating in a process 
of economic integration constitute a regional system similar to the existing international 
system (Puchala), where nation-states, represented by their governments, are the most 
important players. In this system, however, it is expected that common or compatible 
ends are the rule and not conflicting interests, which is the rule in the international 
system. Governments, being the most important actors, are able through their interactions 
to shape both the scope and level of regional integration (Duffy and Feld, Moravcsik), 
but are influenced or constrained by domestic, intraregional, and international systems 
and actors (Bemales, and Duffy and Feld).
Economic integration is considered to be a set of routinized processes of 
bargaining and negotiation in which states engage to pursue benefits (Puchala) or national 
interests (Duffy and Feld). Integration is thus a tool of governments to achieve the goals 
defined in their strategies of economic development. The process of integration begins 
when countries identify common economic objectives, and agree on the mechanisms to 
achieve them (Tomassini, Tironi). Cooperation among governments and their support for 
economic integration depends on how their individual national interests are served by the 
process (Bemales), especially those of the most powerful governments (Moravcsik).
The integration process will deteriorate and changes will occur in it when conflicts 
and incompatibility of aims arise due to changes in the national strategies of 
development, in the economic policies, in domestic politics and/or in the international 
arena (Puchala, Bemales, Tomassini, Tironi). Deterioration can take the form of
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stagnation or regression of the integration process. Stagnation (or lack of progress) 
occurs when a minority of the members (or a group of the least powerful countries) find 
that their interests are not being achieved through integration. Regression (reduction of 
the scope of the integration process), happens when the majority of the countries 
(including the powerful countries) finds that integration does not serve their national 
interests. To progress, the integration process needs the member countries to find 
integration a useful tool to achieve their goals, that is, that the integration aims and 
mechanisms reflect their national strategies of development, and economic policies.
This framework for analyzing the role of governments in the evolution of 
economic integration processes is more comprehensive and encompassing than the ones 
developed by Puchala, Bemales, Duffy and Feld, Tomassini, Tironi, and Moravcsik, on 
which it is based. Although all of these authors consider the government (or the state) 
as the most important actor in determining the process, none of them develops a 
comprehensive framework to understand how the governments influence the dynamics 
of economic integration. This dissertation improves the explanation of the evolution of 
integration processes, which is not towards supranationalism, an idea still being proposed 
as late as 1992 with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, but towards whatever member 
countries want it to be. Through the study of the Andean Group, this dissertation 
reinforces the neo-realist proposition that nation-states are, and will continue to be, for 
the foreseeable future, the main actors in international economic processes. This study 
is the first to attempt to understand the evolution of the Andean integration process since 
its inception, and could serve as a model to understand other integration processes.
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There is no doubt that international and domestic factors influence government 
actions (as pointed out by Bemales, Duffy and Feld, and Moravcsik). It is also important 
to analyze the factors which explain changes in the domestic sphere which in turn affect 
national objectives, but this type of analysis is beyond the scope of this dissertation and 
must be left to other investigators. This study focuses on the evolution of the integration 
process. To explain this evolution, following Axiline (1994b: 216, 217, 218), it examines 
the external factors and their influence on the changes in the member governments’ 
strategy of development, and in economic policies, but does not deal with domestic 
factors that shape these changes. This study thus attempts to analyze the area where the 
domestic and the international fields intersect.
1.4.- The alternative explanation and the Andean Group
This dissertation attempts to explain the evolution of the Andean Pact by testing 
the following hypothesis. That, in any stage, the Andean Group’s experience of progress, 
stagnation, or regression is determined to a significant extent by the degree to which the 
member governments find integration aims and mechanisms useful to achieve national 
objectives. These objectives stem from the nations’ development models, strategies, and 
policies they pursue. The extent to which the Andean governments find that subregional 
integration enables them to achieve their goals determines the usefulness to them of the 
Andean Pact, and in turn shapes the evolution of the process. The means to achieve their 
objectives is determined by negotiation. In this process, governments of the member 
countries behave as if they were in the international system. The outcomes of bargaining
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and negotiations, as in the international system, are highly influenced by the most 
powerful countries.
This research project hypothesizes that the Andean process progresses when 
interests pursued by the governments of the member countries are served by the process. 
The process stagnates when a minority of the member countries find their interests are 
not furthered by the integration process. It regresses when the majority of the 
governments consider that the integration process does not reflect their national interests. 
The Andean Group thus can be perceived less as an end in its own right than as another 
instrument for the attainment of national interests which change over time. This may 
explain why the Andean Group did not become an end in itself or a supranational 
organization with a life of its own, as foreseen by the integration theories. It is in this 
sense that the role, and the synchronous behavior of the governments—which are 
influenced by domestic and external factors16—constitutes a fundamental variable in 
explaining the evolution of the Andean Group.
The hypothesis of this research project and the influences on it can be restated in 
terms of the Andean Group as follows. By concentrating mainly on the interactions 
among the Andean institutions, and the governments of the member countries,17 it will
,6Changes in the international environment (global, and regional), in the national environment, in the 
relations among member countries, and between each one of them with other nations, and other 
international actors will modify governments’ behavior. These changes will be reflected in modifications 
in the domestic situation, and in variations in the way national interests are pursued by each country. These 
changes will in turn increase or decrease the usefulness of GRAN.
17"The evolution of the Latin American integration as a political and as an economic process cannot 
be conceived only as a function of intraregional variables; it also significantly depends on the conditions 
of the extraregional international environment. During the period in which the international framework was 
favorable for integration, it effectively progressed, although, as is well known, with great limitations and 
insufficiencies” (Wilhelmy, 1982c: 199).
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be possible to consider the relations among the Andean countries as a subregional system 
of states similar to the international one (Puchala). In this system, nation-states 
represented by their governments are the most important actors (Bemales, Moravcsik), 
and their pursue national political, and economic interests (Duffy and Feld, Tomassini, 
and Tironi) are presumed to be common to all (Puchala). Changes in the evolution of the 
Andean process (progress, stagnation, or regression) will be traced back to the changes 
in governments’ policies, which in turn reflect redefinitions of their national objectives 
(Tomassini and Tironi) and hence the ways they seek to affect the aims and mechanisms 
of the integration process (Bemales).
In other words, governments act not in the common interest of the group but in 
their own individual interests. Thus political factors have to be taken into account in 
order to be able to explain the Andean integration process. This means that, although 
economic integration is a scheme with economic aims and it uses economic mechanisms, 
it has political goals and means. Moreover, it is a political endeavor which uses 
economic means and goals, in which government behavior has the crucial role in its 
evolution.
Research guided by this perspective will result in better understanding of this 
process, which so far has defied successful explanation. Such understanding is especially 
important to help predict future developments of the Andean process in particular and of 
economic integration efforts in general. A better knowledge of these processes will allow 
us to entertain more realistic expectations about the possibilities and limits of the 
integration processes. This research project is also of timely and practical use,
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considering the revival of integration processes all over the world and the formation of 
continental economic blocs.18
1.5.- Overview of the political economy of the Andean countries as a context of the 
evolution of the Andean process: 1969-1995
During the 1960s and part of the 1970s, as was the case of other Latin American 
countries, the common development model asynchronically pursued by the Andean Pact’s 
governments, was one of inward oriented industrialization model. The strategy used was 
import substitution. Although widely varied among countries, the model and strategy, as 
proposed by the United Nations’ Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), 
aimed basically to produce progressively more sophisticated goods, given the limitations 
of the human, material and financial resources, and the size of the market.19 The main 
policy used to achieve the aims was market protectionism. This convergence of the 
models and strategies of development (which Hirschman (1971: 270-311), called 
"ideology of economic development"), of the member countries coincided with the first 
phase of progress of the Andean Group. Between 1969 (when the Cartagena Agreement 
creating the Andean Pact was signed) and 1973, there was a rapid advance in the
18We should not overlook, however, the process of political disintegration going on in Eastern Europe, 
in the former Soviet Union and other parts of the world. For an analysis of disintegration see Holsti, 1988; 
Chatterjee, 1993; and Gurr, 1994.
’’"The industrialization process has not taken place in all the Latin American countries [including the
Andean nations] simultaneously or at the same pace Despite these differences, all the countries have
pursued a very similar policy as regards the conduct of the import-substitution process, and all have 
continued to export primary products" (ECLA, 1970: 137).
"In the Agreement’s discussion period and during the first years that it was in force, a certain 
congruency existed in the economic policies of the member countries ... To a greater or lesser extent, they 
were all "Cepalian", progressing towards import-substitution . . .” (Puyana, 1984: 296).
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implementation of important aspects of GRAN.
From the mid-1970s to the 1980s, changing domestic and international conditions 
gradually led governments to divergent ideologies of economic development. As a 
response to these challenges, the Andean countries, at different paces and in different 
forms, gradually and with forward and backward leaps began to shift to a model of 
development based on an outward oriented industrialization.20 The strategy changed to 
one of increasing exports by improving efficiency and competitiveness and augmenting 
the capability of the domestic economic structure to respond to international and domestic 
changes. The new policies aimed at seeking free trade, market competition and at 
maximizing comparative advantages.21
This protracted process of redefining and changing ways to pursue national 
objectives led GRAN first to stagnation (1974-1978) and then regression (1979-1986). 
By the second half of the 1970s, infringements of the Agreement and commitments 
derived from it by the member countries became widespread, as they pursued what they 
perceived as their own national interests. The violations, during this period of stagnation 
of the process, were basically the reaction of governments to the economic problems they 
were confronting. These problems originated by the United States unilateral declaration 
of August 1971 of the inconvertibility of the dollar into gold, and thus changing the basis 
of the international monetary system, and by the increase in the price of oil in the last
“ According to Gereffi (1990: 18), inward and outward oriented industrialization models are not 
mutually exclusive but complementary. This argument was voiced earlier by Robock (1972). However, it 
was not widely perceived as such in the 1970’s and 1980’s.
21Weintraub, 1991 and Cohen, 1993, among others, discuss this shift of the ideology of economic 
development.
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quarter of 1973.
The Andean integration process also stagnated (1974-1978) due to two inherent 
problems that diverted the attention of the governments from furthering the process. One 
of them was the entrance of Venezuela into the Andean Group in December 1973. It 
increased the number of actors, and augmented the difficulties in reaching agreements. 
This oil rich country, moreover, was able to exert an important influence in the Andean 
process while the reverse was not true. The second inherent problem that led to the 
stagnation of the Andean process was a consequence of the overthrown of the Chilean 
Socialist government of Salvador Allende in 1973. In 1974, the Chilean military 
government adopted an outward oriented model of economic development, and a strategy 
based on free trade, private initiative, and government withdrawal from the economy. 
This ideology of economic development was, at that time, considered by the other 
governments incompatible with the one they pursued and incongruous with the aims of 
the Andean Pact. The discrepancy was eventually solved, in 1976, with the withdrawal 
of Chile.
The member countries modified some basic mechanisms and deadlines in the 
Protocol of Lima of 1976; and in the Protocol of Arequipa, 1978. These Protocols 
reflected changes the governments were interested in introducing in the Cartagena 
Agreement in response to the new circumstances effecting their national environment. 
They were also the legal answer to the need to update deadlines that were already 
missed, clearing the way for the process to resume its progress. The new deadlines, 
however, were not met.
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The phase of regression (1979-1986) began, paradoxically, with an attempt to 
revitalize the process. The Presidents of the Andean Group met in May 1979 to 
commemorate the tenth anniversary of the Cartagena Agreement. As a result of this 
meeting the Andean Court of Justice and the Andean Parliament were created in October 
1979 and November 1979 respectively. These attempts did not revitalize GRAN. The 
treaties came into force only in 1983 (the Court) and in 1984 (the Parliament). By the 
time the Court began to function, the governments had reached a "gentlemen agreement" 
not to bring cases to the Court because governments were not ready to fulfill their 
obligations. As for the Parliament (constituted by five representatives of each of the 
national congresses) it has only the power of recommendation. A Court without cases and 
a toothless Parliament were incapable of inducing the governments to amend their 
behavior. On the contrary violations became widespread not only in magnitude but also 
in importance. For example, trade restrictions were applied to Andean trade. This caused 
trade flow to diminish by almost half between 1982 and 1986 (see table VI.2).
In addition to the violations, the representatives of the governments were not able 
to reach agreements on matters that were fundamental for the process to progress, such 
as the common external tariff. When some important decisions were adopted, most of 
the time they were not implemented by the governments.
The behavior of the governments reflected the increasing economic strains 
imposed by the second oil price rise (1979), and by the increasing external debt. The 
Andean process as a tool for the governments became irrelevant to and was neglected by 
them, since governments perceived that economic integration could not be of much help
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to them in coping with the pressing socio-political situation. The governments, instead, 
began to apply policies which over time led to a different strategy of development. As 
a result governments find no important objectives to be fulfilled by the Andean Pact. 
Regression, thus, was characteristic of this period.
The new ideology of economic development that emerged among the member 
countries from the mid 1980s defined an outward oriented industrialization model and an 
export-led strategy based on exporting goods for which each country had comparative 
advantages, and in reliance on the market economy. In 1987, while this ideology of 
economic development was still being hesitantly implemented, Andean countries adopted 
the Quito Protocol. The protocol signaled an attempt to revitalize the Andean process 
based, again, on the governments finding new compatible aims to be fulfilled through the 
Andean process. The aims were to help restructure the economies of the countries to 
increase their economic efficiency and competitiveness, to make them more flexible and 
adaptable to changing international conditions, and to improve the negotiation capability 
of the Andean countries in the international political and economic arenas (JUNAC 
1990a: 13-21). It was not until 1989, however, that GRAN began a phase of rapid 
progress again due to changes in the most important members. First in Venezuela and 
then, in the same year, in Colombia and, in 1990, in Peru drastic changes in economic 
policies signaled a clear and decisive adoption of the export oriented model.22 It was at 
that time that the objectives stated in the Quito Protocol began to reflect governments 
aims. Violations were quickly eliminated, trade increased, and the creation of an effective
^Bolivia had, since 1985, already moved decisively to it. Ecuador did it in 1992.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
30
free trade area advanced rapidly.
Progress lasted until August 1992 when the Andean Group slowed down its 
advancement. It reflected the differences among the governments, especially between 
Peru and the rest of the members, about the pace and depth of the domestic 
implementation of the new ideology of economic development. As a result, Peru 
"temporarily withdrew" from the process.23 Another reason for this slow down of the 
process was the perception of Venezuela and Colombia that an immediate integration of 
their markets, the largest and most dynamic of the Group, provided greater benefits for 
both, and could be done without the participation of the other Andean members.
Presently, the developmental model common to all Andean countries is outward- 
oriented industrialization. The strategy is to promote exports by pursuing a policy of free 
trade with the rest of the world based on comparative advantage. Table 1.1 presents a 
summarized comparison between the two "ideologies of economic development" applied 
from the 1960s to the 1990s in the Andean nations.
This succinct review of the evolution of GRAN shows that economic integration 
is a political endeavor which is shaped by government interests. The Andean Presidents 
officially acknowledged for the first time, on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the 
Andean process, in May 1979, the political nature of economic integration (JUNAC, 
1979b: 57). At the twentieth anniversary, in 1989, the presidents also officially
^Peru’s self-exclusion of from the process was agreed among the representatives of the five member 
countries ignoring the fact that the Cartagena Agreement does not consider this possibility. This is one of 
the most obvious example supporting this dissertation hypothesis, namely that the individual governments 
of member countries are the most important actors in die Andean integration process. As such they act, 
when necessary, above and beyond the rules they have sovereignly agreed upon.
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TABLE LI






Strategy Import substitution Export promotion
Policies Market protectionism Market competition and 
comparative advantage
Government role Direct intervention Arbiter
Andean Pact major emphasis Market and production 
integration
Pure market integration
recognized that GRAN served as a complementary tool in the pursuit of shared national 
interests (JUNAC, 1990a: 16, 69).
2.- METHODOLOGY
To explore the hypothesis that the evolution of the Andean Group has been 
overwhelmingly determined by the governments of the member countries, this 
dissertation has divided the Andean process into five phases. They correspond to turning 
points in the history of the Andean process: 1969-1973 termed as one of progress, 1974- 
1978 a phase of stagnation, 1979-1986 a phase of regression, 1987-1989 again a phase 
of stagnation, and finally from 1990 to 1995 another of progress.
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2.1.- Indicators
Several indicators have been developed in order to ascertain the main 
characteristics attributed to each of these phases. One indicator is how the main 
mechanisms have evolved. During a phase of progress the main mechanisms would be 
implemented with only minor problems and delays. In a phase of stagnation 
implementation would become more difficult and delays would begin to spread. A phase 
of regression would show great difficulties in implementing the main mechanisms and 
the abandonment or replacement of some of them.
Another indicator is the amount (value) of trade among member countries. 
Progress of the process would be evident if the value of trade among member countries 
increases every year. The process stagnates if the value of intra-subregional trade 
decreases in one or a few years. The process would be in a phase of regression if trade 
among Andean countries decreases in several or most years.24
A third indicator is the fulfillment of obligations by member countries. There 
would be progress if the violations are minimum; stagnation if they become larger, but 
they do not constitute an obstacle to the process. There would be regression should 
violations became widespread, and create major obstacles to the main mechanisms of this 
process. It is clear that this is not an obvious quantitative indicator. What it intends to 
show is that there would be more violations of the Cartagena Agreement when the 
process is in a regression phase than when it is in a phase of stagnation.
The fourth indicator is the number of decisions approved by the Commission, the
21Trade among the member countries "is one of the most accurate indicators of success of economic 
integration" (UNCTAD, 1989: 2).
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political body of the Andean Group. A greater number of decisions dealing with new 
issues would be approved by the Commission during a phase of progress; fewer would 
be passed during a stage of stagnation, while during regression even fewer decisions on 
new issues would be approved. Parallel to this, during the phase of progress there would 
be more decisions modifying previous decisions which would strengthen the process than 
during the phase of stagnation. In turn during the phase of regression there would be 
fewer decisions of this type than in a phase of stagnation. On the other hand, modifying 
decisions that weaken accords would be more common during a phase of stagnation than 
in a phase of progress, and even more frequent in a phase of regression. Unimportant 
decisions would be more common in a phase of regression, than in a phase of stagnation 
or in a stage of progress. Table 1.2 summarizes these indicators.
2.2.- Three levels of analysis
If findings from an examination of the implementation of the mechanisms, of 
trade, violations, and decisions confirm the existence of the phases the Andean Pact has 
gone through, the next endeavor is to find out the factors that can explain the different 
phases. This can be accomplished by analyzing, for each of the phases, how the 
strategies of development, the and the policies to be pursued by the governments were 
reflected by the aims and mechanisms of the Andean process. This is to be done 
concurrently with the analysis of the interactions of the governments of the member 
countries to achieve their objectives and the examination of the activities of Andean 
institutions. This proposition yields three levels of analysis, or three different
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Decisions Few More Even more
perspectives to explain the evolution of the Andean process.
The first level examines the interactions of the Junta with the governments of the 
member countries, and of the governments among themselves pertaining to their positions 
on the general situation of the Andean process, and on specific issues being negotiated.
The second level is the analysis of short-term domestic policies being implemented 
or modified by the member countries, and how these policies are reflected by the Andean 
integration. This analysis will allow us to identify the similarities and differences of the 
domestic policies in relation to the main mechanisms of the Andean Group, and the
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possible changes in the importance of the Andean Pact for each member government, as 
well as the changing short-term goals to be achieved through this process.
The third level analyzes the asynchronous shifting of the countries’ strategy of 
development. This will be done through the analysis of the strategies of development 
being implemented by the economic plans and the long-term policies adopted by the 
member governments as well as the analysis of the economic, political, and overall 
situation of the countries. They will be compared with the aims of the Cartagena 
Agreement to see how the domestic interests are reflected by the Andean purposes. These 
three levels of analysis are summarized in table 1.3.
TABLE 1.3 
LEVELS OF ANALYSIS
LEVEL TYPE OF ANALYSIS
1 Interactions among governments and Andean institutions
2 Analysis of national short-term policies
3 Analysis of national strategies of development
At each one of these levels it will be possible to determine the extent to which 
the Andean Group reflects the interests of the member governments. If progress in the 
Andean economic integration process coincides with the existence of harmonious relations 
between government and Andean aims, if stagnation can be related to the lack of 
harmonious relations between Andean objectives and the interests of a minority of the
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member countries, and if regression is linked to the majority of the member countries 
not being able to relate their interests to the aims of the Andean Group, then the 
proposed hypothesis to explain the evolution of the Andean Group will have established 
its validity.
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I.- INTEGRATION ATTEMPTS FROM INDEPENDENCE UNTIL THE END OF
WORLD WAR H
From the time the former Spanish colonies in America began their efforts to 
become independent, they simultaneously but unsuccessfully attempted to integrate in one 
way or another. Until the end of World War II, these undertakings were primarily aimed 
to achieve political integration following confederal or federal models. Since World War
II, these endeavors have focused on some form of economic integration.
Several Latin American leaders and writers of the past century dreamed that it 
was possible to create a larger political unit encompassing sizable parts of the continent. 
The most common aim was to have a strong and prosperous nation capable of protecting 
itself from external threats. The main bases for this dream were the commonalities of 
language, religion, culture, history, civilization, and the longing for reestablishing a
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hypothetical and unrealized unity in colonial Spanish America. Chief among the 
proponents of this integration was Simon Bolivar. Under his leadership the independence 
of what are today Venezuela, Colombia, Panama, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia was 
attained. Bolivar first proposed the idea of political integration in 1815 in his "Jamaica 
Letter" ("Carta de Jamaica"). In that letter he proposed the creation of a confederation 
modeled after the ancient Greek confederacy called the amphictyony (Belaunde, 1983: 
124-125). The objective was to protect the nascent republics from European powers. The 
forces toward disintegration, however, were stronger, and by the late eighteen thirties, 
the four former Spanish viceroyalties (New Spain, New Granada, Peru and Rio de la 
Plata) had splintered into eighteen countries.
From 1826 to 1865 four inconsequential international conferences were held 
aiming to create political alliances against European attempts to reconquer the area. From 
1865 to the end of World War II, the Latin American countries placed more reliance on 
this time from the United States.1
Inter-American conferences were also held from the end of the XIX century on.2 
They were not successful in attempting to pursue some form of economic cooperation
‘The Latin American met several times, among them in, Lima, 1877-1880; Caracas, 1883; and 
Montevideo, 1888-1889 but nothing important came out of them.
3At the first Inter-American conference, 1889-1890, Secretary of State James G. Blaine proposed the 
creation of a continental customs union. It was rejected by the Latin Americans due to the existing anti- 
American sentiments, and because it was perceived as running counter to Latin American interests (Martz, 
1993: 30-34).
During the Seventh International Conference of American States, Montevideo, 1933, Secretary 
of State Cordell Hull proposed bilateral tariff cuts. The aim was to increase trade and to ease the problems 
created by the Great Depression and the 1930 Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act (This Act increased the average 
ad valorem tariff level from 38.2 to 55.3 percent, the highest of this century [Milner, 1990: 141; Lake, 
1991: 133]). The Latin American governments rejected the suggestion because they were highly dependent 
on tariff revenues.
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between the United States and Latin America.3
Between the two World Wars, attempts by Latin American countries to create 
customs unions among themselves were opposed by the United States and by Great 
Britain because they violated the most favored-nation principle.4 As far as the United 
States was concerned, any customs union formed in this hemisphere ought to fulfill the 
conditions set forth in the Conference of the Commissions of Inter-American 
Development, New York, 1944 (Grunwald, Wionczek, and Camoy, 1972: 69-70). These 
criteria were: a) the customs union should be open to any country, b) tariffs and other 
trade restrictions among the members should be eliminated in the shortest time possible, 
c) the common external tariff should be equal to or lower than the ones that were applied 
before the existence of the union, and d) the members should participate in international 
conferences aimed at reducing trade barriers.
3For a study of US foreign economic relations with Latin America in the 25 years period, 1906-1931, 
see Seidel, 1973. The author termed this period as Progressive Pan Americanism. It was aimed "at 
expanding trade, building investments opportunities, and tapping sources of agricultural and mineral raw 
materials in Latin America", ... in order "to aggrandize United States economic interests and enhance 
domestic prosperity", while at the same time it tried "to allay Latin American fears of its might and 
suspicious of its intentions. Yet ... [it] could not completely replace Latin fears and suspicious with an 
ideology of politico-economic progress that would be realized under benevolent and non-coercive United 
States Stewardship" (2, 646) At the end of this period, ”[i]n the emerging [of the Depression], as so often 
before, the interests of the United States took precedence over general hemispheric remedies" (ibid., 9).
4For example, in 1939, a free trade agreement was signed by Argentina and Brazil. Argentina tried 
to expand and deepen it with a 1941 treaty creating a customs union between Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Paraguay, and Uruguay. The treaty was not ratified due to US opposition. A similar fate was encountered 
by a customs union treaty, signed in 1943, between Argentina and Chile.
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After World War II, Latin American nations renewed their attempts to integrate 
among themselves in order to increase their international standing through economic 
rather than political integration. Economic integration processes "were founded on the 
joint economic and political goals of accelerating economic development and achieving 
economic independence" (Bryant, 1984: 79). Since the very beginning decision-makers 
were aware that economic integration would be only one of the many tools available to 
them to further economic growth and hopefully socio-economic development. More 
concretely, "[t]he primary goal of integration [was] development, with an emphasis on 
industrialization" (Mytelka, 1975 38). Industrialization, "[t]he motive for subregional 
integration in Latin America and the Caribbean during the 1950s and 1960s, [aimed] to 
expand the scope for import substitution; ..." (Weintraub, 1993: 10).
Governments were also aware that integration by itself would not avoid the 
difficult and painful measures to deal with their socio-politico-economic problems, 
although they had hoped that economic growth fostered by integration would help to do 
the job.
... regional integration is no panacea for Latin America. It will not diminish the 
need for political, economic and social reform. ... and certainly will not obviate 
the need for greater access to the markets of the developed countries. ..., 
however, ... the concerting [sic] efforts on a region-wide basis could significantly 
accelerate the attainment of these goals (Dell, 1966: 14).
Few governments were willing to undertake the kind of fundamental redistribution 
of wealth required to create a sizeable domestic market. Instead, they opted for 
regional free trade agreements, hoping that by grouping the middle classes ... 
they could reach the market size required for industrial take-off (Green, 1995:19).
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As stated by the then head of the powerful Peruvian National Planning Office:
the Latin American integration process emerges as a common necessity, a 
meeting place of national development policies and a means to make possible a 
self-sustaining development. Within this concept, integration is necessarily a 
complementary road to be used. As such, integration would accelerate the 
adoption of measures that in turn would reduce internal disequilibria and would 
allow a more rational social structure (Marco del Pont, 1969: 76).
In other words, integration could not be an end in itself, but ought to be an additional
policy tool, and only part of an overall strategy for development.
2.1.- The role of ECLA
When World War I interrupted trade, Latin American countries had to produce 
as many products as possible that were formerly imported. The import substitution 
process was an unexpected by-product of the severance of trade links. It was fostered 
when the Great Depression greatly hurt Latin American exports, drastically limiting the 
importation of manufactured goods. Between the wars import substitution was abandoned. 
World War n, however, forced the Latin American countries to produce locally goods 
that until then were imported.
After World War n, the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America 
(ECLA)5 provided the rationale to further import substitution as a explicit strategy for 
industrialization and the promotion of economic development. This strategy was 
accompanied with a proposal to enlarge the domestic markets through economic
5ECLA was created in 1948, in 1984 was renamed ECLAC: Economic Commission for Latin America 
and the Caribbean.
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integration.6 A Latin American common market was necessary to overcome "the splitting 
of the industrialization process into as many watertight compartments as there are 
countries, without the advantages of specialization and economies of scale" (Prebisch, 
1959: 268). Greater emphasis was given to the integration mechanism promoting 
industrialization, than to the one fostering trade integration.7
Latin American governments found ECLA’S recommendations politically useful 
and they began to apply them. ECLA’s willingness to play an economic and a political 
role, in part, the result of the personality and the work of Raul Prebisch, ECLA’S second 
Executive Secretary (Bawa, 1980: 4-7). As a result, this United Nations institution was 
able to play a very important role in promoting import substitution and economic 
integration (Gregg, 1968: 313-319, 328-332; Axline, 1994a: 9; 1994b: 184).
2.2.- International factors favoring economic integration
International factors also created an environment conducive to the gradual 
acceptance of ECLA’s economic integration proposal by the Latin America. The most 
important ones were the post World War H political and economic orders. In the political 
realm, the new world order was characterized by a bipolar system dominated by the two 
continental superpowers. The new international order established new monetary, financial 
and trade systems. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the
6It was argued that the success of the policy to replace imports for domestic production was due 
basically to the possibility of having larger regional markets (U.N., 1952: 7).
7"... it was realized in the beginning that the integration of trade should proceed side by side with 
industrialisation, ... [but] industrialisation was the cardinal principle of the Prebisch Thesis ... (Bawa, 
1980: 150).
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International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD-The World Bank) were created to maintain these systems.
With bipolarity came the Cold War. Because of it and specifically due to the 
Korean War, the prospects of a continuing lack of availability of industrial goods led the 
governments to recognize the need for guided import substitution industrialization as a 
permanent strategy. This conclusion was reinforced by the problems to establish the new 
international economic order. The IMF was unable to deal with the existing monetary 
disarray. GATT, which was intended only as a temporary procedural guideline for tariff 
negotiations, became the sole treaty dealing with one aspect of international trade, 
namely commercial policy.8 Finally, resources of the IBRD were to be dedicated to 
reconstruction rather than to development (Wionczek, 1966: 73-74; Kaufman, 1990: 120- 
126; Hirschman, 1971: 85-123; Spero, 1990: 33-35, 154-155,159-160,203-208; Walters 
and Blake, 1992: 13-16, 40-45, 70). Given this scenario, currencies continued to be 
unconvertible, trade restrictions in the countries devastated by the War were maintained, 
and resources for development were not forthcoming.
On the other hand, there were pressures on the Latin American governments to 
comply with the newly created international economic order. These pressures came 
primarily from the IMF, which compelled these countries—chiefly Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile and Uruguay which had a relatively large reciprocal trade in raw materials—to
®The agreement creating the International Trade Organization (ITO), was an all encompassing treaty 
on trade. Its creation was prevented when the Truman administration decided, in 1950, not to send the 
treaty to the Senate. He feared that it would be defeated.
In December 1993, among the accords reached in the latest GATT negotiations, the Uruguay 
Round, was the creation of the World Trade Organization, WTO, as the institution dealing with all issues 
related to international trade.
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reduce their controls over trade and payments policies. According to the IMF, this should 
be done through promoting trade liberalization, extending tariff preferences on a mul­
tilateral basis, creating freely convertible currencies, and eliminating their bilateral 
payment agreements.9
As a consequence, trade among the Latin American countries steadily declined, 
creating payments problems.10 This situation persuaded the countries, principally the 
aforementioned four, to look for mechanisms that would allow them to reestablish the 
level of trade and solve the payments difficulties. One of these means was the creation 
of a free trade area in harmony with United States conditions and with Article XXIV of 
GATT (and specifically paragraph 5).11
Another international factor contributing to economic integration as a viable
’Most of the Latin American countries had bilateral trade agreements with the United States since the 
early 1900s when protectionism became the main feature of the US trade policy. These agreements were 
quite disadvantageous to Latin America. It seems that the IMF was successful in its pressure because the 
United States promised to accept the abrogation of these unfavorable treaties.
l0These twin problems imposed from abroad of forced industrialization and free trade led to the Latin 
American nations to a developmental model with two parallel strategies. One of them was outward-looking 
to the international market, especially through the exports of raw materials, and the other was the inward- 
looking import substitution scheme which was very protectionist and thus, very inefficient (Valdes, 1981: 
448).
""... the provisions of this agreement shall not prevent, .... the formation of a customs unions or of 
a free trade area ..." (Dam, 1970: 432).
"Art. XXIV of the GATT exempts from the basic requirement of nondiscrimination [that is, the 
application of the most favored nation clause, stated in Arts. I and II of GATT] to: a completed customs 
union or free trade area and an "interim agreement" to achieve such a union or area "within a reasonable 
length of time" according to a plan and schedule that is not disapproved by the Contracting Parties" (Evans, 
1968: 83).
"[Although they are technically incompatible with the most-favored-nation-principle and are 
undeniably discriminatory, such arrangements are, or at least once were thought [by the time of the 
negotiation of the General agreement], to constitute a movement toward the GATT goal of freer trade" 
(Dam, 1970: 19).
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political option was the deterioration of the terms of trade.12 Positing that problem out 
constituted one of ECLA’s major contributions. It made the Latin American governments 
aware of the vulnerability caused by the reliance on the vagaries of the international 
market to obtain the foreign exchange they needed for development (ECLA: 1970).
The Treaty of Rome, 1957, which created the European Economic Community 
(EEC) also influenced politicians and thinkers (Gutierrez and Wilhelmy, 1991:482). The 
Community was the model for Latin America. European integration, ever since it began 
to be proposed in 1946, was supported and actively promoted by the US government 
(Machlup, 1977: 8-12; Hallstein, 1962: chp. 2; Hackett, 1990: 6-7; Simai, 1977: 12).
The United States, however, opposed economic integration in Latin America. 
Between the end of World War II and 1960 the United States policy towards Latin 
America was focussed mainly on security matters. The Latin American countries, on the 
other hand, were concerned with economic issues (Bawa, 1980: 16). At the economic 
level, the United States government believed that its interests and of the world would be 
better served with global trade liberalization. The government was concerned that "trade 
diversion" would be greater than "trade creation in the cases of economic integration 
processes among developing countries."13 The United States was also worried that
12Terms of trade is defined a the ratio between the average international price of exports of a country 
(or a region) and the average price of its imports. A deterioration of the terms of trade, means that over 
time a country (or a region), is getting less for its exports and/or paying more for its imports.
l3Given a intra-regional trade liberalization process by which country members reduce or eliminate 
import tariffs reciprocally in a pan or all of the universe of products, trade creation is a situation by which 
local production is replaced by imports from a partner country which is more efficient. Trade creation will 
lower for consumers the price of the products in the imponing country by the amount of the eliminated 
tariff plus the amount of the difference between the price in the imponing country before the abolishment 
of the tariff and the price after its elimination.
Trade diversion is a situation by which cheaper imports from non-member countries are replaced 
by impons from more expensive productions coming from a partner country. The importing country will
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economic integration would affect adversely its commercial interests, and that this 
process could make the region less dependent on the United States. To accept the 
creation of a process of integration, the United States demanded that in addition to the 
criteria stated in 1944 (see above, section 1), the process must be beneficial to new 
private foreign investment, and insure free competition within the integrating area 
(Thompson, 1970: 108).
As for security matters, with few exceptions, Latin America was "free" of the 
Communist peril and was within the United States’ sphere of influence. For this reason 
the region enjoyed a low priority in both political and economic terms. Between 1948 and 
1958 "... Latin America received only 2.4 percent of Washington’s foreign aid, ranking 
behind every other region in the World" (LaFeber, 1984: 95). In the 20 year period, 
1945-1965, Latin American countries (excluding the Caribbean) received US $3.92 
billion (Thompson, 1970: 52). The Marshall Plan allocated US $17 billion to reconstruct
be paying more for the products now coming from its partner, but the price paid by the consumers will 
be equal or lower than before tariffs abrogation. This phenomenon will occur because the partner country 
has the advantage of not being charged with the import tariff—which is applied to imports originating from 
non-member countries.
These concepts were first coined by Viner (1950). They were subsequently developed and 
expanded by Meade (1969), Gehrels (1956-1957), Lipsey (1957), Johnson (1962), Markower and Morton 
(1953), and Krauss (1972). For and overview of the theories see Lipsey (1960), Krauss (1972), and 
Pelkans (1980).
Trade creation is deemed as positive, in terms of world’s welfare because efficiency has increased. 
Trade diversion, in the contrary is considered negative because efficiency has decreased. This factors do 
not hold if only the interests of the integrating countries are taken into account. Several political effects can 
be analyzed. Two of them will be dealt with here. In the first case (trade creation), the less efficient 
partner, which looses its production, may consider it as unacceptable for its consequences in employment 
and income generating activities, while the successful partner might be increasing its exports only slightly. 
In the second case (trade diversion), the country which stops buying from third countries to buy from a 
less efficient partner is not only losing fiscal revenues because tariffs are being eliminated on imports from 
the partner, but also, by definition, the country is paying a higher price than otherwise. This country will 
be "losing" twice, forfeiting budget income and buying dearer, while the winning country may only export 
marginally. In both examples the "losing" country will be unhappy with the situation, even more so, if the 
integration agreement does not consider effective compensatory devices. In the case of the "winning" 
country, increase in exports may be only minimal.
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Europe.
2.3.- Domestic factors favoring economic integration
At the domestic level, many Latin American nations were undergoing profound 
changes and facing similar problems. Chief among them were demographic explosion 
and rural migration to the cities. These problems created a need to industrialize, to 
provide urban jobs and to meet the increasing demand for goods. Other common 
economic problems were stagnation, chronic inflation, balance of payments deficits, and 
deterioration of the terms of trade. These problems led to social and political unrest.
Import substitution industrialization changed the structure of production in Latin 
America. Industry increased its share in the gross domestic product at the expense of 
agriculture. Over time, industry grew at a slower pace and more inefficiently than 
expected, while agriculture stagnated. The import structure changed. The importation of 
semi-finished products and capital goods became more important than the importation of 
consumer goods.14 The structure of exports remained almost unchanged. Major exports 
continued to be raw materials and minerals. Imports rose due to the deepening of the 
industrialization process and the increasing demand for manufactured consumer goods.15 
The price of exports tended to remain the same or to decrease due to vagaries of the 
market, which stagnated agricultural output even more. Deficits in the trade balance
14This meant that dependency on foreign goods increased because it became more difficult for imports 
to be reduced in case of a decrease in foreign exchange earnings. This was so, due to the fact that a 
decrease in imports of intermediate and capital goods would almost immediately slow down industrial 
activity, which in due time would affect economic growth.
l5The latter was originated by the increase of urban population due to internal migration.
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ensued, capital borrowing increased, as well as debt service. Consumption rose at a 
faster pace than production, and investment lagged because of low rate of savings. 
Unemployment increased because industrial production was capital intensive.
ECLA’s regional economic integration proposal allowed these countries not only 
to continue the strategy of import substitution industrialization, but permitted them to 
increase exports of traditional goods, and more importantly of semi-manufactured and 
manufactured goods within the region. This in turn would free foreign exchange to be 
used for imports from outside the region of goods not produced within it. In addition, 
economic integration, by creating an expanded market, would generate the incentives to 
establish new industries in these countries. Existing industries would increase efficiency 
and would become competitive in the international market. By doing so, Latin America 
could diversify its exports, and therefore change its export structure. In turn, increased 
exports would increase regional production, would make import substitution more 
efficient, and would decrease reliance on imports, thereby reducing the vulnerability and 
dependency of the region. Economic integration was proposed as the instrument by which 
a vicious cycle of underdevelopment could be transformed into a virtuous circle of 
development.
2.4.- Progress of economic integration between 1945 and 1960
Between 1945 and 1960, several avenues were pursued towards the creation of 
the common market. In 1954, a Group of Experts summoned by ECLA supported the 
need for "... greater integration of the national economies in wider spheres ..." (Lleras
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Restrepo, 1972: 64), and to limit the scope of the most favored nation clause. In 1955, 
ECLA, in its Sixth Session, created a Trade Committee which proposed the constitution 
of a common market. It should be created gradually, should cover all goods, should 
provide special treatment to the relatively less developed countries (RLDC), should 
further production complementarity, should have a payments system and safeguard 
clauses, and should foster competition (U.N., 1962: 38).
The Central American countries were the first to agree to pursue some sort of 
economic integration. In 1952 the Central American Committee for Economic Cooper­
ation--CCCE—(Comite Centroamericano de Cooperation Economica) was established. 
Between 1954 and 1960, the Committee was able to create some regional institutions, 
and to negotiate a series of treaties that led to the creation in 1960 of the Central 
American Common Market (CACM).
3.- ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN THE 1960s
During the 1960s, the Latin American integration process began to take shape in 
the form of the Central American Common Market (CACM), the Latin American Free 
Trade Association (LAFTA), and the Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA).
3.1.- The Central American Common Market (CACM)
The CACM was created by the General Treaty of Economic Integration (Tratado
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General de Integracion Economica), signed in 1960 in Managua, Nicaragua. The aim 
was to create a customs union with a high degree of economic policy harmonization to 
foster the economic development of the region.
At first, progress was highly impressive but problems among member countries, 
which had existed from its inception, began to mount. Two of the most acute problems 
were the unequal distribution of trade benefits and of industrial production. The most 
developed countries—Guatemala and El Salvador—benefitted the most, while the least 
developed ones—Nicaragua and Honduras—benefitted the least. Political problems made 
the situation even more difficult. In 1969 El Salvador and Honduras fought the "Soccer 
War." In the 1970s there was a series of trade retaliatory measures imposed primarily 
because of economic stagnation. By the end of this decade, most of the restrictions to 
trade among the countries were lifted, but by then civil wars in Nicaragua, El Salvador 
and Guatemala brought the process to a halt until the early 1990s when some attempts 
were being made to revitalize it. Currently, emphasis is given to infrastructure and to 
create a common market among themselves and with other Latin American countries.16
3.2.- The Caribbean integration: CARIFTA and CAR1COM
The treaty creating CARIFTA was signed in Antigua in 1965. The aim was a 
gradual creation of a free trade zone in the Caribbean. In 1972 the Caribbean Community 
(CARICOM) was created with the signing of the Treaty of Georgetown. It encompass 
the Caribbean Common Market and a system of functional cooperation and coordination
16See for instance Caballeros, 1992; Caceres, 1992; and Rojas, 1992.
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in specific areas. Its members expected that integration would bring about accelerated and 
balanced development, greater economic independence, and increased leverage in 
international negotiations.
Although some progress has been achieved towards the creation of the common 
market, problems still abound. As in the case of the CACM, the unequal distribution of 
benefits seems to be the major difficulty, accompanied by a weak linkage system among 
these insular countries. Since the mid-1980s, renewed attempts to further Caribbean 
integration have been made. More recently, a report of the West Indian Commission 
(1992) suggesting new actions to deepen and expand integration was presented to the 
Heads of State. "Despite frequently declared ambitious plans, intra-regional trade still 
faces much higher barriers than most exports to the outside world" (Inotai, 1994: 59).
3.3.- The Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA)
a) The Treaty of Montevideo
The Treaty of Montevideo creating LAFTA was signed in February 1960, and 
went into effect in June 1961.17 The original seven members were Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Mexico, Peru, Paraguay, and Uruguay. In 1961 Colombia and Ecuador joined the 
association, Venezuela did it in 1966, and, lastly Bolivia, in 1967. The original aim was 
the creation of a free trade zone over a period of 12 years, 1961-1973.
17An unofficial English text, translated by ECLA (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs, Multilateral Economic Co-operation in Latin America, Vol. I: Text and Documents, New York: 
United Nations, 1962), was published in Wionczek (ed.), 1969: 43-66.
Other English translations of Treaty of Montevideo have been published in Inter-American Institute 
of Legal Materials, 1975: 3-25; and in Dell, 1966: 228-257.
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The most important instrument was intra-regional trade liberalization. Every year, 
new tariff reductions were to be negotiated bilaterally, and product-by-product. The 
treaty also provided for limited industrial integration. There were provisions to protect 
agriculture from trade intra-regional liberalization, to apply the most favored nation 
clause only among the member countries, and to provide a trade treatment favorable to 
the RLDC. Finally a weak institutional structure was created.
By 1964 LAFTA was stagnating. New and broader goals were to be planned, and 
decisions had to be taken at the highest level, if this institution was to be revitalized 
(Haas and Schmitter, 1964). Two different approaches were proposed. One, was to 
convert LAFTA into a common market. The second approach was subregional 
integration. The latter was the aim of some of the medium-sized countries, particularly 
Chile and Colombia which had realized that the Latin American common market would 
be quite difficult to achieve. These two countries were the most dissatisfied with the lack 
of substantive progress of LAFTA.
In December 1965, the Council of Ministers of Foreign Relations was created.18 
In 1966 a limited payment system began to operate.19 Furthermore, in 1967 the Summit 
of American Presidents, which met in Punta del Este, Uruguay, decided to create the 
Latin American Common Market in fifteen years beginning in 1970. By 1968, however, 
it was clear that the dynamism required to overcome the obstacles to the free trade zone
,8The Protocol was signed in December 1966. For the texts of Resolution 117 creating the Council and 
the respective Protocol see Wionczek (ed.), 1969: 87-88 and 67-70 respectively; and also Inter-American 
Institute of Legal Materials, 1975: 116-119.
I9In 1965 a rudimentary and cautious Multilateral Payments Clearing agreement among the Central 
Banks of the LAFTA’s members was created. See the text in Wionczek (ed.), 1969: 350-353.
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was lacking. The need to modify the Treaty was raised by Peru in May of 1968, and by 
Mexico in July of the same year. Discussions went on until December 1969 when the 
member countries could only agree, through the Caracas Protocol, to extend the deadline 
to create the free trade zone from 1973 to 1980.20 This postponement did not help at 
all, and by the end of the 1970s, a new treaty was being negotiated. It was signed in 
Montevideo in 1980.21 It replaced LAFTA with the Latin American Integration 
Association (Asociacion Latinoamericana de Integration - ALADI).
ALADI’s official aim is the gradual and progressive creation of a Latin American 
common market. The new treaty, however, makes most of the obligations even less 
stringent than in the previous treaty. It doesn’t set a timetable to achieve the aim. Some 
of the mechanisms of the old scheme were retained but greater negotiation and 
operational flexibility were allowed. New mechanisms facilitate the adoption of bilateral 
as well as multilateral agreements which do not have to include all of the member 
countries. The less developed countries are treated more favorably than in the Treaty of 
Montevideo. A new category of countries—those of intermediate development—was 
created. These countries receive some advantages over the most developed countries, but 
they are not as extensive as those accorded to the less developed members.
b) LAFTA’s major problems and obstacles
From the outset LAFTA was plagued by a series of difficulties. Negotiations for
“ For the text of the Caracas Protocol see Inter-American Institute of Legal Materials, 1975: 26-28.
2lTo differentiate this treaty from the first one signed in the same place, the second treaty was officially 
designated as "Tratado de Montevideo 1980" (Art. 64).
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furthering the free trade area quickly became an impossibility since no country wanted 
to disrupt powerful domestic protectionist interests. LAFTA became a scheme to sell 
excess production, and to buy what was not met by domestic production, but not for 
fostering industrialization. The cumbersome tariff reduction system, the broad safeguard 
clauses, and the clauses limiting agricultural trade allowed for this.
Intraregional trade, nevertheless, increased over the years (see table n .l) , but it 
was marginal, only 14 percent of total trade. Paradoxically, this percentage was reached 
in the last two years of life of LAFTA. The major beneficiaries of the trade were the 
three largest countries. Around 60 percent of the total intraregional trade were generated 
by the big three: Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, while the five medium-size 
countries—Chile, Colombia, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela—shared 30 percent of the 
total intraregional trade. Only 5 percent of the trade was shared by Bolivia, Ecuador, and 
Paraguay (Morales, 1978: 64). Most of the intraregional exports from a given country 
went to two or three other member countries. For example around 50 percent of 
intraregional exports of Argentina, in 1980, went to Brazil and Chile. For Brazil 58 
percent of its intraregional exports went to Argentina, Colombia and Chile. In the case 
of Chile, this country concentrated 65 percent of its intraregional trade with Argentina 
and Brazil (Guerra-Borges, 1991; 160-161).
A more important indicator, the percentage of intraregional trade enjoying tariff 
reductions in relation to total intraregional trade went down from 88.7 percent 1966 to 
only 40 percent by the end of the 1970s. This last figure, in turn, was only 6 percent of 
LAFTA’s total trade (Blejer, cl985: 19). Exports of products enjoying tariff reduction
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TABLE n.l  
LAFTA: TRADE INDICATORS 1960-1980 
(In millions of US dollars FOB and percentages)
1960 1965 1970 1975 1978 1979 1980
1 7,345 9,389 13,787 29,664 44,630 60,729 78,134
2 567 842 1,266 4,010 5,838 8,575 10,921
3 7.7% 9.0% 9.2% 13.5% 13.1% 14.1% 14.0%
4 — 5.6% 9.4% 23.0% 16.8% 36.1% 28.7%
5 — 9.7% 10.1% 43.4% 15.2% 46.9% 27.4%
1.- Total exports by LAFTA countries.
2.- Total intraregional exports.
3.- Percentage of intraregional exports over total exports.
4.- Annual average rate of growth of total exports with respect to the previous data.22
5.- Annual average rate of growth of total intraregional exports with respect to the
previous data.23 
SOURCE: Fuentes and Villanueva, 1989: 103-104.
were not important for Bolivia, Paraguay and Venezuela, while 80 percent of Brazilian 
intraregional exports were enjoying these reductions.
The second major instrument, industrial complementation agreements, which were 
designed to help further import substitution by promoting industrial specialization, was 
a failure. Complementation agreements were, in practice, accords among private 
entrepreneurs that were sanctioned by their governments. For this reason, these
-This indicator is calculated as the percentage difference between the value of trade of a given year 
with respect to the previous data shown in the table and divided by the number of years that are in between 
the two data. This percentage result merely indicates the average percentage that trade has increased with 
regard to the earliest data.
^See previous footnote.
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understandings were of limited scope and were of little effect. Most of the agreements 
involved basically enterprises of the three major countries. The main beneficiaries 
appeared to be foreign enterprises and oligopolies (IDB, cl985: 69; Guerra-Borges, 
1991: 158).
The main reasons for the failure of industrial complementation agreements were:
a) the unwillingness of the governments to coordinate industrial planning and policies;
b) their lack of interest in relinquishing the possibility of developing production of 
specific goods; c) the impossibility of determining a priori a balanced agreement; d) the 
unequal distribution of benefits derived from these agreements; e) the lack of sufficient 
financial resources, both at national and at international levels, and f) the different levels 
of development of the member countries (Bawa, 1980: 59; IDB, cl985: 69-70; Morales, 
1974: 66; Guerra-Borges, 1991: 158).
The non-fulfillment of the expectations of the medium-sized and small countries 
led to a demand for compensations from the larger members in the form of greater access 
to their markets. The largest countries, however, were content with the status quo and 
unwilling to make additional concessions. This situation led to an increasing polarization 
of LAFTA and to its paralyzation by the middle of the 1960s.
The benefits were concentrated in the three major countries and created a 
disillusionment of the medium-sized and small countries. The different abilities to take 
advantage of the gradual and limited creation of the Latin American Free Trade Area 
were principally related to "the great differences of the economic dimensions and 
structures of its member countries" (Salgado, 1984: 81), that is, to their different levels
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of development.
In all, these problems reflect that "national interests dominated regional interests, 
and the region remained an afterthought to more pressing concerns" (Rothstein, 1977: 
197). This conclusion was more clearly expressed by Vacchino24 (quoted by Marmora, 
1990: 54), who stated that "[t]he LAFTA scheme adapted itself, without major 
difficulties and complications to the role reserved for economic integration in the national 
development strategies, that is, a secondary and subordinate role to national and 
international priorities." It is then not difficult to understand why there was no "political 
will" among the governments of the member countries to adopt the measures needed to 
pursue a common endeavor that from the view point of economic rationale would have 
benefitted all.
24Vacchino, Juan Mario; "Teonas, esquemas y experiencias de integracion economica regional," in: 
Nuevo Mundo, Aiio 5, Nos 15/16, Jan-Jun 1982, p. 175.
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FROM BOGOTA TO CARTAGENA (1966-1969): 
EN ROUTE TO SUBREGIONAL INTEGRATION
1.- THE DECLARATION OF BOGOTA; AND THE DECLARATION OF THE 
PRESIDENTS OF AMERICA
1.1.- The "Report of the Four11
Trying to revitalize the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA), the 
new president of Chile, Eduardo Frei, asked on January 6, 1965, four outstanding Latin 
American economists for advice on how to accelerate the Latin American economic 
integration process. They were Felipe Herrera, then President of the Inter-American 
Development Bank; Raul Prebisch, then Secretary-General of the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development; Carlos Sanz de Santamaria, then President of 
the Inter-American Commission for the Alliance for Progress; and Jose Antonio 
Mayobre, then Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Latin America. 
Their answer, in April of the same year, was the "Proposals for the Creation of
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the Latin American Common Market."1 They said that the lack of a general integration 
policy (with clearly and distinctively established objectives, methods and deadlines) is the 
major reason why economic integration is progressing so slowly. They recommended the 
conversion of LAFTA and the Central American Common Market (CACM) into the 
Latin American Common Market. To achieve this, a definition of major objectives, the 
adoption of political decisions at the highest level, and the adoption of new mechanisms 
were needed.2 These four prominent economists thus reiterated the importance of 
political decisions and of institutional structure.3
The recommendations of the "Report of the Four," as this document was known, 
were not acted upon. "The first conference of LAFTA foreign ministers, held in 
November 1965, considered the report... [but] did not adopt any of its major proposals 
... . Another LAFTA conference at the end of 1966 also failed to resolve any major 
issues" (Grunwald, Wionczek and Camoy, 1972: 55). This was a reflection of the 
divergent national objectives of the participating members toward LAFTA.
In the meantime (1965-1967) the movement towards subregional integration began 
to be discussed in earnest. The Chilean President again was its promotor (Frei, 1976:
'For the texts in Spanish of Frei’s letter and the answer the see Garcia Reynoso et al., 1965. For the 
English translation of these documents see Dell, 1966: 279-310.
2Among the mechanisms suggested were automatic across-the-board tariff reductions, industrial 
programming, foreign investment promotion, a payment system, and a strengthened institutional structure.
3In other words, they gave the neo-functionalist and federalist approaches greater relevance than the 
functionalist one. As it has been mentioned in chapter I, neo-functionalism focussed on a political decision 
to deepen the process. In this case, the four prominent economists suggested deepening the process by 
converting the two Latin American integration processes into a common market. Federalism focussed on 
the creation of institutions as the tool to achieve integration. The advice to strengthen the organs of the 
Latin American integration process was in line with this approach. Functionalism stressed cooperation only 
on technical, non-political issues.
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11). President Raul Leoni of Venezuela and President-elect Carlos Lleras Restrepo of 
Colombia supported the initiative (Elgueta, 1976: 24-25). Moreover, as President-elect, 
in July 1966, Lleras Restrepo visited the presidents of Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru and 
Chile and invited them to meet in Bogota, Colombia in order to adopt the basis of a 
future Andean Community (Frei, 1976: 11; de la Puente, 1988: 214; Valdes, 1984: 63).
1.2.- The Bogota Meeting
In August 1966, in Bogota, the Presidents of Chile, Eduardo Frei Montalva; 
Colombia, Carlos Lleras Restrepo; and Venezuela, Raul Leoni; and the personal 
representatives of the Presidents of Ecuador, Galo Plaza Montano; and Peru, Fernando 
Schwalb Lopez Aldana signed the Declaration of Bogota (Declaration de Bogota).* They 
decided to foster economic growth of their countries, as a means of achieving a balanced 
and harmonious regional development. To accomplish this, they agreed to an automatic 
tariff reduction more accelerated, and more encompassing than LAFTA’s; a program to 
develop new industrial production; a program to harmonize economic policies, in which 
a common foreign investment policy had a priority;5 and more effective actions favoring 
the relatively less developed countries (RLDC) than the ones in LAFTA.
The proposed measures were more in line with ECLA’s proposals. According to 
Tomic (1980: 188), the Declaration of Bogota was a veiled note to the big three
*The Declaration also includes a "Bases for an Immediate Action Programme" which provides greater 
details and more specific steps the governments were willing to pursue. The English version of this text 
can be found in Inter-American Institute of Legal Materials, 1975: 149-164.
5A common treatment of foreign investment and technology was a major preoccupation of the 
Presidents. They wanted to avoid repeating LAFTA and CACM experiences, where there was significant 
evidence that "foreign companies had seized many of the benefits from integration" (Ferris, 1979a: 51).
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(Argentina, Brazil and Mexico) that if LAFTA remained in stagnation, the Andean 
countries would proceed towards subregional integration. It was also a clear indication 
that the presidents of the Andean countries were not only dissatisfied with LAFTA’s 
results, but more importantly with the aims, structure and mechanisms of this institution. 
The presidents believed in a radical departure from LAFTA as the solution.6
1.3.- The summit of Punta del Este
These were the most important antecedents (with regard to subregional 
integration) to the summit meeting at Punta del Este, Uruguay, in April 1967. The 
Presidents of all the countries of the Americas were present, and the United States, for 
the first time, gave official support to integration in Latin America. At this meeting the 
Declaration of the American Presidents (Declaration de los Presidentes de America) was 
signed. The Declaration, among other things, instructed the Ministers of Foreign Affairs:
To promote the conclusion of temporary subregional agreements, with 
provisions for reducing tariffs within the subregions and harmonizing treatments 
toward third nations more rapidly than in the general agreements, in keeping with 
the objectives of regional integration. Subregional tariff reductions will not be 
extended to countries that are not parties to the subregional agreement, nor will 
they create special obligations for them. ...
The countries of relatively less economic development will have the right 
to participate and obtain preferential conditions in the subregional agreements in 
which they have an interest (Wionczek (ed.), 1969: 97-98, italics added).
For the Andean countries this was a significant achievement. The Latin American 
nations and the United States had accepted the principle that nations would be able to
6"... the move to Andean integration represented a response to the inability of LAFTA to respond to 
the national interests of the less well developed partners by failing to agree to packages of measures that 
would assure support of all the member countries" (Axline, 1994b: 204).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
62
create subregional groupings within LAFTA’s framework. Subregional integration would 
allow countries to move faster towards the goal of a common market while at the same 
time member countries would not have to apply the most favorable nation clause.7
The Declaration of the American Presidents was a non-binding document. Soon, 
it was forgotten by most of the governments but not by the Andean countries.
1.4.- "Bases for a Subregional Agreement1'
In June 1967, two months after the Presidents’ summit, in Vina del Mar, Chile, 
the Joint Commission (Comision Mixta), envisaged in the Declaration of Bogota (August 
1966), to draft the subregion agreement, was installed. It was composed of government 
representatives of Colombia, Chile, Peru, Ecuador, and Venezuela.8 The Commission 
adopted the "Bases for a Subregional Agreement" at its third meeting, in August of 1967, 
in Caracas, Venezuela and in the following month the LAFTA Council of Ministers 
ratified them. The five-member countries agreed to eliminate tariff and non-tariff 
restrictions for all the products at a faster rate than LAFTA. The Bases stipulated the 
adoption of a minimum common tariff, a set of rules of origin, safeguard clauses, and 
regulations to prevent unfair competition. The countries also agreed to coordinate their 
economic policies. Ecuador and any other RLDC joining the subregional integration 
process would enjoy special treatment to benefit effectively from the opportunities created
7The principle of the Most Favored Nation states that any concession given to any member of an 
agreement should be automatically extended to all parties.
®The Bolivian government joined the Commission as observer at its third meeting (August 1967), and 
as official member in the fourth meeting (November 1967).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
63
by integration, especially with regard to trade, industry, and investment.
In the second session of its sixth meeting the Joint Commission was able to finish 
its work.9 On May 26, 1969, the Plenipotentiaries of Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador 
and Peru signed the Cartagena Agreement in Bogota, Colombia. Venezuela abstained.
2.- THE CARTAGENA AGREEMENT: ORGANS
The original Cartagena Agreement10 established the Commission and the Junta 
(Board) as the principal organs of the Andean Pact.11 The original auxiliary units were 
the Consultative Committee, and the Social and Economic Committee.
2.1.- The Commission
The Commission is the highest organ of the agreement. It has exclusive legislative 
power, as a consequence it is entrusted with making political decisions. It is in charge
’The Joint Commission in this sixth meeting was not able to reach the final accords and had to adjourn. 
A second session was then called to finish the work. By this act the technique of adjourning and calling 
for a another session of the same meeting was established within the Andean Pact. This device would be 
used every time government representatives would not be willing to acknowledge the lack of progress or 
the existence of problems in agreeing on certain issues.
10The English translation published in International Legal Materials (Vol. VIII, No 5, September 1969) 
is reproduced in Garcia-Amador, 1978: 239-282; and in Inter-American Institute of Legal Materials, 1975, 
Vol I: 175-218.
"In 1979 the Andean Court of Justice (May) and the Andean Parliament (October) were created. The 
Quito Protocol, 1987, incorporated them as principal organs of the agreement. The following Andean units 
are not, however, part of the Cartagena Agreement: the Andean Development Corporation (Corporation 
Andina de Fomento, CAF), created in February 1968; The Andean Reserve Fund (Fondo Andino de 
Reserva, FAR), created in June 1976, and later transformed into the Latin American Reserve Fund (Fondo 
Latinoamericano de Reserva, FLAR) in March 1991; the Andean Council of Ministers of Foreign Relations 
(November 1979); the Andean University "Simon Bolivar, established in September 1986; the three social 
agreements (see chapter IV, section 1.1); and the Andean Presidential Council created in May 1990.
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of the general direction of the process and to deal with all the aspects included in the 
agreement. It is constituted by one plenipotentiary from each country.12 The 
Commission meets ordinarily three times a year, and extraordinarily at the request of one 
country or the Junta. The quorum is fixed at two-thirds of its members (four out of five), 
each member having one vote. Non-participation in a meeting is considered as abstention 
in the voting.
The Commission’s accords are called "Decisions." Decisions, as a general rule, 
are adopted by affirmative votes of two-thirds of its members. There are three groups of 
issues, detailed in the three annexes of the Cartagena Agreement, for which this general 
rule does not apply. For the first group of subjects, included in Annex I,13 there is the 
right of veto. For the second group of matters, considered in Annex n ,14 any member 
country can veto an item only once. In the third group of issues, related to the special 
treatment of Bolivia and Ecuador, a decision is approved if at least one of these two 
countries votes affirmatively and the other abstains.
l2The plenipotentiary of each country, have been, in practice the minister or cabinet rank functionary 
who was in charge of integration matters.
l3The original items in this Annex were: Delegation of responsibilities to the Junta; approval of changes 
of the agreement; amending the Junta’s proposals; approval of the rules for policy harmonization, of 
physical and agricultural integration programs; modification of the number of dutiable items exempted from 
the tariff reduction program; acceleration of the tariff reduction program; and establishing the terms of 
accession to the agreement. The latest version of the Cartagena Agreement, also includes: to modify the 
deadlines stipulated in the agreement; to approve and modify the common external tariff (moved from 
Annex II) and; to approve Junta's proposals with regard to solving conflicts arising from restrictions in 
agricultural trade.
14Items included in this Annex were: Approval of the list of products reserved for sectoral industrial 
programming, approval of the sectoral industrial programs, approval of the rationalization programs, 
approval of the common minimum external tariff and the common external tariff (moved to Annex I), 
approval of the special rules on origin. With the changes in the text of the agreement, the approval of 
sectoral industrial programs was taken out of this Annex because it became possible for a country not to 
participate in some of them. The rationalization programs were eliminated from the agreement, thus it 
disappeared from this Annex. No new items were included in this Annex.
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This complicated voting system relies heavily on consensus, and gives the 
Commission the characteristic of an inter-governmental institution, in which 
governments’ priorities dominate and the decisions adopted by the Commission reflect 
the interests of the governments. This is reinforced by the fact that most of the decisions 
need domestic legislation in order to be implemented.15 In theory, however, the 
Commission had to reconcile and amalgamate national interests, giving shape and form 
to community interests (JUNAC, 1982a: 2).
2.2.- The Junta
The Junta is the secretariat and the technical organ of the Cartagena Agreement. 
Its headquarters are in Lima, Peru. Its main duties are to ensure the observance of the 
agreement’s norms, the observance of the Commission’s Decisions and of its own 
Resolutions; to prepare studies at its own initiative as well as those requested by the 
Commission; to coordinate with government offices in charge of integration, and with 
other organizations dealing with regional integration; to cooperate with Bolivia and 
Ecuador so these countries can benefit from the process; and to evaluate yearly the 
progress made, and based on the results, to propose modifications. In order to fulfill 
these tasks, the Junta has the power to make "Proposals" to the Commission dealing with 
measures and policies.16 The Commission has to consider all the Junta's proposals.
15With the functioning of the Andean Court, January, 1984, all decisions should have been 
automatically part of the national legislation unless it was otherwise indicated in the decision. In practice, 
this automaticity has not worked.
16This power was an exclusive prerogative of the Junta. With the Quito Protocol, the governments of 
the member countries also share this power but they have not use it.
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The Junta is composed of three members appointed unanimously by the 
Commission. They serve for a three year term and can be reelected. In case of vacancy, 
the Commission should appoint a replacement for a three year term.17 All actions of the 
Junta must be adopted unanimously.
The Junta's main mission is to represent the interests of the subregion as a whole. 
With this in mind, the expectation for this principal body was that it would be in charge 
of putting into practice a balanced distribution of benefits. The Junta has technical and 
administrative personnel under its sole control which is independent of the 
governments.18
2.3.- Other bodies
The Consultative Committee was in charge of linking the governments with the 
Junta, but it rarely functioned. Its tasks were taken over by the specialized councils 
created by the Commission, and later eliminated by the Quito Protocol.
The Economic and Social Committee19 was composed of representatives of 
entrepreneurs and workers. Its function was to advise the Commission and the Junta on 
matters pertaining to the committee’s interest, as requested by any of the two main
17This was later changed by Article 11 of the Quito Protocol, signed in May 1987. The replacement 
should serve only for the remainder of the period.
18In practice Junta’s members tend to reflect the interests of their countries since their candidacy has 
to be supported by their governments. The same applies, in general, with regard to the Junta's professional 
personnel.
'*The Committee was later replaced, in January 1983, by the Entrepreneurial Consultative Council 
(Decision 175) and the Labor Consultative Council (Decision 176). They were incorporated by the Quito 
Protocol as auxiliary bodies. Their functions remain similar to the functions of the Economic and Social 
Committee.
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organs. This Committee was also seldom asked to convene.
The auxiliary bodies have not functioned as expected, because the Commission 
and the Junta colluded to monopolize control of the Andean process, the Commission 
from the national and political point of view, the Junta from the community and technical 
view point. The few times these auxiliary organs were called on, they were given tasks 
for which their reports were not given much attention. They were also summoned just 
to be informed about some issues which were in their direct interest.
3.- THE CARTAGENA AGREEMENT: AIMS AND MECHANISMS
The official aims of the Cartagena Agreement are to promote the balanced and 
harmonious development of its member countries, and to accelerate their growth by 
means of economic integration. The benefits derived from integration should be 
distributed with equity in order to reduce the existing gap among the member nations. 
These aims have the objective of bringing about a sustained improvement in the standard 
of living of the subregion’s inhabitants.
The mechanisms to implement the principles were: (a) policy harmonization, 
giving priority to a common treatment of foreign investment; (b) industrial programming 
to accelerate industrialization; (c) a gradual tariff reduction process; (d) a common 
external tariff preceded by a common minimum external tariff; (e) agricultural 
development and cooperation programs; (f) physical integration, and (g) special treatment
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for Bolivia and Ecuador, the relatively less developed countries of the group.
3.1.- Policy harmonization
Policy harmonization, which includes coordination of planning, is the first 
mechanism the Cartagena Agreement’s text contemplates (Chapter HI). As such, the 
drafters signaled that this mechanism was to be the framework for other mechanisms. 
Member countries were required to begin a process of coordination of their development 
plans, and to coordinate their economic and social policies in order to attain a common 
planning system. This process would evolve gradually, parallel to, and in coordination 
with, the formation of the subregional market.20
3.2.- Industrial programming
Industrial programming would be implemented through sectoral programs for 
industrial development, and rationalization programs. Each sectoral program would be 
a negotiated accord specifying the products included, and investment needed. The accords 
should also consider plant locations, harmonization of trade and other policies, a common 
external tariff, special treatment for Bolivia and Ecuador, and other complementary 
measures with regard to the enjoyment of the expanded market. Rationalization programs 
would be applied to industries which have not been selected as part of sectoral programs. 
The aim was to increase their efficiency and productivity.
“ This meant, according to the Junta (JUNAC, 1983a: 8), the adoption from the outset of a set of 
common norms on basic aspects of economic policy to avoid distortions in the functioning of the unified 
market competition.
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3.3.- Program of tariff reduction
The tariff reduction program was a complex mechanism. It was characterized for 
encompassing all the dutiable products; being automatic and irrevocable; being gradually 
achieved; having different forms of liberalization according to the level of development 
of the country and according to the product; being flexible by allowing the use of the 
safeguard clauses; and for the existence of temporary and limited exemptions to the tariff 
reduction program according to the level of development of each country.
3.4.- External tariff
The common external tariff (CET) was to be adopted in two stages. The first was 
the approval, by December 1970, of the common minimum external tariff (CMET). The 
larger countries were to begin the process of gradual, proportional and automatic 
approximation of it in December 1971 and finish this process in December 1975. Smaller 
countries were, in practical terms,, not required to apply the CMET.
The second stage was the approval of the CET itself. It was to be negotiated 
between December 1973 and December 1975 when it would be approved. The larger 
countries would have five years (1976-1980) to apply it gradually. The smaller countries 
would have ten years (1976-1985) to do it.
3.5.- Special treatment for Bolivia and Ecuador
Specific advantages were given to Bolivia and Ecuador in the tariff reduction
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program and the CET. They were in the form of longer periods to implement these 
mechanisms, and in the form of the immediate opening of the Andean market for most 
of their products.
In other mechanisms only general and ambiguous advantages were conferred upon 
these nations. In the case of policy harmonization it was stated that a differential 
treatment should be enough as to compensate for the structural deficiencies of Bolivia and 
Ecuador. As for the industrial programming, these countries should have priority in the 
localization of plants, should have preferential treatment and exclusive advantages to 
benefit effectively from the expanded market. The other member countries also pledged 
to act jointly in order to obtain technical and financial assistance for the smaller nations.
3.6.- Other mechanisms
The common agricultural regime was basically a vague set of cooperation 
programs designed to improve agricultural production and development. More 
importantly, it also considered a list of agricultural products (to be defined by December 
1970) which would be exempt from the tariff reduction program.
The Cartagena Agreement also included the adoption of rules with regard to 
unfair competition, safeguard clauses, and origin of goods. These rules were designed 
to minimize trade distortions and to rely on the market as the most important tool to 
determine trade.
With regard to physical integration, the agreement attempted to improve 
infrastructure, especially in the areas of energy, transports, and communications; and to
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4.- THE ANDEAN INTEGRATION PROCESS AS A POLITICAL ENDEAVOR
The creation of the Andean Group put into practice the decision to pursue 
subregional integration to increase the rate of growth, and to redistribute its benefits in 
an orderly manner. In this way, it was expected that increasing social malcontent could 
be alleviated. This process was the most creative and the boldest of all the integration 
processes attempted in Latin America then or later. Its political creators set to themselves 
objectives, ends, and means that responded to both the realities of the end of 1960s and 
the future (Davila, 1984: 1).
The governments were also hopeful that subregional agreement would accelerate 
the creation of a Latin American common market. As such, the Andean Group was 
conceived of as a temporary agreement within LAFTA. This view was echoed by the 
Peruvian Minister of Foreign Relations, General Edgardo Mercado Jarrin (1969: 26-27). 
He declared that
the Andean Group had been created to overcome the institutional deficiencies, and 
the vacuum existing in LAFTA; to promote dynamically the development of a 
relatively homogenous group of countries; and to execute temporarily, within the 
framework of the Treaty of Montevideo, a program that would help the Andean 
countries to develop at the same rate as the rest of the region.
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4.1.-Negotiating the Cartagena Agreement
The member countries supported the creation of the Andean Pact basically as a 
tool to achieve or to further their own and not necessarily coincidental national 
interests.21 As such, each one of the partners perceived that the subregional integration 
process should be an instrument to contribute to their economic and social development. 
Although it is complementary to the national measures applied by each country, the 
common instrument was designed to greatly modify national structures (JUNAC, 1979b: 
7). It is also true that this common instrument has to reflect the national interests of the 
governments of the member countries.
a) Commercialists vs Developmentalists
From the beginning the countries’ position clearly defined two groups: the 
"commercialist" and the "developmentalist" (Avery, 1983: 158). The first group was 
composed of Colombia and Chile, the most developed and industrialized countries of the 
subregion and thus perceived as the most important and powerful units (see table III. 1). 
They intended to have an integration process in which market forces would be 
predominant. Their aim was basically to create a common market as defined by the 
prevalent economic theory of the time and by GATT. This common market would be 
created gradually but as quickly as possible with the support of a powerful institutional 
structure as prescribed by federalist and neo-functionalist theories.
21 "It is evident that each country pursue its own objectives to which they give maximum priority, and 
conceiving integration as an instrument that contributes to reach these goals.... national economic interests 
are, as a matter of fact, above the Andean process ..." (Vega-Centeno and Iguinez, 1978: 171, 172).


















ANDEAN GROUP AND ANDEAN COUNTRIES STATISTICAL PROFILE




Colombia Venezuela Peru Ecuac or Bolivia
% % % % %
A 1992 33 57 47 93 68 113
B 1970 9.4 21.4 39 10.6 19 13.2 24 6.1 11 4.3 8 55.5
1994 14.0 34.5 35 21.0 21 23.4 24 11.6 12 7.9 8 98.3
C 1970 70.4 57.4 71.8 58.1 39.5 38.2
1993 4/ 85.6 70.3 83.7 70.9 58.0 53.9
D 1970 2.9 6.5 38 3.0 18 4.2 25 1.8 11 1.4 8 16.9
1994 5/ 6.7 13.2 37 7.5 21 8.7 24 3.7 10 2.6 7 35.7
E 1970 4.1 7.5 7.8 4.7 4.2 13.1 6.9
1993 6/ 6.2 7.9 10.0 10.0 8.3 6.5 7.9
F 1970 7.6 7.2 25 11.6 41 7.2 25 1.7 6 1.0 3 28.6
1993 11 41.5 50.0 28 80.1 45 27.1 15 14.5 8 5.9 3 177.6
G 1970 779 337 1,091 544 277 231 515
1993 3,013 1,472 3,774 1,224 1,324 915 1,810
H 1970 8/ 89 501 15 1,970 58 424 12 438 13 70 2 3,403
1993 9/ 1,427 4,389 33 4,585 34 1,618 12 1,853 14 1,050 8 13,395
I 70-75 26.0 34.5 36.1 40.5 41.2 45.4 38.0

















70-75 72.0 73.0 48.6 110.0 95.0 151.3 85.0
90-95 37.014.0 33.2 75.8 57.4 84.8 52.0
70-75 64.2 61.6 66.2 55.5 58.9 46.7 60.0
90-95 74.4 69.3 70.3 64.6 66.6 61.1 67.0
1970 89.0 78.0 75.0 81.0 72.0 57.0 74.0
1993 10/ 95.0 90.0 90.0 87.0 88.0 81.0 88.0
1970 65.0 47.2 54.4 60.4 53.7 60.4 53.0
1990 66.0 57.4 60.9 80.0 72.0 60.1 65.0
1970 15.0 8.0 10.0 20.0 8.0 20.0 n.a.
1992 6.0 9.0 10.0 20.0 5.0 11.0 n.a.
1970 11/ 33.0 25.0 15.0 51.0 14.0 63.0 28.0
1994 41.4 39.0 49.0 83.0 88.0 66.0 55.0
1970 19.5 16.0 3.0 16.0 11.0 15.0 9.0>
1994 12/ 23.0 41.0 22.0 21.0 51.0 27.0 36.0
Blank = Not applicable 
n.a. = Not available 
A = Human Development Index 
B = Population (Millions)
C = Percentage of urban population 
D = Economically active population,
EAP (Millions)
E = Urban unemployment rate as percentage 
of EAP
F = Gross Domestic Product (Billions of US 
current dollars)
G = Gross Domestic Product per capita (US 
current dollars)
H = Foreign direct investment (Cumulative, 
US$ millions)
I = Natality rate (Per thousand)
J = Infant mortality rate 
K = Life expectancy at birth (Years)
L = Adult literacy rate (Percentage)
M = Ratio of students to total school-age 
population
N = Food imports (Percentage of merchandise 
imports)
O = Total external debt as percentage of GDP 
P = Public debt service as percentage of 
exports of goods 
1/ Chile is not included while Venezuela is in 
GRAN figures 
2/ GRAN data may not add-up due to rounding 
3/ Data in percentages column refer to shares
within GRAN.
4 / Chile: 1990 5 / Chile: 1995 6 / Chile: 1994 
7/ Chile: constant prices, 1980 
8/ Chile: 1970 only 9/ Chile: 1993 only 
10/ All countries 1992, GRAN 1993 
11/ Chile: external public debt only 
121 Colombia and GRAN 1993 
SOURCES - UNDP, 1995 : 20, 162; ECLA, 
1976b; 1984a; 1985a; 1994d; 1995a: 5, 8, 13, 
20, 53, 173, 174, 191, 193, 502-503, 764; 
JUNAC, 1994; 1994c: 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12, 33, 
35; 1994d; 1995c: 27; 1995i: 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10 




The developmentalists, Peru, Venezuela (which were not as developed and 
industrialized as Chile and Colombia) and to a lesser extent Bolivia and Ecuador (the 
least developed members), wanted an integration process that would emphasize sectoral 
industrial programming, economic planning and regional coordination. The position of 
these four countries was nearer the ECLA’s stmctmal-dependentista proposals.
It can be said the difference between the two groups was having less policy 
harmonization versus having more policy harmonization; and having more or less 
government intervention in the economy and, thus, in the Andean integration process.
b) National interests and the negotiation of the Cartagena Agreement
The Chilean governments considered the Andean Group as a place for expanding 
exports (Tironi, 1978: 260-263), for improving its relations with Bolivia and Peru with 
whom Chile has border problems and, during the administration of Salvador Allende, as 
a mechanism to reduce its international isolation. For Colombia the "Andean integration 
is visualized as a tool for increasing foreign trade, for stimulating industrial growth, and 
for reaching a greater economic efficiency" (Caballero, 1978: 102).
Chile and Colombia were the most interested in finishing the draft as soon as 
possible. Their delegations presented most of the proposals, hammered out the 
agreements, and worked the hardest to convince the other countries. Therefore, the final 
text reflected more the developmentalist interests of the other four countries than the
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commercialist interests of these two.22
The Andean Group, for Peru was also a tool. "We never understood integration 
other than to be of profound instrumental value. ... A liberating instrument par 
excellence, the Andean Pact should ... strengthen our economic autonomy and the 
increasing capability of our peoples to decide their destiny by themselves" (Velasco, 
1972: 320).23 The Peruvian government up to 1968, was not enthusiastic about 
subregional integration. Its participation in the negotiation process was characterized by 
apathy and obstructionism.24 The Peruvian aim was to relinquish as little sovereignty 
as possible. Only after the reformist military government took power in October 1968, 
did Peru, after some hesitation, decide to participate in earnest.
For Venezuela (Blanco de Iturbe, 1978: 252, 254), the role of integration was 
viewed as a contribution that would help its industrialization and to increase its 
international trade. Venezuela at the very end refrained from signing the Cartagena 
Agreement. This country felt that, the agreement, as it was, would have meant that its
- " .. .th e  fact that they [Chile and Colombia] progressively accepted a shift from the commercial to the 
developmental axis in the integration strategy only shows how important the extended market was for the 
governments of both countries" (Mace, 1994: 37).
“ "The "two fundamental objectives of the Government [are]: political and economic independence at 
the international level, social justice at the national level. ... The active participation of Peru in ... LAFTA 
and the Andean Group is oriented to attain these goals" (Mercado Jam'n, 1969: 24).
The Andean Group "... contributes to substantially further national development, ..., to acquire 
greater influence in the Latin American and international arenas, ..." (Garcfa Bedoya, 1981: 74, 90).
For the Peruvian National Institute of Planning, "Integration ... should be a complement ... for 
attaining our goals in a more efficient manner" (Plan National de Desarrollo 1971-74. Vol. I. Plan Global. 
Lima, Peru: Instituto Nacional de Planificacion, 1971, 51, quoted in Vega-Centeno and Iguiiiez, 1978: 
172).
“ Most of the times its delegates would behave more as observers than as negotiators. Moreover, the 
membership of the delegation of Peru was constantly changing, forcing the other delegations to explain all 
over to the newly arrived Peruvian representatives, in turn they would not commit themselves to any 
opinion adducing lack of knowledge.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
77
small progress to industrialize would be wiped out by the more advanced countries, Chile 
and Colombia.25
According to the Ministry of Planning and Coordination of Bolivia the Andean 
Pact was a tool for its industrial development.26 Bolivia reluctantly joined the 
negotiation process, in August of 1967, a year after the signing of the Declaration of 
Bogota. By then, Bolivia had realized that the other five countries had clearly decided 
to go ahead. For Bolivia to forgo integration would have meant to be even more isolated 
from the region and the subregion.27 To participate in the subregional integration would 
also allow Bolivia easier access to other countries. Last but not least it would provide 
another sympathetic forum to continue to press for its quest for access to the ocean.
In the case of Ecuador the Andean market would serve for the expansion of 
Ecuadorean exports and the development of certain industries (Moncada, 1978: 152).
^Venezuela had begun its industrialization process later than these two countries. Besides being an oil 
rich and oil exporting country, the inflow of foreign exchange obliged Venezuela to maintain an exchange 
rate parity based on its oil revenues in order not to pile up excessive foreign reserves. This meant that this 
country had to have an overvalued currency in relation to everything else but oil. This in turn meant that 
imports were made easier and exports more difficult. To protect its industries, high tariffs had to be 
imposed, and when this was not enough, quotas and import prohibitions had to be enacted. This 
protectionism lead to local production which was more expensive in Colombia, Chile, and even in some 
cases, in Peru. From the political point of view, local industrialists successfully opposed Venezuela’s entry 
to the Pact unless special provisions were included (Rodriguez, 1974).
26"... the Andean subregional agreement constitutes one of the vital mechanisms to implement the 
national strategy of development ... because it offer access to an expanded market which will allow the 
development of the industrial sector" (Estrategia Socio-Economica del Desarrollo Nacional 1971-1991, La 
Paz, Bolivia, 1970, Tomo II, 647; quoted in Morales and Machicado, 1978: 44).
More political goals (Dooner and Fernandez, 1982: 25) for Bolivia were: (a) non-participation in 
the Andean Pact would be a form of marginalization which its consequences were difficult to foresee, (b) 
Since Chile was going to be a member, with whom had a long-standing territorial problem, there was no 
other alternative for Bolivia but to be a member also. And (c) the idea that the Andean Group could 
improve the situation in Bolivia, while it could hardly made things worse.
^Bolivia had lost all its coastal territory, and Peru its southernmost department, to Chile as a result 
of the Pacific War (1879-1883) between Bolivia and Peru against Chile. Since then Bolivia has been 
demanding access to the sea either through part of its former land or through Peru. In January 1992, Peru 
granted Bolivia a corridor to the Pacific Ocean.
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Ecuador participated with enthusiasm in the negotiation process. The objective of the
Ecuadorean delegation was to obtain as many advantages as possible. Because of this
delegation, the RLDC were able to obtain more extensive special treatment than Chile
and Colombia were disposed to accept.
Whatever were the national interests and the degrees of enthusiasm, the
governments considered the Andean Group as a tool to improve the standard of living
of their population. As a Colombian study stated28:
... the Colombian contribution to the Andean process is positive and contributes 
to accelerate it when the national objectives and those of the Andean integration 
coincide; and is negative, producing its stagnation, when the interests do not 
coincidence ...
Colombia designs and executes its economic policy based solely on its 
domestic aims ... it has never adopted policies having as the sole reason its 
participation in the Andean Group.
This is also clearly and succinctly stated by Guerra-Borges (1991: 124): "In the last
analysis integration processes are political processes because their creation, development,
stagnation, or reversion are caused by government decisions."
c) The Andean Pact: A political endeavor?
The aforementioned facts show that the negotiating process was political, in which 
the governments were directly involved. Eduardo Frei (1974: 33) corroborates it by 
stating that "the experience of how the Andean Pact was created shows that it was bom 
thanks to a political decision carried out with political will." Frei’s assertion is reinforced
28Junguito, Roberto and Caballero, Carlos.- Situation y perspectivas de la economia colombiana en 
relation con elprogreso del integration andina. Bogota, Colombia: FEDESARROLLO, November 1974, 
quoted in Caballero, 1978: 103.
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by the following quotations: "The drafting of the Cartagena Agreement is the result of 
a long negotiation, held between August, 1966 and May, 1969, which had essentially a 
political character" (JUNAC, 1972: 3). "The birth of the Cartagena Agreement was 
really the product of a political decision ..." (Grados, 1992: 41). The Andean economic 
integration process, from the start as well as in practice, was a political endeavor, 
initiated and implemented by politicians using economic mechanisms to achieve shared 
national goals, rather than an economic enterprise employing economic tools.
4.2.- The Cartagena Agreement: an economic or a political instrument?
The official aim of the agreement, to foster economic development, was an 
economic objective. This objective was to be achieved "mostly" by economic means. The 
integration process considered in the agreement aims to attain a sort of economic union 
but without considering the creation of a common market29 (because economic policy 
harmonization is considered a mechanism, but there was no explicit provision for free 
movements of capital and labor).30 Market integration and policy integration, as 
explained in chapter I, section 1.1, were part of the aims of the Agreement. By having
■^There is no clear agreement with regard to what was the form of integration the Andean process 
wanted to pursue. Some authors say that it was the achievement of a customs union only; others assert that 
the aim was to create a common market (Fffench-Davis, 1978: 67; JUNAC, 1991: 5); still others maintain 
that the final objective was the formation of an economic union (Salazar, 1973: 13; JUNAC, 1979a: 35; 
JUNAC-CEE, 1986: 7). A more cautious view is to say that the purpose was the creation of a larger 
economic area (Davila, 1984: 6); or an extended market (Marquez, 1990: 7)
“ Chapter XII of the Cartagena Agreement deals with financial matters. Its aim is the coordination of 
national financial and payment policies. Among the aspects to be coordinated is the adoption of measures 
facilitating capital circulation within the subregion. Facilitating the circulation of capital is not as having 
free movement of capital, that is, a situation in which capital could go from one country to another as if 
it was moving within one country. As for movement of labor, the Cartagena Agreement is completely 
silent, perhaps because it was perceived as a social issue.
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Industrial Programming as a mechanism to accelerate industrialization (that is, import 
substitution), production integration was also an important aim of the Andean integration 
process. Thus, from the typological point of view, the agreement’s aim was to create an 
economic union (that is, the economic policy integration aspect of market integration) 
accompanied integration of production.31
The Cartagena Agreement was also a political instrument, because it considered 
topics that have no direct relation to economics. One example of this was the basic 
objective of the agreement, to bring about "a sustained improvement in the standard of 
living of the subregion’s inhabitants." This aim clearly encompassed more than economic 
aspects, and many of them were in the realm of politics. The agreement also included 
issues32 that for non-economists seem to be within the realm of economics, but for 
economists they are in the realm of other social sciences, like politics.33 This is so 
because although economics may intervene to formulate alternatives based on efficiency, 
choosing among alternatives is a process in the hands of governments. They may not 
choose the most efficient proposal for their countries or for the subregion as a whole in 
economic terms, but in political terms dictated by the moment.
31 As has been mentioned in chapter I, section 1.1, production integration focus on industrial planning, 
coordination and specialization. Market integration refers to the process of creating a larger markets, 
through preferential trade areas, free trade zones, and customs unions. Policy integration aims to harmonize 
and eventually unify economic and social policies.
32To mention only a few cases, issues like the preparation and the negotiation of sectoral industrial 
programs; common regime for the treatment of foreign capital, and transnational corporations; or a 
common tariff schedule classification, as well as determining the list of products to be exempted from the 
tariff reduction program.
33For example Cooper and Massed (1965) and Johnson (1965) argue that the reason for establishing 
an integration process such as a customs union may be to further non-economic objectives, and preference 
for industrialization is one of these non-economic aims.
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The process of making economic decisions is not an economic issue but 
exclusively a political one, "... policy is politics."34 From the text of the Cartagena 
Agreement it is clear that economic decisions that had to be taken had to respond to 
political objectives (Aninat, 1992: 17). It is also clear that with the exception of the 
automatic tariff reduction program, the functioning of the mechanisms are subject to 
negotiations among the representatives of the governments of the member countries. 
Furthermore, through the text of the agreement, it is apparent that the implementation 
of the treaty is in the hands of the governments of the member countries.
4.3.- The Agreement as a reflection of the interests of the governments
On a more practical level, the ultimate aim of the Cartagena Agreement was to 
be an instrument for the improvement of the living standard of the member countries. In 
other words, development is the major goal for each one of the member countries. Being 
only one means to deal with development, subregional integration was logically linked 
to the model and strategy of development" of the members.35 This meant that the aims 
of the Cartagena Agreement had to reflect the objectives which at that moment the 
member countries wanted to accomplish through the process of subregional economic 
integration. The rationale with regard to the role of Andean integration, as had been 
already contemplated by ECLA several years ago, was to be a support development by
^"Nobody has attained political maturity who does not understand that policy is politics. Economists 
are particularly apt to overlook these truths'* (Joseph A. Schumpeter, quoted by Lortie, 1975: v, italics 
added).
35The Andean governments, during the 1960s and part of the 1970s, asynchronically pursued a common 
development model of inward-oriented industrialization. The strategy used was import substitution (ECLA, 
1970: 137; Puyana, 1984: 296).
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enlarging the market size and, creating the possibility for import substitution to be 
furthered more efficiently, and dynamically.
The development model and the integration scheme were responses to the concert 
of opinions of the five original member governments. These responses were based upon 
the internal situation and perspectives of each one of the countries, as well as on the 
international situation at the end of the sixties (JUNAC, 1987: 1; 1976: 19). The 
Cartagena Agreement expressly reflects the prevalent ideas about economic development 
in Latin America during the sixties (Carmona, 1984: 5). One of these ideas was that 
states should not only have a major role in adopting decisions to put the agreement into 
practice but also, that the state should have a major role in their implementation.
At the time the final draft was considered to contain a regional strategy flexible 
enough to accommodate the diverse national economic policies of the member countries, 
while being sufficiently coherent to accomplish the common goals pursued by the parties. 
The Andean process was created by a political initiative to deal with political issues 
(development) by employing economic instruments.
4.4.- Organs: An assessment
The institutional structure, especially with regard to the Junta, was one of the 
innovative characteristics of the Andean Group. The original main bodies of the 
Cartagena Agreement were created with enough powers in the expectation that they 
would influence the actions of the governments of the member countries. "The Treaty 
established a well-developed institutional framework" (Mace, 1983: 183). With the
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exception of the EEC, no other integration process had an organization with such 
autonomy and power to implement the political agreement.
Even considering this powerful community organization in which the Junta is 
considered autonomous and with a high degree of authority, the Junta recognized that 
what is to be done is contained in the Cartagena Agreement; how to do it is within the 
scope of the Commission; and the speed of action would depend on what the 
governments were willing to provide for it (JUNAC, 1979a: 38-39). In similar terms, 
the Cartagena Agreement is a framework treaty outlining the main lines of action for 
economic integration. Its efficiency, however, definitively depends to a great extent on 
the effective and coordinated action of the agreement’s institutions. It also depends on 
the ability of the member countries to apply the common policies, and on the will of the 
governments to fulfill their obligations (Aninat, 1992: 15). In other words, the most 
important aspects of the agreement: its aims, its policies and its evolution are not in the 
hands of the Junta's but in hands of the governments of the member countries.
5.- ANDEAN PRINCIPLES AND MECHANISMS
The Cartagena Agreement reflected the national objectives the member countries 
wanted to accomplish through the Andean integration process. The member countries, 
through the negotiation of the agreement, not only reached consensus on the common 
aims to be fulfilled but also with regard to the mechanisms to be used. Besides,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
84
consensus arrived at through negotiations did not mean a convergence of interests, but 
a common denominator of the national interests of the member countries. This common 
denominator also reflected the relative power of the countries involved, in which the 
more important and more interested ones were able to tailor the treaty to their own 
interests better than the less powerful and/or less interested countries.
National interests and relative power, however, could change over time, due to 
internal and external factors. These changes make countries evolve. Evolution could lead 
countries to take different paths at different paces to achieve their changing objectives. 
Since the Cartagena Agreement is a collective accord, changes in it which reflect changes 
in the member countries are difficult to arrange because all governments have to agree 
to them. Thus, over time, there is a major tendency for the Cartagena Agreement, and 
in general all integration processes, to fail to reflect the national interests of some or 
most of the member countries. If this is so, countries will became more and more 
reluctant to fulfill their obligations. If the situation became extreme some countries may 
withdraw, or even worse, the process may be cancelled. The other, more likely 
alternative is that after negotiations among the member countries, the Cartagena 
Agreement would be modified to reflect a new minimum common denominator of the 
aims of the various governments. Continuous progress of the Andean process is not only 
far from being assured, but stagnation and regression tend to be more likely to happen.
5.1.- Main principles of the Cartagena Agreement
By May 1969 five of the six negotiating members were willing to sign the accord.
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In other words, for them the Cartagena Agreement reflected their national interests which 
led to the common denominator of the Andean process. This common denominator was 
spelled out by the Junta (JUNAC, 1972b) and has the following characteristics:
(a) Governments play the most important role in the development process of their 
countries and in the Andean integration process. The primacy of the governments in the 
Cartagena Agreement is shown by the fact that the Commission, the highest organ of the 
process, is composed of government representatives, and through its decisions, is in 
charge of taking measures to achieve the aims of the agreement. The primacy of the 
governments is also demonstrated by the fact that implementation of the mechanisms of 
the agreement through the Commission’s decisions rests on the governments.
(b) Since the member countries had equated development with industrialization, 
furthering industrialization was a common national interest (Graciarena, 1983; 
Fanjzylber, 1983). The member countries agreed that Andean integration would be one 
important tool for more efficient import substitution through specialization in production 
and pooling their domestic markets.
(c) Improving the standard of living of their peoples was the official ultimate but 
vague aim of the Cartagena Agreement. The efforts of the governments to further 
development, and to arrogate to themselves the most important role in the Andean 
integration process, in order to promote more efficient industrialization, would be useless 
if, ultimately, these actions would not benefit their people. One important measure to 
avoid this outcome was that foreign capital should play a subsidiary role in their 
development, and in the Andean integration process. Foreign capital, furthermore, would
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be restricted to being a complement to domestic capital and the former should be directed 
to invest only in areas the governments considered beneficial. Domestic capital would be 
in control of the investment activity. Governments agreed to set common rules to treat 
foreign capital that would increase their negotiating powers, and would avoid competing 
with each other to attract foreign investment.
In summary, three main aims reflecting the common denominator of national 
interests became the principles of the Cartagena Agreement (Moncayo, 1985: 31-34). 
They were:
1) The primacy of governments in the Andean process
2) More efficient import substitution industrialization process
3) Control, of foreign investment
5.2.- Main mechanisms of the Cartagena Agreement
The main mechanisms agreed upon to put these principles into practice were the 
tariff reduction program, common tariffs, industrial programming, and the common 
treatment of foreign capital (Moncayo Garcia, 1985: 73-75). The first three mechanisms 
would contribute to the industrialization process. They would provide the enlarged and 
protected market (the tariff reduction program and a common tariff) needed for attaining 
more efficient production of durable consumer goods, and intermediate and capital goods 
in which the member countries would specialize through industrial programming.
The common treatment of foreign investment would assure that the main benefits 
derived from the integration process would accrue to the countries rather than outside
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investors. It would also allow the member countries to attract resources to finance the 
Sectoral Programs of Industrial Development without competing among themselves. This 
common treatment of foreign investment was an integral part of the mechanism of policy 
harmonization. Its political importance at the time, however, made it the single most 
important policy to be harmonized. As such, it is considered independently, instead of 
including it within the mechanism of policy harmonization.
A minimum harmonization and coordination of planning and policy was thought 
to be necessary to ensure that the other mechanisms would achieve their goals. A long­
term common economic plan (through harmonization of planning) would allow member 
countries to ratify the common long-term goals to be accomplished by the Andean Group. 
Harmonization and/or coordination of policy would ensure, on the one hand, that 
domestic rules would not undermine the integration efforts, and on the other hand, that 
they would not provide undue advantages to particular countries. These main mechanisms 
were:
1) Tariff reduction program
2) Common external tariff
3) Industrial programming
4) Common treatment of foreign investment
5) Planning coordination
6) Policy harmonization
The principles and mechanisms used to achieve common goals describes the basic 
elements of the type of inward oriented development pursued by the governments of the
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member countries through the Andean integration process. As such they reflect the 
common minimum denominator of the national interests of the member countries at the 
time of the signing of the Cartagena Agreement. The principles will serve as the 
reference to compare the evolving strategy of development of the member countries as 
shown by their development plans, and the mechanisms will be compared to their 
economic policies.
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CHAPTER IV 
FROM CARTAGENA TO CARACAS (1969-1973): 
OPTIMISM AND PROGRESS
89
1.- THE ANDEAN GROUP; 1969-1973
Between 1969 and 1973 the Andean integration process went through a phase of 
progress. Progress according to the hypothesis of this research project, as stated in 
chapter I, is characterized by the following indicators: (1) intra-Andean trade increases 
every year; (2) violations to the Cartagena Agreement are very few; (3) decisions made 
by the Commission to implement the mechanisms are approved within the timetable 
established by the agreement; and (4) the implementation of the main mechanisms by the 
governments proceeds without major delays. Sections 2 and 3 of this chapter show that 
the Andean Group enjoyed a phase of progress.
The explanation of this progress, as stated in the hypothesis, lies in the similarities 
in the strategy and policies pursued by the governments of the member countries. These 
similarities led to an analogous set of national goals to be achieved through the Andean
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process whose aims and mechanisms reflected those of the governments. This argument 
is proven in section 4. In other words, the Andean Group had a phase of progress 
because all the governments of the member countries found some of their goals reflected 
in the aims and mechanisms of the Cartagena Agreement.
1.1.- Overview of its major achievements
The Cartagena Agreement came into force in October 1969, after Pern ratified 
it.1 Between 1969 and 1973 all deadlines but one were met, and the nature of the 
Andean integration process and of its institutions were defined (JUNAC, 1979a: 35-36). 
Trade increased steadily; and the first Sectoral Program of Industrial Development, was 
approved in 1972. The Andean Group went, thus, through a phase of progress.2
The Andean integration process also expanded to social aspects,3 giving it a more 
comprehensive character.4 Three social agreements were adopted. The first, the Andres 
Bello5 Agreement, dealt with educational, scientific and cultural integration. It was
'In accordance with Article 110 the "Agreement shall become effective upon communication of 
approval by three states to the Executive Secretariat of LAFTA." The agreement was approved by Chile 
in July 1969, by Colombia in August, by Peru and Ecuador in October, and by Bolivia in November 1969.
2Among the writers who concur with this assessment are Bawa, 1980: 188; Davila, 1984: 17; Ferrari, 
1991: 68; Mace, 1983: 184; 1994: 45-50; Marquez, 1989: 5; and Rodriguez Mancera, 1992: 7.
3On social integration in the Andean process see: Aparicio, 1972; 1974; Chan, 1990; Duran and Lobos, 
1976; Herrera, 1983; JUNAC, 1978e; Miletich, 1977; Ochoa and Gauldfeldt, 1991; Racacoechea, 1981; 
Villegas, 1976; and Vittini (ed.), 1980.
4 A neo-functionalist writer would have seen these social agreements as a clear case of spill-over.
s Andres Bello was a writer, poet, intellectual, and educator. He was bom in Caracas, Venezuela, in 
1781. In 1829 he moved to Santiago, Chile, were he devoted his life to the improvement of education and 
to public service. He died in 1865, in Santiago.
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signed in January 1971. The Hipolito Unanue6 Agreement covering cooperation on 
health issues was signed in December of the same year. Finally, the Simon Rodriguez7 
Agreement on labor integration was signed in October 1973. Unfortunately very little has 
been done in these three areas. The Commission ignored the agreements, and "the Junta 
... did not cooperate with the ‘Andres Bello,’ ‘Hipolito Unanue,’ and ‘Simon Rodriguez’ 
agreements" (Guerrero, 1979: 149).8
The most important reason for neglecting the social agreements was the driving 
concern of the community organs in approving decisions directly related to the 
implementation of the Cartagena Agreement. For this matter, since the social agreements 
were not an official part of the Cartagena Agreement, these areas were not perceived by 
the Commission or by the Junta as central to the Andean process. Successful actions in 
the areas of health, education and labor would have increased public support for the 
Andean process, but the "democratization" of the process was never a major concern for 
the decision-makers either.
1.2.- The admission of Venezuela
More than three years after the creation of the Andean Pact and after almost one 
year of official negotiations between the members of the Andean Group and the
6Hipolito Unanue, 1755-1833, was a noted Peruvian physician and intellectual who was deeply involved 
in the independence process of his country. He founded the first school of medicine in Peru.
7Simon Rodriguez, 1771-1854, was a Venezuelan educator, and tutor of Simon Bolivar, the liberator 
of the Andean countries and Panama.
8Out of the 380 decisions adopted by the Commission until June 1995, only one percent were devoted 
to social issues (JUNAC, 1995h: 8).
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government of Venezuela, the parties signed the "Additional Instrument of the Cartagena 
Agreement for the Accession of Venezuela," and other related documents in Lima in 
February 1973.9 The additional instrument modified the Cartagena Agreement in two 
important aspects. First, the approval of the common external tariff (CET), of 
rationalization programs, and of the Junta’s proposals to solve conflicts arising from 
restrictions in agricultural trade were included in Annex I of the agreement (issues 
subject to veto). Second, the list of products exempted from the tariff reduction program 
was increased (see section 2.1 below).
By the end of December of 1973, Venezuela officially became the sixth member 
of the Andean Group. This act was the last of this first phase of the life of the Cartagena 
Agreement, a phase described as one of progress and optimism.
1.3.- Ideological pluralism
When in November of 1970 the socialist, Salvador Allende, became President of 
Chile, a dilemma was posed. Was the Andean Group a place for a country shifting to a 
socialist economy, or was the Pact limited to countries with capitalist economic systems? 
The military reformist governments of Bolivia, Peru, and to some extent Ecuador, were 
supportive of the concept of "ideological pluralism" within GRAN. That is, they accepted 
that countries with different economic systems could participate in the Andean integration
’They were the Consensus of Lima, and Decision 70 of the Commission. The Consensus of Lima was 
just a formal declaration of the signing of the documents. Decision 70 spelled out the rules to put into 
practice the Additional instrument should be and how Venezuela would comply with existing decisions. 
Among them the timetable for trade liberalization and for the application of the CMET, and the procedure 
for Venezuela to participate in the Metalworking Program.
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process. The civilian government of Colombia was not very enthusiastic.
For the reformist military governments and for the Socialist Chilean government, 
support of "ideological pluralism" had its rationale in the need to provide legitimacy to 
their experiments (Bemales, 1974a: 231). Colombia’s lack of enthusiasm was based on 
the fear that these political experiments might be imitated by other countries, and on the 
rhetorical attack of these regimes on representative democracy (ibid.). Nevertheless,the 
Andean Foreign Ministers in their third meeting, in June 1972, declared "... we want to 
praise the way that respect of the fundamental principle of ideological pluralism is 
manifested in the advances of the Andean integration; this offers a significant testimony 
to the possibility of common objectives beyond the socio-economic structures each 
country adopts "(JUNAC, 1972d: 4).
Aside from these general aspects, the more direct and concrete problem posed to 
the Andean Group was the possibility of integrating partners with capitalist and socialist 
systems. It was assumed, in the Andean Pact, that all countries had to have capitalist 
economies, although they could have democratic or dictatorial regimes as a form of 
government (Guerrero 1979: 77). For GRAN, "ideological pluralism" was an untested 
area. With the overthrow of Allende in September of 1973, the issue was put to rest, but 
between 1970 and 1973, it created great concern.
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2.1.- The tariff reduction program
The most important instrument related to increasing trade was the Andean 
liberalization program. The deadlines for fulfillment of the commitments were met 
(JUNAC, 1976: 61). All dutiable products were classified into several lists which made 
the tariff reduction program a cumbersome process to implement and to manage.
The process of the tariff reduction program involved specific procedures for each 
of the lists. It included three different forms of liberalization: (1) Rules applied among 
the three largest countries, Chile, Colombia and Peru. (2) More favorable treatment by 
the three largest countries toward the less developed countries, Bolivia and Ecuador. (3) 
Special rules for Bolivia and Ecuador to liberalize their trade. "Restrictions of all 
kinds"10 were also to be eliminated according to the level of development of the 
countries. Table IV. 1 presents a summary of the tariff reduction program process.
The tariff reduction program had the following profile: of all the 4,188 dutiable 
products, 34 percent of them11 were reserved for industrial programming (1,416
'“Restrictions of all kinds were defined by Article 42 of the Cartagena Agreement as any administrative, 
financial or exchange measure imposed unilaterally by a member country which impedes or hinders 
importation.
"Tradeable products, for customs purposes were classified by most of the countries following the 
Brussels Tariff Nomenclature. This system divided the universe of dutiable products in XXI sections and 
99 chapters. Each chapter was further divided into "positions," "subpositions," and "items." An item, is 
thus, the unit of this scheme. All countries using this scheme had to have identical descriptions up to the 
level of "subpositions."
The Andean Group, by Decision 51 of March 1972, adopted a common nomenclature based on 
the Brussels Tariff Nomenclature. It was called NABAND1NA, that is, Andean Brussels Nomenclature.
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TABLE IV. 1 
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dutiable items);12 3 percent were classified as goods not produced in the subregion (144 
items); 3 percent were on the LAFTA’s Common List (132 items);13 and 60 percent 
were in the list of automatic tariff reduction (2,496 items). According to these data, only 
66 percent of all dutiable products were nominally included in one or the other tariff 
reduction schedule.
There were two other major drawbacks for the effective functioning of this 
mechanism. One was the unilateral list of exemptions.14 The other was the agricultural 
program which allowed the governments to protect some goods from trade disruptions.
In their unilateral list of exemptions15 each country included not only those 
products in which they had comparative disadvantage, but also products which the 
countries did not want to trade. For example, all countries, regardless of their level of 
competitiveness included most textiles in their lists (JUNAC, 1976: 62). By the time the 
member countries had to present their unilateral lists in December 1970, the five member 
countries together had exempted 1,844 items. These constituted 44 percent of the total
I2Almost all the products belonging to the so called "dynamic industries" (automobiles, basic 
metal—steel—, glass, paper and cellulose, electronics, electrical products) were included (Tomic, 
1980:198). They were generically mentioned in the Declaration of Bogota of August of 1966.
13This list was composed of products for which tariffs reduction were irrevocable (Art. 8 of the Treaty 
of Montevideo).
14Articles 55 and 102 of the Cartagena Agreement.
lsChile and Colombia were allowed to have up to 250 dutiable items exempt from the tariff reduction 
program; Peru up to 450 items; Bolivia 350 items plus 50 subpositions; and Ecuador 650 items. Peru had 
to withdraw from its list one-hundred items by December 1974, and again by December 1979. For Chile, 
Colombia and Peru, these products could remain exempt until December 1985. Up to 20 items, however, 
could continue to be exempt for four more years. The time limit for Bolivia and Ecuador was December 
1990 and they could be prorogated without a deadline.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
97
items in the automatic tariff reduction list.16
This excessively large number of trade exemptions demonstrates that countries 
were more interested in protecting their own industrial production than in expanding 
trade. Conversely, member countries did not want to expand intra-Andean trade at the 
expense of their domestic production. In other words, the member countries put national 
interests above community interests.
Decision 16 of the Commission approved the list of agricultural products to which 
member countries could at any time apply import restrictions.17 This was a 
comprehensive list, and included most of the agricultural products exported by any of the 
partners. With the entrance of Venezuela, the list was increased by around 30 items.18
16This percentage was, in reality, only 33 percent because Bolivia and Ecuador, by Article lOOf of the 
original Cartagena Agreement, were allowed to treat most of their imports from other member countries 
as if they were coming from non-member countries until December of 1976, some 6 years after the others. 
This was, in practice, a de facto  generalized exemption from the tariff reduction program for Bolivia and 
Ecuador.
With the entrance of Venezuela the scheme became more complex. Venezuela had the same right 
to have 250 items exempted from the tariff reduction program—as Colombia and Chile. In addition it could 
have 200 additional items exempt with one of the following countries: Colombia, Chile or Peru. The 
number of exemptions with any one of these countries could not exceed 110 items. The affected country 
could then have an equal number of items exempt from the tariff reduction program with Venezuela. 
Bolivia and Ecuador could increase their list of exemptions by 30 items each. These items could only be 
exempted with Venezuela.
17Article 72 of the Cartagena Agreement, by invoking Article 28 of the LAFTA’s Treaty of 
Montevideo, allowed nou-discriminatory measures to limit imports of agricultural goods to the amount 
required to meet domestic deficit and/or to equalize prices of the imported and domestic products.
18Major items included in the consolidated list were: cows, pigs, chickens, beef, lamb, pork, mutton, 
bacon, milk, dairy cream, eggs, onions, tomatoes, peas, chicken peas, lentils, beans, manioc, bananas, 
pineapples, avocados, oranges, mandarins, grapefruit, grapes, raisins, apples, pears, coffee, dried hot 
peppers, wheat, barley, oat, com, rice, sorghum, quinoa, peanuts, nuts, soybean seeds, cottons seeds, 
castor oil seeds, sunflower seeds, colza seeds, sugar cane, sugar beet, cacao, tobacco, cow skins, cow 
hides, wood, wool, cotton, and agave.
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2.2.- Common minimum external tariff
The Common Minimum External Tariff (CMET) was approved by Decision 30 
in December 1970, meeting the deadline established by the Agreement. The CMET was 
meant to be the first step towards the adoption of a common external tariff on imports. 
The agreement and the text of Decision 30 stipulated that between December 1971 and 
December 1975 Chile, Colombia and Peru were obligated to gradually and automatically 
increase the domestic tariffs of their products whose national levels were below those 
approved. The countries could maintain any tariffs that were above the minimum.19
The CMET was not to be applied 1) to the products included in the reserve list 
for industrial programming, 2) to those in industrial programs, 3) to those products not 
produced in the subregion, 4) or to the products included on the list of exemptions.
The CMET had an average of 40 percent, tariffs ranged from 0 to 120 percent, 
but 97 percent of the items had tariffs of 80 percent or less (JUNAC, 1983a: 7). The 
average levels of the CMET by type of products are shown in the last row of table IV.2.
2.3.- Industrial programming
The aim of industrial programming was to further the import substitution 
industrialization process in the Andean area by assigning the production of a given 
product to one country which would be the sole supplier for the subregion. Industrial 
programming was to be implemented through the Sectoral Programs of Industrial 
Development (SPIDs), and the industrial rationalization program. The former was the
‘̂ Bolivia and Ecuador were only required to apply the CMET to those items in the list of non produced 
products once their production in the subregion had begun.
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TABLE IV. 2
AVERAGE NATIONAL TARIFFS (MAY 1969) BY TYPE OF PRODUCT 









BOLIVIA 71 41 31 48
COLOMBIA 93 38 39 53
CHILE 190 118 95 135
ECUADOR 145 73 49 89
PERU 137 69 48 85
AVERAGE 127 68 52 82
CMET 53.9 36.2 39.1 41.2
CMET =  Common Minimum External Tariff 
SOURCE: JUNAC, 1972a: 19, 21.
important one, and such became synonymous with industrial programming. The latter 
was never put into practice.
For some governments and observers industrial programming was the most 
original, innovative and notable mechanism of the Andean Pact, and its cornerstone 
(Valdes, 1981, 451; Hutcheson, Bolte, Culagovski, Gonzalez, andMorawetz, 1983: 4). 
Industrial programming was the mechanism par excellence to make possible a more 
efficient and rational import substitution industrialization process. Besides, this 
mechanism was to be one of the tools which would allow Bolivia and Ecuador, the 
relatively less developed countries of GRAN, to have access to the benefits of the 
agreement (Fffench-Davis, 1978: 37, 45-46).
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The Sectoral Programs of Industrial Development (SPIDs) were ad-hoc specific 
agreements to be negotiated for each sector. They "are specific in the sense that they are 
established anew for a particular industrial sector. ..." (Vargas-Hidalgo, 1979: 215). 
Each member country was to receive exclusive or shared rights to produce items for a 
fixed period and to have free trade in them. A common external tariff had to be agreed 
upon, and members were required not to encourage production assigned to others.
Negotiations and accords for each program were difficult and cumbersome. First, 
according to Article 33 of the original text of the Cartagena Agreement, all countries had 
to participate in each one of the SPIDs. Second, all SPIDs were to meet many technical 
and economic requirements. Third, each country could veto a SPID once.20 It is easy 
to understand that each of these matters became topics for long debates and negotiations. 
They were political issues, or, as Nye (1968a: 335-336) put it, they were 
"overpoliticized" topics.
From a political viewpoint, the twin objectives of the SPID, efficiency and equity, 
were seen as practically impossible to achieve simultaneously. "In the political sense, 
it is clear that the programming decisions alleviate the concerns of the weaker countries 
and thus remove a major obstacle to integration among developing countries. But at the 
same time ... such decisions disturb the stronger members, which feel limited by [this 
mechanism], with the result that such programming is particularly difficult to negotiate" 
(Salgado, 1984: 86). In other words, this instrument had to reconcile balanced industrial
order to avoid a negative vote, the practice developed was that when it was clear in the 
Commission that a country would veto a proposal, the proposal would be sent back to the Junta without 
formal vote but with requests for modifications. This meant that countries could "unofficially" veto a 
proposal.
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development among the parties with the creation of more efficient industries.
From a pragmatic angle, the most sensitive political issue and "problem ... is 
which country gets what, in terms of production allocation" (Hojman, 1981: 158). This 
was the first and the foremost concern of the governments. Once this issue was 
satisfactorily solved, then other issues would become negotiable. During this first phase 
only was approved the Metalworking Program (Programa Metalmecanico) ,21 in August 
1972, by Decision 57.22 "This step forward, although limited in scope, was one of the 
most important advances towards consolidating the Andean Group" (Salgado, 1984a: 
141).23 This sector was the first to be programmed because of its importance as a source 
or as a generator of expertise, as a basis for the production of capital goods, as a source 
for the diffusion of technology, and as a creator of employment.
2.4.- Planning coordination and Andean development Strategy
According to chapter in of the Cartagena Agreement, the first chapter dealing 
with the mechanisms of the process, the Andean countries were to have a common 
development strategy. This strategy was to be based on the coordination of the 
development plans of specific sectors and the harmonization of social and economic 
policies, resulting in a joint planning system for the development of the subregion.
2lFor details in this industrial program see Guerrero, 1973; Avila, 1978; Mytelka, 1979: chapter 5.
~Of the 72 group of products which the program included, 20 were assigned to Bolivia, 23 to 
Colombia, 22 to Chile, 11 to Ecuador and 25 to Peru (Avila, 1978: 212).
23The reference to this program being limited in scope refers to the fact that the Junta decided, after 
two years of preparing it, to present what was only the "First Metalworking Program." The meaning of 
this was, that many products that are part of this sector were not included either because the existence of 
production or they were long planned national projects in one or several countries (JUNAC, 1976: 70).
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The subregional development strategy would serve as a blueprint from which the 
integration process could evolve. It would also provide the a framework for Andean 
activities, especially those related to the mechanisms of the Cartagena Agreement.
At the beginning of 1972 the Junta presented its "Bases for a Subregional 
Development Strategy" (Bases generates para una estrategia subregional de desarrollo). 
This document proposed an overall strategy that involved joint actions on the part of all 
the member countries acting together, and actions that had to be undertaken at the 
national level. The role of integration was emphasized to be complementary to the 
national development policies (JUNAC, 1976: 123). The "Bases" had a poor reception 
by the governments of the member countries (JUNAC, 1979a: 43). Accepting the 
"Bases" and adopting an Andean development strategy would have meant that the 
governments were accepting the Andean process as an end in itself, and not as mere 
instrument, placing constraints on their own national plans, and relinquishing 
sovereignty.
Other reasons for the lack of interest of the governments were: 1) The admission 
of Venezuela to the Andean Pact increased the size of the Andean market (see table V. 1, 
chapter V), and changed the overall characteristics of the Andean process, especially in 
the financial aspects. This made the Junta revise the "Bases." 2) The existing political 
pluralism in 1972. There were not only military and civilian regimes, but also among 
them, there were governments with socialist, reformist, populist, and market oriented 
economic policies. And 3) within the countries, there was, in most cases, a lack of 
continuity in implementing their policies. By 1977, it was clear for the member countries
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and the Junta that a subregional development plan was not important for the member 
governments and had to be abandoned. As such, this study will not consider planning 
coordination as a mechanism to achieve the aims of the governments.
2.5.- Policy harmonization
The most important tasks in the area of policy harmonization were: the adoption 
of a common regime on the treatment of foreign capital, trademarks, patents, licenses 
and royalties; the approval of a uniform treatment of multinational corporations, the 
avoidance of double taxation, the adoption of guidelines for the harmonization of 
industrial development legislation; and the creation of permanent procedures to achieve 
coordination and harmonization of policies. There was also an urgency to harmonize 
industrial development legislation and foreign trade policies which directly touched on 
the functioning of the tariff reduction program and of the common tariff.
In this regard, Decision 22 on the permanent procedures for achieving 
coordination and harmonization of policies, was approved by the Commission in 
December 1970, within the deadline imposed by the Cartagena Agreement. This 
Decision, however, only created several councils24 and set the rules for their 
functioning. The objective of the councils was to facilitate harmonization of policies and 
planning coordination. The councils, composed of government officials, had only an 
advisory role.
24These councils were: planning, monetary and exchange, finance, fiscal policy, and foreign trade. 
Later on, other councils were created: Tourism (Decision 36, March 1971), Health (Decision 68, 
November 1972), Physical Integration (Decision 71, June 1973), Agriculture (Decision 76, May 1974), 
Industrial Policy (Decision 178, May 1983), and Science and Technology (Decision 179, May 1983).
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The Commission approved, within the deadline required by the Cartagena 
Agreement, Decision 46 on the uniform treatment of multinational corporations and the 
rules to be applied to subregional capital. The rules were aimed to foster the creation of 
Andean multinational corporations with the participation of subregional capital as a 
majority partner. No multinational corporation was created during the whole period of 
the existence of this decision. In March 1972 the Commission approved Decision 51: the 
Andean tariff classification scheme, NABANDINA.
Industrial development legislation were vaguely harmonized in Decision 49 
(approved in December 1971). This decision contained rules for the gradual elimination 
of tariff exonerations, tariff reductions, and tariff refunds. It also contained a schedule 
for the Commission to approve rules with regard to harmonization of fiscal, exchange, 
monetary and financial policies; and a timetable to harmonize incentives for exports; as 
well as joint actions for industrial development. Decision 49 also included rules for non- 
discriminatory tax treatment on subregional products. None of the governments 
implemented this decision, because "harmonization of policies demand[ed] changes in 
national policies and the renunciation of unilateral practices that go beyond what the 
member countries were willing to accept..." (JUNAC, 1979a: 45). Between a community 
obligation and a national interest, the latter prevailed.
There was a lack of agreement in adopting rules to govern unfair competition, 
rules of origin of the merchandise, and a failure to implement the rules for transport of
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goods by road approved in 1972.25
By the end of 1973, little progress was visible in the area of policy 
harmonization. In other words, governments were uninterested in this mechanism. "Even 
though there have been notable technical and conceptual progress [regarding policy 
harmonization], few decisions [in this area] have been approved which in some cases 
have not been implemented..." (JUNAC, 1979d: 52). The main reason was, that "it 
would have been impractical to expect any government to renounce control over its own 
economy in strategic areas ... in order to further the long-term objective of the GRAN 
... [N]o member country was prepared at any stage to cede its sovereignty by allowing 
the responsibility for economic decisions to be vested in the Commission" (Puyana, 1982: 
161). As in the case of planning coordination, governments considered policy 
harmonization would limit their decision-making freedom and their capabilities to pursue 
their objectives. Given the situation, this mechanism will not be considered in the 
remaining of this chapter nor in chapters V and VI.
2.6.- Common treatment for foreign capital
The adoption of the common regime on the treatment of foreign capital,
^With regard to unfair competition, governments wanted to apply export promotion mechanisms, e.g., 
subsidies, tax rebates, technical assistance, soft credits, for all the products they were interested in 
promoting without discriminating the markets of destiny. Harmonization in this area would have meant, 
at least, the no application of these measures to exports to the Andean Group. In the case of the origin of 
the merchandise, the member countries were afraid that general rules would be too stringent to meet and 
thus, their products would not be able to qualify. Linked to this reason, there were very complex technical 
problems about how to have a set of acceptable, fair, general, and simple rules applicable to all 
merchandise. Lastly, the main problem for the implementation of the decision on transport of goods by 
road, was the opposition of the Ecuadorean truckers. They feared that free passage throughout its country 
would leave them without business, since the existing national regulations reserved to nationals the 
transports of goods within the country.
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trademarks, patents, licenses and royalties, Decision 24, in December 1970, as required 
by the Cartagena Agreement, was a major breakthrough (Guerrero, 1971; Mytelka, 1979: 
chapters 3 ,4). This decision responded to the perceived need to prevent foreign capital 
from taking undue advantage of the benefits of the Andean process as had been the case 
with the Central American Common Market (Hansen, 1967: 54-55; Schmitter, 1972: 41- 
45), while at the same time welcoming capital contributions to the development of the 
subregion.26 Another reason for this common policy regarding foreign capital was to 
avoid competition for foreign investment among member countries (JUNAC, 1972c: 2).
The most important aspects of Decision 24 were: (a) gradual nationalization of 
foreign investment;27 (b) access to the expanded market limited to companies 
undergoing its gradual process of nationalization;28 (c) different treatment for different 
sectors;29 (d) prohibition of investment in areas already adequately covered and of 
acquiring investment owned by nationals; (e) no access to medium and long-term 
domestic credits; (f) transfer of profits limited to 14 percent of the foreign investment;30
“The effects of foreign direct investment in the Andean Group and in Latin America were studied, 
among others, by: Tironi, 1975; 1976a; 1976b; Behrman, 1972; Chudnovsky, 1974; Mytelka, 1979; 
Vaitsos, 1970; 1973; 1978.
27A company was considered national if 80 percent of the capital was domestic and it was under local 
control and management. A company with between 51 and 80 percent of local capital was defined a mixed 
if it also was under local management and control. Finally, a company was foreign if less than 51 percent 
of the capital was local.
“The period of transformation of a company from being foreign into mixed—in order to gain access 
to the subregional market—was 15 years if it was located in Colombia, Chile, Peru or Venezuela, and 20 
years if it was located in Bolivia or Ecuador.
“ Companies in mining, oil and forest could be exempted by government from this Decision.
30This limit was justified as a reaction against multinationals overcharging raw materials, under 
invoicing exports, for excessive remittances of profits, and charging exorbitant fees for patents and 
royalties. For a study dealing with these aspects, see Vaitsos, 1973a.
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(g) reinvestment of profits limited to 5 percent of the company’s capital; (h) foreign 
technologies, patents and trade marks were to be approved by the national authorities; 
(i) contracts of technology and patents could not have restrictive clauses for the importer; 
and 0) creation of a national office in each country to oversee all aspects related to 
foreign investment, transfer of technology and industrial property.
Among the issues, limiting the transfer of profits to 14 percent of the investment 
caused the greatest controversy, and "drew the wrath of Washington" (Cockcroft, 1996: 
13). This was an irony because neither the Junta's proposal nor the Commission had 
considered it. It was the Colombian representative who proposed and finally imposed 
it.31 This is another illustration of national interest prevailing over that of the 
community. This also demonstrates that within an integration process, stronger members 
are in a better position to "convince" their partners than weaker members.
Decision 24 was considered "the only multilateral Latin American attempt to 
control investment in the region" (Atkins, 1989: 195). It was hailed as "the most 
innovative of the schemes’ [the Andean Group] activities" and as "[o]ne of the most 
original and pioneering aspects of the Andean Group (Ferris, 1979b: 102; Furtado, 
1976: 239). This Decision "... represented a significant shift in policy from the previous 
unrestrained welcome of foreign investment ... to a position of controlled foreign 
investment as one mechanism to gain greater control over both the domestic economy and 
its relationship with the external world" (Bryant, 1984: 87).
■“Colombia was the country with the longest experience of managing foreign investment. Its legal code 
had a 14 percent limit. This limitation imposed in 1967 was to reduce its circumstantial balance of 
payments problems (Guerrero, 1979: 100).
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The implementation of the common treatment of foreign capital and of foreign 
technology through national regulations, was, however, not only different in each country 
but was also interpreted differently. Furthermore, governments ignored some parts of the 
decision, or issued rulings incompatible with the decision.32
2.7.- Intrasubregional trade
Subregional trade had a notable increase. The reasons are easy to discern. First, 
there was a quick reduction of tariffs in favor of Bolivia and Ecuador by the larger 
countries—Colombia, Chile, and Peru. This, as the figures show, allowed the smaller 
countries a rapid increase in their exports to the other member countries (see tables IV. 13 
and IV. 14). Second, the tariff reduction program, although gradual and not covering all 
products, was an automatic mechanism and member countries, complied with the 
reduction of their tariffs. Third, the first products to take advantage of the opening were 
those in which the country had excess production capacity and comparative advantage. 
Lastly, the tariff reduction program was the first mechanism to go into effect within the 
subregion.
Exports among Andean countries increased every year during this first phase, as 
was hypothesized in this dissertation (see table IV.3). Exports among member countries 
were only $86 million in 1969;33 four years later they totaled $228 million, an increase
“ Colombia, for instance, required the gradual nationalization of new foreign investment only; Peru 
required that investment should be registered in local currency rather than in convertible one as ordered 
by Article 5, and new and existing companies should be nationalized regardless of their interest in 
exporting to the subregion or not; Venezuela did not restrict the access to local medium and long-term 
credits (Mytelka, 1979: 66-67)
33 Date does not include Venezuela, since it was not a member yet.
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TABLE IV.3 
ANDEAN GROUP TRADE: 1969-1973
1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
EXPORTS (FOB) (Million of dollars)
GRAN 86.0 122.8 154.6 166.5 227.9
WORLD 2,874.0 3,398.0 2,925.0 3,192.0 4,251.0
IMPORTS (FOB) (Million of dollars)
GRAN 86.1 122.1 154.7 166.7 227.8
WORLD 2,599.0 2,799.0 3,169.0 3,088.0 3,785.0
TRADE BALANCE (Million of dollars)
GRAN (0.1) 0.7 (0.1) (0.2) 0.1
WORLD 275.0 599.0 (244.0) 104.0 466.0
INTRASUBREGIONAL TRADE AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TRADE
EXPORTS 2.99 3.61 5.29 5.22 5.36
IMPORTS 3.31 4.36 4.88 5.40 6.02
RATE OF GROWTH OF EXPORTS
GRAN 42.79 25.90 7.70 36.88
WORLD 18.23 -13.92 9.13 33.18
RATE OF GROWTH OF IMPORTS
GRAN 41.81 26.70 7.76 36.65
WORLD 7.70 13.22 -2.56 22.57
SOURCE: JUNAC, 1977: II-4.25; 1977a: 37-47, and author’s calculations.
of 265 percent. Total exports of the Andean countries also increased, but at a lower rate 
than intrasubregional trade.
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3.- VIOLATIONS OF THE CARTAGENA AGREEMENT AND DERIVED
OBLIGATIONS
3.1.- Violations
In general, in this phase (1969-1973), violations of the Cartagena Agreement and 
its derived obligations were minimal, as was expected for this phase according to the 
hypothesis of this research project. Violations have been be classified in this research as 
(a) non-compliance with the articles of the Cartagena Agreement, especially the approval 
of decisions by the Commission; (b) non-incorporation in the national legislation of the 
approved decisions; and (c) failure to comply, or ceasing to comply with decisions 
incorporated in the national legislation.
Non-compliance with the articles of the Cartagena Agreement was rare in this 
phase. For the years 1969 to 1971, the Commission was able to approve all the decisions 
within the deadlines stipulated in the agreement.
With regard to incorporation into the national legislation of the approved 
decisions, there was only one, but a very important, fault. None of the governments of 
member countries incorporated Decision 49 (Harmonization of industrial development 
legislation) into their national legislation. In fact, it was never incorporated.
As early as June 1971, the Junta compiled the legal instruments with which the 
member countries had incorporated some of the decisions into their national legislation 
(JUNAC, 1971). The Commission, in response to the Junta's information, ordered "... 
the member countries to send to the Junta, within 15 days, ..., the legalized texts of
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national decrees of decisions not yet incorporated [into the national legislation], ... " 
(Comision, 1971: 5). As table IV.4 shows, by September 1971, Colombia had not 
incorporated into their national legislation five decisions, and Chile and Peru four 
decisions, out of the 4034 approved by the Commission (JUNAC, 1971a).35 The
TABLE IV.4
DECISIONS NOT INCORPORATED INTO THE DOMESTIC LEGISLATION BY 
THE MEMBER COUNTRIES, 1969-1973
SOURCE DATE BO CO CH EC PE TOTAL (*)
(1) 23 Sep 1971 0 5 4 0 4 13 5
(2) 31 Dec 1972 3 2 3 3 3 14 4
(3) 11 Jul 1973 9 11 10 8 3 41 n.a.
(*) Number of different decisions not incorporated into the domestic legislation one or 
more countries 
n.a. =  not available
SOURCES: (1) JUNAC, 1971; (2) Guerrero, 1979: 133-134; (3) JUNAC, 1973.
relatively less developed countries—Bolivia and Ecuador—were not delinquent. By 
December 1972 all the member countries were in default. By July 1973, all the 
countries, except for Peru, had substantially increased the number of decisions not 
incorporated into their national legislation.36
“ There was a decision numbered 17a, so by September 1971 there were 40 decisions approved but the 
last one was Decision 39.
“ Not all the decisions had to be implemented by the member countries. Several of the decisions dealt 
with the management of the agreement, like the decisions pertaining to the rules and regulations of the 
Commission, and of the Junta, the creation of advisory Councils, the designation of the members of the 
Junta, etc.
“ Since the focus here is only to show the number of decisions which member countries were not in 
compliance with, as basis of comparison in the other phases, no attempt is made to rank the decisions. This 
is not to say that some decisions were not more important than others, but, it is not always clear how to 
rank them. For example, by December 1972, of the four decisions which the countries were not observing.
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This information shows that as time went by the participating countries found it 
more and more difficult to comply with the decisions their own government 
representatives had agreed upon. Table IV.5 provides the available information 
aboutdelays in implementing decisions incorporated into the national legislation of the 
member countries. This information pertains only to the tariff reduction program, the 
CMET, and decisions on issues directly related to them. The delays were insignificant, 
being 12 months the longest period. This corroborates the hypothesis of this study.
Another problem related to the violation of incorporated decisions concerned 
trade. In this case, decisions were only "partially" implemented, because countries would 
unilaterally stop granting tariff reductions for imports from all or some member 
countries, or not apply the CMET to imports from third countries. In the case of some 
goods, for which national tariffs were below the CMET and at the same time were 
considered important by a country, some governments were reluctant to increase the 
domestic tariff, and de facto, violated part of a Decision.37 These violations were a 
source of conflict and of further non-compliance with obligations by other countries.
A more widespread violation of the CMET was the "special customs regimes." 
They were tariff reductions, tariff drawbacks, and tariff suspensions employed by all the
the most important was Decision 49 on the harmonization of industrial development legislation. The other 
decisions not incorporated to the domestic legal order were: Decision 40 on avoiding double taxation 
(observed by Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru), Decision 46 on multinational enterprises (observed by Colombia 
only), and Decision 56 about highway transportation (observed by Colombia and Chile). Among the three, 
it is difficult to discern how to rank them.
37An example, Ecuador began to produce "Sorbitol' —an artificial industrial sweetener used in sugarless 
chewing gum and toothpaste. This was one of the products defined as not being produced in the Andean 
area and was assigned to be produced in Ecuador. Peru, the major importer of the subregion, did not raise 
its tariff to be applied to non-member countries to the CMET level—50 percent—because this would make 
this important industrial input too expensive for the user industries. This situation led to a permanent 
complaints by the Ecuadorean government, but the government of Peru did not raise its tariff.
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TABLE IV.5
DELAYS IN IMPLEMENTING TRADE MECHANISMS 
BY DECEMBER 1973 
(In months)










LAFTA’S COMMON LIST Art. 49 N N
"RESTRICTIONS OF ALL KINDS." Art. 46 N 3 N 2
Adoption of the lowest duty of Colombia, 
Chile, or Peru Dec. 15 N 6 N 4
Liberalization of NON-PRODUCED goods Dec. 26 4 3 1 1 1
AUTOMATIC TRADE REDUCTION 
1st. reduction: 31-12-71 Dec. 27 N 9 4 N
2nd. reduction: 31-12-72 N 9 12 N
RESERVED TO BE PRODUCED BY BO Dec. 28 N 5 4 2 2
RESERVED TO BE PRODUCED BY EC Dec. 28 5 5 4 N 2
IMMEDIATE FREE TRADE FOR BO&EC Dec. 29 N 5 N 4
COMMON MINIMUM EXTERNAL TARIFF 
Products in Common List
A65b
/D12 N X N X
1st. approximation 31-12-71 Dec. 30 N 12 N X
2nd. approximation 31-12-72 Dec. 30 N X N X
MARGINS OF PREF. FOR BO & EC Dec. 34 N 9 X N
Adoption of NABANDINA 2/ 3/ Dec. 51 10 7 11 X
Blank space means the country put into practice its obligation, in a timely fashion 
N = The country is not required to put into practice the mechanism 
X = Not into practice by December 1973
1/ A = Article of the Cartagena Agreement; D = Decision number 
2/ Data derived from Vinces and Kuljevan, 1974: 411, 413 
3/ NABANDINA was the common tariff classification for the Andean Countries 
SOURCE: JUNAC, 1976a: 1-17
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countries to promote industrialization and other activities. These "special regimes" were 
applied in a discriminate^ manner according to who the importer was.38 The application 
of these mechanisms constituted a generalized violation of the CMET and a erosion of 
the tariff preference39 accorded to subregional productions. Decision 49—not observed 
the governments—attempted to regulate and gradually eliminate this practice.
3.2.- The Junta and the violations
In July 1973, the Junta issued its first report on the fulfillment of the obligations 
by the member countries. The report (JUNAC, 1973a) concentrates on discussing the 
legal aspects40 of the Cartagena Agreement and the decisions of the Commission. The 
Junta stated that the Cartagena Agreement is legally enforceable and has to be fully 
observed by the countries because it is an international pact freely accepted and duly 
ratified by the governments.
In relation to the decisions of the Commission, the Junta argued in a similar 
manner. The Junta alerted the Commission to the consequences of failing to comply with
38As an hypothetical example, Peru would apply up to twelve different tariffs to the importation of a 
given product. If the importer was the government then the tariff was waived. If the importation was done 
by a priority industry then the tariff applied would be, 10 percent of the official rate. If the importation 
was done by a lower priority industry, the tariff would be a higher proportion of the official levy. If the 
importer was, let say a charity organization, the tariff could be very low and it could also be reimbursed, 
according to the specific law which granted this privilege.
39Defined as the difference between the tariff applied to non-member countries and the one—if 
any—applied to member countries.
40For greater details of the legal aspects of integration as well as the controversy about international 
law and "community law", see the articles in the short-lived periodical (October 1967-November 1978) 
'Derecho de la Integration; ’ and articles in "Integration Latinoamericana." More specifically see: Garcfa- 
Amador, 1978; Orrego, 1972; Orrego and Irigoin, 1981; JUNAC, 1972; 1973a; 1980; 1983b; and Zapata, 
1989.
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the decisions: damages to the countries and their nationals, and a loss of credibility in 
the Andean integration process which could quickly lead to stagnation.
Regarding the problem of the entry into force of the decisions at the national level 
the Junta recognized in a previous document the "non-existence of an explicit provision 
in the Cartagena Agreement ..." for the incorporation of decisions into the national 
legislations (JUNAC, 1972: 9). In order to deal with this increasingly thorny situation, 
the Junta reiterated the proposal, for "... the creation of a tribunal41 to solve the 
conflicts, control the legality of the acts of the Commission and of the Junta, and to 
provide uniform interpretations..." (JUNAC, 1973a 3).
Existing loopholes, and the lack of enforcement power of the Junta42 has allowed 
the governments to disregard the requests of the Junta to comply with their obligations. 
Compliance or not, has, since the beginning, been decided solely by the countries.
■“The Junta had proposed the creation of a Tribunal since the very beginning of the existence of the 
agreement. This issue was discussed by the Commission in December 1971. In the following December 
the Junta presented a formal proposal (JUNAC, 1972). The Junta (JUNAC, 1973b: 11) expected the 
adoption of a decision recommending the member countries to create the tribunal by 1974. It was assumed 
the Commission would begin to discuss and negotiate the proposal by the end of 1973.
42Although the Junta has among its functions "To ensure implementation of the Agreement and 
compliance with the Commission’s Decisions" (Cartagena Agreement, Article 15, paragraph a); it has no 
powers to enforce but to plea to the member countries. It is important to note, however, that this 
problem—enforcing the rules—is also one that other inter-governmental organizations have to deal with.
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4.- UNDERSTANDING THE PHASE OF OPTIMISM AND PROGRESS
4.1.- General Factors
Mace (1983: 184-185) summarized the first phase well.
The years 1970 to 1973 were certainly the most productive in terms of 
integration output. ... trade liberalization proceeded according to schedule, 
industrial programming was launched with the approval of the Metalworking 
Program, the strategic Decision 24 concerning control over foreign investment 
and technology transfer was adopted, and other important decisions for the 
integration process were introduced ... This period of euphoria was capped by the 
incorporation of Venezuela ...
The Junta recognized all these and other achievements43 and concluded that this was "...
a phase of great activity which allowed the consolidation of the Andean Group, fulfilling
the priorities established by the agreement" (JUNAC, 1979a: 36). (JUNAC, ibid.). What
are the factors that can help us to understand why GRAN was successful during its first
five years of existence?
The first factor was the influence of the LAFTA experience. The Andean Group
was created as a consequence of the failure of LAFTA (Mace, 1994; 35); the
governments of GRAN and the Junta wanted to demonstrate that a subregional process
was the path to go, in order to pursue economic integration in Latin America. Thus, the
43Among the other achievements mentioned by the Junta are the definition of the activities of the 
principal organs of the agreement, the adoption of the CMET, the opening of the Andean market for 
Bolivia and Ecuador, the approval of common regime for multinational corporations, the agreement on a 
treaty to avoid double taxation, the harmonization of industrial development legislation, the adoption of the 
rules for road transport, the development of a conceptual framework for negotiating with other members 
of LAFTA, and the beginning of common actions in the international arena (JUNAC, 1979a: 36).
The Junta also pointed out some of the existing problems, " ...it was difficult to fulfill the first 
deadlines of the tariff reduction program and to set up an adequate organization to put into effect the 
industrial programming mechanism. It is also important to point out that the negotiations for the adherence 
of Venezuela distracted the Commission from considering other issues" (ibid.).
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governments were willing to comply with their obligations. Among these obligations, was 
the demanding timetable the Cartagena Agreement had set to approve decisions to put the 
mechanisms into practice. This accomplishment would give to the governments and to 
any observer objective and measurable means to test the degree of success by GRAN. 
"On the whole, the rapid pace set by the bureaucrats in Lima [that is the Junta and its 
staff] was matched by the member governments, who saw rapid progress as a source of 
prestige at home" (Puyana, 1982: 5) and abroad.
All the deadlines set by the Cartagena Agreement for 1970, and 1971 were met 
by the Commission, thanks in great part to the Junta’s hard work (Guerrero, 1979: 80- 
81).44 By December 1972, however, the Commission had approved a decision regarding 
Article 30 of the Cartagena Agreement,45 nor the ones set in Decision 24 (Common 
treatment of foreign capital), or 46 (Common regime for multinational corporations), or 
49 (Harmonization of industrial development legislation).46
In 1973, the last year of this phase, the Commission approved just 8 decisions. 
The most important was Decision 70 concerning the conditions for the adherence of 
Venezuela to the Cartagena Agreement, sanctioned in February of that year.
Table IV. 6 shows a summary of the decisions adopted by the Commission
"As it has been mentioned before, the Cartagena Agreement was signed in May 29, 1969; it only went 
into force, according to its Article 110, in October 16 of that year, after the third country, Peru, deposited 
the instrument of ratification. In November of 1969 the Commission met for the first time, and the Junta 
was installed in the following month. In practical terms, it is only at the beginning of 1970 that the Andean 
process began to evolve.
45This article required governments to implement by December 1972, the schedule for the 
harmonization of foreign trade instruments which should had been approved by the Commission.
"The Commission spent most of 1972 discussing three issues. First, the approval of the Metalworking 
and the Petrochemical programs. Second, the incorporation of Venezuela. Third, the controversy 
surrounding Decisions 24, 46, and 49.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
118
between 1969 and 1973. In general it is possible to note (line 5) that the Commission 
over time reduced its output, from 6 decisions per session in 1969 to less than 2 
decisions in 1973. On the other hand, as expected in this study, the majority of the 
decisions adopted were on new issues (line 2)—there were 58 while there were 23 
modifying decisions—and most of the latter were unimportant (line 3.2). The number of 
decisions on new issues (line 2), however, tended to decrease over time, from 23 in 1970 
to only 5 in 1973. Whereas, the modifying decisions (line 3) went up from 1 in 1970 to 
13 in 1972.
A second factor which explains this early success is that most of these obligations 
were not difficult to implement by the member countries, because they did not greatly 
affect the productive structure and/or specific national interests. The high rate of success 
in approving decisions in the first two years of the agreement can also be attributed to 
the fact that the first decisions were relatively easy to take. Linked to this, the lack of 
previous experience, led both the Commission and the Junta to make bold decisions. 
Both were much less concerned with the viability, the efficacy or the efficiency of the 
decisions, and the possibility that these decisions could be implemented by the countries, 
than to fulfill the Andean compromises within the deadlines. This accomplishment would 
lend support to the assumption that the theory and practice of the Andean scheme were 
correct, and implying that the objectives would also be attainable.
A third reason for the progress was the need for the Andean process to show 
results quickly in order to generate further political support by the governments and
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TABLE IV.6
DECISIONS APPROVED DURING 1969-1973
1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 69-73
1 DECISIONS 6 24 21 22 8 81
2 NEW ISSUES 6 23 15 9 5 58
2.1 Important If 3 15 10 6 1 32
2.2 Unimportant 3 8 5 3 4 26
3 MODIFYING DECS 1 6 13 3 23
3.1 Important 1/ 1 1
- Strengthening
- Weakening 1 1
3.2 Unimportant 1 5 13 3 22
4 SESSIONS 1 6 6 7 5 25
4.1 WITH DECS 1 6 5 5 5 22
- Ordinary 1 3 3 3 3 13
- Extraordinary 3 2 2 2 9
4.2 WITHOUT DECS 1 2 3
- Ordinary
- Extraordinary 1 2 3
5. 1/4 6.00 4.00 3.50 3.14 1.60 3.24
6. 1/4.1 6.00 4.00 4.20 4.40 1.60 3.68
SOURCES: JUNAC, n.d.: 1-7; Vinces and Kuljevan, 1974: 199-748.
1/ Important is defined as decisions that have a direct impact on the principal 
mechanisms of the Andean process.47
■"Examples of important decisions dealing with the Cartagena Agreement in general are: Decision 4 
on the percentage contributions of the member countries to the Junta’s budget, and Decisions 6 and 9 on 
the bylaws of the Commission and the Junta respectively. Examples of important decisions concerning the 
main mechanisms are: Decision 16 (agricultural products exempted from the tariff reduction program), 
Decision 24 (common treatment of foreign investment), Decision 25 (products reserved for industrial
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eventually by the domestic groups benefiting from it.48 The choice of issues, decided 
by the Commission after first being proposed by the Junta followed a predetermined plan 
aimed to obtain quick, positive results that would generate increasing support for 
furthering the process as anticipated by neo-functionalist theorists. In so doing, some 
mechanisms were overlooked and others overemphasized.
Another factor that accounts for progress, is that in those years the Andean 
economies were growing as shown by the growth of their GDPs (table IV.7). This fact 
enabled the countries to increase their imports, part of them would be supplied from their 
subregional partners. The ".. .relatively satisfactory growth of the economy [furthermore] 
provided the necessary political support for the agreement..." (Puyo, 1989: 28), since 
any perceived costs derived from the Andean process were easy to overlook because 
there were resources to pay for from the growing economies.
4.2.- The role of the Commission and of the Junta
Between 1969 and 1973 the Commission and the Junta were very active in 
implementing the objectives of GRAN. Given the great expectations of the members 
about the potentials of the Andean process, there was general support for the subregional 
pact from most of the government units dealing with economic and foreign affairs, and
programming), and Decision 27 (products subject to the automatic tariff reduction program). It is 
acknowledged, however, that there is a degree of arbitrariness in this classification.
^Decisions were adopted "... to present in some cases immediate results and to consolidate some fronts 
before opening new ones. This implied, ..., giving priority to industrial programming rather than to the 
agricultural sector, ... and even to industrial rationalization programs ... It also implied giving priority to 
the common minimum external tariff and to the mechanisms that regulate foreign trade rather than to policy 
harmonization, the aim was to make the tariff reduction program work..." (JUNAC, 1979a: 41).
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TABLE IV.7
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, 1969-1973: RATES OF GROWTH
60-70 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
BOLIVIA 5.6 4.8 5.2 4.9 5.8 6.7
CHILE 4.2 3.1 3.1 7.7 1.4 -4.0
COLOMBIA 5.2 6.4 6.8 6.2 8.5 7.8
ECUADOR 4.7 5.3 9.2 6.3 14.4 25.3
PERU 5.0 1.2 7.5 4.2 2.8 5.4
VENEZUELA 6.0 3.5 4.6 3.1 3.3 6.3
SOURCES: 1960-1970: ECLA, 1986: 145;
1969: IDB, cl972: 4;
1970: ECLA, 1973: 39;
1971-1973: Programa de Armonizacion de Cuentas Nacionales Decision 
114). Unidad de Informatica-JUNAC, except for Chile. Chile: 
ECLA, 1976: 236.
from some of the domestic industrial sectors of each country. This meant that the 
members of the Commission had strong political backing within their own countries, and 
had the power to further integration within their respective countries, as well as to reach 
agreements their governments would be complying with.
In practice the heads of the national organs in charge of integration issues 
constituted the Andean Commission. 49 Their offices had complicated tasks. They had
49This situation, on the one hand, unifies the representation of the interests of the country and gives 
a lot of national power to the representative, but on the other hand it forces them to be a specialist in each 
of the issues being negotiated. In the case of the European process, the Council of the European Union "is 
organized along functional lines" (Archer and Butler, 1992: 29). In other words, "the work of the Council 
is divided into policy areas" (Nugent, 1989: 91). It is composed of the ministers in charge of the issue 
being negotiated. The Council in which the ministers of foreign relations sit is the one which deals with 
the most sensitive and important issues.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
122
to harmonize the opinions of relevant public and private institutions and to arrive at a 
national position on each one of the issues to be negotiated by the Commission. The 
opinions were not always in harmony, or even worse sometimes the government 
institutions did not have any opinion or policy. After the coordination process, the 
national unit had to determine the national position regarding the issues. In theory, these 
positions had to be flexible enough to allow the Commission to negotiate decisions. The 
decisions adopted had to reflect the interests of all the member countries, and to be 
realistic enough so as to be implemented by the governments. Once approved, the 
national offices in charge of coordinating the integration process had to push the 
necessary legislation to incorporate the approved decision into the legal system of the 
country, and then they had to pressure the relevant public institutions to implement the 
decision.50
According to a report of the Junta (JUNAC, 1976: 153), "... in some member 
countries [Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela] the government representative to the 
Commission is, at the same time, head ... of the organism legally in charge of dealing
50There were other aspects that made the job of the national office in charge of Andean integration and 
the tasks for the persons in charge of this office even more complicated. First, in all countries, these offices 
were also in charge of coordinating and doing the same work with regard to LAFTA, (and later to its 
successor the Latin American Integration Association), and the Latin American Economic System (Sistema 
Economco Latinoamericano, SELA). Second, in Colombia, Chile, Ecuador and Venezuela—the office in 
charge of all these integration and cooperation processes was in turn only part of a larger organization or 
ministry. Third, in the other two countries—Bolivia and Peru—the office in charge of integration and 
cooperation was reorganized several times, emerging to become a ministry, to be later merged into a larger 
ministry. In the specific case of Peru, it was first created, in September 1969, as the National Office of 
Integration. It was an autonomous office, solely in charge of all the integration processes Peru belonged 
to at that time, e.g., GRAN and LAFTA. The office was "upgraded” and became a ministry, in 1976, as 
a result of changing political winds after the take over of the government by General Francisco Morales 
Bermudez, in 1975. Later on, in the midst of streamlining the state apparatus, the ministry was 
"integrated," in 1978, as part of the Ministry of Industry, Commerce, Tourism and Integration, which in 
1992 became the Ministry of Industry, Tourism, Integration and International Trade Negotiations. These 
changes, although part of the political process in any country, delayed the workings of the Commission and 
in turn they retarded the Andean integration process.
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with and implementing all—or most of the—matters related to integration. In [the] other 
cases, the representative to the Commission completely lacks the executive faculties ... 
In the first case, it is much more frequently the complete and timely fulfillment of the 
obligations ... In the other case, delays and lack of fulfillment are easier to occur."
The Junta, during this phase, (1969-1973) was able to exercise its autonomy and 
its power of proposal without interference from the governments of the member 
countries.51 This was especially true during the tenure of the first Junta, 1969-1972. 
"...|T]t appeared in the early stages of the GRAN that the Junta built up such a position 
of strength that it functioned as a "sixth government" (Puyana, 1982: 5). This allowed 
the process to have a technical organ able to present proposals that had the community 
welfare as its aim.
As any other bureaucratic organization, the Junta also has an interest of its own. 
As such, as an institution, it is an administrator of policies, yet it has vested interests to 
maintain integration as a viable ongoing enterprise (Axline, 1984: 24).
5IThe three members of the first Junta were elected during the first meeting of the Commission in 
November 1969 and reelected for a another period ending in December 1975. The Junta began its work 
in December 1969. Its members were a Colombian lawyer, a Chilean engineer, and an Ecuadorean 
economist. The first Junta was a pragmatic combination of relevant professions and persons who had 
worked in the drafting of the Cartagena Agreement.
Politically, this Junta was composed of members of the two countries that had been pushed 
integration the most (Colombia and Chile); and by one of the relatively less developed countries (Ecuador). 
The president of the Andean Development Corporation, created in 1968 to finance integration project, was 
a Bolivian. This situation left Peru without having a "representation" in the highest positions of the Andean 
Process. The Peruvian Foreign Ministry insisted on the creation of the position of Director-Secretary 
(Director-Secretario) as one immediate below the members of the Junta, and also proposed that a Peruvian 
fill it. The diplomatic offensive was successful, and the members of the Junta grudgingly accepted a 
Peruvian lawyer and economist for this newly created post. The Peruvian success was due to great extent 
to the fact that Article 11 of the Cartagena Agreement stipulates that members of the Junta will be 
designated by a unanimous vote of the Commission. Nation^ representatives from each of the countries 
in the technical-community bodies was assured.
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4.3.- Relations among the governments of the member countries, the Commission.
and the Junta
The governments of the member countries, and the principal organs of the Andean 
Group—the Commission and the Junta-had to meet the challenges of a very broad and 
ambitious integration process which included mechanisms never tried before. The process 
had to advance at a swift pace in the first years because of the deadlines imposed by the 
Cartagena Agreement itself. At the same time the Junta’s proposals and the 
Commission’s decisions had to balance economic efficiency with equity, and with 
national interests. During this phase, especially until the end of 1972, both the 
Commission and the first Junta were able to work together without major clashes. The 
Commission was "imbued with an admirable spirit of cooperation," and the three 
members of the first Junta had "an inexhaustible creative capacity and willingness to see 
the Andean process work" (Guerrero, 1979: 69).
One factor to which the Junta attributed major progress during this phase was the 
decision-making system. The Junta developed a proposal having in mind only subregional 
interests. The proposal was discussed and negotiated the Commission. In this instance 
the political interests of the member countries were harmonized. The decisions adopted 
then represented a harmonious balance between subregional interests and the legitimate 
national interest of each of the member states (JUNAC, 1972: 15).
Another important factor which helped to insure smooth relations between the 
Commission and the Junta was the personal relations among them. The different 
members of the Commission were almost all linked to integration efforts in the past. The
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members of the Junta had known each other while working on LAFTA’s issues and 
during the drafting of the Cartagena Agreement.
Despite this amicable beginning, tensions began to emerge by 1973 between the 
governments and the Junta, as the former became aware of the power of the latter. 
"[T]he national governments ... decided upon open opposition to a number of [the 
Junta’s] proposals; since that time the power of the Junta has been somewhat checked" 
(Puyana, 1982: 5). For instance, in July 1971, the Commission rejected the 
Petrochemical Program (Guerreio, 1979: 83). The governments also complained about 
"these technocrats, [who] inspired by the example of ECLA, took seriously their role as 
disseminators of ‘formal rationality’ ..., with the inevitable consequence that 
considerations of national sovereignty were relegated to second place" (ibid.: 8). An 
illustration of this was the negotiation of the Metalworking Program. The Junta was 
criticized for not taking into account the realities of the member countries. The 
governments were unhappy with the products they had been assigned to produce. They 
clashed among themselves in trying to get production assignments for all the products 
they were producing, as well as those they had planned to produce.52
4.4.- Strategies of development and the Andean integration aims
This section attempts to find out whether the strategies of development pursued 
by the member countries between 1969 and 1973 had objectives were reflected in the
“ For example, at the eleventh hour, during the second meeting of the ninth session of the Commission, 
the Chilean representative complained that Chile had not been assigned anything related to mining machines 
even though Chile is a mining country (Guerrero, 1979: 124).
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basic aims to be attained by the Andean Group (see chapter HI, section 6.1). These 
principles were: primacy of government, import substitution industrialization, and 
subsidiary role of foreign investment.
The comparison between national objectives and Andean aims will be carried out 
by contrasting the relevant aspects of each country’s development plans with the 
principles of the Cartagena Agreement mentioned above. Although development plans 
in the Andean countries have seldom been implemented,53 they set targets which guided 
government action. As such they are good indicators of governments’ interests. For the 
comparison, countries are loosely paired based on their similarities in terms of their 
levels of development (industrialization), and their economic policies. In this respect, 
Chile is analyzed in conjunction with Colombia, Peru together with Venezuela, and 
Bolivia along with Ecuador.
a) Chile and Colombia
Among the Andean countries, Chile had the most radical change in the 
implementation of its development strategy due to changes in government. In November 
1970, power shifted from the Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei to the Socialist Salvador 
Allende, head of the Unidad Popular coalition. The country went from mixed capitalist 
economy to another of increasing state control. In September 1973, after the overthrow 
and assassination of Allende, the military regime changed to a neo-liberal one.
53Among the many reasons the most relevant are: changes in government, especially in the case of 
unscheduled ones; sudden situations of economic crises, reduction in the prices of most important exports, 
inflation, fiscal deficit; and domestic opposition to the implementation of the measures.
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Leaving the analysis of the military government for the next chapter, both the Frei 
and Allende administrations claimed a leading role and advocated the supremacy of 
government in society including control over foreign capital.54 Frei perceived the 
Andean Pact primarily as a market. Allende was interested in increasing the size of the 
domestic market, and meeting this increased domestic demand through imports, some of 
them coming from the other Andean nations.
Colombia during the presidency of the Liberal Carlos Lleras Restrepo (1966- 
1970) had development plans which emphasized the role of the public sector in the 
economy. The development plan of his successor, President Misael Pastrana Borrero 
(1970-1974) of the Conservative Party, stressed the approach of a leading public sector, 
but in neither case was the primacy of the government put into question.
In the case of foreign capital, development plans supported its control, particularly 
after 1967 when limits on the transfer of profits were enacted (Caballero, 1978: 98). 
With regard to industrialization, Colombia has consistently considered, since the late 
1960s, that its industrialization is best achieved through export promotion. Nevertheless 
Colombia did agree with selective import substitution as a principle, especially in the 
case of capital goods (Caballero, 1978: 97-98).
b) Peru and Venezuela
In October 1968, the Peruvian President, Fernando Belaunde was overthrown by 
a coup d ’etat. The new government continued with the strategy of import substitution
**"... it is indispensable to emphasize the central role assumed by the [Chilean] government as 
protagonist of integration [during] Alessandr., Frei and Allende ..." (Atria et al., 1974: 141).
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industrialization through greater government intervention of the productive and service 
sectors.
"Industrialization is the centerpiece of our country’s economic development" 
(Velasco, 1969 [1995]: 267). Industry was regulated by the General Law on Industry 
enacted in July 1970. It provided fiscal and tariff incentives to industries according to 
their priority. It also established rules for the gradual nationalization of foreign 
companies and for government ownership of all the industrial activities defined as "basic" 
(mostly capital goods). These rules were similar to those later approved in Decision 24.
The Peruvian military felt that the government should play a fundamental role in 
the economy. "[W]ith regard to the integration process state action is fundamental, it is 
the state which has to set the objectives and goals to achieve common welfare" (Plan 
Nacional de Desarrollo 1971-75, quoted in Bemales, 1974a: 226).
In the case of the Peruvian military government there was a concordance between 
some of the national objectives and the three major aims of the Andean Pact. Both had 
the government as the primary actor, both wanted import substitution industrialization, 
and both were in favor of greater control of foreign investment.
Venezuela55 aimed since the 1960s to reduce its reliance on oil. In the 1970s this 
objective was more remote than ever, due to the increased value of oil. Oil, on the other 
hand, allowed Venezuela to command resources and to pursue development.
The IV National Plan, promulgated in 1969, aimed to further import substitution 
by promoting exports of traditional and non-traditional goods (Blanco de Iturbe, 1978:
“ Member only since 1974, but it is included here for sake of completeness.
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246), and emphasizing efficient production of intermediate and capital goods. The 
primacy of the role of government was explicit in Venezuelan development plans. Its role 
was heightened by the fact that income from oil allowed the government to have a 
decisive say in the economy. The public sector was to be in control of the production of 
oil and derivatives, petrochemicals, siderurgy and aluminum. Finally, there was "no 
discrimination between foreign and domestic capital until 1974" (Iguinez, 1983: 25), after 
Venezuela became the sixth member, when Decision 24 was put into force.
c) Bolivia and Ecuador
In 1961 Bolivia had its first development plan. One of the main objectives was 
to further import substitution and to increase exports. In 1970, when the Cartagena 
Agreement had already come into force, the second plan was promulgated. It assigned 
the public sector a key role in development, and called for import substitution at the 
Andean level for industries in which the country had a comparative advantages (Morales 
and Machicado, 1978: 42-43). The implementation of the plans was halted by changes 
in government, in 1964 and 1972 respectively.56 Bolivian development plans explicitly 
coincided with two of the principles of the Cartagena Agreement: the primacy of the 
government, and import substitution industrialization.
Given that this country was the least developed of the Andean Group, its need for 
foreign capital was the greatest. The Andean market and the common treatment of
“ In 1964 General Rene Barrientos overthrew Victor Paz Estenssoro, and in 1972 Colonel Hugo Banzer 
removed from power the reformist government of General Juan Jose Torres. The plans, however, served 
as guidelines for the governments which came after.
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external capital, however, provided the country with increased negotiating power which 
would enable it to attract capital on more advantageous terms. The principle of 
subordination of foreign resources was not openly supported by the governments, but was 
not rejected either.
Ecuador, from 1969 on, was governed by Jose Maria Velasco Ibarra. Just before 
the end of his term, in February 1972, General Guillermo Rodriguez Lara seized power. 
He stayed until 1976. The military government, in its "Philosophy and Plan of Action" 
published in March 1972 and in the 1973-1977 development plan, aimed among other 
things to continue the import substitution industrialization process which had begun in 
the 1950s. What was new about the 1973-1977 plan was that the state reserved for itself 
the right to intervene directly in economic activities (Moncada, 1978: 151, 133). With 
regard to foreign investment, the Velasco Ibarra regime gave it the same treatment that 
was applied to domestic investment until the Andean Group approved Decision 24. The 
military government did not have any specific objective with regard to the control of 
foreign investment, but applied Decision 24.
In brief, all the countries agreed with the principle that the government should be 
the most important actor. This was explicitly stated by the reformist military governments 
of Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador, and also by the non-reformist governments of Bolivia and 
Ecuador, by the Christian Democratic and Socialist regimes of Chile, by both the liberal 
and conservative regimes of Colombia, and by oil rich Venezuela. With regard to import 
substitution industrialization, again, the governments—military or not, reformist or 
not—of Bolivia, Peru Ecuador, and Venezuela were highly supportive, the governments
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of Chile and Colombia were less so. Both considered that increasing trade among 
member countries was more important. Finally, with regard to the subsidiary role of 
foreign investment, the governments of Chile, Colombia and Peru backed this aim, while 
the governments of Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela had no special policy for the control 
of foreign investment.57 The primacy of government is the aim most supported by the 
governments, while the subsidiary role of foreign investment was the least supported. 
The different positions of the governments are summarized in the following table.
TABLE IV.858 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ANDEAN AIMS 














Primacy of government S S s s S S 6S
Import substitution industrialization S I s s S S 5S 11
Subordination of foreign investment I s s I S I 3S 31
14S 41
S = Supportive I = Indifferent
Table IV.8 shows that during the phase of progress, 1969-1973, as expected in 
this dissertation, there was a great degree of agreement between what the governments
^These results also allows one to conclude that no type of regime—military, civilian, dictatorship, or 
democratic—and an economic orientation—neo-liberal or interventionist—are per se more supportive than 
other of integration. Regarding the hypothesis that democracies tend to support integration more than other 
regimes see Dooner and Fernandez, 1982; and Jaffe and Risquez, 1988.
S8Tironi (1978) is the source of the idea of using a matrix to summarize the findings showing support, 
indifference or not support to the aims, and to the mechanism of the Cartagena Agreement.
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had as national objectives and the aims the Andean Group was assigned to achieve. 
Colombia and Peru supported all three Andean aims. Bolivia, and Ecuador, the relatively 
less developed countries, supported the same two objectives while they were indifferent 
to the subsidiary role of foreign investment. Chile also supported two aims, and was 
indifferent to import substitution industrialization. Venezuela supported two aims and was 
indifferent to the other. "The positive outlook, keenness, and togetherness of the 
technocrats coupled with a fairly strong similarity between the political intentions of the 
governments of Bolivia [until 1972], Chile [until 1973] and Peru explains the successful 
start the Agreement had in its first four years" (Bawa, 1980: 188).
4.5.- National economic policies and the Andean mechanisms
As has been shown above, there was a high degree of correlation between the 
goals of the Andean governments and the principles of the Cartagena Agreement. Over 
time, however, countries’ needs and interests change, while the aims of an integration 
process remain the same until consensus to change them is reached among the members. 
It is important then to analyze the correlation between main mechanisms of the agreement 
(summarized in chapter HI section 6.2) and the economic policies of the member 
countries in order to find out the governments support or lack of support to these 
mechanisms.59
These main mechanisms are: planning coordination, policy harmonization, the
59In a recent article Mace (1994), employs a very similar methodology to analyze the support or lack 
of it to Andean process. He, however, applies it to only 3 mechanisms (CET, industrial programming, and 
Decision 24), and for three periods: 1969-1972 (success), 1974-1977 (first crisis), and 1981-1985 (second 
crisis).
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tariff reduction program, common external tariff, industrial programming, and common 
treatment of foreign investment. The first two, planning coordination, and policy 
harmonization will not be considered in this or in chapters V and VI. The main reason 
is the lack of progress in these mechanisms, as stated above in sections 2.4 and 2.5 of 
this chapter.
a) Chile and Colombia
a .l) The tariff reduction program.- Chile, during the Christian Democratic 
administration headed by Eduardo Frei, considered the Andean pact an opportunity to 
expand and diversify its exports. As such, ever since the negotiations of the Cartagena 
Agreement, this country was supportive of the tariff reduction program as the most 
important mechanism of the agreement.
In the Allende Administration the tariff reduction program lost its importance 
since exports were not one of its aims. As table IV.9 shows, Chilean exports only 
increased between 1969 and 1971. In 1972 exports decreased by 26 percent because the 
country was in a severe economic crisis,60 from which it had not recovered in 1973. In 
this latter year, exports increased 17 percent over 1972, but their value was still $3 
million lower than the peak achieved in 1971. Its participation in intrasubregional trade 
was quite low, ranking, only above Bolivia and Ecuador, between 1969 and 1971, and 
in the last two years of this phase (1972 and 1973), even below Ecuador.
“ In that year production went down, GDP was negative, import grew, and foreign reserves diminished 
(IDB, c!974: 162-163).
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TABLE IV.9
CHILE: ANDEAN TRADE 1969-1973
1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
EXPORTS (17OB) (Millio n of dollars)
GRAN 10.8 18.2 24.8 18.7 21.8
WORLD 1,075.0 1,234.0 962.0 855.0 1,231.0
IMPORTS (FOB) (Million of dollars)
GRAN 21.5 28.8 32.1 50.8 62.1
WORLD 907.0 931.0 980.0 941.0 1,098.0
TRADE BALANCE (Million of dollars)
GRAN (10.7) (10.6) (7.3) (32.1) (40.3)
WORLD 168.0 303.0 (18.0) (86.0) 133.0
INTRASUBREGIONAL TRADE AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TRADE
EXPORTS 1.00 1.47 2.58 2.19 1.77
IMPORTS 2.37 3.09 3.28 5.40 5.66
RATE OF GROWTH OF EXPORTS
GRAN 68.52 36.26 -24.60 16.58
WORLD 14.79 -22.04 -11.12 43.98
RATE OF GROWTH OF IMPORTS
GRAN 33.95 11.46 58.26 22.24
WORLD 2.65 5.26 -3.98 16.68
SOURCES: 1969: INTAL, 1975: 53; 1970-1973: ECLA, 1976a: 171, 175 
and author’s calculations
In both the negotiations of the Cartagena Agreement and in its development plans, 
Colombia was consistently in favor of the "commercialist" approach as the way to go in 
GRAN. The Andean Pact was viewed first and foremost as a place to export, and
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TABLE IV. 10
COLOMBIA: ANDEAN TRADE 1969-1973
1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
EXPORTS (FOB) (Million of dollars)
GRAN 37.5 62.5 69.2 70.1 66.7
WORLD 608.0 736.0 690.0 866.0 1,177.0
IMPORTS (FOB) (Million of dollars)
GRAN 16.0 20.5 28.5 28.6 41.8
WORLD 685.0 813.0 929.0 859.0 1,062.0
TRADE BALANCE (Million of dollars)
GRAN .21.5 42.0 40.7 41.5 24.9
WORLD (77.0) (77.0) (239.0) 7.0 115.0
INTRASUBREGIONAL TRADE AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TRADE
EXPORTS 6.17 8.49 10.03 8.09 5.67
IMPORTS 2.34 2.52 3.07 3.33 3.94
RATE OF GROWTH OF EXPORTS
GRAN 66.67 10.72 1.30 -4.85
WORLD 21.05 -6.25 25.51 35.91
RATE OF GROWTH OF IMPORTS
GRAN 28.13 39.02 0.35 46.15
WORLD 18.69 14.27 -7.53 23.63
SOURCE: JUNAC, 1977: II-4.25; 1977a: 37-47 and author’s calculations
secondly as a means to achieve a more efficient and selective import substitution 
industrialization (Caballero, 1978: 102). Besides being the most industrialized country 
of the subregion, Colombia had been promoting and subsidizing its non-traditional
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exports since 1967.61 Between 1969 and 1973, Colombian exports to the subregion 
almost doubled. The value of its intrasubregional exports, however, were never greater 
than 11 percent of its total exports (see table IV. 10).
a.2) Common tariff.- In relation to the common minimum external tariff, the Christian 
Democrat government agreed to the Junta proposal on this issue. The CMET approved 
was much lower than the Chilean average tariffs (see table IV.2), which meant that this 
country had very few items on which it had to increase its national tariff. The Allende 
government implemented only the first approximation to it, the one due in December 
1971 (see table IV.5). Given that non-tariff barriers had become more important for 
regulating imports, the CMET had in turn become relatively less important for 
accomplishing this aim. Thus, the violation of the CMET shows the lack of importance 
of this mechanism for the government.
Colombia supported a common minimum external tariff that would favor an 
improvement of industrial efficiency. The CMET was quite close to the Colombian tariff 
structure and average levels (see table IV.2).62
6lIn that year, decree 444, known as Statute of Foreign Trade and Exchange (Estatuto de Comercio 
Exterior y  de Cambios Internationales) was promulgated. This decree exempted tariffs on imports of 
intermediate products to be used in the production of goods that would be later exported. It also 
consolidated the existing fiscal incentives to exports in one subsidy equal to 15 percent of the value of the 
exports. The decree also established a flexible exchange rate system, which favored exports.
“ If we check the tariff structure for the other countries (table IV.2 ), all of them gave the least 
protection to capital goods, and the greatest to consumer goods. On the other hand, with the exception of 
Bolivia, all the other countries had their average tariffs well above the CMET.
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a.3) Industrial programming.- Industrial programming was not considered an important 
mechanism for the Frei administration. The government expected that very few products 
would be programmed. Given the complicated negotiation procedures to approve each 
of the SPIDs,63 it was anticipated that regardless of how extensive the list of products 
reserved for SPIDs was, only a few would be programmed. Under these circumstances, 
the Frei administration supported industrial programming. Industrial programming 
became even less important during the Socialist government because the areas subject to 
SPIDs at that time—metalworking and petrochemicals—did not coincide with national 
priorities.
Industrial programming was the mechanism in which the Colombian government 
was the least supportive, but supportive anyhow. Since its industrialization process was 
ahead of the other countries, the government felt the SPIDs should be very selective. 
Without openly voicing its doubts about this mechanism, Colombia participated 
intensively in the negotiation of the first SPID, the Metalworking Program, to get 
assigned the products it was interested in producing. Its participation in the negotiations 
also allowed Colombia to influence major decisions with regard to the levels of tariff 
protection,64 the period for which the countries having the assignations would enjoy a 
monopoly of the production in the assigned products, and other important issues.
“ It should also be remembered that all countries had to participate in each SPID, and that SPIDs could 
be vetoed once by each the member.
“ For example in the case of the negotiations of the metalworking program, "Colombia had 
continuously reiterated reducing the levels of the Common External Tariff; ..." (Guerrero, 1979: 127).
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a.4) Decision 24.- Presidents Frei of Chile and Lleras Restrepo of Colombia were for 
controlling foreign investment. Both felt that foreign capital was getting the lion’s share 
in LAFTA and CACM. There was an increased pressure for an Andean common 
treatment of foreign investment since the Andean Pact was a more ambitious integration 
process, and therefore providing potentially more benefits to be shared.
The common treatment of foreign capital, was enthusiastically supported and 
strictly enforced by the Allende regime. "Decision 24 constitutes the clearest expression 
of the new regional economic nationalism and is strongly supported by the government, 
because the subregional control of foreign capital and the government’s economic policies 
coincide" (Wilhelmy, 1982b: 140).
Support for a common treatment of foreign capital had been voiced by Colombia 
ever since the Declaration of Bogota, in August 1966. A year later, by Decree 444, 
Colombia imposed controls on foreign investment. Among the restrictions was the 
limitation on the repatriation of profits to 14 percent of the total investment, later to 
become a cause celebre and the focus of outcry against Decision 24 by American 
investors.
In summary, Colombia supported all the mechanisms, although not with the same 
enthusiasm for all. Chile, from the economic point of view, supported only Decision 24. 
Nevertheless, the Socialist regime supported all the mechanisms, and the Andean Pact 
in general, because the Cartagena Agreement was seen as a source of imports in case of 
economic boycott by the United States, and as a source of diplomatic support in its 
controversies with the same country (Wilhelmy, 1982c: 210).
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b) Peru and Venezuela
b .l) The tariff reduction program.- The Peruvian military regime was supportive of 
industrial programming and of the common treatment of foreign capital. It accepted the 
tariff reduction program and the restrictions imposed by the common minimum external 
tariff as a trade-off. Being less industrialized than Chile and Colombia, Peru had little 
incentive or interest in the tariff reduction mechanism. There were no important Peruvian 
products that could take advantage of this mechanism, and Peru had to open its market 
both to its more industrialized and competitive partners on an equal footing, and to 
Bolivia and Ecuador at a quicker pace. In other words, the tariff reduction program was 
a mechanism that could only increase Peruvian imports of mostly more expensive or non- 
essential goods, while contributing almost nothing toward the increase of its exports. 
Table IV. 11 shows that the Peruvian trade deficit with its Andean partners rose from 
$4.4 million to $46.0 million.
Intrasubregional exports by Venezuela were important within the total intra- 
Andean exports. They, however, were never more than 2 percent of this country’s total 
exports during the period from 1969 through 1973 (see table IV. 12). This percentage was 
the lowest of the Andean Pact. For this reason, the tariff reduction program was not seen 
by Venezuelan authorities as a means to increase intrasubregional trade. Rather, they 
considered that the tariff reduction program could be a means to improve efficiency and 
reduce costs by creating competition with its domestic production.
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TABLE IV. 11
PERU: ANDEAN TRADE 1969-1973
1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
EXPORTS (FOB) (Million of dollars)
GRAN 21.6 21.6 21.3 28.4 35.8
WORLD 866.0 1,048.0 893.0 944.0 1,050.0
IMPORTS (FOB) (Million of dollars)
GRAN 26.0 46.0 62.1 54.5 81.8
WORLD 600.0 622.0 750.0 796.0 1,024.0
TRADE BALANCE (Million of dollars)
GRAN (4.4) (24.4) (40.8) (26.1) (46.0)
WORLD 266.0 426.0 143.0 148.0 26.0
INTRASUBREGIONAL TRADE AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TRADE
EXPORTS 2.49 2.06 2.39 3.01 3.41
IMPORTS 4.33 7.40 8.28 6.85 7.99
RATE OF GROWTH OF EXPORTS
GRAN 0.00 -1.39 33.33 26.06
WORLD 21.02 -14.79 5.71 11.23
RATE OF GROWTH OF IMPORTS
GRAN 76.92 35.00 -12.24 50.09
WORLD 3.67 20.58 6.13 28.64
SOURCE: JUNAC, 1977: II-4.25; 1977a: 37-47 and author’s calculations
b.2) Common tariff.- The common minimum external tariff was a problem for Peru to 
implement. It would increase the tariff on intermediate and capital goods which in turn 
would increase production costs thereby reducing the competitiveness of Peruvian
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TABLE IV. 12
VENEZUELA: ANDEAN TRADE 1969-1973
1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
EXPORTS (FOB) (Million of dollars)
GRAN 30,111 25,935 35,194 39,288 42,266
WORLD 3,113,000 3,181,190 3,037,000 2,947,000 4,568,102
IMPORTS (FOB) (Million of dollars)
GRAN 13,604 15,056 10,569 14,565 24,617
WORLD 2,018,000 2,201,639 2,066,000 2,441,000 2,815,512
TRADE BALANCE (Million of dollars)
GRAN 16,507 10,879 24,625 24,723 17,649
WORLD 1,095,000 979,551 971,000 506,000 1,752,590
INTRASUBREGIONAL TRADE AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TRADE
EXPORTS 0.97 0.82 1.16 1.33 0.93
IMPORTS 0.67 0.68 0.51 0.60 0.87
RATE OF GROWTH OF EXPORTS
GRAN 0.86 1.36 1.12 1.08
WORLD 1.02 0.95 0.97 1.55
RATE OF GROWTH OF IMPORTS
GRAN 1.11 0.70 1.38 1.69
WORLD 1.09 0.94 1.18 1.15
SOURCE: JUNAC, 1977: II-4.25; 1977a: 37-47 and author’s calculations
exports. Even more important, the CMET, and the future CET, would deprive the 
government of the autonomy to change tariffs as it saw fit. Reflecting this latter concern, 
by the end of 1973 Peru had not yet begun to comply with the CMET (see table IV.5).
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The Venezuelan government supported the CMET because it could be a means 
to improve efficiency and reduce costs.
b.3) Industrial programming.- This mechanism was supported by Peru since it would 
help to diversify industrial production and increase efficiency. It fitted very well into the 
development plans of the Peruvian policy makers.
Industrial programming aims were coincidental with the industrialization 
objectives of Venezuela. Both aimed at developing the efficient production of capital and 
intermediate goods. The SPIDs being programmed by the Junta coincided with the 
sectors whose development was a priority for Venezuela.
b.4) Decision 24.- Embarked on an ambitious reform program including industrialization, 
government ownership of strategic industries, and increasing government intervention in 
the economy, the Peruvian military government recognized the need for foreign 
investment and skills. At the same time it was aware that foreign participation had to be 
controlled in order for it to be beneficial to the country. In the words of president 
Velasco "... it will be ... important to agree on a treatment of foreign investment that, 
while taking into account their rights, would subordinate them to the interests of the 
integrated countries, and thus constitute a supporting factor for our independent 
development" (quoted in Bemales, 1974a: 224).
With regard to Decision 24, support by Venezuela was shown by the creation of 
the commission to prepare rules to regulate investment which proposed regulations
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similar to those of Decision 24. Since this country did not have problems with financial 
resources, thanks to its oil income, regulation of investment was not as important as for 
other member countries. Decision 24, however, would allow Venezuelan investment in 
the other Andean nations.
Peru’s economic policies were reflected only by the Industrial Programming and 
the Decision 24. In practice, however, the Pemvian government was supportive of the 
main mechanisms for reasons not dissimilar to Allende’s Chile, that is, to avoid isolation 
and to get support from its Andean partners in its problems with the United States. 
"UJntegration ... avoids isolation, ... [and] since it is multilateral, integration is less 
costly for its supporters than bilateral actions and declarations" (Wilhelmy, 1982a: 195). 
The military, furthermore, saw the Andean Pact as a tool for the economic independence 
of Latin America. "From the very beginning we saw in it [the Andean Pact] a mean to 
strengthen our nations, a form of struggle to reinforce the economic independence of 
Latin America" (Velasco, 1972, quoted in Bemales, 1974a: 225).
Venezuela, while it was negotiating its entry into the pact during this phase it 
developed a scheme to get support from the entrepreneurial groups, and began to prepare 
itself for its future participation. In general, Venezuela was also supportive of the four 
main mechanisms of the Cartagena Agreement.
c) Bolivia and Ecuador
c.l) The tariff reduction program.- Bolivia and Ecuador, according to the original text 
of the Cartagena Agreement, did not have to begin the tariff reduction program until
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1976. On the other hand, they had been enjoying the benefits of the Andean market since
1970. This resulted in an increase in their exports.
In the case of Bolivia, the absolute amounts were very small, between $4.8 
million in 1969 and $26.7 million in 1973 (see table IV. 13), but it was a five fold 
increase. At its best, in 1973, intrasubregional exports were 11 percent of Bolivia’s total 
exports.65 Bolivian exports to the subregion had their biggest jump in 1971, when tariffs 
began to be reduced by Chile, Colombia and Peru. Its exports increased by 245 percent, 
from $5.0 million to 17.1 million between 1970 and 1971. It is therefore possible to 
conclude that between 1969 and 1973 Bolivia supported the tariff reduction program, 
because it provided the country with some limited benefits at no economic or political 
cost; and helped to increase trade and diversify markets and products.
Ecuador was quite successful in taking advantage of the opportunities created by 
the tariff reduction program. Its exports to the subregion increased seven times, from 
$11.3 million in 1969 to $76.9 million in 1973 (see table IV. 14), this was the highest 
increase of the subregion. Its rate of growth increased as well each year. It was the only 
Andean country which was able to accomplish this feat. Exports increased by 28 percent 
between 1969 and 1970, by 31 percent between 1970 and 1971, by 58 percent and 154 
percent in the following two years.
65Among the most important reasons for its dismal participation in the intra-Andean trade are: its feeble 
and late industrialization which did not allowed it to sell manufactured products, the similarities in the 
structure of agricultural and mining production with the other Andean countries, its lack of transportation 
facilities with the rest of the members, and its lack of access to the ocean, and its geographical location. 
Being at one of the geographical end of the Group’s area made Peru the immediate market, a market which 
was important before the Andean project began.
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BOLIVIA: ANDEAN TRADE 1969-1973
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1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
EXPORTS (FOB) (Million of dollars)
GRAN 4.8 6.0 20.3 19.2 26.7
WORLD 172.0 190.0 181.0 201.0 261.0
IMPORTS (FOB) (Million of dollars)
GRAN 3.5 3.8 3.9 5.3 7.4
WORLD 165.0 159.0 170.0 173.0 204.0
TRADE BALANCE (Million of dollars)
GRAN 1.3 2.2 16.4 13.9 19.3
WORLD 7.0 31.0 11.0 28.0 57.0
INTRASUBREGIONAL TRADE AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TRADE
EXPORTS 2.79 3.16 11.22 9.55 10.23
IMPORTS 2.12 2.39 2.29 3.06 3.63
RATE OF GROWTH OF EXPORTS
GRAN 25.00 238.33 -5.42 39.06
WORLD 10.47 -4.74 11.05 29.85
RATE OF GROWTH OF IMPORTS
GRAN 8.57 2.63 35.90 39.62
WORLD 33.95 11.46 58.26 22.24
SOURCE: JUNAC, 1977: II-4.25; 1977a: 37-47 and author’s calculations
c.2) Common tariff.- As to the common external minimum tariff, Bolivia and Ecuador 
had to apply it in the case of goods not previously produced, once their production 
started, but, between 1969 and 1973 there was none. Consequently, Bolivia and Ecuador
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TABLE IV. 14
ECUADOR: ANDEAN TRADE 1969-1973
1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
EXPORTS (FOB) (Million of dollars)
GRAN 11.3 14.5 19.0 30.1 76.9
WORLD 153.0 190.0 199.0 326.0 532.0
IMPORTS (FOB) (Million of dollars)
GRAN 19.1 23.0 28.1 27.5 34.7
WORLD 242.0 274.0 340.0 319.0 397.0
TRADE BALANCE (Million of dollars)
GRAN (7.8) (8.5) (9.1) 2.6 42.2
WORLD (89.0) (84.0) (141.0) 7.0 135.0
INTRASUBREGIONAL TRADE AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TRADE
EXPORTS 7.39 7.63 9.55 9.23 14 45
IMPORTS 7.89 8.39 8.26 8.62 8.74
RATE OF GROWTH OF EXPORTS
GRAN 28.32 31.03 58.42 155.48
WORLD 24.18 4.74 63.82 63.19
RATE OF GROWTH OF IMPORTS
GRAN 20.42 22.17 -2.14 26.18
WORLD 13.22 24.09 -6.18 24.45
SOURCE: JUNAC, 1977: H-4.25; 1977a: 37-47 and author’s calculations.
had no reason to oppose the aplication of this mechanism, since it enabled them to insist 
on its compliance by its relatively more developed partners.
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c.3) Industrial programming.- Bolivia and Ecuador supported the Sectoral Programs 
of Industrial Development (SPIDs), since import substitution industrialization was one 
of the objectives. Being the least industrialized members, and only in the early stages of 
industrialization—basically producing non-durable consumer goods—the SPIDs constituted 
a challenge for Bolivia and Ecuador. The products included in the list of industrial 
programming were mostly intermediate and capital goods, and some durable consumer 
goods. The challenge was that products assigned to these countries were in sectors which 
were little developed, where the country and its entrepreneurs had little experience, and 
for which there was little or no trained labor. On the other hand, industrial programming 
would push Bolivia and Ecuador to diversify their production, with the advantage that 
the future market would be the Andean Pact. Support of the mechanism was warranted. 
The usefulness of the mechanism, however, depended more on the ability of these 
countries to know what they wanted and to negotiate skillfully, than on the mechanism 
itself.
c.4) Decision 24.- The common treatment of foreign investment was a mechanism 
Bolivia had doubts about. The implementation of the SPIDs and other products assigned 
to be produced by Bolivia meant an investment of $350 million between 1970 and 1985. 
This amount was more than 25 percent of 1973 Bolivia’s GDP which was $1,388 million 
in that year (Morales and Machicado, 1978: 75; IDB, cl976: 378). The SPIDs had the 
advantage of offering to investors the whole Andean market. On the other hand, being 
the least developed country of the subregion, foreign investors would be less willing to
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go to Bolivia, since it could not compete advantageously with other members in terms 
of domestic market, infrastructure, skilled labor and the like. Besides, Bolivia had fewer 
resources to nationalize foreign firms, as agreed in Decision 24. Even though the 
application of Decision 24 may have been disadvantageous to Bolivia, during the 
reformist period of General Torres it was strictly observed (ECLA, 1973: 89). The more 
capitalist regime of General Banzer promulgated a new Law of Investment in December
1971. It relaxed some of the regulations, but the law was still mostly within the rules of 
Decision 24. In practice, both regimes supported the application of the common treatment 
of foreign capital, although one more strictly than the other.
The common treatment of foreign capital posed for Ecuador the same dilemma 
as for Bolivia. On the one hand there was the need to attract foreign capital to develop 
the country, and more specifically to implement industrial and infrastructure projects that 
would allow the country to take greater advantage of the Andean Group. On the other 
hand, Decision 24 imposed controls over foreign investment. The reformist military 
government that took power in early 1972 was in favor of the measure since it promoted 
government intervention in the economy. Since the mid-1960s, moreover, Ecuador had 
begun to receive a high influx of foreign investment not only for the oil sector but also 
for industry and for banking. This eased the anxiety of the government about the possible 
negative effects in applying Decision 24.
In brief, it can be said, that between 1969 and 1973, Bolivia and Ecuador 
supported the four main mechanisms of the Cartagena Agreement.
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d) Conclusion
In summary, all the countries supported the main mechanisms of the Cartagena 
Agreement. Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela did so because the mechanisms 
helped their countries to attain some economic policy objectives, or at least the 
mechanisms did not adversely affect the countries. In the case of Chile during the 
Allende years, and of Peru, even though some mechanisms were not correlated with the 
governments’ economic policies, they supported all the mechanisms, and the Andean Pact 
in general. Reasons of high politics (military and security) rather than of low politics 
(economic and welfare) dictated this support. Table IV. 15 shows, the "unanimity" of 
support for the Andean Pact’s mechanisms between 1969-1973.
TABLE IV. 15 
SUPPORT FOR ANDEAN MECHANISMS
MECHANISM BO CH CO EC PE VE (T)
The tariff reduction program S S s s s S 6S
Common External Minimum Tariff s S s s s S 6S
Industrial Programming s S s s s s 6S
Foreign Investment s S s s s s 6S
24S
S =  Supportive (T) = TOTAL
The analysis of the main mechanisms and their perceived effects on some 
economic policies shows that progress of the Andean Group between 1969 and 1973 can 
be correlated with the usefulness of the main mechanisms to the economic and/or 
political aims of the member countries. The findings corroborate the hypothesis of this 
research project.
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CHAPTER V
FROM CARACAS TO AREOUIPA (1974-19781: DOUBTS AND STAGNATION
1.- MAJOR CHANGES IN THE ANDEAN PROCESS
The years 1974 to 1978 were years of stagnation and doubts in the Andean 
Group. According to the definitions used in this study, stagnation is characterized by: (a) 
delays in the implementation of the mechanisms, (b) reduction in trade in some of the 
years, (c) increasing violations of the agreement, and delays in fulfilling the agreement’s 
obligations; and (d) a reduction in the Commission’s output. The underlying explanation 
to this phase, according to the hypothesis, is that a minority of governments find their 
interests not reflected by the Andean process because their strategies and/or policies are 
changing.
1.1.- Overview
The entry of Venezuela and Chile’s exit required lengthy, time consuming, and
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exhausting re-negotiations of some aspects of the Cartagena Agreement and of the most 
important decisions. After Chile’s withdrawal other problems persisted: continuous 
violations of the agreement, demands by Bolivia and Ecuador for a greater access to the 
benefits of the process, and diminishing political support from the member governments. 
The changes in the international economic system of the 1970s forced the member 
governments asynchronically, but surely, to shift to less interventionism in the economy. 
The Commission correspondingly missed deadlines.1
For these reasons, the usefulness of the Cartagena Agreement was put into 
question by the member countries. This resulted in the Protocols of Lima (1976) and of 
Arequipa (1978) and the modifications of several decisions.2 They made the agreement 
more flexible, established a new balance and synchrony among the mechanisms, and 
reflected the changes of member states with regard to the Andean Pact, while reaffirming 
the fundamental principles of the agreement.
1.2.- Changes due to Venezuela’s entry
Venezuela’s joining of the Andean Group strengthened the Pact politically, since 
GRAN showed its capacity to attract a new, important—and wealthiest—member. 
Economically, the size of the market increased (see table V .l).
'"The delay in these [first ten] years was due basically to internal problems of the member countries, 
which were heavily affected by the international crisis, and by the search for the identity of the Group 
[Venezuela’s entry and Chile’s exit] ..." (JUNAC, 1979a: 144).
2"Tbe delays in implementing the mechanisms, the imbalances between automatic and negotiated 
mechanisms, the greater initial emphasis on some mechanisms over others, and the rigidity of some of the 
stipulations of the agreement, were the factors, among others, which led the Member Countries to modify 
deadlines, and to make adjustments, thus changing the Cartagena Agreement through the Protocols of Lima 
and Arequipa in 1976 and 1978 respectively" (Ferrero, 1981: 39).
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TABLE V .l
VENEZUELA’S ENTRY INTO THE ANDEAN PACT: SOME INDICATORS
Without Venezuela With Venezuela Change
Per capita income 400 dollars 500 dollars +  25.00 percent
Population 60 millions 70 millions +  16.66 percent
Total savings 3 billions 4.5 billions +  50.00 percent
Consumption 25 billions 35 billions +  40.00 percent
Foreign trade 6.3 billions 10.4 billions +  65.08 percent
SOURCE: Llosa, 1973: Anexo estadfstico, Cuadro No 1.
Venezuela’s entry into also contributed to the stagnation of the process due to the 
changes brought about by the Additional Instrument to the Cartagena Agreement for the 
Admission of Venezuela, and by Decision 70. The approval of the common external 
tariff and the programs for industrial rationalization were subjected to veto. The Junta's, 
proposals on industrial programs had to be modified to incorporate Venezuela. The only 
approved Sectoral Program of Industrial Development (SPID), the Metalworking 
Program, had to be renegotiated to include Venezuela. The exemptions to the tariff 
reduction program were increased.
The expanded membership also made more difficult the decision-making process. 
Since the Commission’s decisions were in practice adopted by consensus, with the entry 
of Venezuela, the Andean consensus for the sole reason of having more members, if not
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1.3.- The withdrawal of Chile
The two main reasons which caused Chile to withdraw from the Andean Group 
were its demands to make more flexible the rules on foreign investment and that the 
average effective protection4 of the CET should be 30 percent (Tomic, 1980: 321-322), 
as opposed to the Junta’s proposal of 65 percent. The member countries engaged in long 
and difficult and eventually unsuccessful negotiations—from July 1974 to October 1976. 
In the latter date, Decision 102 abrogated all the obligations and rights of Chile with 
regard to the Agreement.
From a political view point, the basic reason which explained Chile’s exit was its 
new strategy of development, "... show[ing] the open antinomy between the implicit 
economic model of the Cartagena Agreement and the [Chilean] scheme..." (Rodriguez 
Mancera, 1992: 8). The military government of Chile supported a neo-liberal strategy, 
getting the government out of the economy, and granting the leading role to the private 
sector.5 The other members still supported an import substitution strategy in which states
3\ . .  other things being equal, there is an inverse relationship between the number of member states 
in a regional organization and its ability to adopt significant regional policies. ... Given the fact that all 
regional decisions are essentially unanimous intergovernmental agreements, each additional partner 
increases the national interests to be satisfied ... The package deal and trade-offs ... increase geometrically 
..." (Axline, 1994b: 199).
■•Effective protection is protection to the value added of a given product. Nominal protection is the tariff 
applied to a given product.
^ i s  radical departure from the strategy of development pursued by Chile since 1974 was due first to 
the interest of the dictatorship to mark very clear distance with the statism of the Socialist government, and 
second as an attempt to improve its relations with the United States highly deteriorated by the harsh 
repression pursued by the military dictatorship. For an analysis of the ideology of the Chilean experiment 
see Foxley 1983; Maulian and Vergara, 1980, 109-125; Petras and Leiva, 1994.
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and plans played important roles. This divergence caused Chile’s departure.
The withdrawal of Chile diminished the Andean Group’s economic potential: the
size of its population by 13.3 percent; its GDP, by 10.5 percent; and its intrasubregional
trade, by 30.9 percent (JUNAC, 1977: 1.12). There were also other consequences like
the reduction of opportunities for profitable investment, and the "serious splits [that]
developed in the Commission, and a mood of weariness and waning enthusiasm [that] set
in" (Puyana, 1982: 10).
Negotiations with Venezuela and Chile clearly show that divergent interests
among the governments of the member countries, as stated in the hypothesis of this
research project, explains this phase of stagnation of the Andean Group. Professors
Vega-Centeno and Iguiiiez (1978: 179) concur
The lack of political accords ... prevents progress on basic aspects. On the 
other hand, the dynamics of the process demand progress either by making 
concessions, ... or by renouncing ... objectives, perhaps fundamental to the 
national socioeconomic process. It is obvious that there is also the possibility of 
breaking links with the Andean Group ... in order to pursue the national project 
(italics added).
1.4.- The Protocols of Lima and Arequipa
Changes in membership weakened important decisions and led to the adoption, 
in October 1976, of the Protocol of Lima. "These changes amounted to a very 
perceptible dilution of the regional strategy itself" (Mace, 1988: 186).
The Protocol of Lima modified the Cartagena Agreement in important aspects. 
First, the deadlines to adopt SPIDs, to approve the CET, and to comply in full the tariff 
reduction program were extended by three years, to December 1978 for the first two,
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and the last to December 1983. Second, the CET became a tariff band, that is, for each 
item there would be a minimum and a maximum level of protection. Third, SPIDs could 
be approved with the participation of only four countries—rather than by all members— 
and their adoption and implementation were made more flexible. Fourth, the list of 
products reserved for industrial programming was to be reduced. This protocol "meant 
the reaffirmation of the basic postulates of the Cartagena Agreement and a readjustment 
of the deadlines" (JUNAC, 1979a: 37).
Because the new deadlines were not met, the Protocol of Arequipa was signed in 
April of 1978. It again extended the deadlines to adopt the CET to December of 1979, 
and to December of 1980 the approval of the industrial programs. The protocols were 
necessary to reestablish the juridical order of the Cartagena Agreement. At the same 
time, governments modified the agreement to make it more in harmony with their 
changing interests and policies.
2.- THE ANDEAN INTEGRATION PROCESS BETWEEN 1974 AND 1978
The stagnation of the Andean process between 1974 and 1978 can be 
demonstrated by the lack of progress in deepening the process in the areas already subject 
to integration and/or in expanding the process into other areas. Stagnation can also be 
shown through increasing violations of the Cartagena Agreement and its decisions in 
comparison to the previous phase; and by the smaller number of decisions approved.
Section 2 will deal with stagnation expressed by the lack of progress in the most
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important mechanisms of the agreement. Section 3 will deal with the increasing violations 
of the agreement and its decisions. Section 4 will explain this phase of stagnation as a 
reflection of the increasing divergences among the member countries.
2.1.- The common tariff
The common minimum external tariff, CMET, was reduced—by Decision 104— 
from an average of 40 percent to 28.7 percent, to keep Chile within the Pact, and to 
reflect the interest of Colombia in reducing tariffs.6
With regard to the CET, according to the original article 62 of the Cartagena 
Agreement, "[p]rior to 31 December 1973, the Board [Junta] shall prepare a Draft 
Common External Tariff, to be submitted for consideration of the Commission for 
approval within the following two years."7 Clarifying the procedure, in May 1973 the 
Commission (1973a: 4) requested the Junta to present before December 1973 the draft 
of the CET, and to submit its proposal before June 30, 1975. The Junta presented 
Proposal 70 (JUNAC, 1975) only on December 27, 19758 because consultations with the 
government representatives were postponed several times (JUNAC, 1977f: 13). The 
December 31, 1975, deadline was not met.
The Junta's proposal suggested that the objective of the CET should be "to help
6Decision 104 was in response "to the greater flexibility which some member countries required to deal 
with their external sector, especially as a consequence of the international [economic] crisis [of the time], 
and as a result of a general policy of less protection for industry..." (JUNAC, 1979a: 82).
7English version from International Legal Materials, Vol III, No 5, September 1969; reproduced in 
Garcia-Amador, 1978: 261.
“For a detailed analysis of Proposal 70 and governments’ reaction to it see Garay, 1979.
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to allocate economic resources more rationally and efficiently" in order to create 
employment and to develop technology (JUNAC, 1976d: 4-5).9 Proposal 70, as the 
Junta acknowledged, "implied substantial modifications in the tariff policy traditionally 
applied by the member countries with regard to the principles to determine the tariff 
structure and the tariff levels..." (JUNAC, 1976: 91). Member countries disagreed with 
the Junta and with each other on the basic terms of the CET, and on its structure and 
levels (see table V.2). The countries, decided, in Article 2 of the Protocol of Lima, to 
transform the tariff level into a tariff band. This meant that each product would have a 
minimum and a maximum tariff instead of a single tariff.
By early 1978, the Junta presented Proposal 96, which included the tariff band. 
By April of that year, the Protocol of Arequipa was signed postponing the adoption of 
the CET until December 1979.
2.2.- The tariff reduction program
The tariff reduction program continued between 1974 and 1978. The number of 
items included in the tariff reduction process—automatic tariff reduction mechanism, the 
Metalworking and the Petrochemical Programs—increased from 2,772 (66 percent of all 
items) in 1970 to 3,212 (71 percent)10 by December of 1975 (JUNAC, 1976a: 1-6).
’Proposal 70 also included norms for the harmonization of Andean countries’ foreign trade, such as 
elimination of import prohibitions, import quotas, unilateral tariff reductions, elimination of export 
subsidies and common rules of government procurement of imported goods.
10As a result in the changes in the NABANDINA—the common customs nomenclature for the Andean 
Group based on the internationally agreed Brussels Tariff Nomenclature—the total number of items 
increased over time, thus in 1970 it had 4,188 items, by December of 1975 it had 4,532 items and 4,869 
items by April 1981 (JUNAC, 1976a: 1-6; 1982: 48).
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TABLE V.2 
ANDEAN TARIFFS AND 
COUNTRIES’ POSITION TOWARDS ON THE COMMON EXTERNAL TARIFF
(PROPOSAL 70) IN DECEMBER 1975
NOMINAL AVERAGE 1 ARIF]FS BY TYPE OF PRODUCTS
SECTOR BO CH CO EC PE VE PROP 70
1. AGRICULTURE 22 na 24 45 58 63 23
2. MINING 20 na 17 15 63 36 15
3. INDUSTRY 22 na 32 30 70 47 41
3.1 Consumer goods 52 na 54 78 127 143 41
3.2 Intermediate goods 16 na 26 19 60 34 34
3.3 Capital goods 17 na 31 20 55 16 57
4. AVERAGE 1/ 20 44 29 28 65 44 39
MAXIMUM LEVEL OF EFFECTIVE TARIFF PROTECTION
For products reserved for 
Sectoral Programs of 




The rest 80 30 60 80 150 100 90
U  General averages do not coincide with similar data in other tables due to different 
criteria to include items in each of the sectors, 
na =  Not available.
SOURCES: Average tariffs for Chile: Aninat, 1978: 180.
For the other countries: Garay, 1979: 293.
Maximum level of effective tariff: Puyana, 1982: 236; JUNAC, 1977f: 16, 30.
The tariff reduction process created a "margin of preference" in favor of the 
member countries.11 It varied from country to country and from time to time due to
“The margin of preference is the difference between the tariff applied to non-members countries and 
the tariff applied to member countries.
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those economic policies not subjected to policy harmonization. Andean exports enjoyed 
a greater margin of preference if the importing Andean countries applied tariffs higher 
than the CMET and/or non-tariffs barriers on the products from non-member countries. 
Exports enjoyed lower, nil, or negative margin of preference if countries applied tariff 
reductions or no tariffs on imports from non-member countries. Thus, Andean "trade was 
influenced by the internal policies of the countries" (JUNAC, 1976: 64).
Since at one time or another all the Andean Pact countries applied import 
restrictions on non-member countries, in general, intrasubregional trade enjoyed a greater 
margin of preference than the one allowed by the CMET. Peru and Venezuela offered 
a margin of preference two and three times higher than the one set by the CMET, and 
in the case of Colombia it was around 10 points above the CMET (JUNAC, 1979a: 83). 
Bolivia and Ecuador, having to apply the CMET and the tariff reduction mechanisms to 
only a few products, offered very little margin of preference.
Similar conclusions can be drawn from table V.3. The third column of each year 
shows the average margin of preference given by the member countries. In 1970, Peru 
offered a 40.1 percent margin of preference, while Colombia offered only 22.5% 
percent. In 1975, again, Peru gave the largest margin of preference, 44.9 percent, 
followed by Venezuela, 40.9 percent, and Colombia 31.5 percent. In 1980 the 
differences of the margins preferences applied by these 3 countries narrowed. Still, Peru 
offered the largest margin followed by Venezuela and then by Colombia. The margins 
of preference given by Bolivia and Ecuador were the smallest but, they also increased 
from 3.0 percent to 12.8 percent over time.
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TABLE V.3
MARGIN OF PREFERENCE FOR INTRASUBREGIONAL TRADE
1970, 1975 AND 1980
1970 1975 1980
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Bolivia 50.0 48.5 3.0 23.3 21.4 8.2 18.0 15.7 12.8
Colombia 56.0 43.4 22.5 36.8 25.2 31.5 35.0 16.9 51.7
Ecuador 91.0 88.3 3.0 30.9 28.4 8.2 33.0 28.8 12.8
Peru 89.0 53.3 40.1 69.1 38.1 44.9 55.0 23.9 56.6
Venezuela 1/ 1/ 1/ 48.9 28.9 40.9 44.0 20.1 54.3
(1) Average Tariff Applied to non-member countries
(2) Average Tariff Applied to member countries
(3) Margin of Preference in favor of the member countries = [(l-2)/l] X 100 
V  Not a member
SOURCE: JUNAC, 1982: 42-43
2.3.- Intrasubregional trade
Trade among the member countries, as expected by the hypothesis of this 
dissertation, increased between 1974 and 1976, and decreased in 1977 and 1978 (see 
table V.4). The 1977 reduction was mostly due to Chile’s withdrawal, but the 1978 
reduction reflected the effects of the changes in the international economic system. In 
1978, exports decreased by 17 percent while imports fell by 22 percent.
The share of intrasubregional trade in total trade, between 1974 and 1978, was 
never more than 6 percent of total exports, and 8 percent of total imports. In 1969, when 
the Andean Pact began, these percentages were 1.9 percent for exports, and 2.5 percent 
for imports (see table IV.3). "Such trade ... while diversifying, consisted] mainly of
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TABLE V.4
ANDEAN GROUP TRADE: 1974-1978
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
EXPORTS (FOB) (Millions of dollars)
GRANI/ 766.2 779.0 909.0 824.7 681.8
WORLD 21,568.0 16,452.0 17,191.0 15,785.5 16,282.7
IMPORTS (FOB) (Millions of dollars)
GRAN 1/ 766.3 778.9 939.0 856.5 662.1
WORLD 10,441,0 11,538.0 14,032.0 16,945.9 18,770.0
TRADE BALANCE (Millions of dollars)
GRAN 1/ (0.1) 0.1 (30.0) (31.8) 19.7
WORLD 11,127.0 4,914.0 3,159.0 (1,160.4) (2,487.3)
INTRASUBREGIONAL TRADE AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TRADE
EXPORTS 1/ 3.55 4.73 5.29 5.22 4.19
IMPORTS 1/ 7.34 6.75 6.69 5.05 3.53
RATE OF GROWTH OF EXPORTS
GRANI/ 236.68 1.67 16.69 -9.27 -17.33
WORLD 281.58 -23.72 4.49 -8.18 3.15
RATE OF GROWTH OF IMPORTS
GRAN 1/ 331.89 1.64 20.55 -8.79 -22.70
WORLD 339.95 10.51 21.62 20.77 10.76
II Includes Venezuela from 1974 on; 1977-1978 excludes Chile.
SOURCES: World (69-75): JUNAC, 1977: II-4.25;
Andean (69-75): JUNAC, 1977a: 37-47;
1976: INTAL, cl977: 143;
1977-1978: JUNAC, 1993: 10 
and author’s calculations.
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agricultural products. There has been no obvious stimulus to growth and industrialization 
beyond what would have [sic] probably occurred in any case" (Bawa, 1980: 185). The 
limited effects on Andean countries’ trade due to the Andean integration process was 
mainly because of "... [t]he existence of red tape, ..., low levels of efficiency and 
similar structures of production" (JUNAC, 1976: 65).
Economic theory of integration has given major attention to trade creation and 
trade diversion effects due to the tariff reduction program.12 As has been mentioned in 
chapter II, section 2.2., for most economists, the former was positive because it 
increased world’s benefits, while the latter was negative for the opposite reason. If the 
analysis was made, however, from the point of view of the objectives of the member 
countries as a whole, then both, trade diversion and trade creation, were positive.13 
Although the concepts are simple and clear, to measure them is far more difficult.14 "In
12As it was defined in chapter II, section 2.2, given the tariff preference in favor of member countries, 
trade creation is a situation in which local production is replaced by imports from a more efficient member 
country. Trade diversion is a situation in which cheaper imports from non-member countries are replaced 
by more expensive imports coming from a member country.
,3Looking upon only from the point of view of the member countries, some economists (e.g., Dell, 
1966; Kitamura, 1966; Linder, 1966, 1967; El-Agraa, 1989: 349) considered trade diversion as having a 
positive effect. One of the reasons was that Andean countries aimed to further import substitution. By 
definition, import substitution is a process by which governments choose, at the beginning, to replace less 
expensive imports for more expensive local production. In the case of trade diversion, the replacement of 
foreign cheaper imports for costlier imports from other members—thus furthering other members import 
substitution—is a measure of success. Another reason to consider trade diversion beneficial is that increased 
trade among members, increases interdependence among member countries and reduces it in relation to 
non-members. This increase of interdependence tends, in theory, to improve relationships at other levels 
(political, security, cooperation etc.). A third reason pertains to the fact that member countries do not pay 
attention to the effects of their acts upon world welfare.
14 El-Agraa (1989: Pan II) has made a survey of the most important attempts to measure trade creation 
and trade diversion effects. A brief survey of empirical studies of economic integration among developed 
countries, especially the EEC, can be found in Jovanovic, 1992: chapter 5; Krauss, 1972:430-434; Mayes, 
1982: 28-43; Robson, 1987: chapter 13; and Waelbroeck, 1976: 89-99. Attempts to measure the effects 
of integration among developing countries on trade flows have been made by Brada and Mendez, 1985; 
Elkan, 1984; Hazlewood, 1966; 1967; 1975; Kahnert et al., 1969; Newlyn, 1965; 1966; Pazos, 1973; 
Pearson, 1970; Robson, 1968; 1983; 1987; Robson and Lury, 1969; Straubhaar, 1987; Willmore, 1976.
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an interdependent macroeconomic world, ... the problems of actual measurement [of 
trade creation and trade diversion] are insurmountable ... therefore its empirical 
estimation seems rather futile ..." (El-Agraa, 1989: 349).15 In general, it can be said 
that, the studies’ conclusions have been inconclusive.
GRAN, is not an exception, measurements have been inconclusive. For example, 
Chan (1972) in an ex-ante estimate calculated that one-third of the increase of Peru’s 
trade with other Andean countries would correspond to trade creation, while two-thirds 
to trade diversion. An ex-post study for Colombia showed no significant trade creation 
or trade diversion.16 Results reported in one set of estimates of another ex-post study 
covering the intra-Andean trade between 1969 and 1977 showed slightly higher trade 
creation (52 percent) than trade diversion (48 percent) (Khazek and Clark, 1990).
Five studies summarized by Langhammer and Heimenz (1990: 24-25, 30-31, 85) 
measuring trade creation and trade diversion in LAFTA and the CACM, and the study 
made by the Secretaria General de la ALADI (1983: 20-26) for trade in LAFTA were 
also inconclusive.
2.4.- Industrial programming
According to the original Article 47 of the Cartagena Agreement, by December
15As a consequence of tariff variations, trade creation and trade diversion have the effects of imposing 
and eliminating tariffs. They influence from what country to buy, and what to buy. Other direct effects are 
on fiscal revenues, price of goods, and on income distribution. There are also indirect effects on factors 
of production, on relative prices, on terms of trade, and on balance of payments (Chan, 1976: 12-23). 
Since empirical research cannot take into account these effects, they have to concentrate a priori to study 
one or a few of them.
l6Garay, Luis Jorge, "Los efectos del programa de liberation sub-regional en el comercio exterior de 
Colombia," mimeo, FEDESARROLLO, December 1979; quoted in Urrutia, 1981: 185.
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1975 industrial programming should be completed, but this deadline was not met. The 
timetable was "excessively optimistic because ... [p]rograms were difficult to formulate. 
They were not accepted by the member countries, they were not included in the national 
plans, nor were they implemented as scheduled" (JUNAC, 1976: 69). There were two 
reasons for this result, the first was, "industrial programming was, in reality, a totally 
new activity, for which the member countries were not prepared either in providing basic 
information and statistics, or in defining priorities, and even less in taking definite 
decisions by fixed dates ..." (ibid.). The second reason was, "... the political change in 
some of the countries with regard to industrial programming as a result of the neo-liberal 
trends in economic policies" (JUNAC, 1979a: 68).
It took the Junta a long time to present its industrial programming proposals to 
the Commission. It took the Commission several years to discuss, negotiate and finally 
approve them.17 Implementation of the programs, left mostly in the hands of the private 
sector, was far from assured since, because of the principle of the primacy of the state, 
the private sector had little, if any, participation in their negotiations.18
17In general the whole procedure beginning with the preparation of a proposal by the Junta to its 
adoption by the Commission was a long and cumbersome process. For details see Aninat, 1992: 36-43. 
It took more than 3 years to prepare and approve—in 1972—the Metalworking Program; and it took more 
than 6 years to adopt the Petrochemical Program (approved in April 1975), and the Automobile Program 
(approved in September 1977). As for the Siderurgy and the Fertilizers Programs, the Junta spent two 
years in preparing them. By the end of this phase of stagnation (1978) they had not been approved by the 
Commission.
18" Proposals for industrial programming should take into account the motivations of the entrepreneurs 
who must convert such ideas into reality. It is difficult to believe that entrepreneurs will assume the risk 
of investment unless there are clear and tangible profits to be made" (Conesa, 1984a: 98).
"Until now the SPIDs have not been carried out. Governments approve these programs but it is 
not their obligation to implement them. Private economic agents are the ones who should made them a 
reality. For them, the relevant factors are profits, opportunity, power relations, markets, investment, 
technological control rather than community interests" (Parra-Pena, 1979: 36).
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Governments of the member countries, were also reluctant to do their share. 
Countries did not take into account their capabilities and tried to get as many production 
assignments as possible.19 This led to long and protracted negotiations. "Industrial 
Programming is creating more political problems than the other mechanisms... 
...industrial programs are the Gordian knot of the Andean integration. It has to be 
unknotted or destroyed at all costs" (Valencia, 1977: 49). On the other hand, "if the 
SPIDs do not became a reality in the near future, several countries will radically change 
their attitude towards the Andean Pact because the SPIDs represent for them the principal 
source of benefits from integration" (Salgado, 1978: 239). The member countries also 
failed to apply the CET and the tariff reduction program for the existing production of 
the approved sectoral programs, and disregarded their obligation not to encourage the 
production of goods not assigned to them (Hojman, 1981: 159; Hutcheson, Bolte, 
Culagovski, Gonzalez and Morawetz, 1983: 35).
A report by the Junta (JUNAC, cl978: 26, 33) on the Petrochemical Program, 
illustrate this point. By the end of 1978, Bolivia had still not incorporated this Decision 
(approved in August 1975) into its national legislation. The tariff reduction program was 
applied by Colombia and Venezuela in a piecemeal fashion. Every year these countries 
were promulgating a decree lowering the tariffs. Ecuador and Peru applied the tariff 
reduction program on a reciprocity basis. Out of the 111 petrochemical products being
I9For example, according to Puyana (1982:9), during the negotiation period the Petrochemical Program 
was substantially modified, so there was no specialization, since every country could develop an integrated 
petrochemical industry, if it wished.
"It is probably true that [the Metalworking and the Petrochemical Programs] could have been 
approved with a much better technical and economic structure. It is not possible, however, to ignore facts 
like the existence of production, and of long-time projects waiting to be developed..." (JUNAC, 1976: 70).
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produced by the end of 1978, the CET was applied to only 36 (30 percent) of them. By 
1978 only 54 items (33.5 percent), of the 161 dutiable items included in this program, 
were being produced and only two productions began their operations after the 
petrochemical decision was passed (JUNAC, 1979a: 76; cl978: 30-31).
By mid-1978, six years after the approval of the Metalworking Program, 
production existed for 45 of the 72 units assigned in this sectoral program. This in turn 
corresponded to 85 (42 percent) of the 202 dutiable items included in the program.20 
Out of the 65 companies producing these goods, 49 were already in existence by the time 
the program was adopted (JUNAC, 1979a: 69).
The results of the two oldest sectoral programs—Metalworking, and 
Petrochemical—were "almost negligible ... regarding trade and investment ... and 
represented] trade in goods from already existing plants" (Puyana, 1984: 302). In short, 
"the mid-seventies witnessed the gradual stagnation of industrial programming ..." 
(Mairal, 1989: 92) as a consequence of these delays.
2.5.- Common treatment of foreign investment
Decision 24, approved in December 1970, was modified seven times,21 giving 
greater discretionary powers to the governments. By the end of 1978 "there was no 
consensus to adopt common regulations to apply Decision 24 and its modifications" 
(JUNAC, 1979a: 47). These changes can be explained as a reaction to the increasing
20This figure should be taken with caution, since a dutiable item usually covers more production lines 
than the existing production, which are usually the simpler ones.
2lFor a detailed analysis of the changes see Tenorio, 1978; chapters X-XIII.
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scarcity of foreign investment (Ferris, 1979a: 67). Besides, each one of the governments
interpreted the common rules differently. It was not only a new and quite complex norm,
but it also affected political and economic interests in each country.22
As for the effects of Decision 24 on the flow of foreign direct investment
it can be concluded that it has not been negative, since the increase of foreign 
capital during the period of existence of Decision 24 has been substantially 
greater than in the previous period and similar to world trends in the case of the 
developing countries. In the industrial sector, on which Decision 24 has been 
more strict, the inflow of capital has been more dynamic than for the economy 
as a whole... (JUNAC, 1979a: 55).
Between 1967 and 1971 the average annual rate of foreign investment in the Andean
Group was slightly negative,—0.4 percent mostly due to a decrease of investment in
Venezuela. From 1971 to 1977—when Decision 24 was in place—foreign investment
increased on average 7.6 percent annually, while for the industrial sector this rate was
8.3 percent (ibid.: 48, 51).23 Data provided by the Inter-American Development Bank
for private direct investment,24 table V.5, corroborates the Junta’s conclusions.
“ Case in point was the fact that transnationals targeted Colombia to anack Decision 24 (Mytelka, 1979: 
64-65). The Colombian Supreme Court declared "inexecutable" the decree given by the executive power 
to put Decision 24 into force. The problem was solved when in 1973 the Colombian congress passed a law.
23This data disproof the American assertion that Decision 24 would reduce foreign direct investments. 
It seems that the opportunity to enjoy the whole Andean market overcome the initial skepticism about its 
controlist nature.
24The Inter-American Development Bank defines Private Direct Investment "as investment in enterprises 
located in one country but effectively controlled by residents of another country. As a rule, it takes the 
form of investment in branches and subsidiaries in one country by parent companies located in another 
country. The entries for the compiling country represent net changes between the inward and outward 
movements of capital during the reporting period." See for instance: IDB, cl980: 427.
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TABLE V.5
NET PRIVATE FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
(Millions of US Dollars)
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
BOL -76 2 -11 5 26 53 12 15 12
CHI 2/ 41 -42 -1 -5 -557 50 1/ 1/ 1/
COL 39 40 17 23 35 35 14 43 68
ECU 89 162 81 52 77 95 -20 34 49
PER -70 21 24 70 58 316 170 55 25
VEN 3/ 1/ 1/ V 1/ -343 418 -889 -4 68
GRAN 23 183 110 145 -704 967 -713 143 222
L.A. 894 1387 945 2286 1760 3202 1465 3022 3196
1/ Not a member
2/ The outflow of capital between 1971 and 1974 was due to the policies of the Allende
period and the turmoil after the coup d ’etat.
3/ The decrease in (1974 and 1976) was due basically to its oil nationalization program.
SOURCES: 1970-1971: IDB, cl975: 471; 1972-1977: IDB, cl980: 437; 1978: IDB, 
C1986: 420
Sanchez and Bawa summarize the main problems faced by the Andean Group in 
this phase of stagnation:
The decade of the seventies signaled the frustration of the principal 
aspirations ... postulated by the agreement. Industrial programming failed, the 
tariff reduction program was delayed, policy harmonization was weakened, and 
the CET was postponed. All of this occurred within a context of rapid economic 
changes and of the first symptoms of the external debt crisis (Sanchez, 1989: 12).
The original plan for the Andean Group was probably over-ambitious 
[sic]. The foreign investment control regulations were too inflexible, being 
consistent only with a single growth model. The sectoral production-sharing 
agreements probably could not have been carried out in an economically 
gratifying manner because of delays, lack of adequate transport networks, and 
inexperience in manufacturing and quality control would have led to severe cost
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overruns. Multilateral coordination of industrial production without a strong 
central authority is an extremely difficult planning task. The states appear to have 
been too inexperienced to realize that the attempt was likely to encounter serious 
difficulties (Bawa, 1980: 186).
3.- VIOLATIONS AND DELAYS
Following the procedure used in chapter IV, violations can be classified as (a) 
non-compliance with the articles of the Cartagena Agreement, (b) non-incorporation into 
the national legislation of the approved decisions; and (c) failure to comply with decisions 
once they have been incorporated in the national legislation.
During this phase violations of the Cartagena Agreement and the lack of 
compliance of the decisions of the Commission became more prevalent than in the 
previous phase. In this regard, "... the non-compliance of the member countries with the 
Andean decisions ... [and] the lack of uniform application of the decisions..." were the 
most important problems in this period (Vargas-Hidalgo, 1979: 219).
3.1.- Non-compliance with the articles of the Cartagena Agreement
By December 1975 the CET had not been adopted nor had the approval of all the 
Sectoral Programs of Industrial Development been completed.25 The non-fulfillment of 
the deadlines, legally and technically, were violations committed by the Commission and
2sThus, it was not possible to establish the customs union between 1975 and 1980, and industrial 
programming, the most important mechanism for Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela, was not being 
implemented.
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the Junta. In practice they were not considered as such because the Protocols of Lima 
and of Arequipa (which only went into effect in April 1979), gave the Commission and 
the Junta the possibility to assume "de facto ” the validity of the new deadlines.
Although not subject to deadlines, there was also the lack of progress in 
agriculture, infrastructure, rationalization of the existing industry, harmonization of 
economic policies, and planning coordination. Among the reasons for this situation were: 
(a) the concentration of efforts on the tariff reduction program and industrial 
programming; (b) the negotiations and the additional work needed for the entry of 
Venezuela, and the exit of Chile; and (c) the difficulties encountered in preparing the 
SPIDs (JUNAC, 1976: 69-70, 87, 126, 158).26
3.2.- Non-incorporation in the national legislation of the approved decisions
As has been mentioned in chapter IV, decisions concerning policy harmonization
were not approved by the Commission, or when approved the Junta reported that they
were not put into practice by the member countries. During the phase of stagnation this
practice continued. One of the most important deficiencies of the process "was the lack
of will to harmonize ... national policies ..." (Salgado, 1978: 239). Because of this,
... the Andean process had suffered a serious disequilibrium, not only between 
industrial programming and the tariff reduction program, but between the latter 
and policy harmonization. This second disequilibrium had already affected the 
credibility of the process ... and could lead to the stagnation and crisis of the 
process (JUNAC, 1979a: 85).
26,1 [T]he strategy adopted by the organs of the agreement was to create interdependency based 
exclusively on trade flows resulting from the coordinated application of the tariff reduction program, the 
CMET and the implementation of the Sectoral Programs of Industrial Development" (Guerrero, 1979:418).
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The Andean process went into a phase of stagnation as is was alluded by the Junta, it 
was due in part to the lack of progress in policy harmonization.
During the phase of progress (1969-1973) there were a maximum of 5 decisions 
which were not incorporated by the member countries in their national legislation. In the 
phase of stagnation, 1974-1978, the member countries had not incorporated 8 to 14 
decisions (table V.6). By the end of 1978, out of the 14 decisions not incorporated, 
one—Decision 49, Harmonization of Industrial legislation—was not incorporated by all 
of the members. Three decisions were not incorporated by four members: Decisions 120 
(Automobile Program), and Decisions 124 and 125 both dealing with treatment of neutral 
capital within the common regime for foreign capital. Finally, Decision 85—industrial 
property—was not incorporated by three countries (JUNAC, 1978b: I; 1979a: 132).
TABLE V.6
DECISIONS NOT INCORPORATED INTO THE DOMESTIC LEGISLATION BY 
THE MEMBER COUNTRIES, 1974-1978
DATE SOURCE BO CH CO EC PE VE TOTAL (*)
03-25-76 (1) 6 6 3 8 5 6 34 n.a.
11-24-76 (2) 7 1/ 6 8 5 6 32 11
Jan-77 (3) 5 1/ 4 5 4 6 24 8
03-14-77 (4) 6 1/ 4 6 6 6 28 12
11-15-77 (5) 8 1/ 7 8 6 9 36 14
08-26-78 (6) 8 1/ 6 5 7 9 35 14
11-16-78 (7) 8 1/ 6 5 7 8 34 14
'*) Number of different decisions not incorporated into the domestic legislation
one or more countries 
1/ Not a member of the Andean Group at that time.
SOURCES: (1) JUNAC, 1976a; (2) JUNAC, 1976b; (3) JUNAC, 1977b; (4) JUNAC, 
1977c; (5) JUNAC, 1977d; (6) JUNAC, 1978a; (7) JUNAC, 1978b.
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3.3.- Failure to comply with decisions incorporated in the national legislation
Decisions that were once incorporated but only partially complied with increased 
in this phase. Table V.7 provides the available information about decisions pertaining 
only to the tariff reduction program and the CMET that were in this situation.
Venezuela was the country with the most delays. Colombia and Pem showed 
greater delays between 1974 and 1978 in complying with the tariff reduction program, 
than in the 1969-1973 phase (see table IV.5). In contrast, these two countries complied 
better with the CMET during the phase 1974-1978 than in the previous phase.
With regard to the Sectoral Programs of Industrial Development already 
approved—Metalworking, Petrochemical and Automobile—there were important delays 
before incorporating them into the domestic legislation.27 There were even greater 
delays by the governments in implementing these decisions.
Non-compliance with the minimum tariff levels approved in Decision 
30—CMET—increased in this phase. In 1975 and 1976, Colombia did violate the 
minimum levels for 29 items, Pem for 51 and Venezuela for 1,095 (JUNAC, 1979d: 23). 
Regarding the application of the CET by 1976, all the member countries delayed 
applying the CET to the Metalworking Program, Pem being the extreme case, since it 
did not apply the CET (JUNAC, 1976: 95). As table V.8 shows us, the violations of the
^The Metalworking Program was approved in August 1972. Peru incorporated it into its domestic 
legislation in September of that year. In April of 1973 Ecuador did it too, while Colombia did it in 
September and Chile in October of the same year (Vinces and Kuljevan, 1974: 445). The Petrochemical 
Program was passed in August 1975. Peru incorporated it into its national legislation in April 1976; 
Venezuela did it in October of that year; Colombia in February of 1977; Ecuador in February 1978; while 
Bolivia by the end of 1978 had not incorporated it (JUNAC, 1981: 13). The Automobile Program was 
approved in September 1977. Ecuador was the only country to incorporate this decision—June 1978—before 
the end of 1978 (JUNAC, ibid.: 15).
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TABLE V.7
DELAYS IN IMPLEMENTING TRADE MECHANISMS BY DECEMBER 1978
(In months)
MECHANISMS BO CO CH EC PE VE
LAFTA’S COMMON LIST N N 4 1/
"RESTRICTIONS OF ALL KINDS" N 3 N 2 4 1/
Adoption of the lowest duty of Colombia, 
Chile, or Peru
N 6 N 4 4 If
Liberalization of NON-PRODUCED goods 4 3 1 1 1 4 1/
AUTOMATIC TRADE REDUCTION 
4th. reduction: 31-12-74 N N 3 48 1/
5th. reduction: 31-12-75 N N na 36 1/
6th. reduction: 31-12-76 N 12 2/ N 24 1/
7th. reduction: 31-12-77 N 9 2/ N 10 12 If
RESERVED TO BE PRODUCED BY BO N 5 4 2 2 4 1/
RESERVED TO BE PRODUCED BY EC 5 5 4 N 2 4 1/
IMMEDIATE FREE TRADE FOR BO-EC N 5 N 4 4 1/
COMMON MINIMUM EXTERNAL TARIFF 
4th. approximation 31-12-74 N N 1 11
5th. approximation 31-12-75 N N 3
Decision 104 N 4 2/ N 12 23
MARGINS OF PREF. FOR BO & EC N 9 12 N 4 1 /
Adoption of NABANDINA 3/ 4 2 5 10 8 4/
Blank space means the country put into practice its obligation, in a timely fashion.
N = The country is not required to put into practice the mechanism.
1/ By April 30, 1974 Venezuela had to implement this mechanisms (Decision 70, 
Chapter I).
2/ Not a member of the agreement.
3/ NABANDINA was the common tariff classification for the Andean Countries.
4/ Decision 70 in its Article 25 states that Venezuela should implement the 
NABANDINA by December 31, 1993. The data reflects this deadline. 
SOURCE: JUNAC, 1981: 1-10.
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CMET, the CET and the Andean liberalization program reached 2,760 items by July 
1976. Chile and Venezuela were the major offenders. The situation improved after 
Chile’s exit, which coincided with other members drastically reducing their violations. 
The latter was also due to the reduction of the CMET by Decision 104.
TABLE V.8
DUTIABLE ITEMS OF THE COMMON MINIMUM EXTERNAL TARIFF, 
COMMON EXTERNAL TARIFF AND ANDEAN TRADE LIBERALIZATION 
PROGRAM VIOLATED BY MEMBER COUNTRIES, 1974-1978
DATE SOURCE BOL CHI COL ECU PER VEN TOTAL
07-26-76 (1)1/ 69 1359 78 57 76 1121 2760
11-24-76 (2)1/ 11 2/ 23 2 32 483 522
11-15-77 (3)1/ 14 2/ 31 13 15 89 162
08-26-78 (4) 20 2/ 28 19 5 91 163
11-16-78 (5) 11 2/ 27 16 1 11 66
1/ Includes only the number of dutiable items violating the CMET (modified by Decision 
104) and the CET of the Metalworking Program. Venezuela at that date was not 
required to apply the CET.
2/ Not a member of the Andean Group at that time.
SOURCES: (1) JUNAC, 1976c; (2) JUNAC, 1976b; (3) JUNAC, 1977d; (4) JUNAC, 
1978a; (5) JUNAC, 1978b
The violations to the articles of the Cartagena Agreement and to the decisions of 
the Commission show a contradiction between the governments’ will and their actions. 
For the Junta (JUNAC, 1979a: 27) the "contradiction between political will and facts ... 
can be explained [as a] ... political act which attempts to harmonize long term objectives 
with the vicissitudes that characterize ... the dynamics of social relations." In other words 
there was a conflict between long-term aims and short-term interests. These conflicts
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have been expressed in the increasing violations in the phase.
The non-existence of an adjudication organ aggravated the situation.28 On top 
of this, there was not even "a mechanism allowing a permanent and systematic follow-up 
of the fulfillment of the obligations by the member countries (JUNAC, 1976: 9). To deal 
with this last aspect, at the Junta’s suggestion, the Commission, in April 1977, "resolved 
to examine in all its ordinary sessions [three times a year] the fulfillment of the 
agreement and its decisions by the member countries" (Comision, 1977: 8).
The lack of an Andean organism to adjudicate supports the hypothesis of this 
study that governments are the main actors of the process. They decide how to limit their 
own sovereignty by adopting decisions through the Commission, which is composed of 
governments’ representatives. Governments after freely negotiating and agreeing on 
issues as shown by the Commission’s decisions can refuse to implement them without 
fear of penalty.
4.- UNDERSTANDING THE PHASE OF STAGNATION
4.1.- General factors
The situation the Andean Pact was going through during this phase of stagnation, 
was more than "a crisis of growing" (Valdes, 1981: 454); and more than a "... growing 
discouragement ... in some circles ... with regard to the governments’ will to comply
28The Andean Tribunal was created in May 1979, and only in September 1983 began to function (see 
chapter VI, section 2.5.a).
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with their obligations contracted in the agreement" (JUNAC, 1976: 158).
A general factor which seems to explain the evolution of the Andean integration 
process, and other integration processes is economic prosperity. When the economies of 
the member are growing, integration is furthered, but when prosperity "decreases, socio­
political mechanisms begin to function first affecting those peripheral components of the 
economic process such as integration (Davila, 1984: 5(a)). By the end of the 1970s, 
domestic and international circumstances were leading toward economic recession.
Another aspect, which is directly related to a main element of the hypothesis of 
this dissertation, was the increasing differences in the strategies and economic policies 
pursued by the member countries. During this phase, as the Andean countries began to 
differ more and more in their economic policies and strategies, and the Andean process 
became more and more stagnant, since the Cartagena Agreement reflected less and less 
the interests of the countries. The agreement, however, was kept unchanged until the 
partial and formal modifications introduced by the Protocols of Lima and Arequipa began 
preparing the grounds for its next phase: regression.
The clearest case of divergence was between Chile and the other member 
countries. The Chilean government drastically and rapidly changed the strategy of 
development from inward to outward oriented, while other members were only willing 
to be more "flexible" in some aspects of their strategies. The policies adopted by Chile, 
"were divergent from the policies of the Andean integration" (JUNAC, 1979a: 36). Other 
more important sources of divergence were the
increasing differences [among the member countries] in the conceptualization of 
the models of development, in the political systems, in ideological orientations,
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and in positions towards the world economic, political and ideological reality. 
That is, there was a gradual movement from basic homogeneity to the acceptance 
of pluralism in the hemispheric relations, and from it to divergence (Valdes, 
1981: 455).
Among the member countries now there was a "wide spectrum in the political and 
economic positions" (JUNAC, 1976: 175), making it more difficult to reach accord and 
thus to further Andean integration.
The entry of Venezuela, and Chile’s exit transformed GRAN into a hesitant 
decision-making system, and instilling a low morale.29 Venezuela, supported by Chile, 
introduced the practice of private meetings of the Commission which did not include the 
members of the Junta and the Director-Secretary as it used to be.30 The consequence 
was further delays by the Commission due to time consuming negotiations between 1972 
(when negotiations about the entry of Venezuela began in earnest) and 1979 (when the 
new Metalworking Program was approved).31
The lack of synchrony between the automatic mechanisms (e.g., the tariff 
reduction program) and the negotiated ones (e.g., industrial programming) led to a 
greater role for the former. The tariff reduction program was automatically applied and
29There was "the evident loss of some political coherence due to the political changes in the system. 
... first... was the entry o f ... Venezuela. Another change was the exit of another country. An important 
fact ... [was] the international [economic] crisis" (Valdes, 1977: 74).
"These private meetings were called when difficult problems arose and members of the Commission 
wanted to deal with the issues as candidly as possible without the press, and other members of their 
delegations.
3I"... until 1973 we progressed very dynamically... In that year we stopped ... because ... otherwise 
... Venezuela would have not entered ... [0]nce it entered ... the Junta in 1973 and part of 1974 was 
devoted to prepare new or to change the Sectoral Programs of Industrial Development. ... in 1974, two 
significant things happened: the substantial change in the economic policies of the Chilean government, and 
also the beginning of the economic depression, which struck hard on at least two countries, Chile and Peru 
... [T]he Junta and the Commission [in] ’74, ’75, and ’76 did nothing but act as fire fighters" 
(Barandiaran, 1977: 69).
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viewed as a market mechanism, while industrial programming was to be negotiated and 
perceived as a planning mechanism. The steady progress of the tariff reduction program 
and the increasing problems in approving industrial programs led to the preponderance 
of the former, and thus of market mechanisms.32 As a consequence there were fewer 
warranties for a balanced and harmonic development, and for a fair share of benefits.
The uneven distribution of benefits was another factor.33 Trade benefits accrued 
mostly to Colombia which, with Chile, exported 62.1 percent of the manufactured goods 
(Puyana, 1982: 101). As regards the Metalworking Program, in 1975 Colombia’s share 
was 56.4 percent of the total trade, while Chile’s share was 33.7 percent, and Peru’s was 
9.9 percent (JUNAC, 1977: n.2.4). In 1978, with Chile out of GRAN and Venezuela 
not yet in the Metalworking Program, Colombia’s participation was 44.0 percent, and 
Peru’s was 21.2 percent (JUNAC, 1979a: 70). In the Petrochemical Program, excluding 
Chile, the Colombian share between 1975 and 1977 was 49.3 percent, Venezuela’s 27.1 
percent, and Peru’s 23.6 percent (JUNAC, cl979: 152). In the case of foreign direct 
investment of US$8 billion, the cumulative investment in the subregion up to 1977, 45 
percent went to Venezuela, 25 percent to Peru, and 17.5 percent to Colombia (JUNAC, 
1979a: 49).
The most dissatisfied members were the relatively less developed countries. "In
32"[W]hile in the Andean Group the aspects concerning the tariff reduction program folIow[ed] more 
or less their predicted course, the ones related to ... the industrial project lag[ged] behind" (Vega-Centeno 
and Iguinez, 1978:176), because "the latter were cumbersome and hard to negotiate" (Salgado, 1978: 239).
33The most developed countries, Chile and Colombia, got most of the benefits, while Bolivia and 
Ecuador, the RLDC, the least. This outcome is nor dissimilar in other integration schemes. The CACM 
is a case in point. Nicaragua and Honduras, the RLDC of the CACM, complained that they were not 
getting the benefits of the process. See Cochrane, 1969: Chapter 5, Fagan, 1970; Hansen, 1967: 55-64.
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1978, sales of manufactured goods from Bolivia and Ecuador represented 5.7 percent of 
subregional trade in those products" (Puyana, 1984: 121). Bolivia’s share in trade of 
products of the Metalworking Program was nil between 1975 and 1977, while Ecuador’s 
share went from 0.04 percent in 1975 to 14.5 in 1976 and to 26.2 percent in 1978, five 
percentage points above Peru (JUNAC, 1977: II.2.4; 1979a: 70).34 Neither Bolivia nor 
Ecuador had any exports in petrochemical products between 1975 and 1977. As to 
foreign investment, only 1.5 percent of the total US$8 billion accumulated until 1977 
went to Bolivia and 11.0 percent to Ecuador (JUNAC, 1979a: 49).3S
Between the largest and the smallest countries stood Peru. This country expected 
to reap benefits from the industrial programs, whose approval was increasingly delayed. 
"Moreover, the progress of the tariff reduction program implie[d] for the country a 
continuous increase of its trade deficit with the rest of the subregion [see table V.12]. 
This cost [was] absorbed by Peru in exchange for the potential benefits of industrial 
programming" (Vega-Centeno and Iguinez, 1978: 177).
The marginal effects of integration in the economies of the member countries 
contributed to the lack of response by the governments to further the process. According 
to the Junta, in Bolivia the Andean integration had not produced the benefits this country
“This was one of the few positive, albeit limited, effect for Ecuador. Total exports of the products 
included in the Metalworking Program was only $8.5 million (up from $1.3 million in 1973; JUNAC, 
1979a: 70). Ecuador’s share of 26.2 percent of this trade amounted to $2.21 million, which was only 1.2 
percent of its exports to GRAN in 1977.
“ "Bolivia’s disenchantment stems from three factors, its concern over modest regional trade increases, 
its complains concerning sectorial allocations, and its charge that other members are nor meeting their 
obligations toward Bolivia" (Avery, 1983: 161)
"Bolivia and Ecuador ... were assigned exclusive rights to certain industries, but had neither the 
technical know-how nor the financial capacity to take advantage of them" (Conesa, 1984: 98).
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had expected, nor had it contributed significantly to the improvement of its standard of 
living. From 1969 to 1978, Colombia reaped the greatest economic benefits from this 
process; while the Andean integration contribution to the Ecuadorean economy was 
small. In Peru and in Venezuela the impact of the Andean process was marginal 
(JUNAC, 1979a: 139-143).
There were attempts to inject more dynamism into the process through two 
summit meetings of the Andean presidents. The first was held in Washington in 
September 1977, and the second in Bogota, in August 1978.36 In these meetings the 
presidents officially supported Andean integration and gave instructions to approve 
lengthy negotiated proposals. In 1978, however, all the member countries were in the 
midst of holding elections37 which greatly overshadowed the relevance of integration.38
Another general factor contributing to the stagnation of the Andean process was 
what has been termed for the European Community "the democratic deficit".39 In the 
Andean case, this "democratic deficit" consisted of two issues. One was the need to end
“ The meetings were held taking advantage of the presence of the 5 Presidents. For Washington it was 
the ratification of the Panama Treaty; for Bogota it was the swearing in of the Colombian president.
37In Bolivia elections were held in July 1978. In the same month, a coup d'etat ousted President 
General Hugo Banzer, and the results of the elections were abrogated by the new government. Elections 
in Colombia were held in the same year replacing Liberal Alfonso Lopez Michelsen by another Liberal, 
Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala. Ecuador voted a constitutional referendum in January 1978. In that same year, 
Peru elected a Constitutional Assembly; and in Venezuela, Luis Herrera Campins was elected to replace 
Carlos Andres Perez.
38"... from 1977 on, electoral processes began in Ecuador, Colombia, and Venezuela, ... as we all 
know, under these circumstances; the Andean issues and the integration issues became less important from 
the political and decision-making points of view" (Barandiaran, 1977: 70).
39In the case of the European Union and its predecessors, the concept of "democratic deficit" was 
loosely related to two aspects. One was the lack of control over the Council of Ministers by the European 
and the national parliaments. The other was the contrast between the secrecy of the Council and the 
openness of the European Parliament (Colchester and Buchan, 1990: chapter 4; Williams, 1991: 155, 162- 
171).
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authoritarian governments in Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, and Peru, and to begin a 
democratization process allowing the incorporation of diverse social sectors into the 
integration process (Dooner, 1982: 35). The other issue was the monopolization of the 
process by a bureaucratic elite and the lack of people’s consciousness that the process 
could affect them (Salgado, 1978: 240).
There was also "the action deficit." According to Ferris (1979b: 86), "... there 
is often a gap between what national leaders are saying, what they are feeling, and what 
they are doing with respect to the Andean Pact. This gap may be due to insufficient 
resources or to an unwillingness to move beyond the cost-free statements of public 
support."
In summary, there were international and domestic changes; delays; increasing 
violations of the Cartagena Agreement and its decisions; as well as the growing 
dissatisfaction of the RLDC; and monopolization of the process by a bureaucratic elite. 
All these factors led the Junta to warn that "it is clear that it is not going to be easy to 
achieve the goals in the short timetable set by the Cartagena Agreement" (JUNAC, 1976: 
3). Over time, this warning became a reality and changed the attitude towards the process 
from one of "confidence and optimism, to one of doubts and hesitations about the 
future..." (JUNAC, 1979a: 37). During this phase of stagnation, however, the member 
countries were still interested in the Andean process as a tool to achieve some national 
goals. This was illustrated by the members extending the deadlines twice, and holding 
two summit meetings.40
4frThese facts can also be interpreted as the lack of interest of any country to follow the steps of Chile, 
and thus put and end to the Andean Group.
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One consequence of the stagnation of the Andean process is shown in table V.9, 
which summarizes the Commission’s activities. Between 1969 and 1973, 81 decisions 
were approved while in the phase of stagnation—1974 to 1978—only 55 were passed. Of 
the 81 decisions, 58 decisions concerned new issues adopted in the phase of progress 
representing 72 percent of all decisions; while in the following phase, only 65 percent 
of the decisions dealt with new issues. Of all the decisions on new issues approved 
between 1969 and 1973, 55 percent could be considered important, while it was only 22 
percent between 1974 and 1978.41 As for decisions modifying previous decisions, there 
were 23 in the phase of progress and 19 in the phase of stagnation. In the first phase, 
however, all but one were unimportant modifications; while in the second phase 12 were 
unimportant, 7 were important, and out of these 7 decisions, 4 weakened the process.42
4.2.- The international environment at the end of 1960s and early 1970s
In the late 1960s, the international economic order created at the end of World 
War II by the United States was on the verge of profound changes. The international
4lExamples of important decisions approved between 1974 and 1978 were: Decision 91: Petrochemical 
Program; decision 97 authorizing Chile’s to sell its public enterprises to foreigners; Decision 99 adopting 
a timetable to approve the remaining SPIDs; Decision 100 Decision proposing the governments to adopt 
the Protocol of Lima; 120: Automotive Program; and Decision 128 proposing the governments to adopt 
the Protocol of Arequipa.
42Modifying decisions approved between 1974 and 1978 which strengthened the Andean process were: 
Decision 104 reducing the levels of the CMET; and Decisions 109 and 124 considering as neutral capital 
the investment done by international organizations and foreign governments’ entities devoted to economic 
development. The four modifying decisions approved between 1974 and 1978 which weakened the process 
were: Decision 103 making more flexible the common treatment of foreign investment; Decision 105 
postponing, in the light of the Protocol of Lima, the deadlines the Commission imposed itself by Decision 
99 to approve the SPIDs; Decision 129 modifying the Metalworking Program; and Decision 130 modifying 
the Petrochemical Program.
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TABLE V.9
DECISIONS APPROVED DURING 1974-1978
69-73 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 74-78
I DECISIONS 81 15 5 15 15 5 55
2 NEW ISSUES 58 10 5 8 10 3 36
2.1 Important 1/ 32 1 1 4 1 1 8
2.2 Unimportant 26 9 4 4 9 2 28
3 MODIFYING DECS 23 5 7 5 2 19
3.1 Important 11 1 4 1 7
- Strengthening 2 1 ^ 3
- Weakening 1 2 2 4
3.2 Unimportant 22 5 3 4 12
4 SESSIONS 25 4 5 3 5 2 19
4.1 WITH DECS 22 4 3 3 4 2 16
- Ordinary 13 3 3 2 2 1 11
- Extraordinary 9 1 1 2 1 5
4.2 WITHOUT DECS 3 2 1 3
- Ordinary
- Extraordinary 3 2 1 3
5. 1/4 3.24 3.75 1.00 5.00 3.00 2.50 2.89
6. 1/4.1 3.68 3.75 1.77 5.00 3.75 2.50 3.44
11 Important is defined as decisions that have direct impact on the progress of the 
principal mechanisms of the Andean process.
SOURCES: JUNAC, n.d.: 1-12; 1982c: Tomo I, 281-391, Tomo II, 1-584.
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monetary system, based on the dollar standard,43 had as a goal the stability of the 
exchange rates through the International Monetary Fund. The international trade system 
aimed at gradually freeing trade through negotiations called GATT Rounds.
By the early 1970s, the monetary system collapsed. The main reason was a major 
feature of the system itself. For the dollar standard to function, dollars had to be 
provided for international transactions. When the world economy recovered from the 
devastation of WWII, the need for American dollars increased steadily. To furnish the 
demand for dollars the United States had to run permanent balance of payments deficits 
which were covered by printing money backed nominally by the federal gold reserves.44
The system allowed the United States to live beyond its means. In due time 
United States gold reserves became just a fraction of the dollars held outside the 
country.45 As deficits mounted, - the desire for dollars by the rest of the world 
diminished. This meant that at one point United States deficits or the convertibility the 
dollar into gold had to be stopped, or the dollar price of gold had to be increased.46 In 
August 1971 President Nixon announced the non-convertibility of dollars into gold. In 
December the Congress of the United States approved the increase of the price of gold
"Briefly, the Dollar Standard (or more technically known as fixed exchange rate pegged to the dollar) 
meant that the American currency replaced gold as the means of exchange in trade and in other 
international transactions. The United States government, in 1947, fixed the relationship of the dollar to 
gold at $35 an ounce, and committed itself to convert dollars into gold at that price. In mm, all other 
currencies fixed their exchange rates in relation to the dollar.
"This situation by which a domestic currency is used also as an international means of exchange is 
called international seignorage.
"By December 1971, the external liabilities of the United States were $51 billion, while the reserves 
were only $11 billion (ECLA, 1973 : 46).
"This effect is known as the Triffin dilemma, after Robert Triffin, who was the first to point out this 
inherent flaw of the system (Triffin, 1960).
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from $35 to $38 per ounce. This meant a de facto devaluation of 8.6 percent of the 
dollar.47 A second devaluation of the dollar, 11 percent, came in February 1973. In 
March 1973 the dollar standard was replaced by the generalized floating exchange rate 
system which exists today.
Parallel to these changes, the international trade system began to move towards 
protectionism. In August 1971, Nixon, heralding the return to trade protectionism,48 
also announced a temporary ten percent surcharge on US imports. In that year the United 
States had its first trade balance deficit of this century ($2 billion). These deficits 
continued from then on with few exceptions.
This situation was the result of structural changes in the international economic 
system. The most important were: (a) the loss of comparative advantage by the United 
States, (b) a corresponding loss of competitiveness, and (c) stagflation (inflation 
accompanied with slow or nil economic growth) in the developed world in the 1970s.49 
Given that quotas and tariffs had been successfully limited and reduced, protectionism 
in the form of non-tariff barriers were devised by the industrialized countries.
The situation was aggravated with the increase of oil prices in late 1973. This led 
the developed countries to reduce their imports, while non-oil exporting developing
“ Most Latin American countries decided to maintain their existing exchange rate. The exception was 
Venezuela which revalued by 2.28 percent (IDB, cl973: 69).
■“Examples of protectionism are: government procurement regulations, customs procedures, health, 
sanitary and security regulations, technical standards, subsidizing ailing industries, managed trade, and 
voluntary export restraints.
“ The developed countries grew by 2.0 percent in 1970 and 1971 (ECLA, 1974: 14), and by 5.8 
percent in 1972 (IDB, cl975:57). Inflation among these countries was 3.7 percent annual average between 
1961 and 1971, 4.7 percent in 1972 and 7.7 percent in the following year (IDB, c.1975: 58).
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countries had to cope with higher oil prices combined with the stagnation of their 
exports. The crisis was solved due to the initial inability of the oil exporting countries 
to "use" the foreign exchange earned. They recycled the "petrodollars" by depositing 
them in Western banks. The banks in turn began an era of commercial loans largesse 
especially to Latin America.
In short, the international economic system in the 1970s was one of changes, 
disarray, and turmoil. These changes in the international economic system created grave 
problems for the Third World including the Andean nations. Among the most important 
were high rates of inflation, low rates of growth, increase in the cost of imports, 
decreasing participation in international trade, large fluctuations in exchange rates and 
in the real and nominal rates of interest, and increasing external debt.50
At the domestic and at the Andean level, the governments did not correctly assess 
the changing international situation, preventing them from understanding the profound 
changes that were emerging in the world economy (Alegrett, 1989: 7).
The international crises affected the member countries differently. The oil 
exporting countries—Venezuela and Ecuador, and to a lesser degree Bolivia—benefitted. 
Colombia—an oil importing country—enjoyed an extraordinary boom in the price of 
coffee—its major export—and a general increase in its exports. Chile the military 
government applied recessionary policies to cope with the crisis. Peru—a marginal oil
“ During the 1970s other trends suggesting the deterioration of the external position of the Andean 
countries were already in existence. One was the increase of food imports due to the explosive growth of 
the cities and the stagnation of the agricultural sector. Another trend was the lack of dynamism in the 
exports of manufactured goods which forced the countries to increase their exports of primary goods. 
Finally, there was the increasing transfer of financial resources in the form of profit remittances and debt 
payment. All of these factors led to increasing balance of payments deficits and to more debts.
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exporter and importer—was the most affected. This country did not take any measures 
to deal with the OPEC decision because of the increased availability of commercial loans 
at low or negative real rates of interest.
The major changes occurring in the international economic system in the 1970s 
"directly affected the Andean integration process, since over time it became more and 
more evident that the impact of integration on the transformation of the national 
economies and the acceleration of their rates of growth was marginal..." (Carmona, 
1984: 14). In other words, external forces beyond the control of the member countries 
shaped their economic policies, and the Andean integration having marginal effects on 
the countries, was not useful to reverse the effects of the external factors. More 
importantly, "changes in the internal economic policies ... increased, among the member 
countries, the differences with regard to the costs and benefits of the process, and to the 
convenience or not of adopting neo-liberal policies supported by the Western 
industrialized countries" (Davila, 1984: 19). Changes in the international environment, 
thus, created a recession in the Andean economies forcing the governments to find 
domestic solutions which—among other consequences—led to the stagnation of the 
Andean integration process as hypothesized in this research project. 51
51 "Economic nationalism and self-reliant measures could not survive rising inflation, unemployment, 
and increasing indebtedness, all of which reduced the Andean countries’ margin for maneuver" (Mace, 
1988: 186), relegating GRAN to a back seat.
"... the integration process came almost to standstill from 1974 to 1976 [and beyond] due to the 
serious deterioration of the international economy precipitated by the oil crisis and nationalism superseding 
the need for regional cooperation" (Bawa, 1980: 188).
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4.3.- The Commission, the Junta. and the governments, and the relationship among 
them
At the institutional level, the Commission, composed of government 
plenipotentiaries, represented the interests of the governments, which were well protected 
because decisions were taken, in practice, by consensus. The Junta as the secretariat and 
the technical body of the agreement, was in charge of presenting the proposals upon 
which the Commission had to decide. This power allowed the Junta to set the agenda, 
and become the voice of the community interests. Its power was enhanced by its 
participation in the Commission’s meetings. Although the Junta had no vote, in many 
cases its interventions in the negotiations helped the Commission to solve impasses.
The Cartagena Agreement provided the GRAN with more dynamic and stronger 
organs than LAFTA; but they were weaker than the European model. The Commission, 
constituted by ministers in charge of the integration process, met only three times a year, 
but could meet any time in extraordinary session. The meetings of the Commission were 
frequently postponed.52 When the Commission met, it was not able to deal with all the 
items on its agenda. Attempts to overcome the lack of agreement on specific and crucial 
proposals led to adjournment of meetings.53 Proposals piled-up.54
52An indirect way to prove this assertion is the regularity of the meetings of the Commission (see table 
V.9 above). Between 1969 and 1973—during the phase of progress—the Commission met 25 times. That 
is an average of 5 meetings per year, including 1969 in which the Commission only met once in 
November, its first session ever. The maximum interval between meetings was 3 months, but it happened 
only 7 times in the years from 1970 to 1973. During the full five years of the phase of stagnation—1974 
to 1978—the Commission met only 19 times, an average of little less than four times a year. The longest 
interval was 5 months, between November 30, 1973 and April 29, 1974, coinciding with the entry of 
Venezuela—December 1973.
53The Commission’s sessions were adjourned only 2 times—for 3 and 5 weeks—between 1969 and
1973. Between 1974 and 1978 recesses occurred 9 times. Three sessions were adjourned two or more 
times. Adjournments lasted from as little as one week to as long as three months (JUNAC, n.d.).
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Members of the Commission when deciding issues within the realm of other 
sectors (e.g., industrial programming) lacked authority to make compromises beyond the 
instructions they had. The Commission members were also weak in making their 
governments implement the decisions, "... national public organ[s], in many cases, 
believed [they] have the right to determine whether or not to incorporate a decision into 
the domestic legislation or to partially execute it" (JUNAC, 1979a: 147).
The Junta, as mentioned above, had powers, but it depended upon the 
Commission for its budget, and the size of its capable staff was never large enough to 
deal with the multiple tasks it had to perform within the exacting agreement’s timetable. 
Thus, the Junta, and the Commission were not able to do their job.
The Commission, representing governments’ interests, and the Junta, representing 
community interests, did not have in practice enough supranational authority to impose 
subregional decisions onto the governments. On the contrary, the governments were able 
to violate the Cartagena Agreement, and to ignore the decisions of the Commission with 
impunity. Sovereignty, thus, was always preserved and protected.
Working relations between the Commission and the Junta deteriorated during the 
stagnation phase. At issue was the power struggle between the Commission and the 
Junta.55 This deterioration began in 1974 with the entry of Venezuela. This country,
^In contrast in the European Union, the Council of Ministers—equivalent to the Andean 
Commission—meets regularly, and the representatives are the ministers—or their delegates—of the area 
concerned with the agenda of the meeting. "Altogether there are some eighty Council of Ministers meetings 
in an average year . . .” (Nugent, 1989: 93). The Council, moreover, is assisted by its own secretariat of 
around 2,000 members (ibid.: 97), and by the Committee of Permanent Representatives.
55"The struggle between the Commission and the Junta was due to the fact that Venezuela and Chile 
were uneasy with the increasing power of the Junta ... Commission members of these two countries 
pointed out that the Junta should not be so influential and that it was up to the member countries to freely
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supported by Chile, based on Article 15e of the Cartagena Agreement,56 introduced as 
a practice private meetings of the Commission which did not include the members of the 
Junta and the Director-Secretary as it used to be. Over time the Commission invited the 
Junta to participate. The bottom line was, however, that the Junta was not another 
member of the Commission but an invited actor. The supremacy of national over 
community interests was reaffirmed.
Relations between the Junta and the governments of the member countries also 
deteriorated during this phase of stagnation. According to Article 15i of the Cartagena 
Agreement one of the responsibilities of the Junta was to "... maintain direct contacts 
with the governments of the Member Countries through the agency which each one 
indicates for that purpose" (JUNAC, 1983c: 16). The intention of Article 15i was to 
facilitate communications between the Junta and the governments. The governments’ 
contact agencies, in practice, more often than not, made the flow of information from 
and to the Junta more difficult. In order to solve this problem, the Junta unsuccessfully 
proposed the establishment of Junta’s own offices in all the member countries.
Relations among the members of the Commission became less friendly during this 
phase. Until the end of 1973 there was a high degree of consensus among the 
Commission members, and they had a relatively long tenure in their posts. This allowed 
them a great knowledge of the process and, fostered good relations among themselves 
and with the Junta’s members, illustrated by the fact that the members of the
negotiate and adopt decisions best suited to their interests" (Guerrero, 1979: 139-140).
“ According to it, the Junta has the right "[t]o take part in the Commission’s meetings except when that 
body deems it advisable to hold private sessions" (JUNAC, 1983c: 15).
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Commission and of the Junta addressed each other by their first name. Deterioration 
began in 1974, with a faster turnover of the Commission members (for instance, between 
1973 and 1975 Bolivia sent three different representatives, Colombia four, Chile 5, 
Ecuador five, Peru four, and Venezuela two, Guerrero, 1979: 142), and the introduction 
of formality and protocol, proper in any international meeting, reducing the possibilities 
for frank exchanges and clear understanding.
4.4.- Disagreements among the governments of the member countries
Disagreements increased among the governments of the member countries with 
regard to key Junta’s proposals. The major controversies were on the CET, the SPIDs, 
the common treatment of foreign investment, the CMET, and how to deal with the lack 
of compliance with the deadlines set by the agreement. These aspects constituted the most 
important elements of the crisis of stagnation. The deepening division continued between 
the "developmentalist" (Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela) and the "commercialist" 
(Colombia, and Chile) governments.
In the case of the CET, the developmentalist countries considered that it should 
be an instrument for planning and for furthering import substitution industrialization; that 
it should be supportive of the SPIDs, as such tariffs should be even more protective for 
products contained in SPIDs; that it should aid the development of strategic sectors and 
reduce foreign dependency as well as save foreign exchange. The commercialist members 
were in favor of the CET as an instrument to reduce production costs, to improve the 
allocation of resources, and to increase productivity. These disagreements were translated
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
192
into different positions with regard to the Junta’s proposal on the CET. The 
commercialist countries wanted lower tariffs than those proposed by the Junta while the 
developmentalist countries wanted equal or higher tariffs (see table V.2).
Tariffs can be used for diverse purposes, although they may not be achieved 
simultaneously.57 Besides tariff policy has been changed frequently to deal with 
immediate problems.58 These factors made it very difficult to agree on a CET.
Since each government at a given moment in time confronts a diversity of 
situations and has to attempt to harmonize conflicting interests and needs, it is rather 
difficult for the governments to coincide on the objectives, the level and structure of the 
CET. One author argues that it is then more realistic to consider "the common tariff of 
a union ... a political act. ... The adoption of a common tariff is an act of faith and not 
a scientific operation" (Touzelet, 1969: 324). The unwillingness or inability of the Junta
^For example, import tariffs can been raised across the board in order to deal with structural and 
temporary balance of payments deficits, and to increase fiscal revenues. This coincides with the aim of 
protecting local production. The same non-discriminatory increase in import tariffs makes more expensive 
imported semi-finished goods and capital goods which in turn affects the production costs of the domestic 
production. Increasing tariff to change consumption patterns is an example of opposition to promoting 
domestic production of desired goods. The increase of tariffs on commodities for which the governments 
want to reduce consumption increases their protection, and by doing so, they are promoting domestic 
production of the very same products governments do not want people to consume (Chan, 1976: 4-12).
58For example, in the case of Bolivia, in early 1975, tariffs were reduced on raw materials, and 
consumer goods, including cars. Due to the increase of imports between 1974 and 1975 by S141 million 
(37.6 percent), prior deposits, prohibition in the importation of cars, and selective tariff increase were 
imposed by the end of 1975 and in 1976 (ECLA, 1977: 75; IDB, cl978: 168).
Ecuador in 1973 and 1974 enjoyed large surpluses thus, prior import deposits were eliminated, 
imports of food were subsidized, tariffs were reduced by an average of 33 percent but favoring especially 
intermediate and capital goods for agriculture and industry (ECLA, 1976: 250; 1976a: 195, 202). From 
1975 to 1978 surpluses began to dwindle. Imports of cars were suspended, application for imports 
involving advanced payment were refused, tariffs were greatly increased, and prior deposits were 
reinstalled affecting mostly consumer goods (ECLA, 1976a: 196; 1977: 182).
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to recognize the CET as a political act—rather than a technical/economic one59-has 
made it next to impossible for the governments to agree on this crucial mechanism.
The basic disagreement on the Sectoral Programs of Industrial Development was 
over the different emphasis given to its objectives. The developmentalist countries wanted 
it as an instrument for furthering their import substitution process in which planning and 
state intervention played an important role. The commercialist members saw SPIDs as 
a mean to increase efficiency, to reduce production costs, and to lead market forces to 
play a increasingly important role. Colombia60 and Chile were interested in 
programming only very few products, and their common external tariff should be low 
and derived from the rules approved for the CET. The four developmentalist countries 
favored programming most if not all the reserved products, and with high tariff levels 
established independently from the methodology adopted for the CET.
In relation to the common treatment for foreign capital, the problem was the 
Chilean violations as expressed in its Decree Law 600 promulgated in July 1974. The 
Commission met in September 1974. Based on a report of the Junta the representatives
5*The Junta's staff in charge of the CET proposal—the Department of Political Economy—prepared 
a proposal which "had a high academic value," however, it "only satisfied the professional interests of 
some of the participants." "Unfortunately, this is not what the Andean Group required. The lack of 
pragmatism to deal with a problem which was highly political and the obstinacy in proposing a CET which 
the countries were not willing to approve, contributed to aggravate an already difficult problem" (Guerrero, 
1979: 252, 227).
“ In April 1978, the Head of the Global Planning Unit of the National Department of Planning of 
Colombia stated "that Colombia is only interested in the commercial aspects of integration and that the 
country will prevent the approval of, or its participation in, other [industrial] programmes" (Puyana, 1984: 
302). And since Colombia was the most important member of the agreement, there were few possibilities 
to approve them. As a matter of fact only two programs were approved later (December 1980). The 
Siderurgical Program (Decision 160) was just a list of products assigned to be produced. The Fertilizers 
Program (Decision 162) was only the list of products of this sector, its the tariff reduction program and 
a CET "no lower than three percent" (JUNAC, 1982d: 25).
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of the other countries declared "[t]hat Decree Law 600 ... is incompatible with the 
Common Regime for Foreign Capital ..." (Comision, 1974: 4). After intensive 
negotiations, the Chilean government promulgated Decree Law 746, in November 1974, 
which expressly recognized that Decision 24 was part of the Chilean legislation. In 
exchange, the Commission agreed to completely revise Decision 24, but the Commission 
took no action due to the pressures to approve the CET and the SPIDs.
The lack of progress on the CET, the industrial programs, and the demand by 
Chile to modify Decision 24 led to the first major crisis of the Andean Pact. In March 
1975, with a veiled threat, the Peruvian representative urged the Commission to approve 
the Automobile, Petrochemical and Fertilizers Programs "... otherwise [we] would sadly 
have to reexamine our position towards the mechanisms which are functioning..." 
(Comision, 1975: Anexo I). As a result special efforts were made to approve the SPIDs 
under consideration, but only the Petrochemical Program was approved in August 1975. 
From the political view point compromises were made so all countries could, in practice, 
produce whatever they wanted, which from the economic point of view the result was 
inefficiency.61 The rest of the year, the Commission did not make progress on the other 
industrial programs.
By December 1975 negotiations began to modify the overdue deadlines. The 
crucial issue was the future of the SPIDs. According to Article 53 of the Cartagena 
Agreement, products reserved for SPIDs which were not programmed by December 1975
61It is not surprising then that studies found that the Petrochemical Program was inefficient from the 
economic standpoint. One of them concluded: ”[t]he costs of supplying the area, ... with [our] model were 
always less than ... [the model] designed by the Junta del Acuerdo de Cartagena ..." (Wengel, 1980: 134).
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should be included in the tariff reduction program. Developmentalist countries, however, 
had already made clear their unwillingness to comply with this provision.62
By the end first of the meeting of 1976 of the Commission—which began in 
February and ended in April—the Junta's members presented a new protocol proposal 
which was approved as Decision 100. Chile insisted on a full revision of Decision 24 
(Comision, 1976: 7).63 The other representatives were sympathetic with the Chilean plea 
but no progress was made. As part of the solution, four other decisions were also 
approved. Decision 97 allowed Chile to sell its public enterprises to foreigners. Decisions 
98 and 101 approved programs and a special treatment of Bolivia to take advantages of 
the agreement. This was the first case in which Ecuador accepted a special treatment not 
common to both. Finally Decision 99 adopted a timetable to approve the SPIDs. There 
were still two major issues to be agreed upon: the revision of Decision 24, and the 
modification of the CMET, Decision 30. Two working groups were created by the 
Commission to deal with these issues without success.
The six countries met unofficially on August 4, 1976. Chile wanted to discuss 
Decisions 24 and 30 first, the others wanted to sign the Protocol first. Chile’s strategy
“ The Venezuelan delegate maintained: "it would be unrealistic to think that if a representative package 
of sectoral programs is not approved, the countries would be willing to liberalize trade for the reserved 
products, and at the same time continue to comply with the general tariff reduction program..." (Figueredo, 
1975: 2).
The Bolivian representative stated: "[it] is fundamental to exhaust the possibilities of the reserved 
products for industrial programming before these products are incorporated into the liberalization system.." 
(Pereyra, 1975: 2).
The Peruvian Plenipotentiary declared: "Article 53, ... lacks operativity and is not applicable 
inasmuch as there are a considerable number of programs whose approval is still pending. It is not possible 
to refer to them as residual products, which are the ones being regulated by the aforementioned article" 
(Du Bois, 1975: 1).
“ The Chilean delegation provided some explanations for its requests in Pipino 1975, and in a document 
which became part of the Acta Final, as Annex VI: Proposition de Chile. Decision 24.
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was dictated by its perception that its veto power over the Protocol would yield for it 
greater advantages. The other countries did not accept Chile’s demand and signed the 
Protocol. The five countries—Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela—met 
later in Sochagota (Colombia), where they defined a common position to Decision 24 and 
the CMET. In informal talks the five countries presented the Sochagota accords to Chile, 
and a special temporary treatment. Chile rejected them.
On October 5, since Chile did not want to sign the Protocol nor to withdraw from 
the Cartagena Agreement, the six countries approved a protocol which created a 
commission to analyze the conditions in which Chile would remain in the agreement.64 
According to the protocol, if by October 30 consensus was not reached, Chile would 
withdraw from the agreement ending all its rights and duties. On that date the 
Commission adopted Decision 102. It spelled the conditions for Chile’s withdrawal. This 
decision and the aforementioned protocol are clear examples showing that interests of the 
governments are above the rules they have agreed upon.
The Protocol of Lima was subscribed, and other decisions were also approved. 
By Decision 103 the Commission modified Decision 24. Changes included the 
elimination of limits of profit remittances, the extension by three years of the time limit 
for foreign companies to transform into national enterprises, and the access for foreign 
enterprises to medium-term internal credit. Decision 104 reduced the levels of the 
CMET. Finally, Decision 105 modified the timetable approved by Decisions 98 and 99
6tThe protocol was the solution because the Cartagena Agreement does not include the possibility of 
expelling a member. Chile, on the other hand, did not consider "denouncing" the agreement since doing 
so would have meant that some rights and obligations would remain in place for a few more years.
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dealing with the creation of the Special Program for Bolivia and the negotiations of 
SPIDs.
By October 30, the Cartagena Agreement had changed, but the crisis created by 
Chile was only one problem, albeit the most important, of the stagnation phase. If Chile 
had been the only source of stagnation of the process, then after its withdrawal, the 
Andean integration should have resumed its progress. Stagnation continued in 1977 and 
1978. Only one important decision was adopted in each of those years (see table V.9). 
From 1976 to 1978, little progress was made. Although efforts of both the Commission 
and the Junta were focused on approving SPIDs,65 only the Automotive Program was 
approved, in September 1977, and no progress was made on the CET. Key to this 
situation was the lack of enthusiasm of Colombia. This country had consistently 
supported, since the drafting of the Cartagena Agreement, a very limited role of 
industrial programming. The Commission devoted the first quarter of 1978 to discuss and 
adopt the Protocol of Arequipa postponing deadlines again.
4.5.- Strategies of development and the Andean objectives
The most important aims of the Cartagena Agreement were summarized, in 
chapter ID, section 5.1, as: the primacy of government, a more efficient import 
substitution industrialization, and the secondary role of foreign investment. As in chapter
“ "... the greatest efforts of the agreement’s organs were oriented towards approving the automobile 
industrial program .... Once more they made the mistake of putting all the eggs of integration into one 
basket" (Guerrero, 1979: 303-304).
"To concentrate the efforts in industrial programming is the correct strategy for the success of 
[Andean] integration..." (JUNAC, 1976: 159).
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IV, a comparison will be made in this section between the main objectives of the 
agreement and the relevant aspects of the strategies of development of the member 
countries.66 If important differences are found, then it is possible to conclude the 
existence of a relationship between the increasing differences in the strategies of 
development of the member countries and stagnation of the Andean integration process.
a) Chile and Colombia
In Chile, with the coup d ’etat of September 1973, the strategy of development 
changed. The new long-term aim, stated in the 1975-1980 Economic and Social 
Development Plan, was: "to establish a more open economy in terms of world market 
opportunities and competition, with a considerably smaller public sector, and with private 
enterprise and the price system subjected to fewer controls and playing a more important 
role than in the past" (ECLA, 1976a: 154). To accomplish these goals, among other 
things, the plan "call[ed] for free operation of market mechanisms and the stimulation 
of competition ...; a favorable climate for foreign investors; reduction of public spending 
... and rationalization of public investment; ... transferring responsibilities to private 
groups ...; reform of the welfare system; ... [and] support for productive sectors that are 
capable of reducing imports and increasing exports in an efficient way" (IDB, cl976: 
189). In other words, a change to a neo-liberal approach which assigns the state a passive 
role as mere regulator and facilitator of private activities, and integration with the
“Countries have been loosely paired by their similarities in their levels of development and 
industrialization, and by the affinity of their strategies, and economic policies. This is why Chile is coupled 
with Colombia, Peru with Venezuela, and Bolivia with Ecuador.
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international economy. The main goal was explicitly reiterated in the Development Plan 
for 1976-1981, and later in its updated version as Development Plan for 1977-1982.67
The Colombian Economic and Regional Plan, 1975-1978, continued to support 
import substitution but only in cases in which it could be done efficiently, provide jobs, 
and increase exports and the supply of consumer goods (JUNAC, 1982d: 15, Caballero, 
1978: 100). This emphasis on efficiency and competitiveness, especially since 1975, 
constituted the clearest example of moving away from the goal of industrialization by 
import substitution (Iguinez, 1983: 19; Caballero, 1978: 102). Colombia had gradually 
transferred to the market a fundamental role in resource allocation (JUNAC, 1982d: 15- 
16). Government intervention was to be reduced, according to the 1975-1978 Plan, to 
"provide the adequate environment for the expansion of existing enterprises and the 
creation of new ones ..." but at the same time the state participated in the primary and 
basic industries (Iguinez, 1983: 23).
With regard to foreign investment, until 1976 Colombia was supportive of 
Decision 24 and the government applied it as strictly as possible (Caballero, 1978: 116- 
117). By 1976, the Lopez Michelsen administration favored a more "flexible approach 
to foreign direct investment in view of the energy crisis" (Guerrero, 1979: 288).
In short, the three main principles of the Cartagena Agreement, primacy of the 
state in the economy, import substitution industrialization, and subordination of foreign 
investment were opposed by the Chilean military government. Colombia, on the other 
hand, was indifferent to the three principles of the Cartagena Agreement.
67"The strategy for development of the Chilean economy has been conceived within the framework ... 
in which the role of the state is regarded as subsidiary" (IDB, cl978: 190).
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b) Peru and Venezuela
The Peruvian long- and short-term plans, during this phase of stagnation, had 
among their objectives the "direct and extensive participation of the public sector in the 
economy, particularly in the production of basic commodities, domestic and foreign 
marketing, and financial institutions. ..." (IDB, cl975: 400). In 1977, the second phase 
of the military government installed in August 1975, released its Plan Tupac Amaru. It 
reaffirmed "the pluralist structure of the economy in terms of the corporate property: 
state, social, private and reformed private. In relation to industrial development, the Plan 
intended "to revise the program of import substitution so that the productive structure 
may be less dependent on imported inputs" (IDB, cl978: 355).
In 1974 Venezuela began to modify its development plan in order to take into 
account the enormous inflow of foreign exchange due to the increase in oil prices in the 
previous year. The Fifth Plan of the Nation, 1976-1980 had among other objectives to 
increase and diversify industrial production, especially in iron, steel, petroleum, and 
aluminum (IDB, cl979: 410) which were to be under the direct control of the state. At 
the same time it aimed for increasing industrial efficiency, and for increasing the 
production of goods of mass consumption (Iguinez, 1983: 29). The inflow of foreign 
exchange reduced the need for foreign direct investment, and allowed the government to 
be very supportive of the subordination of foreign direct investment.
In brief Peru and Venezuela supported import substitution, the primacy of the 
state, and the subordination of foreign direct investment.
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c) Bolivia and Ecuador
One of the Bolivian aims of its 1974-1975 Biennial Plan, and its Plan for Social 
and Economic Development, 1976-1980 was to diversify production through the 
diversification of exports and markets, the increasing domestic supply of consumer and 
agricultural goods, and the development of industrial production based on selective 
import substitution of consumer goods for domestic and external markets (IDB, cl975: 
208; ECLA, 1977: 71; JUNAC, 1982d: 14).
Government intervention in the economy to guide and manage it was made 
explicit in its plans and in its acts. There was a large degree of direct state intervention 
in the production of basic goods. Mining, oil and gas resources belonged to the state, and 
run by public enterprises. Besides, only the state could invest in petrochemical, 
metallurgy, and siderurgy (Morales and Machicado, 1978: 31).
As mentioned in chapter IV, section 4.4., the principle of subordination of foreign 
investment, by which foreign investment should be directed only to areas of 
governments’ interests, was not an aim of the Bolivian government in the phase of 
progress nor the phase of stagnation. "[W]ith the exception of 1970 and 1971 [when 
Decision 24 was not yet in application], the country has followed an open door policy 
to foreign capital" (Morales and Machicado, 1978: 29). The Investment Law of 1972 was 
quite generous in providing incentives for investment, national and foreign.
The reformist military government which took power in Ecuador in 1972 intended 
to intervene more directly in the economy, especially in industry (Iguinez, 1983: 24). 
The Integral Plan for Transformation and Development, 1973-1977, called for the
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government to exercise complete ownership of the steel, petroleum-refining, fishing, and 
fertilizer industries (IDB, cl975: 276; Iguinez, 1983: 22, 24).
The import substitution industrialization pursued by the Ecuadorean military 
government was a selective one. It was aimed toward an efficient production of goods 
which could be exported to the Andean Group. It was based on state incentives, public 
investment in infrastructure, and special treatment of foreign investment (Moncada, 1978: 
151). Although the products in the tariff reduction program were important, more 
emphasis was given to develop production assigned in the SPIDs (JUNAC, 1982d: 16).
Ecuador continued to favor a greater role of foreign direct investment. As such, 
it maintained its indifference to the principle of its secondary role.
In brief, Bolivia and Ecuador supported the primacy of the state, and import 
substitution. They continued to be indifferent to the secondary role of foreign investment.
To restate the relationship between the three main principles of the Cartagena 
Agreement and the aims of the six member countries were as follows. The four 
developmentalist countries—Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela—supported the 
primacy of the state, while Colombia was indifferent and Chile was not supportive (see 
table V.10). In the previous phase, all the member countries supported this principle. 
Import substitution industrialization was also supported by the four developmentalist 
countries, while Chile was not supportive of this principle, and Colombia was indifferent. 
In the previous phase, the former countries and Colombia were supportive of import 
substitution, while Chile was indifferent. Finally, the principle of subordination of 
foreign direct investment was supported by Peru and Venezuela; while Bolivia,
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Colombia, and Ecuador were indifferent to it; and Chile was not supportive of this 
principle. In contrast, during the phase of progress, Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela 
were indifferent to this principle, while Chile, Colombia and Peru supported this 
principle.
TABLE V.10 















Primacy of government S N I S S S 4S 11 IN
Import substitution industrialization S N I s S S 4S 11 IN
Subordination of foreign investment I N I I S S 2S 31 IN
10S 51 3N
S = Supportive I =  Indifferent N = Not supportive
The overall picture, in this phase of stagnation, was one of lesser support and 
increased indifference, as opposed to the generalized support for the principles during the 
phase of progress. Chile left because its national aims were not in agreement with those 
of the Andean Group. Colombia became less identified with the principles of the Andean 
Group. Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru continued the same level of support as in the previous 
phase while the new member, Venezuela, supported the 3 mechanisms.
4.6.- Domestic policies and the mechanisms of the Andean Group
It is apparent from the previous discussion that, during this phase of stagnation,
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the member countries became less identified with the principles of the Cartagena 
Agreement. This can be validated by comparing economic policies pursued by the 
governments with the four mechanisms of the Agreement. These mechanisms, as defined 
at the end of chapter HI, and redefined in chapter IV sections 2.4 and 2.5, are: Tariff 
reduction program, Common External tariff, Industrial Programming, Common 
Treatment for Foreign Investment. In comparing this phase of stagnation with the 
previous phase, much less correspondence should be expected between these four basic 
mechanisms and the economic policies pursued by the governments.
a) Chile and Colombia
Based on the neo-liberal strategy of free market, Chile "maintained the policy of 
periodic mini-devaluations of the Peso, promoted non-traditional exports, ... introduce[d]
progressive reductions in customs tariffs  and step[ped] up the transfer to the
private sector of ... [state] companies ... not considered as key enterprises" (ECLA, 
1976a: 154). Beginning in 1974 and speeded up from 1975 on, import tariffs were 
reduced and non-tariff barriers were eliminated. By the time Chile withdrew from the 
Cartagena Agreement, its policies had little, if any, affinity with the Andean mechanisms.
For Chileans the Andean trade liberalization mechanism was an obstacle, because 
it introduced discrimination in favor of the Andean imports. Their gradual lowering of 
tariffs and the elimination of non-tariff barriers meant a position far removed from the 
CET proposed by the Junta. The SPIDs represented for the Chilean government, "a re­
edition on a larger scale of old protectionist and interventionist national policies"
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(Wilhelmy, 1982b: 142). Finally, since the military government was eager to attract 
foreign capital, Decision 24 was considered an obstacle.
To sum it up, "the Chilean decision was to maintain ... a non-discriminatory 
external opening, and to stimulate foreign investment ... [Because of these factors] the 
Chilean withdrawal from the Andean Group, ..., [was] congruent with the policies and 
characteristics of the regime and of the government..." (Wilhelmy, 1982b: 143, 147).
In Colombia the export promotion policy enacted in 1967 (Iguinez, 1983: 42) 
began to bear fruits from 1973 on. This policy, and the fact that Colombia was more 
developed than the other member countries, led to a permanent trade surplus for this 
country (see table V .l l )  These results and the strategy of development pursued by 
Colombia made this country support the tariff reduction program.
The Colombian industrial policy, established in the 1975-1978 Plan, aimed to be 
in line with the compromises contemplated in the Andean Pact, especially as they relate 
to industrial programming (Caballero, 1978: 100). In September of 1976, however, 
during the crisis created by Chile, and in the middle of an anti-inflationary program, both 
the President of Colombia, Alfonso Lopez Michelsen, and his Finance minister—Rodrigo 
Botero—voiced their concern about inefficient import substitution industrialization. For 
them, SPIDs should aim to increase exports and to create jobs "based on industrial 
efficiency" (Caballero, 1978: 120).
The president also suggested to make Decision 24 more flexible in order to deal 
with the new international realities (Guerrero, 1979: 288, 290). In relation to the CET, 
the Colombian government, in 1975, considered the CET a tool to improve the industrial
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TABLE V .l l
COLOMBIA: ANDEAN TRADE 1974-1978
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
EXPORTS (FOB) (Millions of dollars)
Gran 1/ 66.7 140.5 189.9 218.0 298.8 304.2
World 1,177.0 1,352.0 1,465.0 1,773.0 2,443.2 3,002.7
IMPORTS (FOB) (Millions of dollars)
Gran 1/ 41.8 103.0 90.5 210.0 170.6 228.0
World 1,062.0 1,337.0 1,503.0 1,990.0 2,028.3 2,836.3
TRADE BALANCE (Millions of dollars)
Gran 1/ 24.9 37.5 99.4 8.0 128.2 76.2
World 115.0 15.0 (38.0) (217.0) 414.9 166.4
INTRASUB REGIONAL TRADE AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TRADE 1/
Exports 5.67 10.39 12.96 12.30 12.23 10.13
Imports 3.94 7.70 6.02 10.55 8.41 8.04
RATE OF GROWTH OF EXPORTS
Gran 1/ -4.85 110.64 35.16 14.80 37.06 1.81
World 35.91 14.87 8.36 21.02 37.80 22.90
RATE OF GROWTH OF IMPORTS
Gran 11 46.15 146.41 -12.14 132.04 -18.76 33.65
World 23.63 25.89 12.42 32.40 1.92 39.84
1/ Includes Venezuela from 1974 on; 1977-1978 excludes Chile.
SOURCES: World (69-75): JUNAC, 1977: II-4.25; Andean (69-75): JUNAC, 1977a: 
37-47; 1976: INTAL, c.1977: 139; 1977-1978: JUNAC, 1993: 10 and author’s 
calculations.
competitiveness to avoid making the mistakes linked to import substitution (Iguinez, 
1983: 48). This position was reiterated, in September 1976, by the Colombian President.
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In short, Colombia supported only the tariff reduction program. It was indifferent, 
especially after 1976, to the CET—as presented by the Junta in its Proposal 70, to 
Decision 24, and to the SPIDs. Chile, on the other hand, supported no mechanisms.
b) Peru and Venezuela
b .l) The tariff reduction program.- Peru felt the full impact of the changes in the
international economic system.
The loss of dynamism of the Peruvian economy between 1975 and 1978 
went hand in hand with the deterioration of the balance of payments situation, a 
growing negative position in the level of net international reserves, a substantial 
fiscal deficit, and high external public debt service payments. In view of this 
situation the government adopted a number of corrective measures in 1977 and 
1978 ... (IDB, C1980: 354).
Given this scenario, Peru, with the exception perhaps of Chile, had the most difficult
political, economic and social problems to deal with among the Andean nations.
Andean trade liberalization was viewed by the government as a mechanism which
weakened its attempts to reduce trade deficits. As a matter of fact, Peru had trade deficits
with the Andean Pact in all the years of this phase, except for 1978 (see table V.12),
when the successive devaluations showed results.68 The government, however, was
indifferent to this mechanism instead of not supporting it because the tariff reduction
“ Peru’s exchange rate (Soles per one US dollar) and trade balance (millions of US dollars) between 
1973 and 1980 were respectively as follows:________________________________________________
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Exchange rate 38.70 38.70 40.37 55.76 84.24 156.35 224.73 288.85
Trade balance 79 -405 -1,097 -675 -422 304 1,722 826
Sources: Coronado et al., 1986: 63, 84; BCR, 1993: 1, 111.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
208
TABLE V. 12
PERU: ANDEAN TRADE 1974-1978
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
EXPORTS (FOB) (Millions of dollars)
Gran 1/ 35.8 68.9 130.1 140.0 72.4 138.2
World 1,050.0 1,521.0 1,315.0 1,393.0 1,665.8 1,819.6
IMPORTS (FOB) (Millions of dollars)
Gran 1/ 81.8 213.3 226.0 270.0 408.9 87.2
World 1,024.0 1,531.0 1,386.0 2,109.0 1,918.0 1,464.0
TRADE BALANCE (Millions of dollars)
Gran 1/ (46.0) (144.4) (95.9) (130.0) (336.5) 51.0
World 26.0 (10.0) (71.0) (716.0) (252.2) 355.6
INTRASUBREGIONAL TRADE AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TRADE 1/
Exports 3.41 4.53 9.89 10.05 4.35 7.60
Imports 7.99 13.93 16.31 12.80 21.32 5.96
RATE OF GROWTH OF EXPORTS
Gran 1/ 26.06 92.46 88.82 7.61 -48.29 90.88
World 11.23 44.86 -13.54 5.93 19.58 9.23
RATE OF GROWTH OF IMPORTS
Gran 1/ 50.09 160.76 5.95 19.47 51.44 -78.67
World 28.64 49.51 -9.47 52.16 -9.06 -23.67
1/ Includes Venezuela from 1974 on; 1977-1978 excludes Chile.
SOURCES: World (69-75): JUNAC, 1977: II-4.25; Andean (69-75): JUNAC, 1977a: 
37-47; 1976: INTAL, c.1977: 139; 1977-1978: JUNAC, 1993: 10 and author’s 
calculations.
program was viewed as a trade-off with the SPIDs.
Venezuela enjoyed a short prosperity between 1974 and 1977. Its industrial policy
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changed from 1974 on. Emphasis was given to the development of basic metal 
industries—e.g., steel, aluminum—and petrochemicals (ECLA, 1976: 333). By 1977 
economic problems began to develop due to the reduction of oil income. The budget 
deficit increased, external borrowing increased, trade surpluses were converted into trade 
deficits,69 the rate of growth slowed, inflation augmented, and the rate of growth of 
exports diminished, while consumption continued to increase.
To increase the supply of goods, during the oil bonanza, 1974-1977, the 
Venezuelan government "made no attempt to retard the growth of imports, and in some 
cases encouraged it by selective tariff reductions and the granting of credit for purchases 
abroad" (ECLA, 1976a: 386). The government of Venezuela, however, considered that 
"trade expansion [was] not an end in itself" (Blanco de Iturbe, 1978: 256), and that 
industrialization was more important. Venezuela was able to obtain additional exemptions 
to the tariff reduction program in the negotiations to its entry into the Pact, thus 
increasing the number of goods protected from Andean competition. This showed that 
the tariff reduction program could be more harmful than helpful for Venezuela. As such, 
the government was indifferent to it. The Venezuelan intra-Andean trade figures show 
increasing exports and imports, and a favorable, but decreasing, trade balance with the 
rest of the subregion (table V.13).
b.2) Common external tariff.- During this phase, the Peruvian government was 
indifferent to the CET. Lowering domestic tariffs, as expected by the Junta’s Proposal
“ In 1977 Venezuela had its first trade deficit in forty years (Iguinez, 1983: 34).
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TABLE V.13
VENEZUELA: ANDEAN TRADE 1974-1978
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
EXPORTS (FOB) (Millions of dollars)
Gran 1/ 254.9 173.3 187.0 263.8 121.1
World 14,653.0 10,671.0 10,272.0 9,527.5 9,177.6
IMPORTS (FOB) (Millions of dollars)
Gran 1/ 56.3 125.0 116.0 198.1 246.3
World 4,314.0 5,810.0 6,662.0 11,224.8 12,195.1
TRADE BALANCE (Millions of dollars)
Gran 1/ 198.6 48.3 71.0 65.7 (125.2)
World 10,339.0 4,861.0 3,610.0 (1,697.3) (3,017.5)
INTRASUBREGIONAL TRADE AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TRADE 1/
Exports 1.74 1.62 1.82 2.77 1.32
Imports 1.31 2.15 1.74 1.76 2.02
RATE OF GROWTH OF EXPORTS
Gran 1/ -32.01 7.91 41.07 -54.09
World -27.18 -3.74 -7.25 -3.67
RATE OF GROWTH OF IMPORTS
Gran II 122.02 -7.20 70.78 24.33
World 34.68 14.66 68.49 8.64
1/ Includes Venezuela from 1974 on; 1977-1978 excludes Chile.
SOURCES: World (69-75): JUNAC, 1977: II-4.25; Andean (69-75): JUNAC, 1977a: 
37-47; 1976: INTAL, c.1977: 139; 1977-1978: JUNAC, 1993: 10 and author’s 
calculations.
(see table V.2), would increase imports in opposition to government’s aim. In this phase, 
"[c]ommercial aspects [the tariff reduction program and CET] of the integration process
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were not promoted" (Iguinez, 1983: 49).
The successful demand of Venezuela to consider the approval of the CET as an 
issue subject to veto (Annex I of the Cartagena agreement), demonstrate this country’s 
protective stand.
b.3) Industrial programming.- The SPIDs were supported by the Peruvian government. 
Peru’s industrial law, which was in effect, prioritized the production of goods similar to 
the ones reserved for industrial programming.70
The 1976-1980 Venezuelan Plan supported the Cartagena Agreement. Particular 
importance was given to industrial programming. SPIDs were considered "fundamental 
for a greater expansion, specialization and diversification of production ... [and] there 
was a similarity between the Venezuelan industrial development priorities and the 
products reserved for industrial programming" in the Andean Group (JUNAC, 1982d: 
20). Special importance was given to the Automobile Program.71
b.4) Decision 24.- The government of Peru was also in agreement with Decision 24 as 
it was. Its domestic legislation in this matter remained in place during this phase.
Venezuela put into force Decision 24 in 1974. The government took advantage 
of GRAN to avoid "a long [domestic policy] debate . . . "  (Blanco de Iturbe, 1978: 256).
70"... there is a great correspondence between the priorities established by the General Law of 
Industries and the type of products subject to industrial programming" (Iguinez, 1983: 48).
7,For the former Director of the Instituto de Comercio Exterior of Venezuela, and as such the 
government representative to the Commission, "the Automobile Program is more important than all the 
tariff reductions. With that industry, we will make fundamental progress in the integration process, ..." 
(Alegrett, 1977: 68).
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Surplus of foreign exchange allowed Venezuela to strictly apply Decision 24 without
major economic or political consequences.
In brief, Peru and Venezuela were indifferent to the tariff reduction program, and
of the CET, while they continued to support industrial programming and the common
treatment for foreign investment.
The new Peruvian position reflected international and domestic changes which
during the second phase of the military government (1975-1980) assigned a very low
priority to integration.
[T]he crisis of the external sector and the domestic opposition [to the regime and 
its adjustment policies] were of such magnitude that ... integration [was] 
gradually relegated to the back seat." In practice, "... integration ... [was] 
supported insofar as it [did] not go against the more pressing objectives like the 
reestablishment of external credit, ... and internal peace (Wilhelmy, 1982a: 207, 
195).
In the case of Venezuela, more important than the specific stands of Venezuela 
to each one of the main mechanisms was its political stand. With the oil income, 
Venezuela’s international position improved, resulting in a very active foreign policy.72 
In this context, as a foreign policy objective of status and prestige, rather than one of 
welfare,73 the Andean Group represented a forum for Venezuela in which it could
^Examples of it were its leadership in OPEC, and in the Non-aligned movement. In Latin America 
and in the Andean Group, Venezuela aimed for a leadership based on integration and cooperation. An 
example of this is the creation, in 1975, of the Latin America Economic System (Sistema Economico 
Latinomericano - SELA) due to Venezuela’s support which was rewarded with the designation of Caracas 
as the seat of the secretariat. Venezuela also expanded diplomatic relations very quickly. Between 1969 and 
1979 it established relations with 27 states. For a recent study on Venezuela’s active foreign policy between 
1969 and 1979 see Nones, 1994.
73There are four common purposes of foreign policies of all contemporary states: security, autonomy, 
welfare, and status and prestige. "There is no precise meaning to these terms [status or prestige] as applied 
to the relations between states, but let us simply use them in a common sense way: Political associations 
seek to generate deference, respect, and sometimes awe among others. ... Many foreign policies reflect 
or incorporate these values" (Holsti, 1995: 84, 107).
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became a leader. "For this country the political aspects of integration took priority over 
the economic ones..." (Portales, 1982: 166).
c) Bolivia and Ecuador
c .l) The tariff reduction program.- With regard to the tariff reduction program, Bolivia 
became indifferent to this mechanism. In order to fight inflation, Bolivia, kept its 
currency overvalued, at 20 pesos per dollar, from 1972 to 1979 (when the Peso was 
devaluated by 25 percent). It unintentionally favored imports which increased almost by 
fourfold from $204 million in 1973 to $770 in 1978 (see table V.14). This is also 
reflected in its growing trade deficits with the Andean Group in 1975, 1977 and 1978. 
These results made the government unwilling to begin the tariff reduction program by 
December 1976, as stipulated in the original Article lOOf of the Cartagena Agreement. 
The Protocols of Lima and of Arequipa postponed this issue until December 1981.
Ecuador began exporting oil by 1973 when its price skyrocketed. This provided 
the government with resources to undertake projects aimed at taking advantage of the 
Andean Group opportunities. To cope with the increased demand created by oil income, 
imports rose almost four times in five years, from $397 million in 1973 to $1,505 in 
1978 (see table V.15). This favored intra-Andean trade. At the same time Ecuador had, 
except for 1974 and 1978, an increasing trade surplus with the Andean subregion. 
Between 50 and 83 percent of the exports to GRAN from 1973 to 1978 were oil. With 
these results, Ecuador, in contrast to Bolivia, continued to favor of the tariff reduction 
program.
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TABLE V.14
BOLIVIA: ANDEAN TRADE 1974-1978
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
EXPORTS (FOB) (Millions of dollars)
Gran 1/ 26.7 62.0 25.7 38.0 11.3 16.0
World 261.0 556.0 443.0 621.0 712.7 725.3
IMPORTS (FOB) (Millions of dollars)
Gran 1/ 7.4 14.4 26.0 19.0 18.4 26.0
World 204.0 390.0 558.0 615.0 586.3 769.5
TRADE BALANCE (Millions of dollars)
Gran 1/ 19.3 47.6 (0.3) 19.0 (7.1) (10.0)
World 57.0 166.0 (115.0) 6.0 126.4 (44.2)
INTRASUBREGIONAL TRADE AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TRADE 1/
Exports 10.23 11.15 5.80 6.12 1.59 2.21
Imports 3.63 3.69 4.66 3.09 3.14 3.38
RATE OF GROWTH OF EXPORTS
Gran 1/ 39.06 132.21 -58.55 47.86 -70.26 41.59
World 29.85 113.03 -20.32 40.18 14.77 1.77
RATE OF GROWTH OF IMPORTS
Gran 1/ 39.62 94.59 80.56 -26.92 -3.16 41.30
World 22.24 253.46 2.19 4.77 -4.67 31.25
\J Includes Venezuela from 1974 on; 1977-1978 excludes Chile.
SOURCES: World (69-75): JUNAC, 1977: H-4.25; 
Andean (69-75): JUNAC, 1977a: 37-47; 
1976: INTAL, c.1977: 139;
1977-1978: JUNAC, 1993: 10, 
and author’s calculations.
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TABLE V. 15
ECUADOR: ANDEAN TRADE 1974-1978
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
EXPORTS (FOB) (Millions of dollars)
Gran 1/ 76.9 172.1 153.6 192.0 178.4 102.3
World 532.0 1,055.0 897.0 1,174.0 1,436.3 1,557.5
IMPORTS (FOB) (Millions of dollars)
Gran 1/ 34.7 159.8 87.1 89.0 60.5 74.6
World 397.0 959.0 943.0 976.0 1,188.5 1,505.1
TRADE BALANCE (Millions of dollars)
Gran I! 42.2 12.3 66.5 103.0 117.9 27.7
World 135.0 96.0 (46.0) 198.0 247.8 52.4
INTRASUBREGIONAL TRADE AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TRADE V
Exports 14.45 16.31 17.12 16.35 12.42 6.57
Imports 8.74 16.66 9.24 9.12 5.09 4.96
RATE OF GROWTH OF EXPORTS
Gran 1/ 155.48 123.80 -10.75 25.00 -7.08 -42.66
World 63.19 98.31 -14.98 30.88 22.34 8.44
RATE OF GROWTH OF IMPORTS
Gran 1/ 26.18 360.52 -45.49 2.18 -32.02 23.31
World 24.45 141.56 -1.67 3.50 21.77 26.64
i / Includes Venezuela from 1974 on; 1977-1978 excludes Chile.
SOURCES: World (69-75): JUNAC, 1977: H-4.25; 
Andean (69-75): JUNAC, 1977a: 37-47; 
1976: INTAL, c.1977: 139;
1977-1978: JUNAC, 1993: 10 
and author’s calculations.
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c.2) Common external tariff.- Although during this phase of stagnation, 1974-1978, 
Bolivia did not have an explicit position with regard to the CET—that is, Proposal 70—it 
is possible to conclude that it was indifferent to it. First, the lack of position meant that 
the government had not decided on its future tariff policy. On the other hand, the tariff 
levels in the intermediate and capital goods proposed by the Junta were much higher than 
the Bolivian ones (see table V.2). Since Bolivia had little chance to develop industries 
in these areas—except for the products assigned to it by the SPIDs—this meant increasing 
trade diversion, and an increase in the costs of these products.74 Thus, Bolivia was 
indifferent to this mechanism.
With regard to the CET, Ecuador supported it, and the Junta's proposals. The 
tariff levels and the tariff structure supported by Ecuador were the same as those 
proposed by the Junta (JUNAC, 1977f: 31).
c.3) Industrial programming.- Bolivia in the 1970s had a manufacturing sector which 
was still in an early stage of development. The Investment Law of 1972 served as the 
main stimulus. It set as the first priority the production of goods in the metallurgy, 
petrochemical, metalworking, basic chemistry, pharmaceuticals, automobile, electrical, 
and electronic industries (Iguinez, 1983: 22, 49). These areas were similar to the 
products reserved for SPIDs. Beginning in 1973, Bolivia began to promote exports of
74"... import substitution at the regional level gives rise to trade diversion ... This may ..., bring 
benefits to the union as a whole ... The crucial point is that all the benefits ... accrue to the particular 
country where the new industry is located, while the importing countries face a net cost ..." (Williamson, 
1981: 201). And Bolivia was, with those high CET levels, to be diverting cheaper imports of capital and 
intermediate goods from non-member countries to more expensive ones from the other Andean members.
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manufactured goods, especially of products assigned to it by the SPIDs, and the products 
for which Bolivia had immediate free access to the Andean market (JUNAC, 1982d: 14). 
For Bolivia industrial programming was a tool to further its industrialization.
Another result of Ecuadorean oil revenues and government incentives was the 
increase in the production of manufactured goods. The Industrial Development Law, 
enacted in 1957 (Iguinez, 1983: 21) was modified in 1973 allowing more enterprises to 
benefit from it (IDB, cl980: 241).75 "Industry grew 11.6 percent in 1974 compared to 
an annual average of 7.8 percent in 1970-1973" (IDB, cl976: 227). Support for industrial 
programming increased in this phase. For Ecuador, SPIDs were considered the 
fundamental means allowing access to the benefits of the Cartagena Agreement and to 
accelerate its development.
c.4) Decision 24.- The Bolivian Investment Law of 1972 took as many departures from 
it as the decision allowed. Decision 24 was an instrument the government was indifferent 
to because it was viewed as limiting Bolivia’s possibilities to attract foreign investment. 
Foreign direct investment did not constitute a significant contribution to economic activity 
or the financing of important investment (see table V.5).76
Until 1976 Ecuador’s indifference towards Decision 24 was because it was 
seeking more foreign investment. Afterwards, the new Military Junta, in greater need
75Tax exemptions encouraged investment in industry. In 1975 it was about $100 million, and $80 
million in 1977 (IDB, cl978: 229).
76The small domestic market, the lack of adequate infrastructure, and export difficulties due to Bolivian 
landlocked geography have been factors contributing to this result.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
218
o f foreign capitals became even more indifferent to it, supporting the elimination of 
Decision 24 (Frambes-Buxeda, 1990: 105).
In brief, Bolivia and Ecuador were supportive of the SPIDs. Bolivia was 
indifferent to the tariff reduction program, the CET and to Decision 24. Ecuador 
supported the tariff reduction program, the CET, and was indifferent to Decision 24.
d) Conclusion
In short, in the phase of stagnation, the countries were less supportive of the main 
mechanisms of the Andean Group than in the phase of progress, when all the countries, 
for their own interests, supported all of the mechanisms. The relationship between 
government economic policies and the Cartagena Agreement’s main mechanisms, table 
V.16, shows that three developmentalist countries (Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela) 
supported or were indifferent to the main mechanisms, while Colombia and Bolivia were 
indifferent, and Chile was not supportive.
Two countries—Colombia, and Ecuador—supported the tariff reduction program, 
while Bolivia, Peru and Venezuela were indifferent to this mechanism, and Chile opposed 
it. Four countries—Bolivia, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela—were indifferent to the CET, 
while Chile was not supportive of this mechanism, and Ecuador supported it. Industrial 
programming was supported by Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela. Colombia was 
indifferent and Chile opposed. Finally, in the case of Decision 24, only Peru and 
Venezuela supported it, while Bolivia, Ecuador, and Colombia were indifferent to it, and 
Chile against it.
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Indifference was the most common position of the member countries towards the 
main mechanisms of the Cartagena Agreement, during this phase of stagnation and 
doubts. In contrast, during the phase of progress support for the mechanisms was 
widespread (see table IV. 15).
TABLE V.16
SUPPORT FOR ANDEAN MECHANISMS: 1974-1978
MECHANISM BO CH CO EC PE VE TOTALS
Tariff reduction program I N s S I I 2S 31 IN
Common Tariff I N I s I I IS 41 IN
Industrial Programming S N I s s S 4S 11 IN
Foreign Investment I N I I S S 2S 31 IN
9S 11I4N
S =  Supportive I =  Indifferent N = Not supportive
By the end of this phase the international economy had changed due to the oil 
crisis and the demise of the Bretton Woods system. These changes affected the Andean 
countries differently, leading to greater divergences in their long-term plans and in their 
economic policies. In general, there was a trend to attract foreign capital, to increase 
exports, and minimize the consequences of the economic crisis. For the Andean process 
these changes meant increasing demands to make the common treatment of foreign 
investments more flexible, to reduce support to the SPIDs, and to increase exports 
outside the Andean market.
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CHAPTER VI
FROM AREOUIPA TO QUITO (1979-1986): PESSIMISM AND REGRESSION
1.- MAJOR CHANGES IN THE ANDEAN GROUP IN THE 1980s
During the 1980s the Andean process entered into a phase of regression. The 
indicators showing regression, as stated in the hypothesis of this research project, are: 
(a) reduction in intrasubregional trade; (b) widespread violations of the Cartagena 
Agreement; (c) abandonment of the implementation of the Andean mechanisms; and (d) 
decisions approved by the Commission were the fewest ever and concentrated on 
unimportant issues or actually weakened the process.
The evidence presented in this chapter supports the hypothesis of this dissertation,
i.e., that regression was due to the fact that the majority of the governments of the 
member countries did not find their current interests reflected in the existing Cartagena 
Agreement. In other words, their national goals could not be achieved through the 
Andean integration process.
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Sections 2 and 3 of this chapter corroborate the hypothesized indicators for the 
phase of regression. The last section of this chapter (section 4), examines the evidence 
and shows that regression is adequately explained by the hypothesis of this dissertation.
1.1.- The debt crisis
Due to the debt crisis, the 1980s has been termed "the lost decade" for Latin
I
America. This international crisis was spurred by the second oil price rise at the end of 
the 1970s. The debt crisis produced major changes in Latin America. On the economic 
front, governments began an asynchronous shift from the import substitution strategy of 
development, to an export-oriented strategy. In the political front, military dictatorships 
were peacefully and also asynchronously replaced by elected civilian regimes.
The crisis made the Andean integration process regress rather than progress as 
expected after the adoption of the Protocols of Lima (1976) and of Arequipa (1978). 
Three important facts in the early 1980s led to the regression. First, the disequilibria of 
the external sector characterized by increasing balance of payments deficits and the 
increasing inability to pay the external debt; second, border conflicts between Peru and 
Ecuador (1981), and between Colombia and Venezuela (1980); and finally natural 
disasters (especially in Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru in 1983).
In 1979 oil prices skyrocketed again. As opposed to the first oil price rise of 1973 
not many of the new "petrodollars" were deposited in banks. Banks did not increase 
loans to the non-oil exporting developing countries, and did not roll-over the previous 
loans. The developed world applied (1980-1982) restrictive monetary and trade policies.
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Interest rates and debts soared, exports by the developing countries decreased, and terms 
of trade deteriorated for the Third World.1 The developing countries found themselves 
in a no-win situation. They had to repay their increasingly costly loans due to raising 
interest rates and the shift from long-term to short-term loans. At the same time they 
were unable to earn enough foreign exchange because decreasing export’ pricesm and 
reduced demand from the developed countries. The international debt crisis followed. It 
was officially recognized as such after Mexico announced, in August 1982, a moratorium 
of its debt payments. Generalized recession, hyperinflation, high unemployment, and 
monetary and financial disarray ensued.
Latin American integration processes, including the Andean Group, were 
paralyzed or suffered reversal because the economic, financial and negotiating capacities 
of each country was devoted to dealing individually with its own the debt crisis (Axline, 
1994: 4; Rodriguez Mancera, 1992: 10). Moreover, these processes regressed from their 
most common goal: trade. Intraregional trade accompanied the general trend of trade 
reduction instead of being anti-cyclical (INTAL, 1990a: 26; Rodriguez, 1988: 127). This 
was caused by trade barriers imposed in the 1980s.
The Andean economies went through adjustment programs of different degrees 
of harshness and at different times. Peru applied several of them since 1976, Bolivia 
since 1979, Ecuador and Venezuela since 1981, and Colombia since 1984 (JUNAC,
'In the case of Latin America, the total debt increased on an average of 27.3 percent yearly, going 
from $161.4 billion in 1978 to $441.6 billion in 1987; interest payments on the extem i public debt 
increased by 32.3 percent annually between 1978 and 1987; while the service of the public debt, in the 
same period, increased at the rate of 16.9 percent per year (IDB, 1989: 503, 509, 511). The value of Latin 
American exports decreased by 4.3 percent annually from 1980 and 1987, while their volume increased 
by 4.4 percent per year during that period (IDB, 1988: 15).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
223
1985: 2).2 The immediate aims were to reduce inflation, to diminish the balance of 
payments, and fiscal deficits through recessionary policies. Longer-term aims were to 
open the economies to international competition, to reduce state intervention in the 
economy, and to increase productivity, efficiency, and economic growth.
The result was that the Andean countries began to pursue, at different times, and 
with different degrees of intensity, similar strategies of development and economic 
policies, ".. the changes in the world economy have made national economies become 
more and more homogenized in their behavior and practices ..." (Alegrett, 1989: 14). 
This provided the basis for the Andean countries to modify the Cartagena Agreement and 
to make it a tool to fulfill redefined national interests.
1.2.- Winds of Democratization
In most Latin American countries, the debt crisis was one of the factors forcing 
the military back to the barracks in relatively peaceful processes (Drake, 1989; Maxfield, 
1989). In the Andean Group, this was the case in Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru. The new 
civilian regimes had to deal with their legacies: economic recession, social unrest, and 
domestic and subregional conflicts. As a result the Andean obligations were set aside.
2The economic consequences were devastating. In 1989, per capita gross domestic product (GDP) for 
GRAN was 7.5 percent below its 1980 level. Gross domestic product decreased at 2.1 percent annually 
between 1981 and 1983, between 1984 and 1986 to grew at 4.3 percent average in each year, and in 1987 
it decreased by 0.4 percent. The ratio between gross investment and the GDP went down from 20.7 percent 
in 1980 to 14.9 percent in 1989. In the 1980s the Andean subregion was a net exporter of capital, in 
amounts near 6 percent of its GDP. All countries, except Colombia went into arrears in paying interests 
to the private banks; and in the case of Peru and Bolivia to the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund. Inflation went up to three digit levels or more in Bolivia in 1982, 1983 and 1984; reaching a record 
of more than 8,000 percent in 1985. Peru had three digit inflation level in 1983, 1984, 1985, and 1987; 
and four digit levels between 1988 and 1990. Venezuela had inflation rates between 20 percent in 1980 to 
81 percent in 1989 (its highest); while in Ecuador it went from 11 percent to 84 percent in these years, 
reaching its height in 1988 with 83.6 percent (JUNAC, 1991a: 42, 43; 1990c: 138).
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Bolivia had the most difficult transition from authoritarianism to an elected 
regime. Between 1978 and 1982 there were several elections, coups d ’etat, and counter 
coups. In September 1982 the Congress elected in 1980, was convened and chose the 
leftist Heman Siles Suazo as president to rule until 1986. Conflicts between the Executive 
and opposition dominated Congress over the expansionary economic policy of the former 
led to economic havoc. Siles had to call early elections in 1985, and was replaced by the 
veteran, and by then conservative, Victor Paz Estenssoro. He quickly enacted a liberal 
economic policy stabilizing the economy and polity. In August 1989, Paz Estenssoro 
became the first Bolivian president to finish a full term since 1964. He was replaced by 
Jaime Paz Zamora, his nephew and a center-Ieftist.
The 1978 elections and the runoff elections in 1979 signaled the end of the 
military regime in Ecuador. The reformist Jaime Roldos became president in 1980. In 
1981 he died in a plane crash and was replaced by Osvaldo Hurtado, his vice-president. 
In a highly contested election, in 1984, Hurtado was succeeded by the conservative Leon 
Febres Cordero. In both governments, congressional opposition did not allow the 
executive to fully implement the austerity economic measures due to oil revenue 
shortfalls and increasing external debt in the case of the former, and the neo-liberal 
economic program in the case of the latter.
The Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces of Peru, after the elections 
of 1980, handed power to the centrist Fernando Belaunde Terry, the same person the 
military had overthrown in 1968. Although economic conditions sharply deteriorated 
from 1983 on, Belaunde was able to finish his term and pass the presidential band to
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Alan Garcia Perez of the left of center APRA party in 1985.
These transitions from authoritarian regimes to elected regimes changed the 
political, social, economic, and strategic interests that guided the Cartagena Agreement. 
Since GRAN’s inception, this was the first time all its members had elected governments.
1.3.- Regression of the Andean process
The debt crisis and the further changes in the international economic system made 
the Andean governments concerned mainly to deal with the crisis. Little attention was 
given to other issues, like integration.3 The international economic crisis induced the 
Andean countries to slowly and asynchronically change their strategies of development. 
This created a growing divorce between the interests of the countries, in a process of 
finding a new strategy of development, and the usefulness of an Andean Group created 
to complement the strategy of development that was being replaced.4 Due mainly to 
these factors, the debt crisis and the ensuing changes in the strategy of development and 
in the economic policies, the Andean Group suffered further erosion of political support 
(Avery, 1983: 155; Puyo, 1989: 30).5 GRAN became dynamic again when the member
3"The international environment, the debt crisis, the growth problems of the countries of the region, 
and the economic and social implications of adjustment programs and structural reforms are contributing 
to hindering the integration process, since these factors are preventing the agreements from evolving in the 
way it had been expected" (INTAL, 1990: 1).
"... during periods of economic stress, governments prefer national over multinational solutions 
for economic problems ... in spite of the fact that, from purely national points of view, common ... 
administered policies might be not only desirable, but also essential" (Feld, et al., 1994: 276-277).
presently [1982] there is a clear opposition between national models and policies, and the 
integration model and policies" (de la Puente, 1988: 226).
5"In fact, towards the end of the seventies, it had already become clear that the application of the 
principal instruments of the Cartagena Agreement was rendered unfit by reasons of an essentially political 
nature. At that time, a plausible agreement on common interests of the Member States remained distant
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countries adopted a new and similar strategy of development.
General import restrictions reduced intra-Andean trade. Trade was one of the 
most important mechanisms the countries had to assess the benefits that the Andean 
integration was accruing to them (UNCTAD, 1989: 2). Deep concerns created the first 
decrease in intrasubregional exports which occurred in 1982 (minus 4.4 percent in 
relation to 1981, see table VI.2). There was a widespread consensus about the main 
cause: the worldwide economic crisis.6 The direct cause was that "[i]n 1982, the 
member countries adopted protective short-term policies, in some cases in conflict with 
... the [Andean] trade liberalization program and the minimum common external tariff" 
(IDB, cl984: 140). Violations of the Cartagena Agreement and the decisions of the 
Commission with regard to trade and other mechanisms became widespread.7 None of 
the Andean goals were achieved, and what was more important, achievement was not 
expected in the near future (Aninat, Fffench-Davis, and Leiva, 1990: 162; Bawa, 1980:
on the horizon. This is especially true in relation to the implementation of sectoral programs of industrial 
development... the establishment of a Common External Tariff, . . .  the inobservance [sic] of the guaranteed 
access to markets ..."
"Harmonization in external trade mechanisms had been sluggish, regulations for treatment of 
foreign capital and technology had been questioned and unilateral restrictive measures applied to protect 
themselves from the world crisis pointed to the need for a revision of the Cartagena Agreement to adapt 
it to new circumstances" (Mairal, 1989: 94, 95).
6"The crisis of the Andean integration was in its worst in 1982 and 1983. In those years almost all the 
countries had dire economic difficulties due basically to the international recessionary tendencies" (JUNAC, 
1991a: 87).
7"... in the 1980s, the period of real stagnation ... was characterized by the contraction of ... 
intrasubregional trade and the proliferation of violations" (JUNAC, 1989b: 6).
According to Taylor (1984: 72) "the timetable for realizing the goals of the Cartagena Agreement 
has been procrastinated or often seemingly forgotten" affecting the tariff reduction program, common tariff 
and industrial programming.
"... the accords and mechanisms defined at the beginning of the 1970s were eroded and non- 
compliance ensued ..." (JUNAC, 1991a: 87).
"... all the member countries ... shared generalized violations of the commitments with regard to 
the [Andean] trade liberalization program and the common tariff, to which the failure of industrial 
programming was added" (Hurtado, 1990: 3).
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xv; Carmona, 1984: 12; Ferrari, 1991: 68; Fuentes and Martinez, 1990: 5-6; JUNAC, 
1987: 2; Rodriguez Mancera, 1992: 3).
This situation and the inability to find solutions for several years constituted the 
major aspects of the crisis of regression of the Andean process. "Nineteen seventy-nine, 
... marks the beginning of the crisis of the Cartagena Agreement" (JUNAC, 1987a: 6). 
This regression phase ended when the Cartagena Agreement was again drastically 
modified by the Protocol of Quito, signed in 1987.8
1.4.- The Quito Protocol
The changes brought about by the Quito Protocol reflected the immediate and 
long-term goals the governments wanted to achieve through the Andean Group. These 
goals were to make the Cartagena Agreement am efficient instrument to collaborate in 
the economic development of the subregion (JUNAC, 1988a: 8; Marquez, 1989: 13); to 
dependence on external factors" (Mairal, 1989: 97); and to make its mechanisms more 
flexible and thus, more viable and similar to the interests of the member countries. In 
other words, the Andean process of integration was affected by the changes in the 
national strategy of development pursued by the governments (Tironi, 1976: 63).
“The changes in the 1980s in the international economic system not only the provoked regression in 
GRAN but in all economic integration processes of the region (Bryan, 1984: 83; INTAL, 1992: 19). "[T]he 
regional integration movement is in deep trouble. In the best cases, integration schemes are going through 
periods of extreme difficulty characterized by a slowdown in the decision-making process, a reluctance to 
adhere to regional commitments and obligations and, in some instances, even a reversal in decision-making 
itself. In the worst cases, the schemes are in disarray, facing the prospect of complete collapse" (McIntyre, 
1984: 15).
The Central American Common Market was paralyzed even before the civil wars in the region 
virtually brushed it aside. The CARICOM languished due to the external effects on the economies of the 
member countries. The Latin American Free Trade Association, LAFTA, after several years of intense 
negotiations was scaled down and replaced, by the Latin American Integration Association, ALADI, in 
1980. The main attributes of the ALADI treaty were flexibility and pragmatism (INTAL, 1981: 22).
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Practically no part of the Cartagena Agreement was left untouched by the Quito 
Protocol. It profoundly modified the chapters dealing with the organs of the agreement, 
economic policy harmonization, industrial programming, common external tariff, the 
tariff reduction program, agriculture, and the special treatment for Bolivia and Ecuador. 
It also added a new chapter on social and economic cooperation.
With the approval of this protocol, the Commission also adopted a set of decisions 
to facilitate ending of the phase of regression (see section 4.2).
2.- THE MECHANISMS OF THE CARTAGENA AGREEMENT AND THE PHASE 
OF REGRESSION
2.1.- The tariff reduction program
With the Protocols of Lima and Arequipa, the three largest Andean 
countries—Colombia, Peru and Venezuela—should have eliminated customs duties among 
themselves by December 1983. They did it with some delays (see section 3.3). Bolivia 
and Ecuador should have embarked on their tariff reduction process between December 
1980 and December 1990, but by the end of this phase (1987), they had not begun it.
From 1982 on, restrictions on trade among Andean nations were unilaterally 
imposed by member countries, due to increasing fiscal deficits, devaluations, external 
debt and high interest rates (Abusada, 1981: 276; Schuldt and Urriola, 1991: 126-127). 
Trade diminished (see section 2.6), and between 1982 and 1986 bilateral trade accords
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were signed to "address the most critical cases" (JUNAC, 1981: 6).
In October 1982, Venezuela became the first country to impose non-tariff barriers 
to trade within the subregion. In that year, around 500 items were under trade 
restrictions. By November 1986, of the 3,340 items in the tariff reduction program (70 
percent of the total dutiable items) almost two-thirds were still under non-tariff barrier 
restrictions, and 9 percent (301 items) were traded under bilateral accords By December 
1987, 8 months after the Quito Protocol was signed, items under bilateral accords had 
increased to 809 items (Figueredo, 1985: 161; JUNAC, 1986a: 6; 1988a: 22).
In brief, for most of the phase of regression, a large portion of intra-Andean trade 
was subject to trade restrictions, and the attempts to eliminate them were unsuccessful.
2.2.- Common tariff
With the 1976 and 1978 changes made in the Cartagena Agreement, a common 
external tariff band was to be approved by December 1979. In March 1978 the Junta 
presented proposal 96 on the common tariff and related matters.9 Unsuccessful efforts 
were made in 1978 and 1979 to meet the deadline to approve it. In 1989 and 1981 these 
efforts continued, but without success.
In February 1980, the Junta presented to the Commission new guidelines for the 
CET (JUNAC, 1980f), based on them governments reached accords, this resulted in the
’Using the concept of effective protection (that is, protection on the value added to the product) to 
define the floor of the band, the proposal suggested 70 percent as the maximum protection to be granted 
to any product. For agricultural products, the resulting nominal protections were to be adjusted downward, 
and upward for capital goods, as well as for labor intensive and high technology products. The average 
effective rate, considering the modifications, was 38 percent.
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Junta presenting a modified version of Proposal 96 (JUNAC, 1980g).10 The 
governments’ positions vis-a-vis this proposal in 1980, are presented in table VI. 1.
As shown in table VI. 1, the basic disagreement among the governments was on 
the level of protection. Two contradictory problems were the main issues. The first was 
that a protectionist CET would recreate, at the subregional level, the short-comings of 
the import substitution policies (Koopmann, 1979: 118); the second was that the 
protection proposed for the floor of the band would not be enough to warrant production 
at the subregional level."
In 1984, the Junta suggested that in the new protocol, which had to be adopted 
in order to again restore the juridical basis of the Cartagena Agreement, no deadline 
should be set to approve the CET. This "will facilitate its adoption when the conditions 
are ripe." The Junta also recognized that "the viability of the [Andean] process depends 
on the convergence of political will and the real capability of the member countries to 
make commitments, and not on the setting of rigid deadlines" (JUNAC, 1984b: 26).
In short, the CET, a crucial mechanism, was not approved in this phase of 
regression. Characteristic of this phase, as opposed to the phase of stagnation, was that
“The floor of the tariff band for 1990 was still 70 percent effective protection, but the ceiling was 
limited to 2.5 times the level of the floor, or 100 percent ad-valorem, whichever was lower. Colombia, 
Peru and Venezuela would reach gradually tariff levels within the band between December 1980 and 
December 1990, while Bolivia and Ecuador would do it between 1981 and 1990. The width of the band 
would be reduced in 1983, 1987 and 1990 from 80 percent effective protection to the target of 70 percent. 
The criteria to assign levels of effective protection were the same as in Proposal 96, but protection for 
capital goods was reduced from 40-50 percent to 15-40 percent by considering only the potential generation 
of unskilled jobs rather than considering both skilled and unskilled.
""Each country seem to have a different idea as to the optimum level of openness of the Andean 
Group’s markets to imports from the outside, ...; and all the members seem to have different opinions as 
well as ... what would constitute a reasonable degree of protection" (INTAL, 1982: 73).
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TABLE VI. 1
GOVERNMENTS’ POSITION IN RELATION TO THE CET PROPOSAL
MAXIMUM LEVEL OF THE TARIFF BAND
Protection Levels Dates of application
Ju Effective 2.5 times the minimum See the line below
Bo Nominal 100 1990, but possible reductions 
could be agreed upon
Co Effective 120, 90, 80 1983, 1987, 1990
Ec Either Ample and flexible No opinion
Pe Effective 120, 105, 90 1983, 1987, 1990
Ve Nominal 100 Permanent
MINIMUM LEVEL OF THE TARIFF BAND
Protection Levels Dates of application
Ju Effective Co, Pe, Ve: 80, 75, 70 
Bo, Ec: 70
Co, Pe, Ve: 1983, 1987, 1990 
Bo, Ec: 1990
Bo Effective 70 Bo and Ec should adopt it 7 
years after Co, Pe & Ve
Co Effective 80, 70, 60 1983, 1987, 1990
Ec Effective 80 Permanent, to be revised in 
1987
Pe Effective 80, 75, 70 1983, 1987, 1990
Ve Effective 80 Same as Ecuador
Ju: Junta's proposal 
SOURCE: JUNAC, 1980a: 1-2.
there were no attempts to solve the legal situation nor to pretend that the governments 
were close to approving the CET. The different approaches of the member countries to 
tariff policies was at the center of the problem.
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2.3.- Industrial programming
In December of 1980 the time span for adopting Sectoral Programs of Industrial 
Development—SPIDs—expired. In the five additional years for the adoption of Sectoral 
Programs of Industrial Development (1975-1980), provided by the Protocols of Lima and 
Arequipa, only the Automobile Program was approved (Decision 120, in September
1977). Between 1977 and 1987, several decisions were approved to "complement" 
Decision 120.12
The Petrochemical Program (Decision 91) was modified by Decisions 130 (August
1978), and 170 (March 1982). Among other things, these decisions dealt with the 
assignment of products originally allocated to Chile, and the inclusion of Venezuela in 
this program. The incorporation of Venezuela into the Metalworking Program, and the 
distribution of the products assigned to Chile were done in Decision 146, July 1979. 
Finally in December 1980, Decisions 160 and 162 approved the Siderurgical and the 
Fertilizers Programs respectively. The first was just a list of products to be part of the 
program, while the second was only the tariff reduction program timetable for fertilizers. 
In other words, no new industrial program, as defined in Chapter IV of the Cartagena 
Agreement was approved after the Automobile Program.13
l2In January 1979 three decisions related to the Automobile Program were approved. Decision 131, 
involved the rules for a balanced exchange of auto components; Decision 132, complementing rules on a 
Bolivian assignation; and Decision 134, excluding an item from Decision 120. Some deadlines in Decision 
120 were postponed by Decision 149 (September 1979); Decision 158 (June 1980); and Decision 159 (July 
1980). Decision 181 (July 1983), suspended the obligations and set deadlines to review the Automobile 
Program. Finally, in May 1987, as part of the package agreed for the adoption of the new protocol. 
Decision 120 was abrogated by Decision 223.
l3Other proposals presented by the Junta were: chemical (Proposal 91), pharmaceutical (Proposal 92), 
and electronic and communications products (Proposal 69). None of them were approved.
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The Junta and the Commission, following the clear interest of the majority of the 
Andean governments for industrial programming continued to devote most of their 
energies, resources and capacities to approve SPIDs. They considered that the prestige, 
success, and uniqueness of the Andean Pact were basically centered on the advancement 
of this mechanism. Its failure, first by not approving most of the industrial programs, and 
second by not implementing the few approved programs, were the keys in the frustration, 
lack of solutions, and widespread violations of the Agreement. This situation became 
even more complicated when some governments began to withdraw approval for other 
Junta's proposals and to threaten not to fulfill their obligations if SPIDs were not agreed 
upon.14 Credibility in the Andean process reached a record low. "It could be said, ..., 
that the whole scaffolding of the [Andean] scheme cracked" (INTAL, 1990a: 92).
Industrial Programming, turned out to be a very difficult mechanism to put into 
practice. This mechanism failed because governments did not have their industrial 
development objectives clearly defined; were unable to figure out the financial, 
technological and human resources needed;15 and were too ambitious in reserving too 
many groups of products for industrial programming (INTAL, 1988: 36). Industrial 
Programming, having to harmonize the interests of the countries, became an illusion. In
14A typical case was this cryptic declaration: "... the government of Ecuador does not consider prudent 
to continue to discuss new mechanisms aiming to ... define the Andean market [the CET], without solving 
the most fundamental issue, that is, the consolidation of what has already been built [the existing SPIDs] 
... Ecuador will have to abstain its position in issues dealing with new mechanisms defining the market 
until substantial progress has been done in observing existing obligations..." (Salgado, 1980: 1).
15"If the industrial programming is to get ahead according to' the schedules $33bn are needed. 
Apparently this sum cannot be raised on the domestic capital markets nor is the basic technological 
infrastructure in the subregion developed sufficiently to carry our the ambitious industrial projects. As a 
consequence, the Andean countries must to a considerable extent rely on capital and technology from 
abroad, including direct investments by transnational corporations" (Koopmann, 1979: 120).
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November 1983 the Commission, with the adoption of a new Andean industrial strategy, 
"virtually abandoned" industrial programming (INTAL, 1984a: 62, 81) in favor of 
industrial cooperation.
With regard to the existing SPIDs, the Metalworking Program, after its 
modification by Decision 146 of July 1979, was continuously violated. The worst offense 
was that countries began to produce products assigned to other members (JUNAC, 1989: 
33), violating the principle of industrial specialization. The lack of progress of this 
program was mainly due to economic recession.
The principal factors working against progress in the Petrochemical Program were 
the magnitude of the investment required (Venezuela was the only country able to afford 
them), the debt crisis, the rise of oil prices, and the worldwide excess of production 
capacity (INTAL, 1979: 115, 116; 1982: 82). In 1983, the Junta presented a proposal 
to modify the Petrochemical Program, but the Commission did not act on it.
Against the implementation of the Automobile Program worked the changes in 
technology, in consumer tastes, and in the direction of the industrial development policies 
of the member countries brought about by the energy and economic crises of the 1970s. 
From July 1983 all the rights and obligations derived from this program were suspended, 
and the program was abolished in May 1987. The most ambitious and most well defined 
industrial program—and for these reasons the most rigid and difficult to 
implement—became the first industrial program to be abrogated.
According to 1986 data (JUNAC, 1986: 9-10), of the original 1,670 customs 
items reserved for industrial programming, only 625 (37 percent) were the object of any
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SPID, or assigned—outside the Industrial Programming mechanism—to be produced by 
Bolivia or Ecuador.16
2.4.> Common treatment of foreign investment
After the changes in common treatment of foreign investments (Decision 24) in 
1977 (Decision 103), the governments of the member countries announced at different 
times their interest in modifying Decision 24 again.17 The goal was to attract foreign 
investment. To attain this aim, the governments decided that the best approach would be 
to increase their autonomy on this issue (Fuentes and Martinez, 1990: 19). In May 1987, 
at the same time that the Protocol of Quito was approved, Decision 24 was again 
profoundly modified by Decision 220.
The new common regime of foreign investment reduced the number of foreign 
enterprises to be nationalized and delayed its process. The new regime required that only 
foreign enterprises interested in having access to the Andean market should be
16In the Metalworking Program, of the 267 items, 48 percent (118 items) were being produced by 
1986; in the Petrochemical Program 40 percent (64 items out of the 162 included in this program) were 
in production by that year. In the Automobile Program only 11 items were being produced by the time it 
was suspended in 1987. The Siderurgical Program (with 85 items) remained only a list of products. Out 
of the 92 items assigned (in December 1970 by Decision 28) to be produced by either Bolivia or Ecuador 
outside the SPIDs, Bolivia was able to produce 3, and Ecuador 7; but by 1986, only 5 items were still in 
production, all of them in Ecuador.
l7In October 1980, during the XXXth. ordinary session of the Commission, the Peruvian representative, 
in his first and last intervention and presence during his one year tenure as Minister of Industry, Tourism, 
and Integration, proposed modifying this decision. In July 1983, in the XXXVth. extraordinary session, 
the government of Peru again proposed that Decision 24 be more flexible, in order to attract foreign 
investors. In November 1984, during the XLIIth. extraordinary session, Ecuador joined Peru requesting 
modification of this decision. In September 1985, a meeting of the ministers of foreign relations of the 
Andean Group pointed out the need to modify Decision 24 in order to promote foreign investment in 
accordance with the national development plans of the member countries, and with subregional objectives. 
Peru and Colombia in November (XLIIIrd. extraordinary session) and December 1986 (XLIVth. 
extraordinary session) declared that changes in Decision 24 were an inseparable issue related to the 
adoption of the new protocol.
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nationalized, whereas previously all foreign enterprises had to. It increased from 18 to 
30 years the date by which foreign enterprises had to transfer 51 percent of their shares 
to national ownership in Colombia, Peru and Venezuela; and from 23 to 37 years in 
Bolivia and Ecuador. The minimum national participation was decreased from 30 percent 
to 15 percent three years after the conversion agreement was signed in the largest 
countries, and from 10 to 5 percent after five years for the smallest countries.
Governments, on the other hand, could unilaterally permit foreign capital to buy 
national or subregional enterprises, and allow the reinvestment of profits without the 
previous 7 percent limit. Governments could also decide about the access of foreign 
enterprises to domestic credit; about what sectors originally reserved for national 
enterprises—e.g., basic products, public services, banking, insurance, domestic transport, 
etc—were not any more so; and about the transfer of profits. In addition, payment of 
royalties between affiliates and the parent company was allowed, and it also permitted 
national legislation to decide on the jurisdiction of foreign courts.
These changes in the common treatment of foreign investment increased the 
discretionary powers of the governments and correspondingly decreased the scope of the 
common rules. Control of foreign capital was retaken by the individual governments 
within an emptier subregional shell.
2.5.- Other aspects
Regression characterized the Cartagena Agreement between 1978 and 1986, 
however, there was a phase (1979-1982) in which the process had bright spots. There
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was a process of creating new institutions. During this phase some common foreign 
positions were adopted. Finally, there were attempts at the highest levels to reinvigorate 
the Andean integration process. This was considered to be a sign of "consolidation" of 
the Andean process (JUNAC, 1980b: 5-7).
a) Expansion of the Andean integration process
In 1979, influenced by the entry into force of the Protocol of Arequipa, the 
"transition from authoritarian rule" in Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru, and the presidential 
meeting of May 1979, treaties were signed creating the Andean Tribunal and the Andean 
Parliament. The Andean Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs was also established.
The Andean Tribunal was created in May 1979, but only in January 1984 did it 
begin to function. The Court is in charge of interpreting and unifying legal community 
provisions, and enforcing the obligations derived from the Andean process. It sits in 
Quito, Ecuador and is composed of five members. This means that each country has its 
representative, a situation in which judges may not be seen as impartial (Paolillo 1981: 
112). In practice, the Junta did not go to the Tribunal to make countries fulfill their 
obligations because "violations were too widespread showing a conflict between the 
juridical order and the new subregional realities" (JUNAC, 1987b: 8), and governments 
agreed not to present claims against each other (Cardenas, 1994: 5).
In October 1979 the Andean Parliament was created by a treaty signed in La Paz, 
Bolivia, it entered into force only in May 1984. It is composed of five members of each 
of the national Congresses, elected by their peers. It only has the power to advise about
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political integration, and it has to be informed about the Andean integration process.
The Andean Council of the Ministers of Foreign Relations of the member 
countries, was established in November 1979 by the ministers of that area. Its functions 
are to provide general guidelines for economic integration and political cooperation, to 
determine the most adequate policies, and to coordinate foreign economic policies 
(JUNAC, cl979a: paragraph 22, 24m). Although this Council is not an official organ of 
the Cartagena Agreement, it became, in practice, a higher level body within the Andean 
Group, because it decided the paths to follow. As a de facto higher level in the Andean 
process, the Council ended up making crucial decisions with regard to the new 
orientation of the process, thereby taking away an important function from the 
Commission, which was nonetheless grateful for being relieved of having to make these 
decisions.18 This council was the all important forum for the Andean countries to adopt 
common positions in specific international and regional issues as is shown below.
b) Common Policies
The Council of Ministers of Foreign Relations and the Commission defined a 
common policy for the renegotiation of LAFTA (Latin American Free Trade Association) 
and its conversion into ALADI (Latin American Integration Association). The Andean 
countries displayed a tight cohesion enabling them to impose on the Big 
Three—Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico—most of the Andean goals. At the meetings
l8”... the member states began to make accords about integration obviating, in pan, some of the official 
functions of the Commission... increasingly politicizing the Andean process" (Frambes-Buxeda, 1990: 111, 
112).
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organized by the Latin American Economic System—SELA—the Andean countries 
developed common positions for the adoption of a Latin American view on specific issues 
related to the New International Economic Order, and the GATT’s Tokyo Round.
On political matters, the Andean Council supported the democratization process 
in the Andean countries. It condemned the July 1980 coup d ’etat in Bolivia, which made 
the Bolivian government temporarily suspend its participation in the Andean process (see 
footnote 19, 2nd. paragraph). Also in 1980, the Council, at the initiative of Peru, made 
the Andean governments declare the Sandinista guerrillas as belligerent forces, thus 
recognizing its international personality. Through Peru’s initiative, the Andean Group 
supported, in 1982, the old Bolivian objective to regain access to the Pacific Ocean.
Negotiations between the United States and the Andean Group in the late 1970s 
ended with the signing by the Commission of two Memoranda of Understanding, one on 
economic cooperation, and the other on technological and scientific cooperation (Alegrett, 
1989a: 4-6). Through these Memoranda, Venezuela and Ecuador gained preferential 
access to the US market, which they had lost because of their membership in OPEC; and 
the Andean countries got additional advantages in the US Generalized System of 
Preferences. The Andean Group also negotiated as a unit with the European Community. 
These negotiations led to a General Agreement signed in December 1983 between the 
Ministers of Foreign Relations of the Andean countries and the President of the Council 
of Ministers of the European Community.
The Andean Group was able to project a solid international image, and to gain 
prestige with common positions beneficial to the interests of each of its members,
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achieving results that individually would not have been able to obtain. A major 
drawback, however, was that there "has been no formal definition of the basic principles 
of a joint Andean foreign ... policy" (INTAL, 1982: 101). With the border conflicts 
between Colombia and Venezuela in 1980, and between Peru and Ecuador (January 
1981), the debt crisis, and the economic crisis, the Andean countries concentrated on 
their own urgent problems, and common foreign positions, which could have yielded 
better results, were placed on the back burner.
c) Summit meetings
The Andean presidents met eight times, the first in August 1978 and the last in 
December 1983. Out of these eight, the second meeting, in May 1979, and the seventh, 
in July 1983, were the most important for the Andean process.19 These meetings, 
however, failed to prevent the regression of the process. The presidents provided 
guidelines, they declared their support to the Andean integration process, and reiterated
‘*The first summit meeting, in August 1978 was held in Colombia when Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala was 
sworn in as president. The Declaration of Bogota was signed. It reaffirms the intention to achieve the 
objectives of the Andean Group; the need for a judicial organ, which should be created in 1979; and the 
urgency to update the Metalworking and the Petrochemical Programs by the end of 1978. The presidents 
also agree to meet in May 1979 to evaluate the progress of the Andean process in its first ten years 
(Comision, 1978: Anexo III). Details of this latter meeting are given in the text. In October 1979, the 
presidents met again in Panama, to witness acts related to the Panama Canal.
In 1980, some of the Andean presidents also met for three times. The first in July, in Lima, Peru; 
the second in June, in Riobamba, Ecuador; and the third, in December, in Santa Marta, Colombia. In all 
these meetings "the Presidents ... reaffirmed their integrationist commitment and their support for the 
process, [but] no activities were undertaken at the national level to accelerate it (IDB, cl982: 109). Bolivia 
self-excluded of all these meetings and also from the meetings of the Andean Council, and of the 
Commission, until April 1981 (Comision, 1980: 2-4) because the other member countries did not 
recognized the new government and condemned the July 1980’s coup d ’etat, acts which were considered 
by the de facto regime as an inadmissible interference in the domestic affairs of Bolivia. On the other hand, 
as a consequence of border problems, the presidents of Ecuador and Peru never visited each other’s 
countries; thus the Ecuadorean president was absent in the meeting in Lima, and the Peruvian in the 
gathering at Riobamba.
The last presidential meeting in this phase was in December 1983, on the occasion of the closing 
celebrations in honor of Simon Bolivar’s bicentennial birth.
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their conviction that the process went beyond the economic sphere covering social, 
cultural and political aspects (Zelada, 1979).
In the meeting of May 1979, in Cartagena, Colombia, on the occasion of the tenth 
anniversary of the Cartagena Agreement, the presidents signed the Mandate of Cartagena 
(Mandato de Cartagena). "It was meant to confirm their countries’ continuing support 
of the Andean movement" (Mace, 1983: 186). The Mandate reaffirmed that "integration 
must be the principal instrument for attaining ... development...," and declared, for the 
first time, that the Andean Group was "essentially a political undertaking" (JUNAC, 
cl979a: 4, Paragraphs 5 and 6). The Mandate also proposed specific guidelines to 
reactivate the Andean process and suggested concrete measures to have the process 
progress with a pragmatic and flexible approach (Mace, 1983: 186-187; Montenegro, 
1983: 59-67; Tobon, 1989: 19-21).
The seventh summit was held in July 1983 in Caracas, Venezuela. The presidents 
met to commemorate the Bicentennial of the birth of Simon Bolivar (the liberator of the 
five Andean republics and Panama). In this first meeting of all civilian elected presidents, 
they adopted the Declaration "For Us, the Homeland is Latin America" (Para Nosotros 
la Patria es America). The presidents reiterated their support of the Andean process, and 
"decided to make it more dynamic by renewing its aims, actualizing its programs, and 
perfecting its mechanisms" (JUNAC, 1983d: 3).
Notwithstanding all the political support and concrete measures to re-launch the 
Andean process, this had to wait until 1987. Meanwhile, between 1983 and 1986 the
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2.6.- Trade among the member countries
Intra-Andean imports decreased between 1983 and 1986, and also exports in 
1982-1984 and 1986. Between 1981 and 1986 trade decreased at the rate of 11.4 percent 
per year.21 The record low in exports was in 1986 with $655 million (see table VI.2). 
This value was the lowest since 1973 and it was just about half of the peak reached in 
1981 ($1,238 million). The most successful of the Andean mechanisms, trade, had 
regressed by 1986 to the levels of 13 years earlier. In 1987, the year after this phase of 
decay, exports increased by 42 percent, but only reached $932.9 million.
Intra-Andean trade as a percentage of total trade, however, was quite similar to 
the previous phases. It maintained its meager range of 3 to 5 percent of total exports and 
of total imports (see table VI.2).22 These data tell us that intra-Andean trade was 
marginal and its trends followed the general trade tendency rather than becoming an 
instrument to ease the peaks and the valleys created by trade with third countries.
With the decrease in intra-Andean trade, trade flows were analyzed in detail. The 
analyses found a high level of concentration of intra-Andean trade, which made the
“ "In 1983 ... the [Andean] integration process was considered to be at its lowest level ever ... because 
the unfulfillment of the accords, the lack of political will of the governments, and the beginning of a 
generalized economic crisis, showed that the conditions for the end of the Andean Pact were ad portas ’ 
(Zapata, 1991: 37).
21From 1970 to 1981 intra-Andean trade increased 22.7 percent per year (JUNAC, 1987b: 4).
-Trade with the United States, in contrast, was more than 30 per of the total trade. This meant that 
in trade matters each one of the Andean nations was more integrated with the United States than with the 
rest of the Andean Group (Kisic, 1989: 7; INTAL, 1980: 175-176).


















ANDEAN GROUP TRADE 1978-1987
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 j 1985 1986 1987
EXPORTS (FOB) (Millions of dollars)
GRAN 681.7 1,066.2 1,188.9 1,237.7 1,183.4 752.6 749.5 797.3 655.2 932.9
World 16,282.7 23,801.3 30,214.8 29,026.4 25,469.3 23,197.0 25,534.0 24,565.0 18,957.4 ,20,537.5
IMPORTS (FOB) (Millions of dollars)
GRAN 662.1 780.3 959.7 1,247.3 1,250.8 924.1 921.5 813.8 681.0 994.9
World 18,769.9 18,462.9 22,711.1 25,615.7 25,149.5 15,927.0 16,657.1 16,718.0 17,361.8 20,165.0
TRADE BALANCE (Millions of dollars)
GRAN 19.6 285.6 229.1 (9.6) (67.4) (171.5) (172.0) (16.5) (25.7) (62.1)
World (2,487.9) 5,338.4 7,503.7 3,410.7 319.8 7,270.0 8,876.9 7,847.1 1,595.5 372.5
INTRASUBREGIONAL TRADE AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL EXPORTS
Exports 4.19 4.48 3.93 4.26 4.65 3.24 2.94 3.25 3.46 4.54
Imports 3.53 4.23 4.23 4.87 4.97 5.80 5.53 4.87 3.92 4.93
RATE OF GROWTH OF EXPORTS
GRAN -17.34 56.41 11.50 4.11 -4.39 -36.41 -0.42 6.38 -17.81 42.37
World 3.15 46.17 26.95 -3.93 -12.25 -8.92 10.07 -3.79 -22.83 8.34
RATE OF GROWTH OF IMPORTS
GRAN -22.71 17.90 22.95 29.97 0.28 -26.12 -0.29 -11.69 -16.32 46.11
World 10.76 -1.64 23.01 12.79 -1.82 -36.67 4.58 0.37 3.85 16.15
SOURCE: JUNAC-Sistema Subregional de Informacidn Estadi'stica. Decisidn 115.
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association very vulnerable to protectionist policies. In 1982, Colombia and Venezuela 
accounted for 25 and 50 percent, respectively, of all Andean imports.23 This meant that 
the actions of these countries had great impact on the intra-Andean trade, but also that 
import restrictions imposed by these countries affected each other more than they affected 
the other member countries.
Trade within the subregion was also concentrated in a small group of products. 
In 1982, only 1,638 dutiable items registered trade among the members, and they 
decreased to 1,210 in 1985. Ninety percent of the intra-Andean trade was concentrated 
in 345 items in 1982, and only in 241 items in 1985 and for each country less than 100 
items constituted more than 80 per of their intra-Andean trade (JUNAC, 1986a: 16-17; 
1987b: 5). This situation made intra-Andean trade quite vulnerable to import restrictions, 
since restrictions were not applied to all products but selectively and temporarily; hitting 
hardest non-essential products, and products competing with national production (both 
categories were the most likely to be the products transacted among the Andean 
members). Unilateral restrictions were applied, at its height (1983), to more than 4,300 
items (almost 90 percent of the total). In 1982 these items had a total intra-Andean trade 
value of $230 million (27 percent of total trade excluding oil and derivatives), but only 
291 items had subregional trade values of $50,000 each or higher (JUNAC, 1984b: 11, 
13, 15). In 1985 and in 1986 this situation deteriorated (see table VI.6, lines 3, 5 and 
section 2.1 above).
^In 1985, both countries still accounted for 65 percent of the Andean imports. Around 75 percent of 
the decrease in 1983 intrasubregional imports was due to trade restrictions enacted by Venezuela in 1982 
(JUNAC, 1986a: 16). Between 1984 and 1989 Colombia was the major importer from the Andean 
countries with 39 percent of the total, while Venezuela was second with 27 percent (INTAL, 1990a: 99).
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Concerns about how to overcome trade declines were high. In June 1983, after 
the first decrease in intra-Andean exports of more than 4 percent (1981-1982), the Junta 
presented to the Commission an "Emergency and Cooperation Program" (JUNAC, 
1983e) which diagnosed the situation, predicted a trade reduction of one-third for 1983, 
(which in fact it decreased by 36 percent in 1983, see table VI.2), and proposed 
measures. In March 1984 another study (JUNAC, 1984b) showed that the problem was 
worse than expected and it also proposed measures. No important actions were taken by 
the Commission until 1987.
With the abrupt decrease of trade in the early 1980s, the crisis of the Andean 
process became obvious (JUNAC, 1987: 5). The general causes affecting the Cartagena 
Agreement mentioned above also affected trade among the member countries. "The 
decline of intra-Andean trade has been attributed to the particular economic situation of 
the member countries caused by the debt crisis and the policies adopted by the countries 
rather than by the mechanisms created by the Andean Group ..." (IDB, 1990: 11). This 
situation of crisis caused widespread violations of the Andean trade norms, paralysis of 
the community organs to overcome them, and an inability to further integration.
3.- THE VIOLATIONS AND THE ANDEAN INTEGRATION PROCESS IN THE
PHASE OF PESSIMISM AND REGRESSION
Violations of the text of the Cartagena Agreement, and the decisions of the
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Commission, predicted by the hypothesis, became more pervasive than ever during these 
years of regression. The Commission in its meeting of October 1989 taking into account 
that the Andean presidents in their "Mandate of Cartagena" had ordered strict fulfillment 
of the obligations (JUNAC, 1979a, paragraph 20), recommended that the 
plenipotentiaries overcome the existing violations as soon as possible (JUNAC, 1979g: 
1). The Junta, however, continued to report increasing violations (e.g., JUNAC, 1983h: 
4; 1984c: 1; 1984d: 1).
Violations are analyzed in this section following the same procedure as in chapters 
IV and V. First the non-compliance with the articles of the Cartagena Agreement will be 
reviewed; second a presentation of the analysis of decisions not incorporated by the 
member governments in their legislation, and third the violations of decisions already 
made part of domestic legislation.
3.1.- Violations of the articles of the Cartagena Agreement
The new deadlines set by the Protocol of Arequipa (December 1979) were not 
met. Even worse, after a time, there was no attempt by the governments, the 
Commission or the Junta to fulfill these obligations, or to promptly reestablish the legal 
order. The violations reduced the benefits of the agreement, weakened interdependency, 
and diminished the credibility of the process (Carmona, 1984: 14).
As mentioned above, the CET was not approved, nor were all Sectoral Programs 
of Industrial Development as mandated by Articles 2 and 6 of the Protocol of Arequipa. 
In relation to the tariff reduction program the three largest countries continued to lag in
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their tariff reductions, and since 1982 import restrictions reversed the process towards 
a free trade zone.
Bolivia and Ecuador did not begin their tariff reduction program process by 
December 1980 as the new Cartagena Agreement stated. Between December 1980 and 
October 1981, the Commission considered the problem without solving it (see for 
example Comision, 1980: 4; 1981: 6; 1981a: 9). It later postponed sine die dealing with 
this issue, and then faded away due to the crisis of the process (see for example: 
Comision, 1984: 8; 1984a: 4; 1984b: 3). By 1986, the member countries agreed that 
Bolivia and Ecuador would begin their tariff reduction program process 180 days after 
the entry into force of the new protocol (Comision, 1986: 5).
3.2.- Non-incorporation of the Commission’s decisions bv the governments
During this phase of regression, the number of decisions which were not 
incorporated into the national legislation of the member countries increased dramatically. 
In the phase of progress the maximum number of decisions not incorporated by one or 
more of the members were at least 11 (see table IV.4). During the phase of stagnation 
this number increased to 14 (see table V.6). In the phase of regression the maximum 
number of decisions not incorporated reached the record high of 24, in October 1979 (see 
table VI.3), 13 being the lowest (except by the end of this phase when it reached the 
record low of 6 decisions not being observed in May 1987). By then, the Quito Protocol 
was being signed.
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TABLE VI.3
DECISIONS NOT INCORPORATED INTO THE DOMESTIC LEGISLATION BY 
THE MEMBER COUNTRIES, 1978-1987
DATE SOURCE BO CO EC PE VE TOTAL (*)
08-26-78 (1) 8 6 5 7 9 35 14
11-16-78 (2) 8 6 5 7 8 34 14
05-02-79 (3) 14 11 11 13 13 62 20
07-10-79 (4) 12 12 11 5 14 54 20
10-30-79 (5) 16 12 14 9 17 68 24
Feb-80 (6) 14 11 10 9 16 60 22
05-19-80 (7) 13 10 10 4 15 52 20
10-13-80 (8) 13 8 10 4 10 45 17
11-14-80 (9) 13 8 10 4 10 45 17
08-26-81 (10) 13 6 10 4 9 42 16
11-11-82 (11) 9 5 9 4 7 34 14
01-15-83 (12) 9 5 9 3 7 33 14
04-22-83 (13) 10 5 8 3 7 33 14
Jun-83 (14) 10 5 8 3 7 33 13
01-01-84 (15) 10 5 7 3 7 32 13
06-10-84 (16) 11 6 8 3 8 36 14
05-11-87 (17) 6 3 3 2 2 16 6
(*) Number of different decisions not incorporated into the domestic legislation 
one or more countries 
SOURCES: (1) JUNAC, 1978a; (2) JUNAC, 1978b; (3) JUNAC, 1979e;
(4) JUNAC, 1979f; (5) JUNAC, 1979g; (6) JUNAC, 1980; (7) JUNAC 
1980c; (8) JUNAC, 1980d; (9) JUNAC, 1980e; (10) JUNAC, 1981a; (11) 
JUNAC, 1982a; (12) JUNAC, 1983f; (13) JUNAC, 1983g; (14) JUNAC, 
1983h; (15) JUNAC, 1984c; (16) JUNAC, 1984d; (17) JUNAC, 1990b.
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It is interesting, however, to point out that during the depth of the recession, 
(1982-1986), the number of decisions not being observed by the governments remained 
the same (14) as in the phase of stagnation (1977 and 1978). This fact suggests that the 
problem of not incorporating some of the Commission’s decisions began already in the 
previous phase of stagnation. It also shows that these were a core of decisions which the 
member countries consistently were reluctant to observe.24 Chief among the decisions 
which were ignored by all the governments, was Decision 49 on the regulations for 
harmonizing industrial development legislation. Among other decisions which more than 
two countries had difficulties in observing were Decisions 50 and 69 dealing with 
temporary entry of private vehicles; Decisions 56 and 56a on international highway 
transportation25; Decision 85 on industrial property; Decisions 87 and 89 on 
development of technology in copper and tropical forest resources; Decision 120 on the 
Automobile Program and its modifications; and Decision 148 on Andean social security.
3.3.- Non-compliance with decisions incorporated into the domestic legal order of the 
member countries
Trade within the subregion was heavily affected by the unilateral actions of the 
governments. Beginning with 1982 a more extensive and intensive violation of decisions 
already incorporated in their national legislation began. This situation led to claims
24"... there are a number of decisions which have not been incorporated in the domestic legal system 
of the member countries even though some of these decisions have been approved several years ago. ... 
the situation of widespread violations ... has no solution in the near future" (JUNAC, 1980c: 1).
25Although Ecuador was the only country which failed to observe these decisions, in practice this 
situation made impossible unimpeded transportation within the subregion given the geographical position 
of this country in the area: in the middle of the five members.
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stopped presenting its reports on this issue in 1984 when the demands reached a record 
high (see table VI.4) and the governments had been showing an unwillingness or inability 




BOLIVIA BY 1/ COLOMBIA BY ECUADOR BY
C E P V T B E P V T B C P V T
112476 1 1
111577 1 2 4 1 3 7 1 12 2 9 3 2 16
111678 1 2 3 2 2 2 2 8 3 3
050279 1 2 3 2 4 5 2 13 5 2 7
071079 1 2 2 5 3 4 7 2 16 5 5 10
103079 1 2 4 7 1 4 2 4 11 4 4 1 9
051980 1 3 4 1 2 4 3 10 2 4 1 7
101380 1 2 3 2 2 4 2 10 3 4 2 9
111480 1 2 3 2 3 4 2 11 1 3 5 3 12
082681 1 3 4 3 4 6 3 16 1 6 11 4 22
111182 1 1 1 2 4 6 1 1 2
011583 4 4 2 7 6 6 21 2 8 9 4 23
042283 4 4 2 7 7 6 22 2 8 9 4 23
060783 4 4 2 8 7 6 23 1 8 9 4 22
030184 4 4 2 8 7 7 24 1 8 9 5 23
063084 4 4 2 8 9 7 26 1 8 9 5 24
Continues in the next page





PERU BY VENEZUELA BY 2/
B C E V T B C E P T
TOTAL
112476 6 20 2 28 2 1 4 33
111577 2 9 3 2 16 6 4 10 45
111678 4 3 3 10 3 3 27
050279 3 5 1 1 10 3 1 3 7 40
071079 1 2 3 1 7 1 2 2 4 9 47
103079 1 1 2 1 8 2 7 18 47
051980 2 1 1 4 1 9 5 9 24 49
101380 3 1 1 5 1 5 6 6 18 46
111480 3 1 2 6 5 9 6 6 26 58
082681 6 2 3 11 6 13 6 9 34 87
111182 5 6 5 16 1 7 7 8 23 48
011583 8 3 2 5 18 6 31 6 11 54 120
042283 8 3 4 6 22 7 32 7 11 57 128
060783 8 4 5 8 25 6 20 6 9 41 115
030184 9 4 6 9 28 6 20 6 10 42 121
063084 9 4 6 9 28 7 33 7 12 59 141
i / Includes one claim made by the Junta on 11/15/77 
2d. Includes one claim made by the Junta on 11/24/76
SOURCES: JUNAC, 1976b; 1977d; 1978b; 1979e; 1979f; 1979g; 1980c; 1980d; 1980e; 
1981a; 1982a; 1983f; 1983g; 1983h; 1984c; 1984d.
A working group which was routinely created by the Commission to discuss the 
compliance with the Cartagena Agreement and the decisions, reported its "worries about 
several-years-old claims presented by the countries without any action being taken by the 
governments of the violating countries, rendering fruitless the activities of this working 
group" (JUNAC, 1979h: 1). In May 1980 the group suggested to the Commission that
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it devote a session considering exclusively with this issue (JUNAC, 1980h: 2), but the 
Commission never acted on it. The working group existed until the mid-1980s, when the 
Commission itself stopped dealing with this intractable problem. Meanwhile, "specific, 
critical and sensitive cases were abundant in which legitimate interests were being 
affected eroding confidence in the process..." (JUNAC, 1981b: 1).
These unsolvable violations show that the deeper problems confronted by the 
Andean process had to be dealt with first, even though all the governments were in 
agreement that it was a priority task to overcome these violations (Comision, 1984: 4).
The tariff reduction program among the three largest members, which should have 
been accomplished by December 1983, was consistently delayed. The worst offender was 
Venezuela. This country was 23 months late in implementing the 8th tariff reduction 
corresponding to December 1978 (JUNAC, 1981: 5). By August 1981, Venezuela still 
owed tariff reductions for 1979 and 1980. By November 1982, this country had not made 
the reductions for 1981; and by December 1984, it had yet to institute tariff reductions 
for 1982 and 1983. Colombia was best in fulfilling its tariff reductions. It was 6 months 
late for the 1978 decrease, and 7 months those for 1979 and 1980. Peru, having a good 
record of reducing its tariffs, only 4, and 2 months and 1 month late for the years 1978 
to 1980; was as late as Venezuela for the last three tariff reductions, 1981-1983. By June 
1984, however, Peru had already completed the tariff reduction program (JUNAC, 
1983i; 1984c). These delays on the part of Venezuela and Peru, show the effect of the 
international economic crisis on these two countries. It is also not by chance that the 
delays coincided with the worst years of the crisis, from 1982 onward.
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TABLE VI.5
DUTIABLE ITEMS VIOLATED: 1978-1987
DATE SOURCE BOL COL ECU PER VEN TOTAL
08-26-78 (1) 20 28 19 5 91 163
11-16-78 (2) 11 27 16 1 11 66
05-02-79 (3) 14 23 17 1 11 66
07-10-79 (4) 14 38 17 1 11 81
10-30-79 (5) 83 153 97 106 211 650
05-19-80 (6) 83 152 97 73 211 616
10-13-80 (7) 88 309 113 362 357 1289
11-14-80 (8) 178 307 136 208 364 1193
08-26-81 (9) 178 309 135 345 355 1322
11-11-82 (10) 370 352 371 497 1084 2674
01-15-83 (11) 370 352 99 497 1076 2394
04-22-83 (12) 235 308 121 380 2026 3070
Jun-83 (13) 235 344 87 411 2800 3877
03-01-84 (14) 289 323 1405 509 2811 5337
06-10-84 (15) 311 278 1311 455 2911 5266
05-11-87 (16) 25 2 806 1650 1793 4276
SOURCES: (1) JUNAC, 1978a; (2) JUNAC, 1978b; (3) JUNAC, 1979e; (4) JUNAC, 
1979f; (5) JUNAC, 1979g; (6) JUNAC, 1980c; (7) JUNAC, 1980d; (8) JUNAC, 
1980e; (9) JUNAC, 1981a; (10) JUNAC, 1982a; (11) JUNAC, 1983f; (12) 
JUNAC, 1983g; (13) JUNAC, 1983h; (14) JUNAC, 1984c; (15) JUNAC, 1984d; 
(16) JUNAC, 1990b.
The number of items violated by the member countries during this phase of 
regression grew constantly. Influenced by the presidents’ meetings, however, a record 
low has been achieved in 1978 and 1979, with only 66 items violating either the CMET
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or the tariff reduction program. By 1984, after a sharp increase in 1982, the member 
countries had combined violations of more than five thousand dutiable items, and by the 
time of the signing of the Quito Protocol (May 1987), this number was still more than 
four thousand (see table VI.5).
In relation to existing industrial programs, member countries, which had 
incorporated these decisions into their domestic legislation, consistently refrained from 
applying the CET to products already in production (see for example, Comision, 1981a: 
Anexo IV) and to implement other aspects of these decisions (JUNAC, 1989: 33-34).
By 1985, all the countries were applying restrictions to most of the products, 
without discriminating between the Andean and third country imports. Bilateral 
agreements had been signed to reestablish some of the trade movements while at the 
same time protecting sensitive products from Andean competition. Table VI.6 line 2 
shows that a large percentage of the decreased trade in 1985 was traded under bilateral 
accords, reaching 50 percent of its intra-Andean trade for Venezuela, 47 percent for 
Colombia, and 45 percent in the case of Peru.26 Peru and Venezuela were the countries 
which had the largest percentage of their intra-Andean trade under restrictions (see line 
3). With regard to the 295 items that constituted 90 percent of the intra-Andean trade 
(line 4), only 26 percent of the items were free of restrictions, and 10 percent of these 
items had their CMET violated by the member countries.
26In 1986, Venezuela had 54.1 percent of its intra-Andean trade under bilateral accords, Peru had 50.0 
percent, Colombia 37.8 percent, Ecuador 23.3 percent, and Bolivia zero percent (JUNAC, 1988a: 23).
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TABLE VI.6
TRADE SITUATION IN THE ANDEAN GROUP IN 1985 
(Excluding oil and derivatives)
GRAN BOLIVIA COLOMBIA ECUADOR PERU VENEZUELA
(1) 26.2% n.a. 50% n.a. 15% 16%
(2) 38.8% n.a. 47% n.a. 45% 50%
(3) 35.2% n.a. 3% n.a. 40% 34%
(4) 295 5 169 21 78 22
(5) 76 1 49 4 17 5
(6) 27 5 12 3 7 0
(1) Percentage of intra-Andean trade free of restrictions.
(2) Percentage of intra-Andean trade in bilateral accords.
(3) Percentage of intra-Andean trade under restrictions.
(4) Number of items covering 90 percent of exports.
(5) Number of items covering 90 percent of exports which were free of restrictions
(6) Number of items covering 90 percent of exports which their CMET were violated.
SOURCE: JUNAC, 1986a: 19-21.
The widespread violations of the mechanisms of the Cartagena Agreement and of 
the decisions of the Commission, and the "poor record in implementing [sub]regional 
decisions" were "the most significant factor[s] explaining the crisis...: (Mace, 1983: 
188). Given this situation, the Junta (JUNAC, 1986a: 17) reiterated the need to adopt 
an additional protocol to the agreement.
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The phase of regression was due primarily to the crisis of the international 
economic system during the 1980s characterized by stagflation (economic stagnation 
accompanied with high inflation) in the industrialized countries, stagnation of world trade 
due to protectionism, high interest rates, external debt, high unemployment, and oil price 
fluctuations (JUNAC, 1982a: 11-12). The Andean governments had to adapt to the new 
circumstances by often modifying their economic policies, and by doing so they were 
redefining their strategy of development or the other way around. During these years of 
trial and error,27 the Andean process, in turn, suffered because the countries were at the 
same time trying to redefine the objectives for the pact which would reflect the changing 
national interests.28
The changes in economic policies and eventually in the strategy of development 
led to an alliance between governments and domestic entrepreneurs (Schuldt and Urriola, 
1991: 126-127; Cox, 1989: 2). They agreed that local production had to be protected, 
and that balance of trade had to be improved by reducing foreign competition. Imports
^Supporting the hypothesis of this dissertation, the Junta (JUNAC, 1985: 3) argued that the regression 
of the Andean process could be explained by "changes in the economic policies and strategies of 
development, which in many cases have been in conflict with the explicit Andean objectives and 
mechanisms. In effect, the abandonment of the strategy of import substitution and the adoption of open 
economy policies provoked a sort of "identity crisis" in the Cartagena Agreement which affected the most 
important instruments of the agreement."
“Other factors contributing to the crisis of the process were the marginality of the Andean integration 
in the national development plans, which gave greater importance to integration with the world market than 
the Andean; diplomatic and political conflicts; different levels of development; structural heterogeneity of 
the member countries; lack of agreements to distribute costs and benefits; political instability; the lack of 
long-term view which precluded sustained efforts; the lack of macroeconomic policy harmonization; and 
that the agreement was as too statist, too rigid, and unrealistic 1985: 3; Kisic, 1989: 7; Caretas, 1989: 2).
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from the Andean countries were curtailed, leading to a series of retaliatory measures and 
to bilateral trade agreements and widespread violations of the agreement ensued. The 
violations showed the Andean Pact’s failure to increase interdependence, and also 
weakened the credibility of the process, especially by investors who lost money because 
of the closing of the Andean market (INTAL, 1988: 34; JUNAC, 1981a: 7-8; 1985: 35).
The regression of the Andean process epitomized by the decrease of subregional 
trade29 led to the realization that solutions for the existing problems demanded extensive 
modifications of the Cartagena Agreement, which made the Commission and the Junta 
begin a process of "soul searching. ',3°
This section analyzes the effects of the changes in the international system on the 
Andean process, the attempts of the community organs and of the governments to 
redefine the Andean process, the paralysis of the Commission’s work, and how the 
strategies of development and economic policies were in conflict with the original aims 
and mechanisms of the Cartagena Agreement.
M"The unprecedented decrease of intra-subregional trade in 1983 made evident the internal problems 
of the process and the crisis of the Andean model" (JUNAC, 1987: 5).
“ The deepest crisis of the Andean Pact made the community organs, especially the Junta, devote much 
time and effort to find out the causes and suggest solutions. Studies done by the Junta and individuals 
interested in the Andean process were presented at seminars and conferences. The Junta, also submitted 
some of its studies to the Commission, the governments, and the public in general.
For examples of the Junta’s concerns, besides the documents quoted in this chapter, see: JUNAC, 
1981c; 198Id; I984e; 1986b; 1986c; I986d, 1986e.
The Junta also organized several seminars and publicized them. See for instance: Schuldt, 1983; 
Pacheco, 1983; Aponte 1983; Maza 1984; Quijano, 1984; Lagos, 1984; Abugattas, 1985; JUNAC, 1984f; 
1985a; FEDESARROLLO 1984; JUNAC-INTAL, 1985.
The Junta, besides, published works by members of the Junta and observers of the process. See 
for example: Carmona 1982; 1984; Florez, 1983; Romero, 1983; Paz, 1985; Ground, 1985; Davila, 1986.
Other publications dealing with the Andean Group problems during this phase are: Perez, 1985; 
Lleras, 1985; Carmona 1985; Lloreda, 1985; Moncayo, 1985a; Cardenas and Gonzalez 1986; Cardenas, 
1986; Salazar, 1988.
Among the studies on the crisis of the integration processes in Latin America are: Cornejo, 1983; 
INTAL, 1984b; Penaranda, 1984; Nunez, Margain and Cherol (eds.), (1984); IDB, cl985: 1-180.
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4.1.- The effects of the changes in the international economic system on the Andean 
countries and on the Andean process
The developed world dealt with the crisis brought about by the second oil price 
rise (1979), by applying recessionary measures in the form of strict monetary policies. 
Chief among them were reducing public expenditure, increasing real interest rates, 
raising the price of oil, and augmenting trade protectionism. These actions, and the net 
outflow of financial resources from the Third World created the debt crisis.
For the Andean countries, the crisis was "the deepest and the longest in the last 
50 years..." (JUNAC, 1985: 1). With balance of payments deficits, the prices of their 
exports decreasing, and their export markets closing, these countries limited their imports 
through continuous devaluations, multiple exchange rates, and non-tariff barriers. The 
gross domestic product of the subregion grew at an average annual rate of 1.4 percent 
between 1980 and 1987. In the same period, the population increased by an average of 
2.4 percent per annum. The balance of payments for the Andean Group was negative in 
1982, 1983, 1986 and 1987 by $1.3, $1.8, $3.3 and $2.0 billion respectively; and in 
1988 this deficit jumped to $4.9 billion (JUNAC, 1990c: 106, 10, 90). The external debt 
increased from $24.2 billion in 1977 to $77.2 billion in 1987 or more than three times 
in 11 years, and the ratio of total debt to gross domestic product was 69 percent, up from 
39 percent in 1980 (JUNAC, 1985: 1; 1990c: 126). The result was inflation combined 
with recession (stagflation) in the subregion, accompanied by an unemployment rate of 
10 percent and higher of the economically active population (JUNAC, 1985: 1).
The consequences for the Andean process, during the first half of the 1980s, as
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previously mentioned, were the indiscriminate closing of the members’ markets (Aninat, 
Ffrench-Davis and Leiva, 1990: 166), the loss of importance of industrial development 
and planning, and the elimination of deadlines to create free trade (Langhammer, 1990: 
24). Integration became unimportant. By 1987, however, coinciding with the regional and 
international trend, the Andean countries agreed to drastically modify the Cartagena 
Agreement and re-launch the Andean integration process (Grabendorff, 1990: 20).31
4.2.- The community organs, the governments, the relations among them and the 
long march to revitalize the Andean integration process
The basic problem confronted by the Andean process in this phase of regression 
was that the original Andean integration model—import substitution industrialization at 
the subregional level—no longer reflected the interests of the majority of the member 
countries.32 The Andean organs and the Andean governments had to pursue a new path 
between a neo-liberal and outward oriented industrialization model (El-Nagger, 1989: 14; 
Fernandez, 1982: 46), and an inward oriented industrialization based on comparative
3lIn Latin America, the prime example was the Economic Integration and Cooperation Program agreed 
between by Brazil and Argentina in 1986. It became, in 1991, the MERCOSUR (Southern Cone Common 
Market - Mercado Comun del Cono Sur) which also included Uruguay and Paraguay. In the case of the 
Central American Common Market, the Esquipulas I and II declarations, signed in 1986 and 1987, 
attempted to revitalize it. Finally, the meeting of the Heads of Governments in St. Lucia, 1987, aimed to 
further the Caribbean Common Market process.
In Europe, the European Community (which in November 1993 became the European Union) 
agreed in 1985 to create a full-fledged common (single) market by January 1993. In 1988 the United States- 
Canada Free Trade Agreement was signed, and in 1993, with the inclusion of Mexico, it became the North 
American Free Trade Agreement. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Magreb 
in the mid-1980s agreed also to further their integration schemes.
32"In fact, towards the end of the seventies, it had already become clear that the application of the 
principal instruments of the Cartagena Agreement was rendered unfit by reason of an essentially political 
nature" (Mairal, 1989: 94).
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advantages (INTAL, 1980: 21-24; Sanchez, 1981: 46-50; Schuldt, 1985: 46).
Up to 1979, the Commission and the Junta pursued the existing import 
substitution path by approving industrial programs. The Mandate of Cartagena, adopted 
by the Andean presidents in May 1979, attempted to increase the importance of trade and 
agriculture. The Quito Protocol, signed in May 1987, showed that the member countries 
wanted an Andean process with more open market policies. Subregional tariff reduction 
program became the most important mechanism, the role of industrial programming was 
reduced, and the common treatment of foreign capital was eliminated, for all practical 
purposes.
The Commission and the Junta dealt unsuccessfully with the violations and with 
furthering the process. By 1980, the process lost momentum. The changes in 
governments in Ecuador (1979), and Peru (1980), the political turmoil in Bolivia (a new 
round of coups, between 1978 and 1982), and the border conflicts between Colombia and 
Venezuela in 1980, and between Ecuador and Peru in 1981 made it impossible for the 
Commission to meet for most of 1981 and 1982. The consequence was that deadlines 
were not met. Soon after the international economic crisis hit the Andean countries 
(1982), violations became widespread (1983), especially in the area of trade and 
industrial programming, the two most important mechanisms of the agreement.
Efforts were made by the Junta and the Commission to overcome this situation, 
which needed a new set of guidelines to redirect the process based on the ongoing and 
anticipated changes in the international and domestic realms. This demanded changes in 
the conceptual and pragmatic frameworks from one in which the international
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environment was favorable to the subregion, to another in which this environment was 
adverse to the Andean process (Moncayo, 1984: 191). The new roles the Andean process 
could play according to the Junta (JUNAC, 1982a: 30-31) were to help ease the 
consequences of the international economic changes and to coordinate efforts to 
renegotiate the external debt.
A comprehensive attempt to rescue the Andean integration from its crisis was 
adopted by the Commission in early July 1983: The Plan for the Reorientation of the 
Andean Integration Process {Plan de Reorientacidn del Proceso Andino de Integracion). 
This plan (JUNAC, 1983a: 11-83) was based on a series of proposals presented by the 
Junta (JUNAC, 1982a; 1983a; 1983e; Camacho, 1984: 14-18),33 and discussed by the 
Commission between 1982 and 1983.
The plan reaffirmed that integration was a complement to the development efforts 
of the member countries and that the activities proposed were aimed at dealing with 
common problems (JUNAC, 1983d: 23-24). There were seven priority areas of action: 
foreign relations, agriculture, trade, industry, finance, science and technology, and 
infrastructure, border and tourist integration. In each area the focus was on pragmatism 
and flexibility in order to reactivate the Andean process and to contribute toward defining 
the new roads of development of the member countries, "... [and] implied the eventual 
modification of the economic integration program..." (INTAL, 1985 126).
Based on this Plan, the Andean Council of Ministers of Foreign Relations
33"When at the beginning of the eighties it became clearly evident that actions relations to the 
Agreement had come to a stand still and that there was even retrogression in past achievements, the Andean 
countries began to put forward new proposals to overcome the situation" (Mairal, 1989: 95).
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prepared a declaration which was approved during the Andean summit by the presidents 
in late July 1983, "For Us, the Homeland is Latin America" (Para Nosotros la Patria 
es America).
The Presidents’ Declaration and the Plan, however, failed to revitalize the process 
due mainly to the deepening economic crisis in the Andean countries (ECLA, 1992: 26; 
JUNAC, 1984b: 1; Camacho, 1984: 18). Both were adopted in 1983, the only year when 
the Andean nations recorded collectively and individually (with the exception of 
Colombia) a negative growth in their gross domestic products. It was -4.5 for the Andean 
Group, -12.3 for Peru, -6.5 for Bolivia, -5.6 for Venezuela, -2.8 for Ecuador, and 1.6 
for Colombia (see table VI.7). The economic crisis increased the violations.34 Again, 
the contradiction between support at the highest political level and of violations went 
hand-in-hand.
This glaring failure, at the highest political level, reconfirmed the fact that politics 
and economics are intertwined, that political wishes should be based on economic 
realities, and that economic changes are determined by political decisions. This 
unsuccessful attempt to revitalize the process based on the existing agreement led to more 
resolute suggestions for a new protocol (Carmona, 1984a: 37), in which the principles 
and mechanisms of the Andean model would be redefined based on the premise "that the 
Andean Pact always was more a political than an economic initiative ..." (Valdes, 1984: 
66).
MIn this phase of regression the number of decisions not incorporated by the member countries were, 
on average, equal to the highest number recorded for the previous phase (see tables V.6 and VI.3), trade 
claims (table VI.4) rose to more than a hundred in 1983, and continued to rise in 1984; and the number 
of items violated (table VI.5) rose almost continuously in this phase having a sharp increase from 1983 on.
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TABLE VI.7
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, 1978-1987 (RATES OF GROWTH)
Bolivia Colombia Ecuador Peru Venezuela GRAN
1978 3.4 6.2 6.6 0.3 2.1 3.9
1979 1.8 4.3 5.3 5.8 1.3 3.0
1980 0.2 5.5 4.9 4.5 -2.0 1.7
1981 0.9 2.9 3.9 4.4 t o 1.8
1982 -4.4 0.5 1.2 0.2 0.7 0.4
1983 -6.5 1.8 -2.8 -12.3 -5.6 -4.5
1984 -0.3 2.9 4.2 4.8 -1.4 1.4
1985 -0.1 2.9 4.3 2.4 1.3 2.2
1986 -2.9 4.9 3.1 9.5 6.8 6.0
1987 2.1 6.0 -5.5 7.8 3.0 3.8
SOURCES: 1978-1979: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela: Programa de 
Armonizacion de Cuentas Nacionales (Decision 114); Unidad de 
Informatica - JUNAC; Andean Group: calculated by the author with data 
from IDB, cl983: 351.
1980-1987: JUNAC, 1990c: 95-106.
In March 1984, the Commission requested the Junta to prepare a draft of a new 
protocol. It was presented to the Commission in June 1984.35 The discussions of the 
draft made clear that the governments wanted a more pragmatic Andean Pact "even 
though ... [it] might mean, ... a significant retreat in terms of the actual scope of the 
Andean process (INTAL, 1985: 74). In December of that year, the Commission asked 
the Junta to present a new proposal with the accords it had reached. In February 1985,
“ For a comprehensive summary of this draft see INTAL, 1985: 127-146.
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the Junta fulfilled this request.
Based on the previous documents, the Andean Council of Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs in its meeting of September 1985, in Cartagena, Colombia, agreed on the 
political guidelines to reform the Cartagena Agreement. The Commission concentrated 
on negotiating the new changes of the agreement between the last quarter of 1985 and 
May 1987. In May 11, 1987,36 the Commission approved Decision 217: a proposal to 
adopt a protocol to modify the Cartagena Agreement, and signed it the following day in 
Quito, Ecuador.
The Quito Protocol (JUNAC, 1987c)37 made the Andean Tribunal and the 
Parliament principal organs of the Cartagena Agreement. The Protocol, however, did not 
incorporate the Council of Ministers of Foreign Relations as an organ of the agreement 
because the Ministers wanted to remain outside of and above the Andean process. 
Member countries acquired the right to make proposals, which until that time had been 
monopolized by the Junta.
Policy harmonization and planning coordination were formally retained, but no 
deadlines were set. The Sectoral Programs of Industrial Development were replaced by
“ Attempts by the Commission to deal with the increasing problems in the Andean process began in 
earnest in the last quarter of 1981. The Commission devoted several of its meetings analyzing the 
mechanisms, programs and activities, and to find ad-hoc and long-term solutions. Among these meetings 
were: XXXth. extraordinary session; XXXVth. ordinary session; XXXVIth. ordinary session; XXXVIIIth. 
extraordinary session; XXXIth. extraordinary session; and XXXVIIth. ordinary session (Comision, 1981: 
3-11; 1983: 4-14; 1983a: 3-18; 1983b: 6-9; 1983c: 5; 1983d: 4). From the first meeting of 1984, the 
Commission’s discussions dealt with the new protocol, the issues and the wording. During this time, in 
each of the sessions of the Commission, the main item of the agenda was some aspects of the future 
protocol (Comision, 1984: 3-8; 1984a: 3-4, Anexo III; 1984b: 2-3, Anexo II and Anexo III; 1985: 3-4; 
1985a: 2-8, Anexo I, and Anexo II; 1986: 3-6; 1986a: 4-6; 1986b: 2-7; 1987).
’’For a detailed summary of the changes brought to the Cartagena Agreement by the Quito Protocol 
see: Salazar, 1987; Carmona, 1988; Mairal, 1989: 97-109.
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three modes of programming: Industrial Integration Programs, Industrial Complementary 
Agreements, and Industrial Integration Projects.38
Bolivia and Ecuador were to begin their tariff reduction program process in 
December of 1988. Colombia, Peru and Venezuela could maintain their unilateral lists 
of exceptions to the tariff reduction program until 1993, and then gradually reduce them 
until 1995. After 1995, these 3 countries could exempt sine die up to 75 items each. 
Bolivia and Ecuador would reduce their lists between 1997 and 1999, and could maintain 
sine die up to 180 items each. The list of products reserved for industrial programming 
could be maintained until 1995, when the tariff reduction program for them would begin.
Two new forms of exemption from the tariff reduction program were created: 1) 
unilateral lists of products subject to "administered trade," in which countries could set 
import quotas; and 2) a new safeguard clause allowing limits on imports of goods which 
could cause problems for domestic production of specific products.
The Quito Protocol established that Bolivia and Ecuador would begin to adopt the 
CMET when the Commission decided it. The approval of the common external tariff was 
left without a deadline.
The new protocol had a more ambitious agricultural integration program. It 
established actions for promoting agricultural trade, and the adoption of a common 
development program for this sector in production and technology. Cooperation was to
“The Industrial Integration Programs were similar to the old Sectoral Programs of Industrial 
Development. At least four countries had to participate. It could include several sectors, and production 
assignation was not mandatory. Industrial Complementary Agreements could be made by two or more 
countries. These agreements aimed to promote co-productions, distribution of markets, joint international 
trade operations and a more articulated production and entrepreneurial activity. In the Industrial Integration 
Projects all members had to participate. Countries were to cooperate to develop new productions in one 
or several sectors.
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be increased in technology, natural resources, tourism, services, social development, 
border integration, and social communication.
In the same meeting during which the Quito Protocol was adopted (May 1987), 
the Commission also approved a package of decisions. The most important one was the 
transition program, Decision 225. It set the framework for the Andean process to restore 
its vitality, to gradually reduce the violations, to decrease trade restrictions, to oblige the 
governments not to impose new restrictions, and to overcome the crisis.
Other decisions were: Decision 220 which made more flexible the common 
treatment of foreign investment (see section 2.4). Decisions 221 and 223 abrogating the 
Automobile Program and the rules for harmonizing industrial development legislation. 
Decision 218 made all decisions automatically part of the domestic legislation, with the 
exception of those which modify existing regulations. In the latter cases, the decisions 
would be formally incorporated into the national legal system. Finally, Decision 224 
approved a joint program to aid Bolivia in transport and communication, and Decision 
229 adopted a timetable to eliminate most of the trade restrictions by December 1988.
All these changes signaled the primacy of Andean trade liberalization over the 
other mechanisms. The adoption of the common external tariff was postponed sine die. 
Industrial programming was left for the future, and its life was extended to 1995, with 
much more flexible rules. Finally, the common treatment of foreign investment, was 
made less common and more unilateral.
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During this phase of recession, the Commission devoted much of its time to 
discuss the Junta’s proposals and to mold them to the changing needs and interests of the 
member countries so that the Andean Group could again become a useful instrument for 
the member countries.
Under these circumstances, between 1979 to 1987, the Commission’s output of 
decisions per session, anticipated by the hypothesis of this dissertation, was the lowest 
in its history. The Commission approved 105 decisions in its 52 sessions, which means 
an average of only 2.02 decisions per session, reaching its lowest level in 1985 with 0.7 
decisions per session. In the phase of progress (1969-1973) this average was 3.24, and 
in the phase of stagnation (1974-1978) it was 2.89 (see table VI.8). No decisions were 
made in 13 sessions (a record number). This gives an average of only 2.69 decisions 
approved per session in which decisions were adopted. These figures, again, were the 
lowest for the entire history of the Andean process.
The number of decisions approved is highly correlated with the situation of the 
process. It went up from 5 to 21 between 1978 and 1979. The high output of 1979 was 
due to the boost given by the presidential meeting commemorating the 10th anniversary 
of the Andean integration process (May 1979). In this meeting the presidents directed the 
Commission to approve measures to inject a new dynamism into the process. From then 
on until 1983, the Commission’s output dwindled.
In 1983, 25 Decisions were approved in 10 meetings. This increased output by 
the Commission was the result of the two presidential meetings of that year. Twenty-one
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2.025. 1/4 3.24 2.89 2.50 2.63 1.71 2.00 2.50 1.00 0.714 2.33 4.001.00
2.693.68 2.50 2.63 2.40 1.66 2.00 2.70 4.00 3.50 5.006. 1/4.1 3.44 1.25
\J Important is defined as decisions that have direct impact in the progress of the principal mechanisms of the Andean process. 
SOURCES: JUNAC, n.d.: 1-20; 1982c: Tomo II, 585-594; Tomo III, Tomo IV; Actas de la Comisi6n.
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of the 25 decisions taken were unimportant.39 Out of the four decisions which were 
important, two (184 and 185) dealt with new issues (the Statute of the Andean Tribunal 
and the program to help Bolivia with its transport and communications problems caused 
by its landlocked geographical situation); and two (Decisions 181 and 189) modified 
previous decisions weakening the process (the first postponed deadlines set in Decision 
120 which approved the Automobile Program; the second made more flexible the 
common treatment of foreign investment).
From 1984 to 1986, the Commission’s output was very low, only 4 decisions in 
1984,40 5 in 1985, and 7 in 1986, most of these decisions being just of an administrative 
nature, like approving budgets, and naming members of the Junta. It was in these three 
years during which both the Commission and the Junta devoted their efforts to the 
modifications of the Cartagena Agreement.
With the signing of the Quito Protocol in May 1987, the Commission’s production 
of decisions increased. In the session in which the Protocol was adopted, 11 decisions 
were approved; all of them were important for the process. In the December meeting the 
Commission approved 7 more decisions, of which 4 were important.
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that during this phase of regression of the 
process the activity of the Commission, as indicated by the number of decisions adopted, 
diminished to its lowest levels ever. This is another important element showing the
39For example the Entrepreneurial and Labor Consultative Councils, the Councils on Industrial Policy, 
on Science and Technology were created by decisions 176, 177, 178 and 178 respectively but nothing of 
consequence came from them. Decisions 191 and 199 approved the budgets of the Andean Tribunal and 
of the Junta. And Decisions 192 through 197 approved several aspects of cooperation in agriculture.
“ "During 1984 the Commission .... met only four times and approved only four decisions, ... none 
of them of any great significance ..." (INTAL, 1985: 77).
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4.4.- Changes in the strategies of development, and the regression of the Andean
process
As in chapters IV and V, the relevant aspects of the strategies of development of 
the member countries expressed in their development plans will be contrasted here with 
the three principles of the Cartagena Agreement presented in section 5.1 of chapter III. 
These principles are: primacy of the government in the integration process, a more 
efficient import substitution, and the subsidiary role of foreign investment. If the 
principles of the Cartagena Agreement were not useful to attain the relevant aims of the 
long-term development plans, short-term emergency plans, structural adjustments, and 
economic stabilization programs of the majority of the Andean countries, then the phase 
of regression has a plausible explanation.
The hypothesis of this study leads us to the following explanation: the original 
aims of the Andean Pact did not reflect the current interests of the majority of the 
member countries. As in the previous chapters, countries are loosely grouped according 
to the similarity of their levels of development (industrialization), and economic policies. 
Colombia is analyzed alone, Peru with Venezuela, and Bolivia with Ecuador.
a) Colombia
This country continued to move towards an export promotion strategy of
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development.41 Some development plans were aimed to correct imbalances created by 
external turmoil and others to provide guidelines for long-term development. The 1983- 
1986 plan is an example of the former. Its basic objective was the reactivation of the 
economy in the short-run (IDB, cl985: 263). A plan setting long-term guidelines was the 
1978-1982 plan. Among other things, it encouraged foreign investment especially for the 
exploration and exploitation of energy resources, in mining and in industry, and to 
increase industrial efficiency (ECLA, 1981: 137; IDB, cl980: 214). In this plan the role 
of the state was reduced to maintain an economic environment favorable for investment" 
(Iguinez, 1983: 19, 23; JUNAC, 1991a: 74).
Colombia’s long-term plan to shift to an export-oriented model, was thus 
indifferent to the primacy of the state, and not supportive of import substitution 
industrialization, and of the subsidiary role of foreign investment.
b) Peru and Venezuela
Peru had plans aiming at both to deal with the imbalances, and to set new long­
term bases for development. From 1978 to 1983 the country moved towards trade 
liberalization demanded by the IMF as a condition for rescheduling its external debt. The 
last Economic Program (1978-1980) of the Peruvian military government, "involved 
reducing fiscal deficits ...; pursuing the policy of mini-devaluations ...; reducing the 
level of effective protection for industry; liberalizing imports and external payments in 
general; restricting public indebtedness; ... as well as pursuing a cautious wage policy"
41 "With time, ... the Colombian export-oriented model became ... more incompatible with the import 
substitution and proindustry bias of the Andean Group ..." (Urrutia, 1981: 193).
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(ECLA, 1981: 440, 448).
The civilian government, which took power in July 1980, moved more rapidly 
towards economic liberalism until 1983. It aimed to stimulate the efficiency and 
competitiveness of domestic production and to control the main financial imbalances 
through the liberalization of imports, the introduction of market mechanisms, the greater 
role to private sector. The role of the state was to be limited to setting policy and 
regulating market forces (IDB, cl982: 355; ECLA, 1982: 449; 1983 : 659; JUNAC, 
1991a: 76). By 1983 with the collapse of the prices of the major Peruvian exports 
coupled with torrential rain in the north of the country and drought in the south, the 
government had to apply recessionary policies which expanded its intervention in the 
economy, and increased trade restrictions.
From 1985 to 1987, the second elected government, which took office in 1985, 
moved in the opposite direction. The economy was to be stimulated through government 
intervention in the economy, by protecting domestic production, and by reducing the role 
of foreign investment (Iguinez, 1990: 15; JUNAC, 1991a: 76).
In brief, Peru moved—between 1978 and 1983—from a process of outward 
oriented strategy of development to an inward orientation after 1983. The government 
of Peru was between 1979 and 1983, not supportive of the primacy of the state, of 
import substitution, and of the subsidiary role of foreign investment. From 1984 to the 
end of this phase of regression, the government’s interests coincided with the principles 
of the Cartagena Agreement.
The principal objectives of Venezuela’s VI and VII Development Plans (1981-
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1985 and 1986-1989), were, among others: (a) to increase productive capacity through 
government investment in such basic sectors of the economy as petroleum, aluminum, 
iron, and petrochemicals; (b) to stimulate domestic and foreign private investment; (c) 
to increase the efficiency of the productive sectors and of public finance; and (d) to 
search for economic and financial equilibria. The aim of the investment strategy was to 
invigorate the import substitution, and the diversification of exports (IDB, cl982: 387). 
In both plans tariffs on consumer goods were to be reduced, foreign trade was to be 
selectively liberalized, and the role of the state and of public investment were very 
important (JUNAC, 1991a: 77).
From these plans, it is clear that the Venezuelan government was supportive of 
the primacy of the state, and of import substitution, but it was not supportive of the 
subsidiary role of foreign investment.
c) Bolivia and Ecuador
Bolivia, being the weakest of the five members, and subject to more economic, 
social and political instability than the others, went into important changes between 1981 
and 1985. The Three Year Plan promulgated in October 1981 was the first attempt to 
apply neo-liberal policies in the country. It "aimed at establishing a new economic 
development, political and social model characterized ... by ... the elimination of 
subsidies and artificial prices, the attraction of foreign capital, a more realistic exchange 
policy based on the market forces, and the participation of the private sector in state 
enterprises" (ECLA, 1983: 145).
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In August 1985, the new government, adopted an outward oriented strategy of 
development. It aimed to increase the importance of the market’s role as a mechanism 
of resource allocation, while simultaneously reducing the participation of the state in 
economic activities (ECLA, 1987a: 101); to encourage the participation of the domestic 
and foreign private sector in the economy (IDB, cl987: 215), and to increase efficiency 
of domestic production.
From 1981 on, the principles of the Cartagena Agreement did not reflect the 
relevant interests of Bolivia. This country was not supportive of the primacy of the state, 
of import substitution and of the subsidiary role of foreign investment.
The National Development Plan, 1980-1984 of Ecuador pointed to, among other 
things, more participation of the state in productive activities, but at the same time to 
further participation of foreign investment (IDB, cl982: 245; cl980: 247; JUNAC, 
1991a: 75). In 1982 Ecuador adopted measures which amounted to the adoption of a new 
strategy of development whose purposes were, among others, to give more importance 
to market mechanisms and to produce goods in which the country has comparative 
advantages (IDB, cl984: 214).
The new government, which took office in August 1984, moved towards a more 
neo-liberal strategy of development to achieve a more efficient allocation of resources 
through decontrolling the economy and increasing the participation of the private sector 
in economic activity (IDB, cl988: 288), and reducing the participation of the state in the 
economy (JUNAC, 1991a: 75).
In short, Ecuador during this phase of regression moved towards a strategy of
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development which was indifferent to the primacy of the state, and not supportive of 
either import substitution or the subsidiary role of foreign investment.
In summary the member countries’ were mostly not supportive of the principles 
of the Cartagena Agreement (see table VI.9). The two smallest members were not 
supportive of the Andean aims, Bolivia being more dissatisfied than Ecuador.
TABLE VI.9
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ANDEAN AIMS AND 
NATIONAL OBJECTIVES IN 1987
ANDEAN AIMS BO CO EC PE VE TOTAL
Primacy of government N I I S S 2S 21 IN
Import substitution industrialization N N N S S 2S 3N
Subsidiary role of foreign investment N N N S N IS 4N
5S 21 8N
S = Supportive I =  Indifferent N = Not supportive
Of the three largest members, only Peru had, by 1987, an economic orientation 
with aims similar to the principal objectives of the Andean Pact. This was mostly due to 
the conffontationalist stance chosen by the government of the time with the international 
banking establishment regarding the non-payment of the external debt. Venezuela, for its 
part, was still committed to import substitution and to government intervention in the 
economy, but with the economic crisis it began to seek a greater role for foreign capital. 
Colombia, like Bolivia and Ecuador, was not supportive of the goals of the Cartagena 
Agreement due to Colombia’s gradual shift to export-oriented industrialization.
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Two countries supported, two were indifferent and one did not support the 
principle of the primacy of the state. Three of the five did not support import 
substitution, and four of the five were not supportive of the subsidiary role of foreign 
investment.
4.5.- Economic policies of the member countries and the Andean mechanisms during
the phase of regression
Comparing the relevant economic policies applied by the governments of the 
member countries to the four main mechanisms of the Cartagena Agreement, as 
anticipated by the research hypothesis for this phase, the loss of support for the Andean 
process can be substantiated. The four main mechanisms of the Andean Group, as 
defined in chapter HI, section 5.2, are: Tariff reduction program, Common External 
Tariff, Industrial Programming, and Common Treatment of Foreign Investment. In this 
phase of regression almost no correlation should be expected between these four basic 
mechanisms and the economic policies pursued by the governments.
The dramatic changes of the economic policies of the member countries affected 
all four mechanisms. Attempts to approve a CET were abandoned due to the crisis which 
began with the application of restrictions to intra-Andean trade. A deeper motive was the 
need of the members to have complete freedom to use their foreign trade instruments to 
cope with the looming economic problems from 1982 on. Therefore, this mechanism will 
not be specifically considered here. Suffice it to reiterate that with the continuous changes 
by the member countries in tariff rates and in import controls, as well as with changes
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in the exchange rates and the foreign exchange system,42 it was meaningless for the 
community organs and the governments to try to adopt a common external tariff. All the 
member countries were unwilling to adopt the CET, and for this reason they were not 
supportive of this mechanism.
a) Colombia
a .l)  The tariff reduction program.- Exports to the Andean partners decreased in 1980, 
and 1982-1984, reaching in 1983 its record low of 60 percent (see table VI. 10). 
Colombian imports from the Andean Group diminished in 1982 and 1984-1987. Trade 
balance with the rest of the Andean countries was negative between 1981 and 1985, as 
well as with the rest of the world, which led the Colombian government to apply a 
restrictive import policy mostly to non-Andean trade.43 Colombia, however, continued
“ Governments used, at different times, a variety of devices single, multiple, fixed, floating exchange 
rates or any combination of them. They actively intervened in the market by setting the price of the dollar, 
by officially monopolizing its selling and buying, by auctioning dollars; by assigning a quota to be used 
by different economic sectors, for a period of time, and by setting priorities.
■“Colombian trade policies changed in response to external changes. Whenever there was an increase 
in foreign exchange, imports were gradually liberalized, so the additional exchange would not fuel inflation 
and create more disequilibria in the economy. This happened from 1975 to June 1980, due to the increase 
in the price of coffee; and in 1986, again due to increases in the price of coffee, and also to the growth 
of oil and coal exports. The main policy changes were: decreasing the number of items subject to prior 
import license, or subject to import prohibition; reducing the tariff rates, especially on capital and 
intermediate goods; simplifying custom formalities; increasing the amount of foreign exchange to be 
allocated for imports; and devaluations at a slower rate than domestic inflation (ECLA, 1981: 149-150; 
1982: 149, 150; 1989: 173; 1989a: 183; IDB, 1988: 378-379).
When foreign exchange was unexpectedly low, imports were restricted and exports promoted. This 
was what happened from the mid-1980 to 1985. In these years the government pursued policies opposite 
to the ones mentioned above. It also increased the support to exports, by financing working capital and 
exports; providing more tax credit certificates; covering the premiums on commercial, political and 
extraordinary risks in respect of exports; and providing assistance to exporting enterprises in areas related 
to the production, packing, wrapping, marketing and transport of merchandise (ECLA, 1982: 137, 148; 
1983: 217; 1985: 194; IDB, cl985: 263; cl986: 229; cl987: 238; cl988: 265).
Changes in trade policy were also affected by the fluctuations in income from drug traffic. From 
1975 foreign exchange from drugs increased steadily to reach $2.5 billion in 1982. From then on it 
decreased to a "mere" $885 million in 1985 (Thorp, 182-183). Raising income in the first period and its 
posterior decrease forced the changes in policies to be more severe.


















COLOMBIA: ANDEAN TRADE 1978-1987
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 | 1986 | 1987
EXPORTS (FOB) (Thousands of dollars)
GRAN 304,224 417,685 387,888 456,668 452,909 181,870 168,593 217,975 281,338 404,980
World 3,002,691 3,300,443 3,945,048 2,956,400 3,094,967 3,080,893 3,483,140 3,551,886 5,107,936 5,024,423
IMPORTS (FOB) (Thousands of dollars)
GRAN 227,951 257,304 378,883 607,683 603,022 620,325 554,672 433,447 248,734 227,874
World 2,836,315 3,233,194 4,662,604 5,199,156 5,477,701 4,968,080 4,492,392 4,130,686 3,852,085 4,227,978
TRADE BALANCE (1'housands of dollars)
GRAN 76,273 160,381 9,005 (151,015) (150,113) (438,455) (386,079) (215,472) 32,604 177,106
World 166,376 67,249 (717,556) (2,242,756) (2,382,734) (1,887,187) (1,009,252) (578,800) 1,255,851 796,445
INTRASUBREGIONAL TRADE AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TRADE
Exports 10.13 12.66 9.83 15.45 14.63 5.90 4.84 6.14 5.51 8.06
Imports 8.04 7.96 8.13 11.69 11.01 12.49 12.35 10.49 6.46 5.39
RATE OF GROWTH OF EXPORTS
GRAN 1.80 37.30 -7.13 17.73 -0.82 -59.84 -7.30 29.29 29.07 43.95
World 22.90 9.92 19.53 -25.06 4.69 -0.45 13.06 1.97 43.81 -1.63
RATE OF GROWTH OF IMPORTS
GRAN 33.60 12.88 47.25 60.39 -0.77 2.87 -10.58 -21.86 -42.61 -8.39
World 39.84 13.99 44.21 11.51 5.36 -9.30 -9.57 -8.05 -6.74 9.76
SOURCES: JUNAC-Sistema Subregional de Informacidn Estadfstica, Decisi6n 115, and author’s calculations. to
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backing this mechanism because this country was promoting exports rather than aiming 
for import substitution.44 As shown in table VI.6, Colombia had only 3 percent of its 
intra-Andean trade under restrictions in 1985, while Peru had 40 percent and Venezuela 
34 percent.
a.2) Industrial programming.- The Colombian government did not support this 
mechanism during this phase. Only the already approved industrial programs were 
accepted because they related to "areas where state intervention is strong ... [but] in all 
other areas, ... one would ... expect Colombia to be reluctant to allow progress in the 
industrial programming effort" (Urrutia, 1981: 193). It is not by chance that no other 
industrial programs were approved after the Automobile Program.
a.3) Decision 24.- With regard to foreign investments, the 1978-1982 administration 
welcomed foreign capital to finance huge investment for the development of coal and 
oil;45 and "for the execution of industrial projects related to chemicals ..., petroleum 
and coal derivatives, and the rubber and plastic industries" (ECLA, 1982: 150). More 
importantly, 1987 "saw important changes in the foreign investment requirements; these 
... created more flexible procedures governing remittances of profits abroad, the 
reinvestment and capitalization of profits and the time limit for forming mixed enterprises"
**”... Colombia was the only Andean country, during the 1980s, with a comprehensive export 
promotion program for manufactured goods" (JUNAC, 1991a: 71).
■“Foreign capital went into Colombia in increasing amounts until 1987 when the coal and petroleum 
projects were completed (ECLA, 1989a: 184).
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(IDB, 1988: 379). In other words, although Colombia was not supportive of Decision 24 
on the common treatment of foreign investment, the government promoted its 
modification in the Commission and, only then, implemented the changes.
In short, Colombia was supportive of the tariff reduction program, but it was not 
supportive of the other three mechanisms: the CET, the SPIDs and the common regime 
of foreign investment.
b) Peru and Venezuela
b.I) The tariff reduction program.- Trade policy between 1978 and 1983 aimed to 
increase competition in the domestic market, and augment the availability of foreign 
goods through import liberalization and the reduction of import tariffs (ECLA, 1982: 
459, 463; 1983: 671; 1985: 579). As a result of these changes the margin of preference 
for Andean imports was reduced, and Peruvian imports from the other Andean members 
as a percentage of total imports decreased from 1978 to 1983 (see table VI. 11).
From 1983 this policy was reversed. Tariffs were increased, some imports were 
prohibited, the import license was reintroduced, exchange controls were enacted, and 
multiple exchange rates were imposed (ECLA, 1986a: 543; 1989a: 569; IDB, cl987: 
349; 1988: 491). Most of these restrictions were not applied to the Andean partners, 
thereby increasing the margin of preference their products enjoyed in the Peruvian 
market creating trade deficits for Peru with its Andean partners in both 1986 and 1987. 
Therefore, by 1987, can be said that Peru was not supportive of the tariff reduction 
program.


















PERU: ANDEAN TRADE 1978-1987
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 J 1987
EXPORTS (FOB) (Thousands of dol lars)
GRAN 138,154 320,915 308,126 242,613 238,957 112,926 186,793 249,801 145,784 157,025
World 1,819,622 3,363,841 3,700,054 2,818,825 2,890,612 2,577,361 2,787,659 3,058,212 2,359,077 2,476,898
IMPORTS (FOB) (Thousands of dot ars)
GRAN 87,170 59,589 107,836 140,904 109,317 68,944 74,843 85,291 166,495 242,162
World 1,463,975 1,737,172 2,879,778 4,017,848 3,296,280 2,254,034 1,988,058 1,730,561 2,431,070 3,247,314
TRADE BALANCE (Thousands of dollars)
GRAN 50,984 261,326 200,290 101,709 129,640 43,982 111,950 164,510 (20,711) (85,137)
World 355,647 1,626,669 820,276 (1,199,023) (405,668) 323,327 799,601 1,327,651 (71,993) (770,416)
INTRASUBREGIONAL TRADE AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TRADE
Exports 7.59 9.54 8.33 8.61 8.27 4.38 6.70 8.17 6.18 6.34
Imports 5.95 3.43 3.74 3.51 3.32 3.06 3.76 4.93 6.85 7.46
RATE OF GROWTH OF EXPORTS
GRAN 90.92 132.29 -3.99 -21.26 -1.51 -52.74 65.41 33.73 -41.64 7.71
World 9.24 84.86 9.99 -23.82 2.55 -10.84 8.16 9.71 -22.86 4.99
RATE OF GROWTH OF IMPORTS
GRAN -78.68 -31.64 80.97 30.67 -22.42 -36.93 8.56 13.96 95.21 45.45
World -23.67 18.66 65.77 39.52 -17.96 -31.62 -11.80 -12.95 40.48 33.58
SOURCES: JUNAC-Sistema Subregional de lnformaci6n Estadistica, Decisi6n 115, and author's calculations.
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By the end of the 1970s Venezuela liberalized its trade by lowering its tariffs in 
order to strengthen competition and efficiency (ECLA, 1982: 532). Due to the external 
disequilibrium,46 this policy was reversed and imports were increasingly restricted and 
controlled from 1982 on.47 These restrictions were also applied to imports from the 
Andean area. As is shown in table VI. 12 Venezuelan imports from the subregion 
decreased in 1980, 1983, 1985 and 1986, while exports did so in 1978, 1982, 1985 and 
1986. Between 1983 and 1987 the balance of trade with the Andean area was positive, 
thanks to these indiscriminate restrictions, while before, thanks to better times for the 
Venezuelan economy, it ran deficits. Thus, Venezuela during this phase was not 
supportive of the tariff reduction program.
b.2) Industrial programming.- As part of the conditions imposed by the IMF to deal 
with its balance of payments problem, Peru had to reduce protection to industry Peru 
between 1978 and 1983.48 In April 1982 a new General Law on Industries was
wIn 1982 the current account showed a negative balance of approximately $3.5 billion, and a loss of 
$7 billion in the country’s international reserves was recorded (ECLA, 1984: 633). In the following year, 
there was a net outflow of long-term capital, the first since 1974. The amortization payments for 1983 were 
equivalent to 95 percent of total expons, forcing the government to ask for moratoria (ECLA, 1985: 670, 
674-675; 1986a: 601; 1989: 705).
The single fixed exchange rate in place for 18 years, was replaced in 1983 by a multiple exchange 
rate with three rates. The bolivar was devalued, on average, by 16 percent in that year, in 1984 by 30 
percent, in 1985 by 9 percent, in 1986 the bolivar was devalued by 50 percent, and in 1987 by 60 percent 
(ECLA, 1985: 664-665; 1986a: 589; JUNAC, 1990c: 128).
47Customs tariffs were increased, the list of prohibited imports was expanded, import quotas were 
established, and prior licenses were introduced (IDB, cl985a: 406; ECLA, 1984: 649-650; 1985: 669).
wIn March 1979, the National Register of Manufactures (a protective mechanism which prohibited 
imports of goods similar to those manufactured in the country and which was one of the main protective 
mechanisms in the 1970s), was abolished and replaced by a list of imports prohibited up to 1980. In 
December 1979, the new custom tariffs came into force. It had the express purpose of improving the 
efficiency of domestic industry and forcing prices down by reducing effective rates of protection to 90 
percent or less (ECLA, 1981: 450).


















VENEZUELA: ANDEAN TRADE 1978-1987
1978 1979 | 1980 J 1981 1982 • 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
EXPORTS (FOB) (Thousands of dollars)
GRAN 121,059 202,233 303,006 354,798 298,845 301,968 322,015 238,885 160,946 215,076
World 9,177,638 14,176,739 19,051,709 20,099,221 16,347,774 14,495,106 15,919,720 14,377,444 8,664,150 10,538,726
IMPORTS (FOB) (Thousands of dollars)
GRAN 246,302 315,197 303,717 357,460 401,504 143,883 187,436 185,207 157,228 199,845
World 12,195,073 11,051,271 12,249,979 13,560,999 13,396,956 6,653,492 8,058,228 8,399,112 8,594,399 9,765,288
TRADE BALANCE (Thousands of dol ars)
GRAN (125,243) (112,964) (711) (2,662) (102,659) 158,085 134,579 53,678 3,718 15,231
World (3,017,435) 3,125,468 6,801,730 6,538,222 2,950,818 7,841,614 7,861,492 5,978,332 69,751 773,438
INTRASUBREGIONAL TRADE AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL T RADE
Exports 1.32 1.43 1.59 1.77 1.83 2.08 2.02 1.66 1.86 2.04
Imports 2.02 2.85 2.48 2.64 3.00 2.16 2.33 2.21 1.83 2.05
RATE OF GROWTH OF EXPORTS
GRAN -54.10 67.05 49.83 17.09 -15.77 1.05 6.64 -25.82 -32.63 33.63
World -3.67 54.47 34.39 5.50 -18.66 -11.33 9.83 -9.69 -39.74 21.64
RATE OF GROWTH OF IMPORTS
GRAN 24.32 27.97 -3.64 17.70 12.32 -64.16 30.27 -1.19 -15.11 27.11
World 8.64 -9.38 10.85 10.70 -1.21 -50.34 21.11 4.23 2.33 13.62
SOURCES: JUNAC-Sistema Subregional de lnformaci6n Estadlstica, Decisidn 115, and author’s calculations. K)oo
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promulgated. Its main characteristics were trade openness and competitiveness. The role 
of the state was limited to planning, setting standards, and promoting national industry 
(ECLA, 1984: 563). The changes in industrial policy in Peru from 1978 to 1985 meant 
that the Andean industrial programming lost support of the government. Between 1985 
and 1990, the second civilian government, immersed in widespread mismanagement and 
in growing debt problems, was indifferent to this mechanism.
Industrial programming was supported by Venezuela until the mid-1980s. For 
example, in order to take better advantage of the Petrochemical Program, in 1979, the 
Venezuelan petrochemical industry was attached to the petroleum state company, 
Petroleos de Venezuela S./4. (IDB, cl980: 392). Earnest attempts were also made to 
implement the Automobile Program. In 1979, agreements in this sector were reached 
with Bolivia, Peru and Colombia (ECLA, 1981: 523).
b.3) Decision 24.- With regard to the common treatment of foreign investment, the 
government which took power in Peru in 1980 adopted incentives for domestic and 
foreign private investment in oil and mining through new laws in these areas enacted in 
1980 and 1981 respectively (ECLA, 1983: 659, 668, 679). During the second civilian 
government, Decision 24 was kept in place even after Decision 220 (which made the 
common treatment of foreign investment more flexible), was approved by the 
Commission (Iguinez, 1990: 124). This was, however, a support by default since there 
was a "lack of a clearly defined policy regarding foreign investment" (EIU, 1990d: 37).
Due to the increasing balance of payments deficits, the Venezuelan support for
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the common treatment of foreign investment began to wane in 1983. In 1986 legal 
provisions inhibiting or deterring direct foreign investment were amended (IDB, cl988: 
411). This country, by the end of the phase of regression, was not supportive of Decision 
24.
In brief, by 1987, Peru and Venezuela were not supportive of the tariff reduction 
program, or the CET, and indifferent to industrial programming. Peru was supportive 
of the common treatment of foreign investment, but Venezuela was not.
c) Bolivia and Ecuador
c .l) The tariff reduction program.- For Bolivia and Ecuador Andean the tariff 
reduction program became less important than before. Even though they had not opened 
their markets to the other members, intra-Andean trade was becoming more and more 
onerous. Bolivia had increasing deficits with the rest of its Andean partners between 1977 
and 1979, and in 1984 and 1985 (see chapter V, table V.13; and table VI. 13), due to its 
overvalued peso.
Ecuador’s exports diminished in 6 of the 10 years of this phase of regression and 
as a result the balance of trade with the Andean Group was negative from 1984 to 1987 
(see table VI. 14) Ecuadorean trade policies also changed in response to international 
influences.49 As a result, Ecuador remained basically indifferent to this mechanism.
49Changes in the price of oil, bananas and coffee were determinant for introducing restrictive or 
expansive import regulations. From 1980 to 1983 prior deposits for import were raised; tariffs on luxury 
items were raised, and imports restricted or prohibited (ECLA, 1982: 243; 1983; 380; 1984: 321; 1985: 
311-313;). From 1984 on, the new government liberalized trade. Import prohibitions were eliminated, some 
import duties, especially on intermediate goods, were reduced ((ECLA, 1986a: 297; 1987a: 301, 1989: 
311; IDB, C1986: 253).


















BOLIVIA: ANDEAN TRADE 1978-1987
1978 1979 1980 1981 | 1982 | 1983 1984 | 1985 1986 1987
EXPORTS (FOB) (Thousands of dollars)
GRAN 15,954 22,102 42,595 44,514 34,232 23,817 15,634 16,853 24,250 30,711
WORLD 725,274 855,998 1,037,185 983,968 898,531 817,954 781,508 672,766 640,338 569,793
IMPORTS (FOB) (Thousands of dol lars)
GRAN 26,021 51,211 30,111 33,689 19,338 21,749 27,755 27,544 17,385 15,351
WORLD 1 769,482 841,544 665,393 917,081 554,135 576,746 488,477 690,867 674,033 766,296
TRADE BALANCE (Thousands of dollars)
GRAN (10,067) (29,109) 12,484 10,825 14,894 2,068 (12,121) (10,691) 6,865 15,360
WORLD (44,208) 14,454 371,792 66,887 344,396 241,208 293,031 (18,101) (33,695) (196,503)
INTRASUBREGIONAL TRADE AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TRADE
EXPORTS 2.20 2.58 4.11 4.52 3.81 2.91 2.00 2.51 3.79 5.39
IMPORTS 3.38 6.09 4.53 3.67 3.49 3.77 5.68 3.99 2.58 2.00
RATE OF GROWTH 0 F EXPORTS
GRAN 1.76 18.02 21.17 -5.13 -8.68 -30.42 -34.36 7.80 43.89 26.64
WORLD 41.41 96.81 -41.20 11.88 -42.60 -8.97 -4.46 -13.91 -4.82 -11.02
RATE OF GROWTH OF IMPORTS
GRAN 41.45 38.54 92.72 4.51 -23.10 12.47 27.62 -0.76 -36.88 -11.70
WORLD 31.25 9.37 -20.93 37.83 -39.58 4.08 -15.30 41.43 -2.44 13.69


















ECUADOR: ANDEAN TRADE 1979-1987
1978 1979 1980 J 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
EXPORTS (FOB) (Thousatids of dollars)
GRAN 102,296 103,288 147,248 139,106 158,459 131,999 56,416 73,767 42,929 125,061
WORLD 1,557,491 2,104,233 2,480,804 2,167,975 2,237,416 2,225,646 2,561,944 2,904,736 2,185,849 1,927,694
IMPORTS (FOB) (Thousands of dollars)
GRAN 74,612 97,281 139,201 107,607 117,596 69,203 76,749 82,288 91,128 309,708
WORLD 1,505,056 1,599,714 2,253,305 1,920,617 2,424,457 1,474,625 1,629,953 1,766,724 1,810,224 2,158,136
TRADE BALANCE (Thousands of dollars)
GRAN 27,684 6,007 8,047 31,499 40,863 62,796 (20,333) (8,521) (48,199) (184,647)
WORLD 52,435 504,519 227,499 247,358 (187,041) 751,021 931,991 1,138,012 375,625 (230,442)
1NTRASUBREGIONAL TRADE AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TRADE
EXPORTS 6.57 4.91 5.94 6.42 7.08 5.93 2.20 2.54 1.96 6.49
IMPORTS 4.96 6.08 6.18 5.60 4.85 4.69 4.71 4.66 5.03 14.35
RATE OF GROWTH OF EXPORTS
GRAN -42.66 0.97 42.56 -5.53 13.91 -16.70 -57.26 30.76 -41.80 191.32
WORLD 8.44 35.10 17.90 -12.61 3.20 -0.53 15.11 13.38 -24.75 -11.81
RATE OF GROWTH OF IMPORTS
GRAN 23.30 30.38 43.09 -22.70 9.28 -41.15 10.90 7.22 10.74 239.86
WORLD 26.63 6.29 40.86 -14.76 26.23 -39.18 10.53 8.39 2.46 19.22
SOURCES: JUNAC-Sistema Subregional de Informacidn Estadistica, Decisidn 115, and author’s calculations.
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c.2) Industrial programming.- At the beginning of the phase of regression, industrial 
programming was still producing some benefits for Bolivia and Ecuador. In Bolivia in 
1979, "the manufacture of metal products ... increased by 6% as the result of the 
installation of various industries, under the auspices of the Andean Group’s allocations 
of fields of production, for the manufacture of tools and compressors and the assembly 
of motorcycles and motor-vehicles" (ECLA, 1981: 101). Over time, the manufacturing 
sector suffered serious decay due to the structural adjustment programs, and the 
recessionary short-term policies derived from them. In 1985, new policies focused on 
export-oriented industrialization. The result was that industrial programming lost 
government support. From 1985 on, the new economic policy left the industrial sector 
subject to the free market (JUNAC, 1991a: 78).
Ecuador continued to implement the sectoral programs. This interest, however, 
was short-lived. The authorities decided, in 1983, to begin to gradually eliminate 
subsidies to industry and the customs protection regime (IDB, cl983: 243; ECLA, 1986: 
263). With the new government in office, changes were more comprehensive from 1984 
on. They aimed toward "a progressive withdrawal from the decades-old protectionist 
framework of manufacturing ... " (ECLA, 1987a: 297), to improve production 
efficiency, and to export manufactured goods (IDB, cl986: 253).
c.3) Decision 24.- Between 1974 and 1982 foreign direct investment in Bolivia did not 
play a major role. Some of the reasons were the country’s institutional problems, the 
small size of the domestic market, transport and marketing difficulties, and the lack of
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progress with respect to regional integration programs (ECLA, 1984: 124). In 1982 a 
new investment law was decreed. It promoted industries with a high degree of import 
contents (JUNAC, 1991a: 74). During the 1980s, Bolivia was supportive of either 
making the Andean common code more flexible, or of eliminating it. Therefore, this 
country was not supportive of this mechanism.
Ecuador began encouraging foreign investment from 1982 on, especially in the 
hydrocarbon and mining sectors.50 Decision 24 was suspended in 1985. Any foreign 
enterprise in the country that exported more than 80 percent of its production was not 
required to become a mixed or national enterprise. In addition, the ceiling on the 
remittance of profits was eliminated (ECLA, 1986a: 293; IDB, cl987: 263, Hey, 1995: 
204-209).
To restate, Bolivia and Ecuador were indifferent to the tariff reduction program, 
and not supportive of the CET, industrial programming, and the common treatment of 
foreign investment.
d) Conclusion
Table VI. 15 shows the summary positions, by 1987, of the member countries with 
regard to the four main mechanisms of the Cartagena Agreement. The general conclusion 
is that the member countries were not supportive of the most important Andean 
mechanisms. In this sense, both the phase of regression and the deep changes in the
“ In that year, amendments were introduced into legislation to encourage foreign contractors to 
participate in the exploration and development of new oil fields (IDB, cl984: 215; ECLA, 1984: 315). In 
1985 the government amended the mining code to attract a greater flow of private investment, both national 
and foreign (ECLA, 1987a: 297-298; 1989: 308; IDB, cl987: 263).
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TABLE VI. 15
SUPPORT FOR ANDEAN MECHANISMS IN 1987
MECHANISM BO CO EC PE VE TOTALS
Tariff reduction program I s I N N IS 21 2N
Common Tariff N N N N N 5N
Industrial Programming N N N I S IS 11 3N
Foreign Investment N N N S N IS 4N
3S 31 14N
S = Supportive I = Indifferent N = Not supportive
Cartagena Agreement introduced by the Quito Protocol find an explanation.
Out of the four mechanisms, three were clearly not supported by the member 
countries, the CET, industrial programming, and the common treatment of foreign 
capital; while the tariff reduction program had relatively more support. This can explain 
why Decision 24 on the common treatment of foreign investments was radically 
modified, that the CET was maintained in the new Cartagena Agreement but without a 
deadline, and that industrial programming was made very flexible. On the other hand, 
the tariff reduction program had only its timetable extended. Given this situation, it is 
pertinent to ask why the governments did not abandon this enterprise, and instead they 
chose to profoundly modify it?
Bolivia and Ecuador although they were not supportive of the aims, or the 
mechanisms, did not leave the Andean Group. They remained because being lesser 
partners they would lose access to the other markets, as well as the increased political
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clout the pact provided at the international level. Being the least important members, 
their withdrawal of the process would not have had much impact on the process.
Colombia had also political reasons to stay. The Andean Pact was viewed as a 
tool to manage its "boundary problems with Venezuela," which was "Colombia’s major 
foreign policy problem" (Urrutia, 1981: 191-192); and as a medium "... for an active 
and permanent international economic policy" (Moreno, 1982: 190).
In the case of Venezuela, the main reason to remain in the process was economic. 
Its interest in pursuing import substitution made industrial programming the sole 
mechanism Venezuela was in support of. At the same time Venezuela expected that the 
CET would not be adopted, and Decision 24 would be changed. All of these factors 
provided Venezuela with the necessary incentives to stay in the process.
Finally, Peru being in a chaotic political and economic situation, did not have 
time to deal with Andean issues. This country remained in the Andean Pact by default.
The main reason for this lack of support for the principles and mechanisms of the 
Cartagena Agreement lies with the changes in the international economic system 
(increasing protectionism and recessionary economic policies of the industrialized world). 
This in turn forced the Andean governments to began a process of changing and adapting 
their policies and eventually their strategies of development. The Andean process, in turn 
went to this phase of regression, which eventually led to the changes in the principles and 
relative importance of the mechanisms of the Cartagena Agreement.
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CHAPTER V n  
FROM QUITO TO .... (1987-1995):
RE-ROUTING SUBREGIONAL INTEGRATION
1.- THE RECENT EVOLUTION OF THE ANDEAN SUBREGIONAL
INTEGRATION PROCESS: 1987-1995
The last nine years of the Andean integration process can be periodized in two 
phases: a short phase of stagnation, from 1987 to 1989, and a phase of progress, from 
1990 to the present (1995). The common thread of these phases is that there were new 
principles and the importance of the mechanisms was reordered. These modifications in 
fact changed the Andean model and re-routed the process, shifting its orientation from 
an industrialization endeavor to a commercial undertaking.
The indicators show stagnation if: (1) trade within the subregion diminishes in one 
or two years; (2) implementation of the mechanisms suffers delays; (3) the output of the 
Commission is limited, and more focused on modifying existing decisions and on 
weakening the process; and (4) violations are more numerous than during the phase of
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progress. Progress is demonstrated, as proposed in this dissertation, by the following 
indicators: (1) increasing intra-Andean trade during all years of the phase, (2) the 
mechanisms are implemented without major delays; (3) decisions by the Commission are 
adopted in a timely manner; and (4) violations are minimal. Sections 2 and 3 analyze 
these indicators for the last two phases.
The explanation for the phase of progress, as advanced in the hypothesis, is that 
the governments of the member countries find that some of their goals can be achieved 
through the Andean Pact. For the phase of stagnation the explanation is that one or more 
of the countries do not find their interests reflected in the aims and mechanisms of the 
Cartagena Agreement. Section 4 of the present chapter corroborates these ideas.
1.1.- The two phases during the re-routing of the Andean process
The expected revitalization of the Andean Pact did not crystallize after the signing 
of the Quito Protocol in May 1987. The reduction of the violations, especially non-tariff 
barriers to trade, was far from accomplished by 1989. From 1987 on, intrasubregional 
trade, however, began to increase. This fact again proves that results in the Andean 
endeavor were much more dependent on the conditions of the member countries and on 
governments’ interests, than the process itself.
It is only by the end of 1989 that the Andean Group not only recovered its vitality 
but progressed rapidly. Deadlines, between 1989 and 1992, were progressively 
shortened, obligations were fulfilled, decisions furthering the process were adopted by 
the Commission, and intra-Andean trade grew quickly. Behind these facts were the rapid
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convergence of the economic policies of the Andean countries, and the direct 
participation of the presidents in the process through summit meetings.
Over time, the different speeds at which the various governments moved away 
from an inward to an outward oriented development strategy created disagreements 
among the Andean members. These disagreements were related to key issues, such as 
the implementation of the free trade zone, the definition of the common external tariff 
(CET), and the scope of policy harmonization. The result was the slow down of the 
process from 1992 until this writing (1995).
1.2.- The new Andean model of economic integration
With the signing of the Quito Protocol in May 1987, the Cartagena Agreement 
was profoundly modified (see chapter VI, section 4.2), and through the accords of the 
Andean presidents, the member countries showed what these changes meant. Based on 
both the Quito Protocol and the actions of governments, the new aims and the reordering 
of the importance of the mechanisms can be discerned.
The Quito Protocol, continued to assign the Andean Group the role of "a tool to 
contribute to the economic development of the subregion" (Marquez, 1989: 9). The 
principles and main mechanisms, however, were modified in order to make the 
agreement more flexible, and to keep it in tune with the changes the countries had 
already undergone, or were continuing to go through. The Cartagena Agreement became 
a more pragmatic and realistic instrument reflecting the interests of the countries (ECLA, 
1992: 26; JUNAC, 1987b: 14; 1989c: 1). These interests dictated the replacement of the
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state by the private sector as the leader in the economy, and the attraction of foreign 
investment. At the same time, Salgado (1992: 38) lamented that "the Quito Protocol ... 
took away from the original Cartagena Agreement all the aspects that made it the 
quintessence of a Latin American version of economic integration."
Salgado was referring to the loss of primacy of industrial programming, to the 
relaxed rules on the common treatment of foreign investment, and to the watering down 
of the formation of the Andean market. All existing mechanisms were made more 
flexible, important obligations were abolished, some deadlines were eliminated, while 
others were reset, "facilitat[ing] the return to legality with regard to the existing 
obligations..." (Vacchino and Solares, 1992: 5).
In the case of the tariff reduction program, the Quito Protocol, and the transition 
program approved by Decision 225, allowed the continuing existence of non-tariff 
barriers under the guise of bilateral "managed trade," and under three new forms of trade 
safeguards (INTAL, 1990a: 92; JUNAC, 1988b: 7; EIU, 1992b: 42).1 There was no 
deadline for completion of the tariff reduction program.
The Protocol also meant the replacement of the Sectoral Programs of Industrial 
Development by three new forms of industrial integration,2 which in practice led to the 
demise of industrial programming. The common treatment of foreign investment was
‘"In the Transition Program the member countries gave legal coverage to their violations ... Safeguards 
became automatic and unilateral, and the non-tariff barriers were given an indefinite time to be lifted. ... 
The only real effect of the Quito Protocol was to mutilate the [Andean] Liberalization Program through 
managed trade" (Puyo, 1989: 31).
2They were an industrial integration program, industrial complementation agreements, and industrial 
integration projects. See chapter VI, section 2.3 for details of these new modalities of industrial 
programming.
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made even more flexible and less common. "In other words, given the impossibility of 
achieving an Andean production zone ... governments opted explicitly ... to concentrate 
efforts on trade liberalization ..." (Rodriguez: 1988: 127). The objective was to achieve 
international competitiveness and efficiency as an indispensable condition of guaranteeing 
subregional integration, which meant leaving behind the import substitution model 
(JUNAC, 1991: 7).
The Andean presidents (JUNAC, 1991b: 105-133) explicitly stated that the 
creation of a common market was the Andean Group’s new long-term objective. The 
means to achieve this objective were: the establishment of a free trade zone, and of a 
customs union; the progressive harmonization of economic policies; the gradual 
liberalization of the movements of capital, people and services; physical, and border 
integration; activities to further competitiveness and technological development; as well 
as cooperation in specific foreign policy issues. The main mechanisms in the economic 
sphere were: the tariff reduction program, a common external tariff, and gradual and 
narrowly defined economic policy harmonization.3
From the above it is possible to assert that the new aims of the Andean Group 
were: the primacy of market mechanisms, export-oriented industrialization, and a greater 
role of foreign investment. The main mechanisms to be used in the GRAN to achieve 
these aims were: the tariff reduction program, a common external tariff, and a minimum 
policy harmonization.
original long-term objective, although never explicitly stated (see chapter III, section 5.1) was the 
creation of an economic union; that is an integration in which policy harmonization and common planning 
were essential as opposed to a long-term aim in which limited policy harmonization and no common 
planning was considered.
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1.3.- Factors influencing the Andean economic integration process from 1987 to 1995
The Quito Protocol signed in May 1987, was not an isolated fact but part of the 
reinvigoration of economic integration movements in the world. Since the mid-1980s, 
there has been a renewed interest in pursuing some form of economic integration, either 
at regional or subregional levels.4
For Latin America, including the Andean countries, the end of the Cold War and 
the disappearance of the Soviet bloc brought, among other things, the cessation of the 
civil wars in Central America, and a growing concern about the need to reverse its 
increasing marginality in both the international polity and the international economy (see 
table VH.l).5 The adoption of market oriented policies, opening of their economies to 
global trade, reduction of the role of the state, and economic integration were means to 
increase the efficiency needed to reverse trade, production, investment and technological 
marginality (INTAL, 1990a: 36; Rico, 1992: 61).
4Besides MERCOSUR (mentioned in chapter VI, footnote 31 new integration processes aiming mostly 
to establish free trade zones in Latin America, are the agreements between Colombia and Venezuela; 
Mexico and Chile; Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela, also known as the Group of Three or G-3; Argentina 
and Chile; Chile and Venezuela; Mexico with Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras; 
Colombia and Venezuela with the Central American Common Market; Venezuela and CARICOM (a non- 
reciprocal free trade zone for Caribbean products); Colombia and CARICOM. In July 1994, twenty-five 
countries surrounding the Caribbean Sea established the Association of Caribbean States. It began to 
function in August 1995. It is composed of the Caribbean islands, the nations of Central and South America 
bordering the Caribbean, Guyana, Suriname, and French Guiana.
5"... during the 1980s ... [w]ith an annual rate of growth of 1.2 percent; a decrease in per-capita 
product of 1.0 percent; and an annual decrease in investment of 4.3 percent, and of the terms of trade by 
3.1 percent, Latin America confronts a real process of increasing marginalization in the world economy" 
(Rico, 1992: 60).
"... the challenge was no longer dependencia but something worse, prescindencia: the rich 
countries were largely ignoring the Third World, including Latin America" (Berryman, 1995: 113).
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TABLE V n.l
LATIN AMERICA’S SHARE OF WORLD TOTALS (%)
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
GDP 6.0 7.0 7.5 6.8 6.4
Foreign direct investment 10.3 15.2 11.8 8.1 5.8
Credit 3.0 12.0 4.7 2.9 3.6
Exports 5.7 5.7 5.5 5.3 3.8
Imports 5.7 6.3 5.8 3.9 3.1
SOURCE: Martinez, 1992: 57
At the same time, changes in the international economic system caused by the 
weakening of the dollar, the increasing protectionism of the developed countries,6 
President Bush’s proposal for a Western Hemispheric free trade area,7 the need to 
coordinate positions in GATT’s the Uruguay Round, the democratization process, and 
the shift to outward oriented development strategies, were additional factors leading to 
the revival of the Andean integration process (Hirst: 1992: 19-20).
Most of the Andean governments, due to their external debt problem, found out
6"... in the results of the international business cycle survey, "Economic Survey International" (ESI) 
published in January 1991 ... the majority of the experts consulted in Latin America expect increased 
protectionism on the part of the USA in the next five years, ..." (Brand, 1991: 289).
For a recent study on American protectionism see: US Barriers to Latin American and Caribbean 
Exports 1994. New York: United Nations, Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean, 
1995. LC/G 1861, LC/WAS/L.28.
7In June 1990, President Bush proposed new economic relations with Latin America through the 
"Enterprise for the Americas." It contained the creation of a free trade area from Anchorage to Tierra del 
Fuego; to encourage American investment in the region; and to reduce the external debt (INTAL, 1991: 
8-9). This program was revived during the first summit meeting of presidents of the Americas since 1967, 
held in Miami in December 1994. It was agreed, as one of the eight initiatives, to create a hemispheric free 
trade zone by the year 2005 (LAWR, WR-94-49, December 22, 1994: 577).
"In order to create appropriate conditions for the realization of the Bush plan, the Latin American 
countries have, ..., increased their integration efforts" (Brand, 1991: 287).
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that they had to follow the advice of the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund (Green, 1995: Chapter 2). This meant neo-liberal policies such as the unilateral 
opening of their economies. Under these circumstances, the Andean Pact could be used 
by the member countries as a springboard,8 and as a safety net.9 By focusing on an 
accelerated Andean trade liberalization process, the member countries would be able to 
increase their exports to each other. By lowering import tariffs to non-members, trade 
diversion would be reduced and the competitiveness needed to conquer the international 
market would be improved. The expanded market would provide some safeguard against 
the increasing protectionism of the industrialized world, "to develop their potentials in 
an uncertain and fiercely competitive international economy" (Rosenthal, 1993: 18).
Integration with the international economy and within the region was then seen 
as complementing each other (Fauriol, 1993: 3; Rosenthal, 1993: 13, 18) rather than 
being mutually exclusive.10 The increase of exports and competitiveness became the 
immediate goals (Fuentes and Villanueva, 1989: 15-17; Esser, 1989: 18; Lahera, 1992; 
Massad, 1989: 102-105; Pena: 1990: 8; Weintraub, 1993: 10).
8"... integration could be an efficient springboard for attaining integration into the world market ..." 
(INTAL, 1992: 22).
"... the regional market should be a mean to increase exports to extra-regional zones as part of 
the strategy of international integration,...” (ECLA, 1991: 21).
"... the Andean market is perceived by many entrepreneurs as a secondary and temporary arena 
vis-a-vis the world markets ... the subregional integration process is the arena to facilitate integration with 
the rest of the world" (Schuldt and Urriola, 1991: 129).
’"... integration ... offers a way of diversifying risk in an international economy that is rife with 
uncertainty" (Rosenthal, 1993: 13)
"This new form of integration was called "open regionalism." There is a growing literature on this new 
phenomenon. See for example: Baumann, 1995; Bekerman, 1993; Cardenas, 1994; ECLA, 1994a; de Melo 
and Panagariya (eds.), 1993; Flores, 1995; Fuentes, 1991; Lahera, 1992; 1992a; Massad, 1989; Palacios 
1995; Porta, 1993; Robson, 1993; Salazar, 1990; Salgado, 1991; SELA, 1992; Ventura, 1995.
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At the Andean domestic level, the asynchronous replacement of the import 
substitution strategy of development by an export-oriented strategy, allowed the Andean 
countries to have new shared aims to revitalize economic integration." The revival, 
however, also recognized that the existing approach to integration failed to expand intra- 
Andean trade and to form a subregional market. This led to a new and more pragmatic 
concept of integration as an open, flexible process of economic cooperation for the 
purposes of expanding trade and creating conditions for increased competitiveness in 
world markets (IDB, 1991: 9). The new approach (see table VII.2) basically followed 
the orthodox economic theory on economic integration, aiming to create a common 
market (ECLA, 1991: 5-6; Gana, 1991: 10-11).
Progress, however, slowed down from 1992 on due to the different speeds in 
implementing the neo-liberal approach to development by the member countries. Peru 
(and Bolivia) wanted a free trade zone without distortions (meaning full harmonization 
of policies directly affecting trade), while Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela wanted to 
go at slower pace. This, eventually, led to Peru’s temporary and partial withdrawal, in 
August 1992, in matters related to trade, policy harmonization, and negotiations with 
third countries.12 In other words, domestic factors were most important in slowing down
“ "One of the permanent difficulties GRAN was confronted with, had been the lack of shared 
commitments to common long-term objectives by the countries. This is the determining factor for a steady 
progress of the integration process" (Peiiaranda, 1990: 8). "In the last three years [1989-1992], the Andean 
Group has developed [sic] great impetus due to two fundamental factors. First, through the coincidence in 
the Member Countries’ economic policies, and secondly, through the Andean Presidents’ decision to 
directly steer and conduct the integration process" (Cardenas, 1993: 1).
l2Another plausible explanation for Peru’s behavior was that it is creating problems as a means to 
prepare its way out of the Andean Group, as voiced by Carlos Bolona, the minister of Finance (El 
Comercio, 1992b: A2).
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TABLE VII.2
ANDEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION APPROACHES: 1960s AND 1990s
1960s-1980s 1990s
END PRODUCT
Creation of common markets in the 
long-term.
Creation of common market in a very 
short period of time.
PRINCIPLES AND MECHANISMS
Basically, trade diversion through 
import substitution.
Preference for subregional trade 
creation and open trade.
Primacy of joint industrial 
programming.
No preferred sector.
Common treatment of foreign 
investments.
Equal treatment of foreign and 
domestic investments.
Special treatment to relatively less 
developed countries.
Principle of reciprocity and limited 
special treatment.
Primacy of the state and its direct 
intervention in the economy.
Market economies and primacy of the 
private sector.
PRACTICES
Multilateral trade liberalization was 
progressively replaced by bilateral 
accords.
Accelerated trade liberalization 
encompassing the whole universe of 
products.
Gradual process toward adopting a 
common external tariff with high levels 
and with many rates, and the adoption 
of a common minimum external tariff.
Rapid process toward adopting a 
common external tariff with low levels 
and with few different tariff rates.
Increasing proliferation of non-tariff 
barriers.
Rapid elimination of all non-tariff 
barriers.
Integration limited basically to 
products.
Integration expanded to services.
Economic policy harmonization was 
agreed but never pursued.
Limited economic policy harmonization 
is expected.
SOURCE: Adapted from ECLA, 1991: 3-4.
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the recent progress of the Andean process, but these factors have not been powerful 
enough to stagnate it.
2.- MAIN ASPECTS OF THE ANDEAN INTEGRATION PROCESS BETWEEN 
1987 AND 1995
2.1.- The presidential summit meetings
The phase of regression in which the Andean Group was immersed was replaced 
not by a phase of progress but by one of stagnation after the Quito Protocol was signed. 
By May 1988, all the member countries had ratified the protocol. The entry into force 
of the protocol, however, did not make the governments comply with the laxer rules they 
had agreed upon.
From 1989 to the end of 1991, progress was swift due mainly to the meetings of 
the Andean presidents.13 They held nine meetings in this three-year period. Three of
13The Andean presidents got together in Caracas (February 1989), for the first time since December 
1983, on the occasion of the swearing in of Carlos Andres Perez as President of Venezuela. In this meeting 
the presidents decided to participate directly in the integration process. This personal involvement imitated 
the example set before by the summit meetings of the Group of Eight, and of the presidents of the 
MERCOSUR countries. These meetings had shown that high level reunions were needed to solve the 
impasses arisen at the lower levels which had prevented furthering the integration process elsewhere. 
Several other reasons also explain the need for presidential leadership to accelerate the Andean integration 
process from 1989 on. First, the potential beneficial impact of President Bush’s proposal of the "Enterprise 
for the Americas" made in June 1990. Second, the revitalization and acceleration of the integration 
processes all over the world, especially the European Community and MERCOSUR. Third, the increasing 
similarities of the Andean countries’ economic development strategies and economic policies. Fourth, the 
creation of continental trading blocs such as NAFTA, APEC and ASEAN. Fifth, the increasing 
protectionism in the industrialized world. Sixth, the delays in the negotiations of GATT’s Uruguay Round. 
And, seventh, the belief that the Andean process was still a relevant tool to help the countries dealing with 
their economic crises, furthering economic development and reducing their marginalization in the 
international economic system.
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these meetings were the most important: Galapagos, Ecuador in December 1989; La Paz, 
Bolivia in November 1990; and Cartagena, Colombia in December of 1991.14 During 
these years, the Commission became a rubber stamp of presidential decisions accorded 
in advance by the ministers of foreign relations. From 1992 onwards the presidents’ 
meetings were suspended and the process slowed down because of the different speeds 
and depths with which the member countries were liberalizing their economies.
Besides the accords to create a common market (detailed below), the presidents 
declared in several of the meetings that the Andean process was a political endeavor. For 
example, in February 1989 (in their first meeting), the presidents proclaimed that 
"Subregional integration ... besides being an economic project is a political, social and 
cultural task" (JUNAC, 1991b: 11). In the following meeting (May 1989) they 
recognized "that the Andean integration is a comprehensive process aimed at ... the 
achievement of the shared objectives of the member states ... for which is required an 
adequate harmonization of the legitimate interests of each one of the member countries" 
(JUNAC, 1991b: 15, italics added).
a) The "Strategic Design," Galapagos, December 1989
The most important and detailed document issued by the Andean presidents setting
l4The other six meetings were: (1) Caracas, Venezuela, when President Carlos Andres Perez took 
power. A "Joint Declaration" was signed. (2) Cartagena, Colombia, in May of 1989; the presidents signed 
the "Manifesto of Cartagena." (3) Machu Picchu, Peru, May 1990; the Andean Presidential Council was 
created. (4) Lima, Peru, in July of 1990 when President Alberto Fujimori took power. The presidents 
decided that President’s Bush "Enterprise for the Americas," should be carefully studied. (5) August, 1990, 
Bogota, Colombia, when the Colombian president Cesar Gaviria Trujillo assumed office; they adopted a 
"Declaration on Enterprise for the Americas." (6) Caracas, Venezuela, May 1991. The "Caracas 
Declaration" was signed.
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the new aims of the Andean process and the relevant mechanisms was the "Strategic 
Design for the Orientation of the Andean Group" (JUNAC, 1991b: 35-78), approved in 
Galapagos, Ecuador, in December 1989. The Design changed the process drastically, 
setting the path for the reactivation of the Andean Group (Lora, 1992: 167; Gonzalez, 
1992: 71). Even more important, "politically, ..., economic integration became guided 
by a Strategic Design which adapted the original [Andean] approach to the new national 
policies and the current world environment" (Serrano, Sanz and Gabaldon, 1991: 7).
The Strategic Design was based on the assumption that the Andean integration 
was still a valid instrument to cooperate with the development of the Andean countries. 
According to the Andean presidents, integration was possible at that moment because the 
economic policies of the member countries coincided in fundamental aspects.
The Design had two main objectives: the consolidation of the Andean economic 
area, and to improve the Andean Group’s integration with the rest of the world. The first 
objective was viewed as contributing to the development of competitiveness within the 
subregion, as a springboard for conquering other markets, as a means to use resources 
more efficiently, and as a way to share the costs of scientific and technological 
development. The second objective would increase the negotiating power of the Andean 
Pact as an economic bloc, and would improve Andean competitiveness in the world. In 
other words, the presidents changed the Andean Group model, making it not only 
compatible with but reinforcing international integration.
The creation of a common market was the practical way to achieve these 
objectives. Therefore, the presidents decided, as a first step, to create a customs union
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by 1999 (thus, de facto, restoring deadlines into the Cartagena Agreement); and a gradual 
liberalization of the movement of capital and labor.
b) The "Act of La Paz," La Paz, November 1990
The presidents met for the seventh time in La Paz, Bolivia, in November of 1990. 
They approved the Act of La Paz (JUNAC, 1991b: 105-133). The most important accord 
(from which Ecuador abstained)15 was the decision to accelerate trade integration. The 
basis for this acceleration was the increasing convergence of the economic policies of the 
member countries. All the governments pursued greater efficiency and competitiveness 
of their economies through liberalization and opened them to foreign trade and 
investment. They also implemented an economic program based on private initiative, 
fiscal discipline, and a restructured and efficient state (JUNAC, 1991b: 107).
Deadlines to fully implement the tariff reduction program and CET were 
shortened from 1999 to 1995. Measures were also agreed upon to speed-up policy 
harmonization, to relax the common treatment of foreign investment, and to begin easing 
the movement of people. These measures meant that "State planning and sectoral 
programming [were] abandoned and replaced by the market, ..." (ECLA, 1992: 29).
15"The Ecuadorean reservations had been a major stumbling bloc during the discussion at the summit, 
with Botja’s [the president of Ecuador] counterparts refusing to accept a ‘twin-track’ solution that would 
allow Ecuador to move forward at a slower pace. In the event Ecuador was given six months [until June 
1991] in which to decide whether or not it would go along with the measure" (AGR, RA-90-10, December 
20, 1990: 1).
"There is a fear in influential circles that Ecuador’s highly protected industrial sector will not 
withstand the strong competition from the partner countries—especiily Venezuela—after the trade barrier 
are removed" (Brand, 1991: 293).
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c) The "Act of Barahona," Cartagena, December 1991
The last presidential meeting was on December 1991, in Cartagena, Colombia. 
They signed the Act of Barahona (JUNAC, 1991m). They agreed that the tariff reduction 
program should be accomplished by January 1993, and that Ecuador would do it by July 
1994. The CET would be approved in the same month and applied as of January 1992. 
They also agreed that by January 1993, subsidies of exports should be eliminated.
Without precedent was the accord of the presidents on specific issues about the 
CET detailed in section 2.4. The Commission, however, was unable to agree on the CET 
by the end of December 1991, and the first crucial deadline of this phase was not met 
which marked the slow down of the process.
The accords the presidents made in these nine meetings, not only gave the Andean 
Group a new aim, the creation of a common market, but also touched on other areas; 
such as policy harmonization, common treatment of foreign investment, industrial 
programming, transportation, agriculture, services, infrastructure, border integration, and 
last, but not least, common foreign policy positions. Most of the agreements were made 
in order to allow for free competition.16
2.2.- The tariff reduction program
The Quito Protocol, in practice, made the process of the tariff reduction program 
to have infinite existence, since some products would be exempt forever from this
16Case in point were the accords on infrastructure and transportation. A coordinated improvement in 
these areas aimed to reduce the costs of transportation (e.g., road repairs), and the delays and additional 
costs due to the lack of adequate infrastructure (e.g., pons).
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process. In May 1987, concomitant to the approval of the protocol, a transition program 
(Decision 225) was also adopted. It spelled out the procedures to eliminate the existing 
violations. The program would be in place until the Quito Protocol entered into force, 
then all the violations would be immediately eliminated. The Protocol went into effect 
in May 1988 but violations continued. Bolivia and Ecuador did not begin their tariff 
reduction process in 1988 as stipulated in the new Cartagena Agreement. Between 1987 
and 1989, little progress was made to fulfill the new obligations because of the difficult 
economic circumstances of several member countries.
As a result of the summit meetings the tariff reduction program quickly 
progressed. Bolivia and Ecuador began their tariff reduction processes, and non-tariff 
barriers and violations of the tariff reduction program were reduced. The presidents 
successively shortened the deadline to create the free trade zone from December 1999 
to January 1993 (see table VII.3).17
The presidential accords were formalized by the Commission. After the end of 
the presidential meetings (December 1991), the Commission regained its importance. Its 
Decision 324 (August 1992) moved forward the deadline to create the Andean free trade 
zone from July 1994 to February 1993.
Peru, however, did not vote, nor participate in the free trade zone, because in 
August 1992 the Commission agreed to suspend its participation in the negotiations of 
trade issues until December 1993. The main reasons for Pern’s withdrawal were its
l7In the meeting in Cartagena, Colombia, in early December of 1991, the presidents decided to create 
the free trade area by January 1993. Ecuador (which was lagging behind the application of neo-liberal 
policies), would join by July 1994. At the summit of In November of 1990 (La Paz, Bolivia), Ecuador was 
already allowed to begin trade liberalization by January 1992.
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TABLE VII.3












ANDEAN TRADE LIBERALIZATION PRO GRAM
AUTOMATIC TARIFF REDUCTION
BEGINS: Col, Peru, Ven Dec. 1970 Not appl. Not appl. Not appl.
Bolivia Nov. 1988 Dec 1991 Dec 1990 Not appl.
Ecuador Nov. 1988 Dec 1989 Jan 1992 5/ Not appl.
ENDS: Col, Peru, Ven Dec. 1983 Not appl. Not appl. Not appl.
Bolivia Sine die Dec 1995 Dec 1991 Dec 1991
Ecuador Sine die Dec 1995 Jul 1992 5/ Jul 1992
ELIMINATION OF THE LIST OF EXCEPT! ONS
BEGINS: Col, Peru, Ven Dec 1993 Dec 1991 Dec 1990 Not appl.
Bolivia Dec 1997 Dec 1995 Dec 1990 Not appl.
Ecuador Dec 1997 Dec 1995 Dec 1992 Dec 1992
ENDS: Col, Peru, Ven Dec 1995 Dec 1993 Dec 1991 Dec 19917/
Bolivia Dec 1999 Dec 1997 Dec 1991 Dec 1991
Ecuador Dec 1999 Dec 1997 Dec 1994 Jul 1992
RESIDUAL: Col, Peru, Ven Sine die 1/ Dec 1995 3/ Dec 1995 3/ Jan 1993 3/
Bolivia Sine die 21 Dec 1999 4/ Dec 1995 4/ Jan 1993 4/
Ecuador Sine die 2/ Dec 1999 4/ Dec 1995 4/ Jul 1994 4/
MANAGED TRADE
80 % reduction of the lists Not appl. Dec 1990 Not appl. Not appl.
Elimination Dec 1997 Dec 1991 Dec 1990 6/ Not appl.
Reserve list for Industrial 
Programming
Not appl. May 1990 




FULL FORMATION OF 
THE FREE TRADE ZONE Sine die Dec 1999 Dec 1995 Jul 1994
\ j  Up to 75 dutiable items could be kept in the unilateral list of exemptions of each country. 
2/ Up to 180 dutiable items could be kept in the unilateral list of exemptions.
3/ Up to 50 dutiable items could be kept in the unilateral list of exemptions.
4/ Up to 100 dutiable items could be kept in the unilateral list of exemptions.
5/ Accord reached in May 1991, Acta de Caracas (JUNAC, 19911: 2).
6/ Ecuador: July 1991. Accord reached in May 1991, Acta de Caracas (JUNAC, 19911: 2). 
7/ Peru: July 1992.
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increasing trade deficit originated by its overvalued currency, and its inability to make 
other members support policy harmonization (see section 4.3 below). More importantly, 
through this decision Peru revoked tariff reductions (which were irreversible according 
to Article 45 of the Cartagena Agreement), and negotiated bilateral agreements with the 
other members which would provide free access to a limited number of items only.
In April 1994, through Decision 353, Peru agreed to gradually rejoin the tariff 
reduction process. By December 1994 Peru was to reduce its tariffs for a large number 
of products.18 The remaining products would follow suit provided that there was 
substantial progress in the harmonization of the different policies and mechanisms 
directly related to trade. The reintegration of Peru, however, was postponed twice. 
According to Decision 377, adopted in June 1995, January 1996 was the latest deadline.
The free trade zone is not a reality because Peru still has to complete its tariff 
reduction.
2.3.- The external tariff
a) The common external minimum tariff (CMET)
The common external minimum tariff (CMET) continued its existence for a much
18Peru did apply these tariff reductions to Colombia and Venezuela, based on simultaneity and 
reciprocity. Ecuador delayed its tariff reduction in favor of Peru. With the conflict between them during 
the first quarter of 1995, all plans to grant each other tariff reductions were shelved. Border disputes like 
this, and the one in January 1981, did not have dire consequences beyond delaying for a while meetings 
of the Commission and disrupting border trade. In any case they were in no way as disruptive as the July 
1969 "Soccer War" between Honduras and El Salvador which accelerated the collapse of the Central 
American Common Market leading it to a profound crisis of this process (Fagan, 1970: 1; Lizano, 1982: 
255).
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longer time than expected because the CET was not approved until November 1994.19 
Its level and range, however, were reduced after the Quito Protocol by Decisions 260 
(February 1990), 273 (November 1990), and 309 (September 1991). Decision 309 
lowered the average from 13.7 percent (as already reduced by Decision 273) to 7.9 
percent; decreased the number of levels from 7 to 5; reduced the maximum level from 
30 to 20 percent; and raised the minimum from 0 to 5 percent (JUNAC, 1991: 5).
The modifications aimed at making the CMET more similar to the tariff levels 
the member countries were adopting, and by so doing, reduced the violations of this 
mechanism. These changes also aimed at fulfilling the presidents accords, who in May 
1989, ordered the CMET to be "revised and adapted to the present needs of the 
subregion" through "the substantial reduction and simplification of the CMET [to be 
accomplished] by the first quarter of 1990" (JUNAC, 1991b: 18, 50).
b) The common external tariff (CET)
The Quito Protocol did not set any deadline for the approval of the CET,20 
because "it has been one of the most difficult problems to deal with in the subregion" 
(Aninat, 1992: 21). As in the case of the tariff reduction program, the president set a 
deadline and successively shortened it December 1999 to January 1992 (see table VII.4).
'T he CMET was a transitional device to give time to adopt the CET by December 1975. It was easily 
approved in December 1970, because it allowed the countries to set any tariff above the minimum agreed 
upon.
“ The present article 62 of the Cartagena Agreement, dealing with the CET, reads: "At the Junta's 
proposal, the Commission will approve the Common External Tariff which should provide adequate levels 
of protection to subregional production, taking into account the agreement’s objective of gradual 
harmonization of the diverse economic policies of the member countries" (JUNAC, 1988: 33).
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TABLE VII 4














APPROVAL Sine die Dec 1992 Dec 1991 Dec 1991
FULL IMPLEMENTATION: 
Col, Peru, Ven Not appl. Dec 1997 Dec 1993 Jan 1992
Bolivia and Ecuador Not appl. Dec 1999 Dec 1995 Jan 1992
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE 
ANDEAN CUSTOMS 
UNION
Not appl. Dec 1999 Dec 1995 Jan 1992
An important internal factor influencing the acceleration of the adoption of the 
CET was the increasing similarities in tariff policies. Governments were reducing tariff 
rates and simplifying tariff structure (see tables VII.5 and VII.6).
Given the successive reductions of the time span to adopt and implement the CET, 
in September 1991 the Junta presented preliminary ideas on this topic (JUNAC, 1991c), 
and later presented proposals 245 , 245/Mod 1, 245/Mod 2 suggesting three levels of 
tariffs, and only 10 percentage points difference between each level. The Commission 
was unable to agree on these, and other issues related to the proposal on the CET. In the 
meeting in early December 1991, in Cartagena, Colombia, the presidents agreed on the 
specifics of the CET.21
21The CET would have four levels: 5, 10, 15 and 20 percent until January 1994, when the 20 percent 
level would be eliminated. Bolivia’s current tariffs of 5 and 10 percent required no change. Automobiles 
were granted a 40 percent special tariff. The application of a common tariff on products not produced in 
the subregion could be deferred until the beginning of their production. A list of products with zero tariff, 
and another with 5 percent were to be adopted. Finally, a flexible tariff system would be applied to some 
agricultural products.
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Later in that month, the Commission met but could reach no accord. Peru and 
Bolivia supported a CET containing only the four tariff levels agreed upon by the 
presidents.22 Colombia and Venezuela argued that the other criteria should be included, 
and declared that by March 1992 they would unilaterally apply a CET based on the 
presidential accords and the Junta’s latest proposal.23 The missed the deadline 
constituted a major factor for the slow down that ensued, especially after the temporary 
and partial withdrawal of Peru in August 1992.
In February 1992 the Commission made some progress but was unable to approve 
the CET because of the unexpected request of Ecuador to apply a lower tariff24 for 
1,022 customs items.25 Colombia and Venezuela decided to immediately apply the CET 
they had agreed on beforehand. Ecuador, for its part, announced that it would soon 
modify its tariff structure to make it more similar to the Junta’s proposal, and the special 
regime this country had requested. It did so by May 1992.
-"On the CET Peru was pressing for the simplest, lowest and speediest formula, while others were 
holding out for higher initial levels and slower transition. ... On export subsidies, Peru was alone in 
pressing for the other to emulate its own decision to eliminate them completely" (LAWR, WR-91-49, 19 
December, 1991: 4).
23This decision became unavoidable after ”[t]he Presidents of Colombia and Venezuela, the two major 
partners of the Andean Group, ... agreed ... in January 1992 ... on a [bilateral] C ET..." (LAWR, WR-92- 
06, February 13, 1992: 9).
24"The principal obstacle to the adoption of the CET by some countries is probably the tariff increase 
for basic products ... once this conflict is solved the other problem is to adopt a CET which fits all 
interests" (Abusada, 1991: 17).
25In this issue, Colombia was willing to allow Ecuador only 5 percentage points above or below the 
CET, and Peru proposed that 50 percent of the list would be left to Ecuador to set tariffs while for the rest 
the tariff should be negotiated (Integration Latinoamericana, 1992: 57).
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The CET was vetoed by Peru in the Commission’s June 1992 meeting,26 and 
thereafter abstained. The other countries, however, were not able to agree, although 
progress was reported.27 Two "incomplete" decisions were approved: Decision 324 on 
August 1992, and Decision 335 on March 1993, but the implementation of the CET was 
postponed three times. Finally, in November 1994, the Commission approved Decision 
370 on the CET (Comision, 1994b). The structure approved was: 5 percent for raw 
materials, 10-15 percent for semi-manufactured goods, and 20 percent for finished goods. 
The average of the CET was 13.5 percent (JUNAC, 1995: 2, 1995a: 6-7). All the special 
treatments agreed to by the presidents, and more, were included in Decision 370 
(LAWR, WR-94-47, December 8, 1994: 562; AGR, RA-94-10, December 22, 1994: 1; 
JUNAC, 1995: 2-3; 1995a: 6-7; 1995d: 8-9).28 The CET was implemented in February 
1995 by Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela only.
:6Peru argued that "the draft decision ... establishes several "Common External Tariffs," there were 
too many products exempt from the general rules, and it did not follow the political guidelines agreed by 
the Andean presidents ..." (Comision: 1992:4). The deeper reason was that the Junta's proposal was quite 
different from Peru’s tariff goals of a single level of 15 percent. In the same session, Peru also vetoed the 
Junta's proposal on the acceleration of tariff reduction among the Andean countries and on trade policy 
harmonization. In casting its negative vote, Peru stated that "the free trade zone, the common external tariff 
and the harmonization o f export policies should be dealt together by the Commission since these are 
interrelated issues" (ibid.: 5). Casting two vetoes in a single meeting of the Commission was without 
precedent. In this case meant that the CET and the creation of the free trade zone were postponed.
27"... the Commission having made important progress on the Common External Tariff, decided to 
continue to consider the issue in its next meeting" (Comision, 1992a: 4).
”... there were a 87 percent consensus and 13 percent discrepancies among Colombia, Ecuador 
and Venezuela..." (Comision, 1994: 4).
"... the Junta ... stressed the important progress reached [on the CET]" (Comision, 1994a: 3).
28There were special treatments for Bolivia and Ecuador, for automobiles, for agricultural products, 
for items related to health, education and mass media, and for products not being currently produced in 
the subregion. In case of temporary scarcity, countries could lower their tariffs to 5 percent, and to zero 
percent if the scarcity lasts more than 6 months. In addition, for 4 years Colombia, Venezuela, and 
Ecuador could apply their national tariffs to 230 items for the first two countries, and to 400 items for 
Ecuador. In each of the first three years these countries should reduce their lists by 50 items; and in the 
fourth year they should eliminate the rest.
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By 1995 no unique and all encompassing CET was in existence. Peru and Bolivia 
were applying their national tariffs; while Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela were 
applying a common tariff to only 44 percent of the dutiable items. For most of the other 
items countries were free to apply any tariff.
Adopting the CET was again the most contentious issue in the Andean process. 
Its protracted negotiation led to the slow down of the process. The similarities of the 
member countries’s foreign trade policies and of their tariff levels were not enough to 
reach an agreement.29 Different economic performances, different rhythms in adopting 
neo-liberal policies, especially reducing tariff and the number of rates (see tables VII.5 
and VH.6), and different effects of economic policies pursued, led to these difficulties. 
Countries with more open and liberal economies like Peru and Bolivia, demanded a quick 
harmonization of economic policies in order to reduce the negative effects of their 
asynchronous and dissimilar application. Countries with a less liberal approach, 
Colombia, Venezuela and Ecuador, wanted to maintain some interventionist economic 
policies which gave them undue advantages.
More specifically, the aforementioned considerations meant that Peru was not 
willing to provide more protection to Andean products than it allowed to its own. 
Countries, however, were not willing to relinquish control of this fundamental policy tool 
(Penaranda, 1990: 12),30 unless the CET reflected very closely the present and potential
J9"... it is expected that an external tariff scheme [with low and relatively uniform levels] will be 
difficult to adopt even though it could have ample political support in each one of the member countries’’ 
(Abusada, 1991: 15).
30"... a common external tariff... means ceding some sovereignty with regard to the .... protection of 
national production in each one of the member countries” (Gana, 1991: 16).
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TABLE VII.5
TARIFF AVERAGE IN THE ANDEAN GROUP: 1986-1992








1986 19.99 46.08 38.54 63.53 31.44
1987 19.99 48.04 39.23 67.46 33.59
1988 18.85 48.20 39.22 70.36 33.59





















1993 9.80 11.60 11.94 16.30 11.80
\J November 11, 1991 
2/ May 28, 1992
(*) Average without tariff surcharges. 
SOURCES: JUNAC, 1992: 3; 1994c: 26.
future tariffs of the member countries.
2.4.- Industrial programming
The Quito Protocol replaced the Sectoral Programs of Industrial Development 
with three forms of industrial programming: industrial integration program, industrial 
complementation agreements, and industrial integration projects.31 In the implementation
3lSee chapter VI, footnote 38.
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TABLE VII.6





Bolivia Colombia Ecuador Peru Venezuela
0 29 24 118
2 1,014
5 1,799 256 2,554 957 2,371
7 54
10 769 6,013 1,124 1,128 1,123
12 5
15 2,088 1,800 667 4,766 1,706
20 1,545 1,534 975 1,645





Total 6,201 6,269 7,081 6,536 6,482 6,976
Average 12.72% 9.80% 11.79% 15.51% 17.65% 11.74%
Number 
of levels 4 2 7 13 2 6
SOURCE: JUNAC, 1992a: 2.
of these new forms market forces and entrepreneurial initiatives would play a more 
important role than planning (JUNAC, 1991: 8; ECLA, 1992: 27; Garay, 1990: 93).
In practice, little was done from 1987 on with regard to industrial programming. 
The Automobile Program was abrogated by Decision 223 (May 1987), and also the
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Fertilizers Program by Decision 303 (July 1991).32 Industrial programming in any of 
its forms ceased to exist when the Commission, in March 1993, adopted the "first 
incomplete" CET through Decision 335. Article 11 of this decision abrogates, among 
others, all the decisions concerning industrial programs.33 The CET and market 
mechanisms now determine industrial production in the subregion.
2.5.- Common treatment of foreign capital
The influx of private foreign capital became crucial to aid the Andean goals of 
modernization, increasing efficiency and competitiveness, and acquiring new 
technologies. In the Andean summit of November 1990, La Paz, Bolivia, it was agreed 
"to remove obstacles to foreign investment ... especially with regard to the access of 
foreign enterprises to the advantages of the expanded market" (JUNAC, 1991b: 110). 
The common treatment of foreign investment, Decision 220, was modified by Decision 
291 (March 1991) which made "such treatment more flexible and ... adapted it to the 
Member Countries’ policy of opening up to the world" (Cardenas, 1993: 9).
Decision 291 provided that treatment of foreign capital be the same as that applied 
to domestic capital. Article 2 of Decision 291 stated that foreign investors have the same 
rights and duties as national investors unless national legislation states differently. As a
“ In May 1989, at the presidents’ insistence the existing Sectoral Programs of Industrial Development 
(Metalworking, Petrochemical and Siderurgy) were transformed into Industrial Integration Programs 
(Decisions 296, 299 and 300) in May 1991, but they were not implemented.
“The only remaining program is the industrial complementation agreement among Colombia, Ecuador, 
and Venezuela (November 1993) related to automobiles. It is paradoxical that the last industrial program 
to be approved (Decision 120, September 1977) and the first to be abolished (Decision 223, May 1987), 
is now the only existing form of industrial programming.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
318
consequence there were no more limits to profit remittances or reinvestment, and no 
more obligation to nationalize the enterprise (that is, to sell the majority of their assets 
to nationals). There was, also, equal access to domestic credit, and governments were 
free to compete among themselves to attract investment. "In other words, with regard to 
foreign investment full authority ... returned to the national level" (ECLA, 1992: 31).
2.6.- Policy harmonization
The need for at least some policy harmonization became more acute the closer the 
integration process came to eliminating tariffs among the members, and the lower the 
CET was going to be. Policy harmonization prevented any government from protecting 
inefficient producers. To do otherwise would have made the increase of production 
efficiency at the Andean level secondary to the protection of domestic production.34
The Quito Protocol completely relaxed the mechanism of policy harmonization, 
and decisions related to policy harmonization were made more flexible or abrogated.35
From 1989 to 1992 the trend changed. In their summit meetings, the presidents 
first set deadlines to harmonize customs tariff exemptions, and set a cap on incentives 
to Andean exports. They also ordered the adoption of a common treatment on dumping,
34"... if the member countries really want to have stable and real free trade then they should harmonize 
key economic policies such as tariffs on third countries, exchange and fiscal policies, government 
procurement, norms of origin and of safeguards, anti-dumping surcharges, and foreign investment" (ECLA, 
1991: 24).
" ... [the] Andean Common Market implies a gradual process of harmonization of economic 
policies directly related to the functioning of the expanded m arket... to avoid distortions in competition" 
(JUNAC, 1991: 6).
“ For example, the norms to prevent distortions in trade competitiveness were made more flexible by 
Decision 230; and the common rules for industrial development were abrogated by Decision 231.
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on export subsidies, and on restrictive practices to free competition; the tightening of the 
existing Andean norms of origin of the merchandise; the elimination of tariff exemptions; 
the harmonization of export promotions measures; the adoption of a common customs 
valuation system; and the definition of guidelines for exchange and monetary policies. 
Finally, the presidents agreed on the approval of guidelines for the harmonization of 
fiscal, monetary, financial and payments, and labor policies.
Not all the presidential accords were adopted by the Commission.36 The ones 
adopted were directly related to trade or to aspects facilitating trade. In many cases, 
however, these decisions meant only the approval of general principles, or procedures, 
or a timetable to continue to debate the issue.37 No decision, however, was approved 
to harmonize other policies, such as exchange and monetary policies, but preliminary 
ideas have been exchanged and studies have been proposed.38 The basic reason for this 
lack of progress was that "the coordination of macroeconomic policies means a restriction 
of the degree of freedom to manage domestic policies, and .... to abandon part of
3<The Commission, from 1989 to 1995, approved decisions concerning a common tariff nomenclature, 
the adoption of GATT’s customs valuation system, the mechanisms to insure free competition, common 
norms about dumping and countervailing duties, and a common customs document. Decisions were also 
adopted about the elimination of customs tariff exemptions, the prohibition of export restrictions, and 
actions aiming to restrict competition, the elimination of subsidies, the harmonization of incentives for 
intrasubregional exports, and the adoption of norms of origin of merchandise (JUNAC, I992d). Other 
decisions dealt with industrial property, copyrights, and international road and air transportation of persons 
and merchandises.
37An example is the harmonization of incentives to export. Decision 330 of October 1992, approved 
with Peru’s abstention, in reality, defined only concepts, types, and forms of incentives to be harmonized. 
Until now, nothing concrete has been done.
MSee for example: JUNAC, 1992d: 6-8; 1992e; Morales, 1994; Espejo 1994; Gordillo, 1994; Pasco 
1994.
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2.7.- Trade within the Andean Group
Among the Andean countries, trade increased steadily in the two phases. Up to 
a point, then, it can be said that the hypothesis that in times of stagnation trade decreases 
at least in one year, and in times of progress it increases in all years seems not to be 
validated for the phase of stagnation, 1987-1989. A closer look at trade figures (table 
VH.7), however, shows that this is not quite so. During the phase of stagnation intra- 
Andean exports increased only by the very low rates of 4 and 7 percent in 1988 and 
1989, while imports among Andean countries increased by 1 percent in 1988 and, in 
1989 actually decreased by 10 percent. The 42 and 46 percent increases in exports and 
imports respectively in 1987 can be mostly attributed to the relative improvement of the 
Andean economies in 1986 and 1987 (see chapter VI, table VI.7, and table VII. 11), to 
the very low levels of trade reached the year before (see table VI.2), and to the fact that 
the signing of the Quito Protocol in May 1987 created new hopes in the subregion.
Between 1990 and 1994, both, Andean trade increased by 20 percent or more 
each year, and from January to September of 1995 by 42 percent (El Comercio, 1995g: 
E2).40 The rapid progress in the elimination of non-tariff barriers and in the reduction 
of tariffs were the reasons for this improvement, especially due to the full elimination of
39"With regard to policy harmonization, it is evident that members are not yet ready to relinquish 
sovereignty because they prefer their own interests instead of subregional interests" (Kisic, 1992a: 63).
■“It is important to point out that intra-Andean trade in 1990 (the first full year of the last phase of 
progress) surpassed the highest trade level attained so far (which was in 1981, just before the Andean 
Group went into accelerated regression, see table VI.2).
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TABLE VII.7
ANDEAN GROUP TRADE: 1987-1994
Phase-> | STAGNATION PROGRESS
| 1987 |_  1988 1989 1990 I 1991 1992 1993 1994
EXPORTS (FOB) (Millions of dollars)
GRAN 932.9 972.0 1,038.6 1,328.9 1,812.6 2,227.5 2,867.8 3,428.0
World 20,537.5 20,420.1 25,264.1 31,407.1 29,494.7 28,562.8 29,740.0 34,252.4
IMPORTS (CIF) (Millions of dollars)
GRAN 994.9 1,002.0 905.8 1,260.2 1,716.8 2,045.7 2,653.0 3,280.3
World 20,165.0 22,911.0 17,339.1 18,055.5 22,695.4 26,860.6 29,411.2 30,731.0
TRADE BALANCE
GRAN (62.1) (30.0) 132.9 68.7 95.9 181.8 214.8 147.7
World 372.5 (2,490.9) 7,924.9 13,351.6 6,799.3 1,702.2 328.9 3,521.4
INTRASUBREGIONAL AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TRADE
Exports 4.54 4.76 4.11 1 4.23 6.15 7.80 9.64 10.01
Imports 4.93 4.37 5.22 1 6.98 7.56 7.62 9.02 10.67
RATE OF GROWTH OF EXPORTS
GRAN 42.37 4.19 6.86 27.95 36.40 22.89 28.74 19.53
World 8.34 -0.57 23.72 24.32 -6.09 -3.16 4.12 15.17
RATE OF GROWTH OF IMPORTS
GRAN 46.11 0.71 -9.61 39.13 36.23 19.16 29.69 23.64
World 16.15 13.62 -24.32 4.13 25.70 18.35 9.50 -4.49
SOURCES: 1987-1991: JUNAC, 1994; 1993-1994: JUNAC, 1995b: 20; 1995c: 21; 1995f: 24, 26, 28, 
30, 40 and author’s calculations.
duties in Colombo-Venezuelan trade in 1992,41 and to the free trade zone formed by 
Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela at the beginning of 1993 (EIU, 1993e: 38, 
46). Another reason was the improved performance of most of the Andean economies. 
Between 1990 and 1992 the Andean Group as a whole had its highest GDP growth of this 
phase (see table V II.ll).
41Trade between Colombia and Venezuela went from $594 million in 1990 to $1.7 billion in 1994, 
increasing its sharing of total intra-Andean trade from 45 percent to 50 percent (JUNAC, 1995c: 21).
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As in the previous chapters, the first type of violations to be analyzed are those 
infringing the articles of the Cartagena Agreement. The second type of violations are 
related to the non-incorporation of decisions of the Commission by the member 
governments. Finally, the third type of non-fulfillment refers to violations of decisions 
which have already been incorporated to the domestic legal system by changes in national 
laws.
3.1.^ Violations of the Cartagena Agreement
Between the signing of the Quito Protocol (May 1987) and 1989, the violations 
of the old Cartagena Agreement continued.42 With the entry into force of the Quito 
Protocol, many of the violations of the old agreement ceased for the simple reason that 
most deadlines were abolished. Some of the remaining commitments, however, were not 
met. For example, member countries did not eliminate non-tariff restrictions to trade 
once the protocol went into force; and the tariff reduction program was not started by 
Bolivia and Ecuador in December 1988. Industrial programming continued its paralysis. 
Finally, with regard to the CET, the member countries did not deal with it. Thus, the 
situation could be characterized as one of stagnation, since there was no sign of 
diminishing violations of the Cartagena Agreement.
42"Today [October 1987] trade can be characterized by the coexistence of the multilateral order of the 
[Cartagena] Agreement with an informal scheme based ... on unilateral non-tariff restrictions and on 
bilateral accords" (JUNAC, 1987b: 22).
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The presidential accords in the summit meeting of December of 1989 meant 
stricter obligations than the commitments the member countries had agreed to in the 
Quito Protocol. It can be said, then, that after 1989 violations of the agreement ceased.
Once the presidential meetings stopped (1992), there was little progress, but there 
were no violations of the agreement. One exception was Decision 321, approved in 
August 1992. This decision dealt with the temporary cessation of Peru’s obligations with 
regard to the tariff reduction program and the CET; and its abstention from decisions in 
these areas and in policy harmonization. This meant that Peru reversed its tariff reduction 
program, and did not apply the CET or any policy harmonization decision even though, 
from the legal point of view, it would have had to comply with them.
3.2.- Failure to incorporate the Commission’s decisions into the domestic legal
systems of the member countries
During the phase of stagnation (1987-1989), nine was the maximum number of 
decisions not incorporated by the member countries into their national legislation (see 
table VH.8). This number compares favorably with its similar during the phase of 
regression, which was 24 (see table VI.3). The minimum number was 6, it, again, 
compares again favorably with the minimum number, 13, in the previous phase.43
In the present phase of progress, the maximum number of decisions not 
incorporated into the domestic legal systems of the countries dropped from 8 to zero
43The first datum (05-11-87) is repeated from table VI.3. It technically belongs not to the regression 
phase (which ended with the signing of the Quito Protocol (May 1987) but to this phase of stagnation. This 
is why, in the text above it is stated that the minimum number of decisions not incorporated during the 
previous regression phase was thirteen.
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TABLE VII.8
DECISIONS NOT INCORPORATED INTO THE DOMESTIC LEGISLATION BY 
THE MEMBER COUNTRIES, 1987-1992
















(*) Number of different decisions not incorporated into the domestic legislation one or 
more countries
SOURCES: (1) JUNAC, 1990b; (2) Ibid.; (3) JUNAC, 1989d; 1989e; (4) JUNAC, 
1989f; (5) JUNAC, 1989g; (6) JUNAC, 1990b; (7) Ibid.; (8) 
JUNAC, 1990b; (9) JUNAC, 1991d; (10) JUNAC, 1991e (11) 
JUNAC, 1991f; Abusada, 1991; (12) JUNAC, 1991g; (13) 
JUNAC, 1991h; (14) JUNAC, 1991i; (15) JUNAC, 1992.
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(June 1992 on). One explanation is "the favorable effects of the convergence of national 
policies and subregional policies ..." (Fuentes and Martinez, 1990: 22). Another reason 
for this fulfillment was the abrogation of decisions the member countries found too hard 
to comply with, or were simply not willing to do so. Between 1987 and 1994 seven 
decisions were eliminated, which more or less coincided with the maximum number of 
decisions not incorporated in the domestic legislation during this phase. A third reason 
was that the Commission postponed deadlines and modified decisions whenever it was 
apparent that the member countries were not going to fulfill their obligations.44
To summarize, as expected by the hypothesis of this research project, during the 
phase of stagnation (1987-1989) the number of decisions not incorporated into the 
national legislation was less than in the previous phase of regression (1978-1987), but 
more than in the phase of progress (1990-1995).
3.3.- Violations of decisions already incorporated into the legal systems of the 
member countries
The most relevant violations of decisions already incorporated into the domestic 
legislation of the member countries were related to not applying the agreed upon tariff 
levels. As expected in this study, during the phase of stagnation, the number of dutiable 
items violated was high (see table VII.9) although not as high as during the phase of 
regression, when it reached 5,300 items in March of 1984 (see table VI.5). The
44An example is the second decision about the CET, Decision 335, approved in March 1993. Its 
deadlines were postponed three times (Decision 350, December 1993; Decision 357, April 1994; and 
Decision 365, July 1994).
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TABLE VII.9
DUTIABLE ITEMS VIOLATED: 1987-1992
Phase Date Source BOL COL ECU PER VEN TOTAL
S 05-11-87 (1) 25 2 806 1650 1793 4276
T




11-15-88 (3) 0 108 123 325 120 576




07-18-89 (5) 139 160 395 53 315 1062
09-22-89 (6) 139 127 275 34 545 1120
N 11-10-89 (7) 139 127 275 34 354 829
P 02-28-90 (8) 138 15 275 3 224 655
R
O
03-26-90 (9) 0 15 9 3 224 251
09-21-90 (10) 11 728 339 865 1915 3858
01-16-91 (ID 0 22 319 867 1924 3132
G 03-15-91 (12) 0 28 3716 1346 1602 6692
R 05-03-91 (13) 0 0 107 1321 1555 2983
E 06-18-91 (14) 0 24 3 1347 951 2325
10-04-91 (15) 8 203 4 281 206 702
S
11-22-91 (16) 8 287 2 73 205 575
S 06-10-92 (17) 562 282 390 213 302 1749
SOURCES: (1) JUNAC, 1990b; (2) JUNAC, 1988c; (3) JUNAC, 1988d; 1988e; (4) 
JUNAC, 1990b; (5) JUNAC, 1989d; 1989e; (6) JUNAC, 1989f; (7) 
JUNAC, 1989g; (8) JUNAC, 1990b; (9) Ibid.; (10) JUNAC, 1990b; (11) 
JUNAC, 1991d; (12) JUNAC, 1991e; (13) JUNAC, 1991f; Abusada, 
1991; (14) JUNAC, 1991g; (15) JUNAC, 1991h; (16) JUNAC, 1991i; 
(17) JUNAC, 1992.
exception was the 6,300 items violated by March of 1988, which could be partially 
explained by the reduction of tariffs by the member countries, thereby increasing the
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violations of the CMET.
The number of violations steadily declined from September 1989 (after the second 
presidential summit held in May 1989), until March 1990 (after the summit meeting in 
Galapagos, Ecuador, held in December 1989). Thereafter the figures were high 
principally due to the acceleration of the tariff reduction program after each presidential 
meeting. These high numbers show, not the lack of political will, but more likely than 
not, the cumbersome domestic procedures to enact tariff reductions.45
Another reason for the high number of items violated was that the rapid reduction 
of tariffs on imports from non-member countries (see table VII.5) placed them below the 
common minimum tariff (CMET).46 Since the Junta has not reported on these issues 
from 1992 on, there is no way to know if the member countries are fulfilling these 
obligations.
The number of trade claims against the member countries among themselves, by 
the Junta and by private companies was not recorded by the Junta from 1984 (see table 
VI.4) until 1990 (see table VII. 10). By June 1984, the number of total claims had 
reached 141. Between September 1990 and June 1992 the number of total claims was 
between 2 and 13. The last figure corresponds to the last report available (June 1992).
15For example, by Decision 258 (February 1990) the member countries from May 1990 on had to 
accelerate their tariff reductions. By September 1990 the number of items violated had risen to more than 
3,800 from its record low of 251 in March 1990. These violations remained high, reached their peak of 
6,700 in March 1991 and remained high until October 1991. In between. Decision 281 (March 1991) and 
Decision 301 (July 1991) were approved accelerating again the tariff reduction process.
4<sThe CMET was reduced in February 1990 (Decision 260), and in March the number of items violated 
went down to only 251 (the lowest recorded in this phase) from 655 in February. In September 1991 the 
CMET was reduced again (Decision 309) and the violations went down to 702 items in October and to 575 
in November from 2,325 in June.
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TABLE VII. 10
CLAIM S M ADE TO:
DATE
BOLIVIA BY COLOMBIA BY ECUADOR BY 1/
C E P V J T B E P V J T B C P V J T
092190 1 1 2
011691 1 1
031591 2 2 1 1 1 1 2
050391 2 1 3
061891 2 I 3
100491 1 1
112291 1 1 1 1
061092 1 1 1 2 1 4 2 1 4
Continues below ...
TABLE VII. 10
CLAIMS MADE TO: ... (CONTINUED)
DATE
PERU EtY 2/ 3/ VENEZUELA BY
Sources
B C E V J T B C E P J T
Total
092190 1 1 3 I
011691 1 I 2 2
031591 2 2 7 3
050391 1 1 4 4
061891 1 1 2 5 5
100491 1 2 3 6
112291 1 2 2 1 3 7 7
061092 1 1 1 4 0 13 8
J =  The Junta
1/ Includes a claim made by an Ecuadorean company to the Junta against its government on 06/10/92 
2/ Includes one claim made by Peru to the Junta on 03/15/91 due to restrictions imposed by the other 
members countries as a response to the cholera outbreak in Peru.
3/ Includes a claim by a Peruvian company to the Junta against its government on 10/04/91, 11/22/91, and 
06/10/92.
SOURCES: (1) JUNAC, 1990b; (2) JUNAC, 199ld; (3) JUNAC, I991e; (4) JUNAC, 199lf; Abusada, 
1991; (5) JUNAC, 1991g; (6) JUNAC, 1991h; (7) JUNAC, 1991i; (8) JUNAC, 1992.
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The number of items affected by non-tariff barriers diminished, especially after 
the entry into force of the Quito Protocol, May 1988, and after the Andean presidents 
agreed, in May 1989 to "lift immediately and effectively all measures which prevent the 
full functioning of the [Andean] Liberalization Program, and to abstain from applying 
new unilateral restrictions" (JUNAC, 1989f: 1; 1991b: 17). In May 1987, by the time 
the Quito Protocol was adopted, there were more than 5,200 items under non-tariff 
barriers; by March 1989 the number was less than 700 (JUNAC, 1988b: 5; 1989b: 13). 
Non-tariff restrictions to intra-Andean trade were completely eliminated by 1992 as a 
result of the presidential accords.
4.- UNDERSTANDING THE PHASES OF STAGNATION AND PROGRESS
This section presents an explanation of the last nine years of the Andean economic 
integration process. This period is a composite of two phases: stagnation (1987-1989) and 
progress (1990-1995). The first three parts will deal with the factors which play a role 
in explaining both phases. The fourth part deals with an analysis of the output of the 
Commission in the form of decisions adopted between 1987 and 1994. The last two parts 
analyze the long-term aims and the economic policies of the governments, focusing on 
the extent to which they were congruent with the aims and main mechanisms of the new 
Cartagena Agreement, and of the presidential accords during the last two phases of the 
Andean process.
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4.1.- The first attempts to change economic policies in the Andean countries (1987-
1989)
The signing of the Quito Protocol was a consequence of the beginning of the 
tendency of national interests to converge again. At the same time the protocol was the 
minimum common denominator the member countries agreed upon to keep the Andean 
process alive. The denominator was to improve trade levels and to minimize obligations.
Both the Junta and the Commission worked to comply with the Quito Protocol. 
The "Transition Program" (Decision 225) approved by the Commission in May 1987, 
and the Plan of Action (June 1987) to put it into practice contained guidelines for 
gradually clearing the most egregious violations (Comision, 1987b: 3-4; JUNAC, 1987d). 
By October 1987, according to the Junta, "governments were not fulfilling some 
obligations [stated in the program] because of the economic difficulties the countries were 
going through ..." (Gutierrez, 1987: 19).
Stagnation was the outcome because the Quito protocol was signed before national 
objectives were clearly defined and during a time when economic recession was still the 
main concern.47 In these circumstances, the governments did not find much use for the 
Andean Pact,48 and violations remained. The lack of compliance proves again, as 
proposed by the hypothesis of this dissertation, that governments will pursue their
47"The lack of an explicit and clear political project setting precisely the supreme objectives of the 
subregion ... constitutes a weak flank" (Rodriguez, 1992; 12).
"... today [March 1987] there are divergent conceptions with regard to the basic guidelines for 
the strategy of development. In consequence, it is not possible to propose a new strategy of economic 
development which is applicable to the subregion, nor to pretend that integration can be based on the 
permanent similarities of die development models of the five Member Countries" (JUNAC, 1987: 14-15).
the Quito Protocol... [has not] been able to make the [Andean] group move without stumbling, 
even though its objectives have been diluted" (Salgado, 1992: 38).
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interests above and beyond any Andean commitment; and that the Andean institutions can 
do little to modify this behavior.
4.2.- The revival of the Andean Pact; The convergence of economic policies (1990- 
1992)
The same economic objectives and the very similar economic policies pursued by 
the Andean governments from 1989 on provided the basis for the revival of the Andean 
Group. The presidential meetings were the means for the acceleration of the Andean 
process. The deadlines for creating a customs union were hastened, policy harmonization 
was quickened, and some steps easing the movements of capital and labor were taken in 
order to create a common market. The leading role was taken over by the presidents. 
The Commission and the Junta were left with the task of incorporating the presidential 
accords into the Andean integration process.49
The attempt to speed up Andean integration was meant to facilitate the integration 
of the Andean countries with the international system in the short-term through trade, and 
in the medium-term through increased efficiency. Andean integration was also a tool to 
give these countries more weight in the international system. In other words, subregional 
integration was a by-product of the Andean governments’ unilateral decisions for
49"... the [Andean] institutions have been weakened. Today [1993] the Junta is a mere Secretariat, 
because its proposal capacity has been lost. In addition, there is more progress in informal meetings than 
in the meetings of the Commission. This has originated awkward situations like the Peruvian withdrawal, 
the continuous changes of decisions, and the adoption of openly illegal norms ... The origin, of course, 
has to be looked in the meetings of the presidents" (ANDI, 1993: 26).
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international integration and neo-liberal policies (Abusada, 1991: 8; Martinez, 1992: 
52).50
There were other uses, old and new, that the governments found for the 
Cartagena Agreement. First, the Andean Group continued to be a tool for aiding 
development processes. Second, it was considered to be a protection from external crisis 
(CRESET, 1989: 31). Third, integration was seen "as a network of commitments which 
provided economic liberalization with stability and continuity" (SELA, 1991: 104).
The main problem was that progress in integration demands greater and greater 
similarities in domestic economic policies; and more and more common positions with 
regard to international economic and non-economic issues; as well as a greater 
participation of society (SELA, 1991: 104).
4.3.- The slow down of the Andean process (1993-1995)
The need for greater harmonization of economic policies was not met by the 
governments, resulting in a slow down of the Andean integration process. It began when 
the tariff reduction program was put only partially into practice; the CET was not 
approved on time; and the harmonization of policies did not progress. These crucial 
failures combined to end the summit meetings.51 All of this made the Andean process
“ In an entrepreneurial meeting held in Caracas, Venezuela, in May 1989 (after the first presidential 
meeting, in the same city in February), the participants declared "that the strengthening of the Andean 
integration is the most adequate road to insure the insertion of our economies into the new realities and the 
demands of the world economy, and guaranties our permanent presence ... in the international economic 
scene" (Cumbre Empresarial Andina, 1990: 111).
51The self-coup of April 1992 in Peru and the failed coups in Venezuela in February and November 
of the same year were the coup de grace to the summits. They were postponed first and later forgotten until 
September 1995. New governments in Ecuador in 1992, and in Bolivia in 1993 contributed to this state of
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slowdown its progress.
August 1992 can be singled out as the date when the slowing down of the Andean 
process began. On that date, the Commission approved Decision 321 by which Peru 
became an observer in the most important aspects of the Andean process: the Andean 
free trade zone, the CET, policy harmonization, and trade negotiations with third 
countries.
One precedent for Peru’s withdrawal was its statement at the Commission’s 
meeting in December 1991 when the CET was not approved. The Peruvian delegation 
deplored the lack of agreement on the CET which "increases distortions to competition 
... thus, Peru reserves its right to apply the necessary measures to counter their effects 
..." (Comision, 1991: 5).
Another precedent was Peru’s Supreme Decree No 014-92-ICTI/DM (April 1992) 
temporarily suspending the tariff reduction program, adducing the existence of trade 
distortions due to the lack of equitable competition as a result of the failure to adopt the 
CET, and to eliminate export subsidies (Cardenas, 1992: 54). In other words, Peru was 
demanding the simultaneous creation of the free trade zone, and of the customs union; 
and at the same time pressing for some economic policy harmonization (JUNAC, 1992b: 
45), so unfair competition could be avoided. The temporary suspension of the tariff 
reduction program by Peru’s decree showed that accords can be unilaterally dissolved if 
they do not fit the interests of the violating country. This fact exemplifies a main finding 
of this research project, namely, that the governments are the main actors in the process
affairs.
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and are able to create and undo obligations.
A final precedent was Peru’s veto, in June 1992, of the CET, because from the 
"technical point of view, it was not a CET and was not observing the guidelines set by 
the presidents in December 1991" (Comision, 1992: 4).52
The most obvious cause of Peru’s temporary withdrawal was its increasing trade 
deficit with the other Andean countries (see table VII. 15) officially attributed to the 
existing distortions in the Andean competition. "Presently, Peru considers that intra- 
Andean trade is distorted because direct subsidies to exports are maintained by the 
majority of the countries of the subregion and they are creating a fictitious 
competitiveness. ... This distortion mainly affects Peru, because it does not subsidize its 
exports" (VMTINCI, 1993: Paragraph 15).53
The most likely reasons for the deficit, however, were domestic currency 
overvaluation,54 and economic instability in the form of high inflation, high taxes and
S2From a political point of view, the reason given by Peru’s minister of Finance, and not recorded in 
the Final Act of the Commission’s meeting was: "Peru could not and would not vote into being the free- 
trade area and the customs unions, as long as Venezuela did not resume diplomatic relations [severed after 
President Fujimori’s self coup on April 1992]" (LAWR, WR-92-25, July 2, 1992: 7).
S3A different version follows. "Full integration has been held up by developments within Peru. After 
president Fujimori assumed dictatorial powers with his autogolpe on April 5, Venezuela suspended 
diplomatic relations. Trade talks were also complicated by Peru’s desire to retain its higher tariff schedule 
(with rates of 15% and 25%) and fear that free trade within the Andean Pact would further erode its trade 
position given its overvalued exchange rate. Thus, in August 1992 Peru suspended its membership until 
the end of 1993" (EIU, 1993e: 46-47).
^The Central Bank adopted in 1990 a policy of quasi-non-intervention in the exchange rate market 
which led to currency overvaluation. The reasons were: first, there was an inflow of foreign currency 
owing to the high interest rates because of the Central Bank’s tight money policy, as inflation remained 
a priority. Second, an unregistered influx of dollars was generated by the cocaine trade. Private studies put 
income from this source at anywhere from $600 million to $1.4 billion a year. Third, the government was 
willing to support the domestic currency when it showed signs of weakening. Fourth, the substantial inflow 
of short-term capital and the large inflow of dollars from the privatization of state enterprises, and from 
foreign investment (EIU, 1992d: 6; 1995d: 10).
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interest rates (Kisic, 1992a: 60, 63-64). In simpler terms, during the negotiation of 
Decision 321, "Peruvian officials argued the need to temporarily withdraw from the 
Andean Group because of the deepening of its economic crisis" (INTAL, 1992a: 93).
The slow down brought about by the temporary withdrawal of Peru also reflected 
the differences among the governments as to the pace and depth of the implementation 
of the new strategy of economic development,55 and more importantly the results they 
were obtaining.56 "The most important factor[s] which could affect integration plans 
[were] the persistence of an unsatisfactory performance of the economies, ... their 
macroeconomic disequilibria" (ECLA, 1991: 18); and the differences in foreign trade 
policies, and in the speed to open their economies (SELA, 1991: 96).
Between 1989 and 1992 Peru had the lowest rate of growth of the subregion (see 
table VII. 11), the highest rate of inflation (Portocarrero, 1992: 69), and its currency was
“ For example, although by 1992 in Colombia "there [was] a loose consensus that economic 
liberalisation [was] necessary, there remain[ed] a strong lobby for protection, "managed" change and 
administrative controls" which slowed the implementation of the program (EIU, 1992f: 4).
In the case of Ecuador, "[n]otwithstading the free market approach in some areas [e.g., foreign 
trade]. President Borja’s government [1988-1992] is well behind other Latin American countries [e.g., 
Chile, Argentina, Peru, Bolivia, Colombia and Venezuela] in other key aspects of economic reform, such 
as trimming back the state sector through privatisation and attracting more foreign investment. Ecuador’s 
implementation of trade liberalisation is also slower than that agreed upon by its partners in the Andean 
Pact, ... (EIU, 1991c: 8).
"...Peru’s economic and trade liberalization process ... is much more accelerated than the other 
Andean countries" (Canale, 1992 3). "Peru also believed it has gone far further in trade liberalisation than 
any of its Pact partners other than Bolivia" (EIU, 1995d: 42). "... Peru recognizes ... that it has progressed 
quicker than its other Andean partners in the same correct direction, however ... the different degree of 
application of the economic policies among the member countries is detrimental to Peru" (VMTINCI, 1993: 
paragraph 16).
“ "The concurrence in time and results and/or difficulties in the adjustment processes help to create an 
identification among the countries. Paradoxically, then, the same motivation which unites some countries 
separates others" (Hirst, 1992; 27).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
336
the most overvalued in relation to the dollar,57 and in relation to the other Andean 
currencies (de la Cuba, 1992: Paragraph 12; Anonymous, cl992: 14). As a result, its 
intra-Andean trade deficit went from $114 million in 1988 to $295 million in 1994 (see 
table VH.15). The lack of agreement to approve the CET in December 1991 could thus 
be seen as a pretext for Peru to partially and temporarily withdraw from the process. The 
evolution of its economy shows that macroeconomic variables are now much more stable, 
but its currency is still the most overvalued in Latin America (La Republica, 1995a: 
10) .58
57
REAL EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATE II (1980 = 100)
PHASE-> | STAGNATION [ PROGRESS
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 p/
Bolivia 126.0 132.5 138.2 163.8 157.8 161.9 166.1
Colombia 165.0 171.0 177.5 200.9 194.3 178.1 169.7
Ecuador 180.9 240.6 208.2 226.1 215.5 214.1 193.0
Peru 97.9 99.7 64.7 49.5 40.4 39.4 42.9
Venezuela 186.0 166.6 195.9 217.9 203.9 195.9 189.0
Source: 1987-1993: IDB, 1994: 45, 63, 81, 145, 169.
1/ Real effective exchange rate takes into account the domestic and foreign inflation rates (consumer or 
wholesale price index), export subsidies and import tariffs and non-tariff restrictions, and selected 
bilateral exchange rates of the main partners weighted according to the relative significance of 
exports to those countries and imports from them (see for example, ECLA, 1994: 100). 
p/ Preliminary.
58The government wants to continue its minimum intervention in fixing the exchange rate and at the 
same time fears that any abrupt increase of the rate of exchange would fuel inflation, a fact which is today 
politically unacceptable since the government has fighting inflation as its main preoccupation.
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TABLE VH. 11
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, 1987-1994: RATES OF GROWTH
PHASE STi\GNATION PROGRESS
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Bolivia 2.1 2.8 2.4 4.4 5.0 1.8 4.0 4.2 3.5
Colomb 6.0 3.7 3.2 4.3 2.0 3.8 5.2 5.7 5.5
Ecuado -5.5 12.8 0.5 3.0 5.0 3.6 2.0 4.0 2.5
Peru 7.8 -8.8 -11.2 -5.4 2.8 -2.5 6.5 12.3 7.5
Venezu 3.0 5.7 -8.1 6.5 9.7 6.1 -0.4 -3.3 2.0
GRAN 3.8 3.1 -3.8 3.9 5.9 4.1 2.4 2.1 n.a.
SOURCES: 1987-1989: JUNAC, 1990c: 95-106
1990-1994: JUNAC, 1995c: 29
1995: ECLAC, 1996:3. Preliminary estimates. Figures have been
rounded to the nearest zero or five
Beyond economic policy considerations, foreign policy reasons could convince 
the Peruvian government in the future to rejoin the Andean Group. If this is so, then, it 
can be argued that the Cartagena Agreement is still a useful tool for this country. In this 
case, the increased negotiation capacity within the Andean bloc could become the most 
important reason to stay.59 Specific foreign policy considerations could be relevant 
arguments for Peru to stay in the Andean process. The considerations are: (1) the 
possibility of improving relations with Ecuador;60 (2) participation in present and future
59This rationality is not different from the ones stated at the end of chapter VI explaining why in the
phase of regression, when aims and mechanisms were not supported by the member countries, the 
governments did not end the Andean process.
“ Although border conflicts, such as the latest one between Ecuador and Peru in February-March 1995, 
have temporarily paralyzed the Andean Pact (and this case was no exception), the closer relations derived 
from the Andean Pact do improve bilateral and personal relations which in "normal" times allow for real
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accords signed by the Andean Pact as a bloc with other countries or groups of countries; 
(3) international negotiating power in fora such as the World Trade Organization (which 
in December 1994 replaced GATT), and UNCTAD; and (4) support and goodwill from 
the other member countries towards Peruvian problems.
Peru, however, was not the only factor causing the slow down of the Andean 
process. Another factor was the perception of Venezuela and Colombia that immediate 
integration of their markets, the largest and most dynamic of the Group, would provide 
them greater benefits.61 The adoption of a bilateral CET on March 1992, constituted an 
important step towards increasing their interdependence.62
Related to the above were the negotiations of integration agreements by Colombia 
and Venezuela with Mexico, Chile, Argentina, the CARICOM, and the Central American 
nations. This did not only reduce the margin of preference for the Andean partners,63 
but did also reduce the negotiating capacity of the Group and of the countries individually
attempts to address more positively the border problem. This was the case of the three visits, in 1992, of 
President Fujimori to Quito, the first ever by a Peruvian President. The first visit of an Ecuadorean 
president to Peru is still being awaited.
6l"... trade [between Colombia and Venezuela] of US$2.3 bn is projected for [1995], from US$700 
m four years ago” (AGR, RA-95-05, June 26, 1995: 8). During the first semester of 1995, Colombia’s 
exports to Venezuela were 48 percent of its Andean exports, while Venezuela’s exports to Colombia were 
82 percent of its Andean exports; these two countries exported $1,725 million during this period, and 
constituted 79 percent of the total intrasubregional exports (Gestion, 1995a: 21).
"The relation between Colombia, Venezuela and Bolivia have [sic] been strengthened through 
times and with the Andean Pact. ... [I]t looks like the increased trade between Colombia and Venezuela 
is affecting negatively the Peruvian manufacturing sector" (Lizardo, 1995: 17, 18).
“ "At the end of the 1980s it was clear that the pair of Colombia-Venezuela should be the second pole 
of integration in Latin America [the first being Brazil-Argentina-Uruguay] ... [W]e believe that integration 
with Venezuela is the central piece in the strategy of Colombia to participate in the international market 
in the 1990s. ... The Andean Pact cannot exclude integration with other Latin American countries ... but 
it should be a bridge towards ALADI ..." (Moreno, 1989: 35-36).
“ " ...the  subregional market is being eroded by trade accords. As a matter of fact, a trade liberalization 
accord among Mexico, Venezuela and Colombia would, in practice, eliminate Ecuador’s possibilities to 
export to latter two..." (ANDI, 1993: 26).
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(INTAL, 1991: 42; JUNAC, 1991j: 1-3). Bolivia and Peru have shown interest in having 
closer links with MERCOSUR.64 The disintegration of the Andean Group has been 
made more likely with the approval of Decision 322 in August 1992 (Peru abstained), 
which allowed the member countries to pursue bilateral negotiations with the sole 
obligation to keep the Commission informed. A possible future scenario could be the 
dismembering of the Andean Pact and the creation of an integration process among 
Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela.
The temporary withdrawal of Peru shows, as anticipated by this study, that the 
governments of the member countries, when they are in agreement, can go beyond what 
the Cartagena Agreement states.65 "Community interests are generated from the sum of 
the different national interests. ... community needs ... [are] subordinated to ... national 
interests, and to the options chosen by each state with regard to the ‘method’ and the 
‘results’ obtained from their processes of economic reform" (Hirst, 1992: 27).
“ In early 1990s, Bolivia was "considering whether it might be better to become a member of the 
fledgling Mercado Comun del Cono Sur (Mercosur)" (EIU, 1991f: 10). In July 1992, according to the 
Financial Times (Kendall, 1992: 5) "[t]he government of President Jaime Paz Zamora said that Bolivia, 
which has lower tariff than the other Andean countries, "may well" seek full membership of Mercosur ... 
Such a move, ... would require [Bolivia] to withdraw from the Andean Pact."
"The Peruvian minister of Economics and Finance, Carlos Bolona Behr, declared ... that his 
country is studying the possibility of having closer links with Mercosur ... It seems to us a more advanced 
integration system which has a bright future... (El Comercio, 1992a: Al).
“ Although the treatment accorded to Peru by Decision 321 was not considered in the text of the 
Cartagena Agreement, neither it allow the Commission to sanction the arrangement they adopted by 
Decision 321.
A more important aspect of Decision 321 was in its Article 3. This article allowed Peru to make 
trade agreements with the other members "within the existing legal framework.” The agreements signed, 
however, included norms to solve controversies outside the purview of the Junta and the Andean Tribunal 
(Cardenas, 1994: 10), the organs legally in charge of dealing with these issues.
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4.4.- The Commission’s output during the phase of stagnation (1987-1989 and the
phase of progress (1990-1994)
The output of the Commission, as expected in this dissertation, was higher during 
the phase of progress than in the phase of stagnation. After approving 20 decisions in 
1987 (due to the optimism created by the signing of the Quito Protocol in May 1987), 
the Commission adopted only 11 decisions in each 1988 and 1989 (see table VII. 12). 
Between 1987 and 1989, the average number of decisions adopted per session went from 
4.0 in the first year, to 2.75 in the second, to a mere 1.83 in the last year of that phase.
Of the 20 decisions approved in 1987, 15 were important new or modifying 
decisions. Nineteen of the 22 decisions adopted in 1988 and 1989 were not important.66 
The three important decisions were: Decision 243 setting the rules by which Ecuador 
would begin its tariff reduction process; Decision 244 which modified Decision 169 on 
Andean multinational enterprises; and Decision 257 modifying the norms about 
international road transportation. In other words, only one decision dealt with a new 
issue.
In the following phase, that of progress, the Commission’s output rose to around 
20 decisions in each year except for 1991 when it rose to 34 (the highest ever), and for 
1995 when it went down to 15. The average number of decisions adopted per session was 
3 or more during this phase, reaching an average of 5.5 decisions in 1993.
“ Among these decisions were Decision 236 codifying the Cartagena Agreement; Decision 239 
recognizing the Andean Confederation of Lawyers as a subsidiary organ of the agreement; Decisions 240 
and 241 extending a member’s Junta term; Decisions 245, and 246 approving the budgets of the Junta and 
the Andean tribunal; Decisions 250-256 on cooperation in agriculture; and Decisions 247 naming members 
of the Junta.


















DECISIONS APPROVED DURING 1988-1994
~ 1  69-73 74-78 79-86 ^1987 1988 1989 [87-89 1990 1991 1992 1993 ] 1994 1 1995 | 90-95
PHASE -- > STAGNATION PROGRESS
1 DECISIONS 81 55 85 20 11 11 1 42 21 34 18 22 19 16 130
2 NEW ISSUES 58 36 63 11 9 9 29 16 21 16 16 10 6 85
2.1 Important J / 32 8 8 7 1 8 10 11 5 2 4 2 34
2.2 Unimportant 26 28 55 4 i _  8 9 21 6 10 11 14 6 4 51
3 MODIFYING DECISIONS 23 19 22 9 2 2 13 5 13 2 6 9 10 45
3.1 Important \J 1 7 16 8 1 1 10 3 11 2 3 3 2 24
- Strengthening 3 4 4 1 1 6 1 6 2 1 1 11
- Weakening 1 4 12 4 4 2 5 3 2 1 13
3.2 Unimportant 22 12 6 l_i 1 1 3 2 2 3 6 8 21
4 SESSIONS 25 19 47 5 4 6 15 7 9 4 4 5 7 36
4.1 WITH DECISIONS 22 16 35 4 4 4 12 7 8 4 4 5 6 34
- Ordinary 13 11 16 3 1 2 6 3 4 3 3 2 2 17
- Extraordinary 9 5 19 1 3 2 6 4 4 1 1 3 4 17
4.2 WITHOUT DECISIONS 3 3 12 1 2 3 1 1 2
- Ordinary 2 1 1 1 1
- Extraordinary 3 3 10 2 2 1 1
5. 1/4 3.24 2.89 1.81 4.00 2.75 1.83 2.80 3.00 3.77 4.50 5.50 3.80 2.28 3.61
6. 1/4.1 [ 3.68 3.44 2.43 5.00 2.75 2.75 3.50 3.00 4.25 4.50 5.50 3.80 32.66 3.82
1/ Important is defined as decisions that have direct impact in the progress of the principal mechanisms of the Andean process. 
SOURCES: JUNAC, n.d.: 1-33; Actas de la Comisidn.
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Between 1990 and 1995, of the 129 decisions adopted by the Commission, 57 
were important, and 72 were not. Examples of the important decisions were: Decision 
258 implementing the Strategic Design approved in Galapagos, Ecuador; Decision 281 
implementing the deepening of the Strategic Design approved in La Paz, Bolivia, 
November of 1990; Decisions 260 and 273 modifying the CMET; Decision 263 
withdrawing products from the list of products reserved for industrial programming; 
Decision 271 approving the Andean road system; Decisions 282 to 285, and 330 
harmonizing some trade policies; and Decision 293 on norms of origin; Decisions 335 
and 370 adopting the CET; Decisions 350, 357 and 365 modifying the CET; and 
Decisions 340 and 341 reducing the debts of the member countries owed to the Junta and 
the Tribunal.67
The slow down of the process from 1993 on is shown by the fact that of the 56 
decisions approved between this year and in 1995, only 15 were important. This situation 
is also illustrated by the fact that for the first time in Andean history, eight decisions 
were adopted with the abstention of Peru and/or Ecuador;68 that for the first time ever
“ Examples of unimportant decisions adopted by the Commission were (besides naming members of 
the Junta, and approving budgets): Decisions 276 and 328 related to agricultural cooperation; Decision 290 
approving the Andean insurance policy for international road transportation; Decision 337 on rules for 
importing used clothes; Decision 342 recognizing the Andean Association of Enterprises and Institutions 
of Water and Sewage; and Decision 351 on common rules for copyrights.
“ Decisions in which Peru abstained from voting, in accordance with Decision 321 (temporary and 
partial withdrawal of Peru), were: Decision 322: Rules to negotiate trade agreements with Latin American 
and Caribbean countries; Decision 324: Guidelines for the CET, the tariff reduction program, and 
incentives for intrasubregional trade; Decision 330: Elimination of subsidies and harmonization of 
incentives to intrasubregional trade; Decision 335: The CET; Decision 357: Modification of the CET; 
Decision 370 adopting the last version of the CET; and Decision 371 approving the flexible tariff system 
for agricultural products. Ecuador abstained from voting on Decision 281 related to the deepening the tariff 
reduction program after the presidential meeting in La Paz, Bolivia.
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two proposals of the Junta were vetoed by Peru and on one of them Ecuador 
abstained;69 and that one proposal was approved with Peru’s negative vote.70
From the foregoing analysis, as expected by the hypothesis of this study, it can 
be concluded that during the last phase of progress, the activity of the Commission was 
greater than during a phase of stagnation.
4.S.- The long-term economic aims of the member countries and the Andean Group
As in the previous chapters, in this section the member countries’ relevant long 
term economic goals, as defined and changed by their governments, will be compared 
with the new aims of the Cartagena Agreement. These new aims as stated at the 
beginning of this chapter are: primacy of the market, export-oriented industrialization, 
and the increased role of foreign investment. The similarity between the Andean aims 
and the goals of the governments during the phase of progress, and the dissimilarity 
during the phase of stagnation will constitute, as anticipated by this research project, a 
owerful explanation for the stagnation and the progress in the process.71
a) Colombia
Between 1987 and 1990, that is for the phase of stagnation, 1987-1989,
^ e r u  vetoed Proposal 245/Mod. 2 on the CET on June 1992. Ecuador abstained and Peru also vetoed 
Proposal 251.Mod. 2 on deepening the Andean integration process in June 1992.
70Decision 320 on air transportation.
71Following the practice of the preceding chapters Colombia has been analyzed alone, while Peru has 
been paired with Venezuela, and Bolivia with Ecuador. The rationale for this is the similarities in their 
levels of development, and their economic policies.
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Colombia72 continued with its development model of "efficient industrialization." This 
meant periodic adjustments of the dollar to compensate for the rise in domestic costs, 
credit and tax incentives for exports, and gradual liberalization of imports, coupled with 
a cautious handling of fiscal and monetary policies (ECLA, 1989b: 207), and the 
increasing role of the market. In the development plan for 1987-90 (Plan de Economia 
Social), the role of the state was diminished, the privatization of public enterprises was 
proposed, and the tariff reduction program was accelerated (JUNAC, 1991a: 74).
In February 1990, the outgoing government of Colombia unveiled the 
"Modernization Program for the Colombian Economy," (Programa de modernization de 
la economia colombiana). Its basic objective was to integrate Colombia into the 
international economy by gradually increasing its competitiveness through trade 
liberalization (Zapata, 1991: 40; IDB, 1990: 83; IDB, 1991: 61, 63). "It was based on 
the consensus that, in order to recover from the growth rates of the 1980s, a different 
development strategy was needed" (Fleischer and Lora, 1994: 15).
This program was continued by President Gaviria (1990-1994) which took office 
in August of 1990 (IDB, 1991: 61). His development plan for 1991-1994, entitled 
Peaceful Revolution (La Revolution Pacifica) in addition, emphasized investment in 
export infrastructure (EIU, 1992b: 9), and the reduction of state intervention in the 
economy (Fleischer and Lora, 1994: 15; ECLA, 1994: 85). He "opted for greater and 
more rapid liberalisation ... The overall strategy [was] letting markets determine prices, 
opening up to external competition and allowing more foreign participation in the
^For accounts of Colombia’s economic reform see Urrutia, (comp.) 1993; Urrutia, 1994; Lora, (ed.) 
1991; Lora and Crane (eds.) 1991; Thorp, 1991.
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economy..." (EIU, 1992f: 4). The 1994-1998 Plan under the new administration of the 
also Liberal Ernesto Samper Pizano, continues along the lines of his predecessor.
In short, Colombian administrations have been moving toward a neo-liberal 
model. This process was accelerated between 1990 and 1994. Colombia, thus, was 
supportive of the primacy of markets, of export-oriented industrialization, and of a 
greater role for foreign investment in these last two phases of the Andean process.
b) Peru and Venezuela
Peru, between 1987 and July 1990, the last three years of the Garcia
Administration,73 saw the end of the "heterodox" economic model based on the
expansion of consumption (1987-1988) and the application of orthodox programs without 
external support (1988-1990). These years were "a lacklustre [sic] period of policy­
making leading to considerable demoralization" (Thorp, 1991: 137). During this period, 
attempts were made to reactivate industry through increasing protection.74 At the same 
time, foreign direct investment continued to be under the rules of Decision 24 even 
though they were already relaxed in May 1987 (JUNAC, 1991a: 76-77).
"The new government [headed by Alberto Fujimori, 1990-1995] had two main 
economic objectives: to stabilize the economy and to achieve the reintegration of Peru 
into the international financial community" (IDB, 1991: 147). It launched a drastic
^For the political and economic conditions of Peru since the 1980s see: Apoyo, 1992; Crabtree, 1992; 
Escobal, 1992; Graham, 1992; Paredes and Sachs, 1991; Pastor and Wise, 1992; Rudolph, 1992; Thorp, 
1991.
74"In 1986, ... [a] wide range of imports was also banned [in Peru] to encourage further import
substitution and promote local manufactures" (EIU, 1990d: 8).
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stabilization program based on closing the fiscal deficit through a substantial real increase 
of the price of gasoline and of public utility rates; the elimination of all subsidies and 
price controls; the replacement of the multiple exchange rate system by a market- 
determined floating exchange; the elimination of import licensing procedures, tariff 
exemptions, and non-tariff barriers; the reduction of customs tariffs; the simplification 
of the tariff structure; and the elimination of all restrictions to foreign investment (IDB, 
1991: 7-8, 147-148; 1992: 164; EIU, 1992d: 9).75
In longer terms, the government adopted "a new pattern of economic development 
based on efficiency, modernization, and international competitiveness, gradually 
eliminating foreign trade difficulties ... The state [furthermore] must provide guidance, 
not implement productive activities" (Fujimori, 1993 [1995]: 442-443). The new 
constitution approved in 1993, ”enshrine[d] the principles of the free market economy, 
[and] reduced the role of the state ... (EIU, 1995d: 6). During the 1990s, industrial 
development was to be based on technological modernization, efficiency, competitiveness 
and quality. The aim was to develop production lines in the areas in which Peru has 
comparative advantages (Portocarrero, 1991: 6-8).
To summarize, during the phase of stagnation (1987-1989), Peru was clearly not 
supportive of any of the new aims of the Andean Pact. Between 1990 and the present, 
Pem supported the three main objectives.
7sThese actions led to a 397 percent inflation rate for the month of August 1990 (when the first, and 
most drastic, set of economic measures was instituted); and to an annual inflation of 12,378 percent for 
1990. Both figures were records (EIU, I992d: 9).
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Venezuela, between 1987 and 1989 (the phase of stagnation),76 was guided by
its seventh Development Plan (1986-1989). Some of its objectives were to stimulate
private domestic and foreign investment, to continue government participation in
production, and to further a more efficient import substitution industrialization.
Soon after he took office for the second time in February 1989, President Carlos
Andres Perez launched a comprehensive and drastic program of structural change. He
decided to shift from inward- to outward-oriented economic development, giving
substantial room to non-traditional exports, private enterprise and market forces (de
Janvry et at., 1994: 123). The program
included ... elimination of all import restrictions, and reduction of tariffs to a 
narrow band; elimination of all exchange controls and adoption of a free floating 
rate... compatible with the development of non traditional exports; price 
liberalization; the restructuring of the public sector ... and privatization of 
parastatal [sic] enterprises; a comprehensive tax reform; ... and the elimination 
of restrictions on foreign investment; ... (Rodriguez, 1994: 378).
In harmony with the new strategy of development, the eighth five-year plan,
1989-1994, mapped a switch to an outward, market oriented strategy for the 1990s (EIU,
1993e: 9). With regard to industrial development, the plan emphasized exports, a
diminished role of the state and of public investment, and the privatization of non
strategic public enterprises (JUNAC, 1991a: 77).
Political instability from early 1992 on, prevented implementation of these
7sFor analyses of the political economy of Venezuela see de Janvry, 1994; Naim, 1993; and Perry and 
Bailey, 1994.
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measures.77 In 1994 and 1995, the new Venezuelan government found itself imposing 
exchange controls and other anti-free market measures reversing the liberalization 
process, and unsuccessfully applied nine economic programs (EIU, 1995e: 10; LAWR, 
WR-94-35, September 15, 1994: 418; Moffett, 1995: A10).
Between 1987 and 1989 Venezuela was supportive of a greater role of foreign 
investment, but was not supportive of export-oriented industrialization or the primacy of 
the market. During the phase of progress (1989-1995), the administration supported the 
three aims of the Andean Pact. This support lasted until 1994, when dictated by the 
circumstances, controls were placed on market mechanisms, while support of the other 
two objectives continued.
In conclusion, Peru and Venezuela were not supportive of market mechanisms and 
export-oriented industrialization during the phase of stagnation (1987-1989). In this 
phase, Peru was also not supportive of a greater role for foreign investment, while 
Venezuela supported it. In the next phase, both countries supported all three aims, except 
for Venezuela which did not support market mechanisms.
c) Bolivia and Ecuador
From 1987 to 1990 the stabilization programs, tax reform and economic
^In February and November 1992 there were two attempts to overthrow the president. In May 1993 
Congress voted to strip President Carlos Andres Perez of his judicial immunity after the Supreme Court 
found grounds to charge him with corruption in connection with government secret funds used to pay 
security guards of the President of Nicaragua, Violeta Chamorro. He was replaced by the President of the 
Senate, Octavio Lepage, until June 1993 when Congress elected the independent senator Ramon Jose 
Velasquez, as interim president. In September 1993 Congress suspended Carlos Andres Perez from the 
presidency indefinitely (EIU, 1995e: 4). In February 1994, independent Rafael Caldera, a former Christian 
Democrat president, took power.
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revitalization efforts in Bolivia,78 introduced in August 1985, provided for an economic 
system in which prices were determined by market forces and private-sector participation 
in the economy was encouraged (IDB, 1990: 62).
At the beginning of 1990, the new Bolivian government issued four decrees 
ratifying its determination to continue the process of liberalizing the economy to promote 
private investment, to privatize public enterprises, and to decentralize the state 
administrative system. Between 1990 and 1992, Bolivia continued to apply measures 
aimed at its economic stability and reform of institutional framework in order to promote 
private sector development (IDB, 1991: 43; 1993: 45).
The present government (1993-1997) headed by president Gonzalo Sanchez de 
Lozada (Minister of Planning in charge of the liberalization of the Bolivian economy 
during the Paz Estenssoro administration), continued the same neo-liberal strategy of 
development. Special emphasis has been given to the capitalization of public enterprises 
through investment of private capital, or their transfer to the private sector under a 
conventional privatization arrangement (IDB, 1994: 46; Hendrix, 1995: A15).
In short, since 1985, when Bolivia adopted a neo-liberal development strategy, 
this country has supported the three new aims of the Andean Group.
The Ecuadorean development plan of 1985-1988 proposed the reduction of state 
participation in the economy, and to limit its role to provide clear and stable rules; it also 
aimed at increasing the participation of the private economic actors in the development
^For an analysis of the reforms see Morales, 1992.
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process (JUNAC, 1991a: 75).79
The collapse of the price of oil in 1986 from $25 to $12 a barrel, the March 1987 
earthquake, which cut Ecuador’s oil production and exports for six months, and political 
instability brought, "[b]y early 1988, large budget deficits, and growing inflation [which] 
forced the reimplantation [sic] of import restrictions and a multi-tiered exchange rate..." 
(de Janvry et at., 1994: 73).®°
Within days of taking office in August 1988, the administration of Rodrigo Boija 
announced stem measures to stabilize the economy. By the end of 1989 the government 
began to shift from stabilization to a growth-oriented program based on the 
encouragement of non-oil exports, private sector initiative and investment, and a market 
oriented approach. Some of the goals were trade liberalization, and increased 
competitiveness (EIU, 1993c: 9; de Janvry et at., 1994: 79; IDB, 1991: 81).
The new [Ecuadorean] administration, headed by the pro-market Sixto 
Duran- Ballen [1992-1996], moved as quickly as its predecessor in instituting 
reform when it came to power in August 1992. Sweeping fiscal reforms were 
announced including a major privatisation programme, the country’s long-delayed 
entry into the Andean Pact free trade area was implemented and, in January 1993, 
a new foreign investment code was announced (EIU, 1993c: 9).
The aims of the program were to improve economic efficiency through trade
liberalization, market competition and foreign investment; through a substantial
79For details of the political economy of Ecuador see de Janvry et al, 1994.
“ Political problems made President Febres Cordero weaker. In January 1987 he was abducted by air 
force paratroopers who successfully demanded the release of the leader of the March 1986 Air Force 
revolt. Later Congress voted to demand his resignation, and forced the resignation of several of his 
ministers. Another factor which eroded public support for Febres Cordero’s program of free competition 
was the increasing political opposition from the political parties, from the opposition controlled Congress, 
and from private entrepreneurial groups. "The positive results of the liberalisation programme were 
ultimately undermined not only by external conditions but also by the president’s attempts to bolster 
political support and salvage his image through large public works investment" (de Janvry et at., 1994: 
73).
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restructuring of the public sector, and the dismantling of the interventionist state (IDB, 
1993: 85; LAWR, WR-93-32, August 19, 1993: 375).
In summary, Ecuador during the phase of stagnation (1987-1989), was not 
supportive of market mechanisms or export-oriented industrialization. A greater role for 
foreign investment, however, was supported by the Ecuadorean government. In the phase 
of progress, 1989-1995 Ecuador supported the three aims of the Cartagena Agreement.
Bolivia and Ecuador supported a greater role of foreign investment during the 
phase of stagnation (1987-1989). Bolivia supported the other two objectives but Ecuador 
did not. In the other phase both countries supported all the aims.
In brief, the five countries were almost equally divided in supporting and not 
supporting the new aims of the Cartagena Agreement during the phase of stagnation. The 
primacy of the market and export-oriented industrialization were not supported by three 
of the five countries; while the greater role of foreign investment was supported by four 
of them. In the next phase, governments supported the three Andean objectives, except 
for Venezuela which did not support the primacy of the market (see table VII.13).
4.6.- The economic policies of the Andean countries
After the changes brought by the Quito Protocol and the presidential accords, the 
most important mechanisms became: tariff reduction program, common external tariff, 
and policy harmonization. The similarities or dissimilarities between these mechanisms 
and the economic policies of the member countries, as in the other chapters, will provide 
evidence to substantiate the claim of this study that these similarities or the lack of them
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TABLE VII.13
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ANDEAN AIMS AND
NATIONAL OBJECTIVES 1987-1995
ANDEAN AIMS CO PE VE BO EC TOTALS
STAGNATION (1987-1989)
Primacy of market mechanisms s N N S N 2S 3N
Export-oriented industrialization s N N s N 2S 3N
Greater role of foreign investment s N s s s 4S IN
8S 7N
PROGRESS (1990-1995)
Primacy of market mechanisms s s N s S 4S IN
Export-oriented industrialization s s S s s 5S
Greater role of foreign investment s s s s s 5S
14S IN
S = Supportive N = Not supportive
explain progress or stagnation, respectively, of the Andean process.
a) The case of policy harmonization
Trade policies (especially tariff reductions) as well as trade figures constitute the 
main elements to contrast the governments’ policies with the Andean mechanisms of the 
tariff reduction program and CET. In the case of policy harmonization, many policies 
are involved, such as monetary, fiscal, financial, and exchange policies, as well as 
policies directly affecting trade, i.e. subsidies to exports, drawbacks, special regimes for
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exports and imports, dumping, etc. As is clear from the discussion of policy 
harmonization at the Andean level (section 2.6 of this chapter), little progress was made 
regarding policies directly related to trade, and practically no progress was made in 
harmonizing other policies. This reflects the difficulty of handling the implementation of 
this mechanism, the lack of enthusiasm by the member countries to support it, and their 
unwillingness to limit their sovereignty and their national interests.
It is possible, however, to distinguish different attitudes of the governments during 
the last two phases the Andean process. During the phase of stagnation (1987-1989), the 
member countries were quite comfortable with the relaxed provisions on policy 
harmonization introduced by the Quito Protocol.81 Governments were still grappling 
with stabilization measures and finding ways to reestablish growth. In this situation, they 
were interested in having the greatest control over the economic tools. Suffice is to say 
that even intra-Andean trade restrictions were maintained in these years. In this phase all 
the governments were indifferent to policy harmonization.
In the first years of the phase of progress (1989-1992), the Andean presidents 
supported the pursuit of some policy harmonization. This limited support was based on 
the need to eliminate distortions in the intra-Andean trade.82 It was at this time that
81"... until 1988, economic policy harmonization had a limited development" (JUNAC, 1992d: 1).
cThe need to have some policy harmonization is the direct result of the aim of the governments to 
pursue an efficient international integration, in which subregional integration is the stepping stone. In order 
for the Andean Group, then, to be an experimental area, the member countries have to create free trade 
conditions within the subregion (as if trade was conducted within each country). To accomplish it, they 
need to eliminate intra-trade barriers, to have a common external tariff, and to eliminate distortions in trade 
due to the pursuit of different economic policies. In other words, ideally, to have free trade, an economic 
union has to be created. This would include the harmonization of economic policies. This is far beyond 
what any government is willing to accept as shown by the European Union. It is not a surprise that policy 
harmonization is so difficult to pursue, even at its initial stage, when the immediate aim is to neutralize the 
most glaring distorting effects its absence produces in the intra-Andean trade.
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policy harmonization made some progress, reflecting the rapid economic liberalization 
of Colombia, Peru and Venezuela.
From the last quarter of 1992 to 1995, however, no important decisions were 
approved to harmonize policies. Most member countries became again indifferent to it 
since they were not ready to reduce further their control of these instruments. The 
exception was Peru, which not only supported but demanded a radical harmonization of 
foreign trade instruments along the lines of its national policies. Because Peru did not 
succeed, it refused to support the other two mechanisms during this later part of phase 
of progress. This situation is shown in table VII. 19. The phase of progress is therefore 
divided in Progress (1990-1992) and Slow Progress (1993-1995).
Given the above discussion, the analysis of policy harmonization will not be 
treated separately below. Suffice it to say that all the governments, except for Peru, kept 
an array of incentives to promote their exports to both the other Andean members, and 
to third countries.83 All Andean countries also applied other economic policies quite
“The 1991 Colombian new foreign trade law created the Council of Foreign Trade in charge of 
designing the policies, and the Ministry of Foreign Trade in charge of the implementation. The Exports 
Promotion Institution (PROEXPO) was replaced by the Colombian International Trade Bank (BANCOLDEX) 
in charge of financing and promoting exports, and offering other financial services (EIU, 1992b: 39; 
Fleischer and Lora, 1994: 17; Lora, 1992: 174-175).
In August 1990, Venezuelan incentive payments in the form of fiscal credits for non-traditional 
exports were lowered from 30 percent to 5 percent of fob value for manufactures and to 6 percent to 
agricultural products. In 1991 the export subsidy was replaced by an import drawback system (EIU, I995e: 
47; IDB, 1991: 172).
"In March 1991 a new [Bolivian] export code, Regimen Nacional de Exportaciones, came into 
effect. It introduced ... a "drawback" mechanism (to devolve import dues on goods to be re-exported) 
effectively reducing further the remaining modest export incentives" (EIU, 1993a: 32). In April 1992, "a 
single window" to facilitate and centralize export procedures in a single office was established. On July 
1992 the Ministry of Exports and External Competitiveness was created (IDB, 1993: 45).
In September 1990, the CERTEX and FENT (the most important exports subsidies in Peru) were 
eliminated (Paredes, 1994: 232; Escobal, 1992 : 252).
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differently.84 The bottom line was that Andean governments, except Pern’s, had chosen 
not to pursue policy harmonization earnestly because it would limit their sovereignty in 
economic policies.85
b) Colombia
b .l) The tariff reduction program.- Colombian exports to the other Andean countries, 
after increasing by 44 percent in 1987, decreased for the next two years by 12 and 14 
percent (see table VII. 14). Except for 1994, exports increased in each of the years of the 
phase of progress, 1991 being the year in which it increased by an outstanding 109 
percent, followed by an impressive 30 percent increase in 1992.
MFor example, member countries had quite different and changing exchange policies and exchange 
systems. The exchange system in Colombia became less and less regulated by the Central Bank from 1990 
on. By the end of 1990 a new law on foreign exchange replaced the one existing since 1967. The aims 
were to liberalize exchange operations, and increase market influence. It allowed holdings abroad by 
nationals, and abolished the Central Bank monopoly on currency transactions (EIU, 1991f: 10; Lora, 1992: 
168). The Central Bank, however fixed the exchange rate in daily basis until January 1994, when it was 
replaced by a free market system (EIU, 1995b: 8).
From 1978 to 1985 a system of minidevaluations was applied in Peru. From 1985 to 1990 a 
multiple tier exchange rate (which had up to ten different rates in a given period) was applied. In August 
1990, the new government returned to a free market determined exchange rate.
The adjustment package introduced in Venezuela by the Perez administration in early 1989 
included a single, freely floating rate and the removal of all restrictions of access to foreign exchange (EIU, 
1990e: 9). By May 1994, this system was replaced by rationed auctions of foreign exchange to stem the 
massive loss of reserves but it created many exchange rates. From June on a comprehensive exchange 
control was imposed with a single fixed rate, and parallel market transactions were forbidden (LAWR, 
WR-94-18, May 19, 1994: 205; WR-94-25, July 7, 1994:289; WR-94-26, July 14, 1994: 301; WR-94-27, 
July 21, 1994: 314; WR-95-24, 1995: 287, EIU, 1995e: 9).
In Bolivia, since August 1985 the official rate has been allowed to float more or less freely (EIU, 
1993a: 8).
From 1971 to 1992, Ecuador has had a multiple exchange rate system. It has gone from a two tier 
to a four-tier system, and since 1988 it is a three-tier system. Minidevaluations and periodical 
maxidevaluations have been the method to adjust the exchange rate. Since November 1992, the government 
allowed exporters and importers to trade their currencies in the free market, which in practice led to the 
floating of the sucre (EIU, 1993c: 7).
“This, of course, leads to the vicious circle of not pursuing policy harmonization because the Andean 
market is too small, and that the Andean market is too small because policy harmonization is not pursued.
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TABLE VII. 14
COLOMBIA: ANDEAN TRADE 1987-1994
Phase-> STAGNATION PROGRESS
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
EXPORTS (FOB) (Mil lions of dollars)
GRAN 405.0 358.1 309.3 372.8 778.4 1.014.4 1,139.0 1,109.8
World 5,024.4 5,026.2 5,739.4 6,765.0 7,244.3 7,071.7 7,123.5 8,407.9
IMPORTS (FOB) (Mil ions of dollars)
GRAN 227.9 328.2 383.4 473.6 475.8 647.7 1,297.6 1,541.8
World 4,228.0 5,005.3 5,010.5 5,588.5 4,967.0 6,513.0 9,841.0 11,855.7
TRADE BALANCE (Millions of dollars)
GRAN 177.1 29.9 (74.1) (100.8) 302.6 366.7 (159.0) (432.0)
World 796.5 21.0 729.0 1,176.5 2,277.3 558.7 (2,717.6) (3,447.7)
INTRASUBREGIONAL TRADE AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TRADE
Exports 8.06 7.12 5.39 5.51 10.75 14.34 15.98 13.20
Imports 5.39 6.56 7.65 8.47 9.58 9.95 13.19 13.01
RATE OF GROWTH OF EXPORTS
GRAN 43.95 -11.59 -13.60 20.50 108.82 30.31 12.51 -2.53
World -1.63 0.04 14.19 17.87 7.08 -2.38 0.73 18.03
RATE OF GROWTH OF IMPORTS
GRAN .-8.39 44.03 16.83 23.51 0.47 36.13 100.33 18.82
World 9.76 18.38 0.10 11.54 -11.12 31.12 51.10 20.47
SOURCES: 1987-1991: JUNAC, 1994; 1993-1994: JUNAC, 1995b: 20; 1995c: 21; 1995f: 24, 26, 28, 
30, 40 and author’s calculations.
The share of Andean exports out of the total Colombian exports, surpassed the 
10 percent barrier in 1991, and since then has continue to increase. The share of imports, 
also increased, but below that of exports. For Colombia the Andean market was growing 
in importance. Therefore the government supported the tariff reduction program during
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this period (1987-1995). This support was more intense during the phase of progress 
(1989-1995), since it coincided with the liberalization of Colombia’s international trade. 
Support for this mechanism also stemmed from the Colombian long-term policy of 
promoting its exports.
b.2) Common external tariff.- Between 1987 and 1989, the Colombian government 
increased its trade restrictions to third countries. The percentage of dutiable items under 
import control increased from 55 percent in 1987 to 60 percent in 1989 (Urrutia, 1994: 
291). These restrictions increased Colombia’s indifference to the approval of a CET, 
since it would have resulted in a drastic and rapid reduction in the protection of domestic 
production via elimination of import controls.
From February 1990 to 1992, the government implemented a program of tariff 
reduction. By May 1993 there were concentrated in four tariff levels: 5, 10, 15 and 20 
percent. Agricultural products were protected by a system of variable tariffs. During 
1991, the government eliminated non-tariffs barriers to imports, and the import surcharge 
was brought down to 8 percent. The average tariff went down to 11.8 percent, in May 
1992 from 44.5 percent in December of 1989 (see table VII.5). The 75 percent tariff 
applied to automobiles was reduced to 35 percent after accords with Ecuador and 
Venezuela in November 1993. Since 1992, tariffs have remained without major variations 
(EIU, 1990b: 36; 1992b: 38; JUNAC, 1991: 8; IDB, 1991: 63-64; Fleischer and Lora, 
1994: 16; Urrutia, 1994: 291, 296).
The acceleration of the opening of the Colombian market to foreign competition,
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and the acceleration of the Andean trade liberalization process from 1990 on, established 
an increasing willingness by Colombia to adopt a CET. This support was conditional on 
the adoption of a CET quite similar to the Colombian tariff structure. This was the case, 
since the CET discussed in 1991 and 1992, had "tariffs slightly lower than those adopted 
by Colombia in August 1991" (Ocampo, 1994: 146). The CET finally adopted in 
November 1994, included criteria which reflected Colombia’s interests. In brief, 
Colombia was supportive of the adoption of the CET during the phase of progress.
Summarizing, Colombia, during the phase of stagnation (1987-1989) was 
supportive only of the tariff reduction program, and indifferent to the CET and to policy 
harmonization. During the subsequent phase, Colombia supported the tree principles, but 
it became indifferent to policy harmonization from 1993 on.
c) Peru and Venezuela
c.l) The tariff reduction program.- Although Peruvian exports to the Andean countries 
grew during most of the years from 1987 to 1994, imports grew faster. This resulted in 
a growing trade deficit with its Andean partners (see table VII. 15). The government of 
Peru, therefore, did not support the tariff reduction program during the phase of 
stagnation (1987-1989), and from 1992 to 1995.
Between 1989 and 1992, Peru, however, was supportive of the tariff reduction 
program. Support in 1989 was due to the fact that President Garcia’s party had an
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TABLE VII. 15
PERU: ANDEAN TRADE 1987-1994
Phase-> | STAGNATION PROGRESS
| 1987 | 1988 1989 1990 | 1991 1992 1993 1994
EXPORTS (FOB) (Millions of dollars)
Gran 157.0 188.6 196.2 214.0 269.4 269.6 269.1 310.1
World 2,476.9 2,645.9 3,437.8 3,312.7 3,329.0 3,484.4 3,341.0 4,361.4
IMPORTS (FOB) (Millions of clollars)
Gran 242.2 302.4 240.9 340.6 546.3 567.8 522.2 645.8
World 3,247.3 2,736.9 2,121.4 2,634.0 3,291.3 3,647.8 4,191.1 5,628.5
TRADE BALANCE (Millions of dollars)
Gran (85.1) (113.8) (44.7) (126.6) (276.8) (298.2) (253.1) (335.6)
World (770.4) (91-0) 1,316.4 678.8 37.7 (163.4) (846.7) (1,267.2)
INTRASUBREGIONAL TRADE AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TRADE
Exports 6.34 7.13 5.71 6.46 8.09 7.74 8.05 7.11
Imports 7.46 11.05 11.35 12.93 16.60 15.57 12.46 11.47
RATE OF GROWTH OF EXPORTS
Gran 7.71 20.11 4.02 9.09 25.89 0.06 -0.19 15.26
World 4.99 6.82 29.93 -3.64 0.49 4.67 -4.02 30.41
RATE OF GROWTH OF IMPORTS
Gran 45.45 24.87 -20.35 41.40 60.39 3.94 -8.03 23.67
World 33.58 -15.72 -22.49 24.16 24.96 10.83 14.89 34.30
SOURCES: 1987-1991: JUNAC, 1994; 1993-1994: JUNAC, 1995b: 20; 1995c: 21; 1995f: 24, 26, 28, 30, 
40 and author’s calculations.
ideology which backed Latin American political and economic union,86 and that the
“Garcia’s party (APRA, American Popular Revolutionary Alliance) was founded by Victor Raul Haya 
de la Torre in Mexico, in May 1924 as a Latin American movement. The "APRA movement ... stressed 
the political union of Latin America and the solidarity with all the peoples and oppressed classes of the 
world (Chang-Rodriguez, 1988: 4), as well as concerted actions against Yankee imperialism, land and 
industry nationalization, and the internationalization of the Panama Canal (Haddox, 1989: 61-62).
"In our platform of Latin American economic and political unity, we have synthesized Bolivar’s 
immortal phase: ‘Union, union adored America, or else Anarchy will devour you’" (Haya de la Torre, 
1931 [1995]: 241).
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implementation of the acceleration of tariff reductions would occur only after he had left 
office. In 1990, the drastic program of opening the Peruvian market to international 
competition went beyond the Andean trade liberalization accords of 1989 and 1990, 
creating no objections for Peru in supporting them. By 1991, Peru showed its 
dissatisfaction with the lack of progress in policy harmonization by delaying the 
finalization of its tariff reduction process until July 1992. In August of 1992, Peru 
obtained its temporary withdrawal from the Andean Group, which signaled, among other 
things, its lack of support of this mechanism.
Venezuelan trade with Andean countries increased during most years from 1987 
to 1994 (see table VII. 16). Exceptions were the reduction of exports of only 3 percent 
in 1991, and imports by 40 percent in 1989 and by 7 percent in 1993. Its Andean trade 
balance showed surpluses in all years, except for 1988, when it was $55 million deficit. 
With these trade results Venezuela was supportive of the tariff reduction program in these 
phases. Moreover, tariff reductions and the opening of the domestic market in Venezuela 
were accelerated from 1989 on, providing increased support to Andean trade 
liberalization.87
c.2) Common external tariff.- From 1983 until mid-1990 Peruvian import duties 
increased. By December 1989 tariffs averaged 45.2 percent. Surcharges raised to 72 
percent. Exemptions and rebates, however, were widespread. Moreover, many items
^Between 1987 and 1993 Venezuelan oil exports to the Andean countries went from as low as $15 
million in 1989, to as high as $106 million in 1991. These figures constituted 5 percent and 22 percent of 
the Venezuelan exports to its Andean partners (JUNAC, 1994b: 1, 5).
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TABLE VII. 16
VENEZUELA: ANDEAN TRADE 1987-1994
Phase-> STAGNATION PROGRESS
[_ 1987 } 1988 1989 1990 | 1991 | 1992 1993 1994
EXPORTS (FOB) (Millions of do lars)
Gran 215.1 220.7 300.1 493.7 478.8 665.8 1,045.3 1,426.4
World 10,538.7 9,957.7 12,913.8 17,692.1 15,219.3 14,184.3 15,459.0 16,717.5
IMPORTS (FOB) (Mi lions of do lars)
Gran 199.9 275.6 166.9 234.6 428.2 617.6 573.1 495.3
World 9,765.3 12,864.8 7,732,5 7,268.6 11,046.1 13,154.4 11,639.9 8,400.8
TRADE BALANCE (1Millions of dollars)
Gran 15.2 (54.9) 133.2 259.1 50.6 48.2 472.2 931.1
World 773.4 (2,907.2) 5,181.2 10,423.5 4,173.2 1,029.9 3,819.0 8,316.7
INTRASUBREGIONAL TRADE AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TRADE
Expons 2.04 2.22 2.32 2.79 3.15 4.69 6.76 8.53
Impons 2.05 2.14 2.16 3.23 3.88 4.70 4.93 5.90
RATE OF GROWTH OF EXPORTS
Gran 33.63 2.62 35.98 64.50 -3.02 39.07 56.99 36.46
World 21.64 -5.51 29.69 37.00 -13.98 -6.80 8.99 8.14
RATE OF GROWTH OF IMPORTS
Gran 27.11 37.90 -39.44 40.54 82.54 44.25 -7.21 -13.56
World 13.62 L 31.74 -39.89 -6.00 51.97 19.09 -11.51 -27.83
SOURCES: 1987-1991: JUNAC, 1994; 1993-1994: JUNAC, 1995b: 20; 1995c: 21; 1995f: 24, 26, 28, 
30, 40 and author’s calculations.
were prohibited from importation. By 1990 there were 661 such items including most 
locally produced consumer goods (EIU, 1990d: 36-37).88
“ "By the end of the Garcia Administration [July 1990] the most important feature of the tariff structure 
was the multiplicity of rates and their wide dispersion. [There were] 56 different gross tariff rates ranging 
from 10 to 110 percent. ... A second important feature was the multiplicity of exemptions about—fifty 
types of special customs regimes existed ... In addition an overvalued currency disproportionately [sic] 
increased the competitiveness of foreign goods, ..." (Paredes, 1994: 227-228).
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In September 1990 the recently elected government of Alberto Fujimori launched 
a sweeping overhaul of the foreign trade system. The majority of the quantitative 
restrictions were removed, the number of tariff rates was reduced from 56 to 3 (15, 25, 
and 50 percent), and most tariff exemptions were eliminated. In March 1991 the number 
of tariff rates was reduced to two: 15 and 25 percent, and it will eventually be only one, 
of 15 percent (EIU, 1991d: 37; Paredes, 1994: 230, 250; Marquez: El). The average 
tariff of Peru dropped to 16 percent in mid-1993, when all subsidies and non-tariff 
barriers were eliminated (LAWR, WR-94-06, February 17, 1994: 64). In 1994 almost 
98 percent of imports had a 15 percent rate. The only exception was the flexible 
surcharge on certain basic foods to temporarily protect local farmers (EIU, 1995d: 39).
Between 1987 and 1989 (the phase of stagnation), Peru was indifferent to the 
approval of the CET because Peru had a multiplicity of tariff rates, exemptions, and 
import controls in its tariff schedule. From 1989 to 1992, the Peruvian government was 
supportive of a CET with three levels (instead of the two levels of its domestic tariff), 
and very few exceptions to the general rule; in exchange Peru wanted a quick and full 
harmonization of some economic policies. From 1992 on, Peru did not support the CET 
because the aforementioned demands were not met by its partners.
From 1987 to 1989, Venezuela continued with its existing import system 
protecting domestic production with high tariffs and an array of non-tariff barriers. This 
system was not conducive to the support of the CET.
An import liberalization program was announced in mid-1989 by the Venezuelan 
government, under which protective tariffs were to be lowered progressively, and tariff
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exemptions eliminated over a four-year period. The final tariff structure included four 
rates: 5, 10, 15 and 20 percent. The negotiations within the Andean Pact accelerated the 
original timetable, finishing the process by early 1992. The average rate fell from 31 
percent in 1988 to less than 12 percent in 1992 (see table VII.5). By the beginning of 
1992 quantitative restrictions were practically eliminated (EIU, 1990e: 40; 1993e: 43; 
ECLA, 1994: 446). The exception was the automobile sector which in September 1991 
its tariff rate was cut from 40% to 25%. The tariff, was increased in November 1993 to 
35 percent as part of the accord with Colombia and Ecuador (EIU, 1993e: 27; JUNAC, 
1995: 3).
During the phase of stagnation (1987-1989), Venezuela was indifferent to the 
adoption of the CET but from 1989 on it supported its approval. The tariff structure 
aimed at by the Venezuelan reform was quite similar to that of the CET proposed by the 
Junta. These similarities were: four basic rates, and special treatment of automobiles. 
Support by Venezuela of the CET, was, thus, established.
To recapitulate, during the phase of stagnation (1987-1989), Peru and Venezuela 
were indifferent to the approval of the CET and of policy harmonization. Peru was not 
supportive of the tariff reduction program and Venezuela was. Between 1989 and 1992, 
the two countries were supportive of the three mechanisms. Between 1992 and 1995 
(slow progress), Peru supported only policy harmonization and Venezuela supported the 
tariff reduction program and the CET, and was indifferent to policy harmonization.
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d) Bolivia and Ecuador
d .l) The tariff reduction program.- Bolivian trade increased during the years of 1987 
to 1994 except for 1988 when exports decreased by 10 percent, and 1987 when imports 
decreased by 12 percent (see table VII. 17). Its trade balance with the rest of the Andean 
subregion was positive in all years. These results compare favorably with Bolivia’s 
performance with the rest of the world. Rates of growth of both Andean exports and 
imports were higher than the rates for total exports and imports in most years. Bolivia 
benefitted from intra-Andean trade and because of this, the country was supportive of the 
tariff reduction mechanism. Support of the tariff reduction program was reinforced by 
the tariff reduction policy pursued by the government from 1985 on, which allowed 
Bolivia to quickly eliminate trade barriers to Andean products.
Exports from Ecuador to the rest of the subregion increased in all the years 
between 1987 and 1994, except for 1992; while imports decreased in 1988, 1992 and 
1993 (see table VII. 18). Its trade balance was negative in 1987, 1991 and 1994. It is also 
important to point out, that this country enjoyed incredible rates of increase in its Andean 
exports in 1987 (190 percent) and in 1993 (65 percent). In the case of Andean imports, 
there was a 240 percent increase in 1987, and a 171 percent in 1994. The Andean Group 
as a market for Ecuador’s exports increased quickly from 1992 on, and by 1994 it 
represented more than 10 percent of its exports; while imports from the Andean Group 
were 14 percent of the total imports.
Ecuador was indifferent to the tariff reduction program between 1989 and 1992, 
not only because of its trade results but also because the government was still hesitant
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BOLIVIA: ANDEAN TRADE 1987-1994
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Phase-> | STAGNATION PROGRESS
[  1987 | 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
EXPORTS (FOB) (Millions of dollars)
Gran 30.7 27.5 50.0 60.0 82.3 99.6 120.0 196.0
World 569.8 597.4 819.2 922.9 850.8 765.5 751.3 1,040.6
IMPORTS (FOB) (Millions of dollars)
Gran 15.4 17.7 21.7 29.9 33.3 40.0 77.5 102.9
World 766.3 590.5 619.9 702.7 992.4 1,115.0 1,177.0 1,196.4
TRADE BALANCE (Millions of dollars)
Gran 15.4 9.8 28.3 30.1 49.1 59.6 42.5 93.0
World (196.5) 6.9 199.3 220.3 (141.7) (349.5) (425.6) (155.8)
INTRASUBREGIONAL TRADE AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TRADE
Expons 5.39 4.60 6.10 6.50 9.68 13.00 15.97 18.83
Imports 2.00 3.00 3.50 4.25 3.35 3.59 6.58 8.60
RATE OF GROWTH OF EXPORTS
Gran 26.64 -10.46 81.81 19.90 37.32 20.93 20.51 63.35
World -11.02 4.85 37.12 12.67 -7.82 -10.02 -1.85 38.50
RATE OF GROWTH OF IMPORTS
Gran -11.70 15.32 22.39 37.79 11.44 20.21 93.67 32.88
World 13.69 -22.94 4.99 13.35 41.23 12.35 5.55 1.65
SOURCES: 1987-1991: JUNAC, 1994; 1993-1994: JUNAC, 1995b: 20; 1995c: 21; 1995f: 24, 26, 28, 
30, 40 and author’s calculations.
to quickly open its market to Andean competition. It became supportive of it from 1992 
on. Ecuadorean indifference towards this Andean mechanism is corroborated by the 
abstention of Ecuador in accelerating the tariff reduction program in both the La Paz 
summit in November 1990, and in Cartagena in December 1991. Its support from 1992 
on is, on the other hand, reconfirmed by its quick embrace of the tariff reduction
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TABLE VII. 18
ECUADOR: ANDEAN TRADE 1987-1994
Phase-> STAGNATION PROGRESS
1987 | 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
EXPORTS (FOB) (Mil lions of do lars)
Gran 125.1 177.1 183.0 188.5 203.7 178.2 294.8 385.7
World 1,927.7 2,192.9 2,353.9 2,714.3 2,851.4 3,056.9 3,061.9 3,725.1
IMPORTS (FOB) (Mil ions of do lars)
Gran 309.7 78.1 92.9 181.7 233.3 172.6 182.7 494.4
World 2,158.1 1,713.5 1,854.8 1,861.7 2,398.6 2,430.4 2,562.2 3,649.7
TRADE BALANCE (Millions of dollars)
Gran (184.6) 99.0 90.1 6.9 (29.6) 5.5 112.1 (108.7)
World (230.4) 479.4 499.1 852.6 452.8 626.5 499.7 75.4
INTRASUBREGIONAL TRADE AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TRADE
Exports 6.49 8.08 7.77 6.95 7.14 5.83 9.63 10.35
Imports 14.35 4.56 5.01 9.76 9.73 7.10 7.13 13.55
RATE OF GROWTH OF EXPORTS
Gran 191.32 41.64 3.30 3.02 8.06 -2.55 65.49 30.82
World -11.81 13.76 7.34 15.31 5.05 7.21 0.16 21.66
RATE OF GROWTH OF IMPORTS
Gran 239.86 -74.77 18.88 95.55 28.43 -26.01 -5.83 170.62
World 19.22 -20.60 8.24 0.38 28.84 1.33 5.42 42.44
SOURCES: 1987-1991: JUNAC, 1994; 1993-1994: JUNAC, 1995b: 20; 1995c: 21; 1995f: 24, 26, 28, 
30, 40 and author’s calculations.
program which was part of Ecuador’s newly-adopted neo-liberal strategy of development.
d.2) Common external tariff.- In 1988 the Bolivian authorities continued to eliminate 
obstacles to external trade aimed at establishing a regime of free trade (ECLA, 1989b;
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151; IDB, 1990: 63). Tariffs were reduced by Bolivia in 1989 and 1991. Capital goods 
levies went from 10 to 5 percent, and for other products from 20 to 10 percent, and they 
have remained so (JUNAC, 1991k: 8; Marquez, 1995: El). Because of this policy, and 
the fact that other Andean countries from the very beginning accepted that Bolivia would 
maintain its own tariffs as part of the CET, this country supported this mechanism during 
the last phase of the Andean process. During the phase of stagnation (1987-1989), 
however, Bolivia was indifferent to the approval of the CET since it was clear that the 
other countries were not ready for it, and that their higher tariffs than those of Bolivia’s 
favored this country’s exports.
From 1987 to 1989, the phase of stagnation, Ecuador maintained its foreign trade 
under tight control. Import restrictions were reinstalled in 1988, due to balance of 
payments problems (de Janvry et al., 1994: 73). This situation made Ecuador indifferent 
to the approval of the CET.
Between 1990 and 1992, the Ecuadorean government implemented a program to 
liberalize foreign trade. By 1992, the maximum tariff was down to 20 percent, from 290 
percent in 1990. Duties on capital goods and certain foods were reduced to 2%; tariffs 
on intermediate goods fell to 7-12%; and tariffs on finished goods to 17%.89 The 
number of items subject to import controls in 1991 fell from 2,300 to 903 in 1992 (IDB, 
1992: 87; 1993: 85; EIU, 1993c: 38-39).
Tariff reductions and trade liberalization brought Ecuador’s tariff system closer 
to the CET proposed by the Junta. Ecuador, therefore supported the CET from 1990 on.
“’Data in table VII.6 reflect tariff levels before these changes.
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This support became stronger when, in February 1992, Ecuador presented a list of 
products for special tariff treatment which was accepted for negotiation.
The position of Bolivia and Ecuador with regard to the three mechanisms of the 
Cartagena Agreement between 1987 and 1989 (the phase of stagnation) was as follows: 
Both countries were indifferent to the CET and to policy harmonization. Bolivia 
supported the tariff reduction program while Ecuador was indifferent. From 1990 to 
1992, Bolivia supported all three mechanisms, but Ecuador supported only the CET and 
policy harmonization, and continued to be indifferent to the tariff reduction program. 
Finally, between 1992 and 1995 (slow progress), the tariff reduction program and the 
CET were supported by the two countries while they were indifferent to policy 
harmonization.
e) Conclusion
As anticipated by the hypothesis which guides this dissertation, during the phase 
of stagnation (1987-1989), governments were mostly indifferent to the main mechanisms 
of the Cartagena Agreement. Likewise, in the phase of progress (1989-1992), they were 
supportive more between 1990 and 1992 (termed here as progress) than between 1992 
and 1995 (slow progress) (see table VII. 19).
During the phase of stagnation (1987-1989), all the member countries were 
indifferent to the approval of the CET and of policy harmonization. In the phase of 
progress (1989-1992), the governments were highly supportive of all the mechanisms. 
From 1992 on (slow progress) four member countries were supportive of the tariff
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TABLE Vn. 19
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ANDEAN MECHANISMS AND 
NATIONAL POLICIES 1987-1995
ANDEAN MECHANISMS CO PE VE BO EC TOTALS
STAGNATION (1987-1989)
The tariff reduction program s N S s I 3S 11 IN
Common external tariff I I I I I 51
Policy harmonization I I I I I 51
3S 111 IN
PROGRESS (1989-1992)
The tariff reduction program s S s s I 4S 11
Common external tariff s S s s s 5S
Policy harmonization s s s s s 5S
14S 11
SLOW PROGRESS (1993-1995)
The tariff reduction program s N s s s 4S IN
Common external tariff s N s s s 4S IN
Policy harmonization I S I I I IS 41
9S 41 2N
S = Supportive I = Indifferent N = Not supportive
reduction program and the approval of the CET, but they were indifferent to policy 
harmonization while Peru did not support any mechanism, except policy harmonization.
The outcomes for the phase of progress (1989-1995) show a majority support for 
the Andean mechanisms. There are, however, significant differences. As compared to
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the years 1990 to 1992, between 1992 and 1995, countries were more indifferent.
The slow down of the process (1992-1995) was the result of: (a) the unwillingness 
of the countries, except for Peru, to pursue economic policy harmonization, (b) The 
demand of Peru to have a CET with minimum exceptions to the general rules, and the 
unwillingness of the others to follow suit, (c) Peru’s revocation of the tariff reduction 
program, while Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela went ahead to create a 
customs union among themselves. And (d) the pursuit of Colombia and Venezuela to 
integrate with other countries and areas.
All these reasons point to the fact that the slow down of the Andean process was 
not the result of the member countries disagreeing with the usefulness of the mechanisms 
for furthering their interests (as was the case in the phase of stagnation), but was result 
of disagreement about the pace and the depth of the implementation of these mechanisms. 
Peru, having gone the farthest, pressed others, but they were reluctant to speed up and 
deepen the process.90
This situation clearly corroborates the main aspect of the hypothesis of this 
dissertation, namely, that governments consider the Andean Group a tool to further their 
national interests. Each government tries to make the implementation of the mechanisms 
reflect as much as possible its domestic policies and interests. The outcome depends on 
the negotiating skills and the relative power of the country. Peru tried to make its 
interests prevail. Being a medium-size country, Peru was not successful and was unable
90It is also possible to consider that Peru does not really want to remain in the Andean Group, and the 
obstacles this country is posing to the process is just a preamble for a departure. In this case, this fact 
would prove the contention of this research project that governments might decide to leave the process if 
the pursue of its objectives are hampered by GRAN.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
371
to prevent other countries, from going in the direction they wanted. The progress of the 
Andean process, however, slowed down.
Support for the mechanisms is shown, and progress of the Andean process is 
recorded, even though Peru opposed them. The progress reflects, as expected by the 
hypothesis, the interests of the countries, especially of the most powerful ones. This 
makes the present progress of the Andean process doubtful in the future, since it is 
highly probable that some decisions already approved (e.g., the CET) will have to be 
renegotiated to include Peru’s interests, and policy harmonization should be resumed if 
this country is going to rejoin the Andean Group.
The first political step towards rejoining was taken during the presidential meeting 
in September 1995 (the first since December 1991) in Quito, Ecuador (six months after 
the latest border skirmish between Ecuador and Peru).91 Peru agreed, by Decision 377, 
to participate only in the Andean free trade zone by January 1996, but only if the 
harmonization of the norms of origin, export subsidies, and duty free zones were pursued 
(El Comercio, 1995a: E l). Nevertheless, President Fujimori reiterated the existence "of 
profound differences among the member countries" related to "subsidies, tariffs, and 
especially the different speed with which each country has been reducing its customs 
duties" (Gestion, 1995: 3).
Since no substantial progress was made in policy harmonization, in December
9lThe presidents signed the Quito Act (Acta de Quito) creating the Andean Integration System (Sistema 
Andino de Integration) in which all the Andean institutions, including the Andean Presidential Council and 
the Andean Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, become part of it. The Junta is transformed into a 
General Secretary. The Quito Act restates that "the Andean subregional integration is one of the principal 
means to accelerate economic and social progress of the Latin American countries," and also that there is 
a need "to gradually reduce distortions in competition" (JUNAC, 1995e: 1-6; El Comercio, 1995: E8).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
372
1995, by Decision 387, the Commission eliminated the deadline of January 1996; and 
allowed Peru to maintain its tariff policy. Peru, however, agreed to expand its bilateral 
trade agreements, especially with Ecuador, even though the other countries could keep 
their export subsidies (El Comercio, 1995b: A l; 1995c: El; 1995d: E2; 1995e: El; 
1995f: E l; Rey-Sanchez, 1995: E l; La Republica, 1995 : 9: Lauer, 1995: 6). The 
situation which led to the slow down of the process, thus, continues.
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CHAPTER V m  
CONCLUSION:
THE LONG MARCH OF THE ANDEAN INTEGRATION PROCESS
1.- INTRODUCTION
In this final chapter the research findings are considered and discussed. The 
various phases of the economic integration process will be compared among themselves, 
and against the different aspects of the hypothesis guiding this endeavor.
The main contention, using the evolution of the Andean Group as a case study, 
is that economic integration processes do not evolve smoothly into supranationalism.1 
On the contrary, the Andean case proves that economic integration processes do evolve 
through non-sequential phases of progress, stagnation and regression. These phases, 
moreover, do not show a tendency toward the disappearance of the nation-state, but 
reaffirm the supremacy of the individual governments.
The indicators used in this study to show whether a given phase is one of
‘"...the  experiences of the 1960s suggest that it may be unfounded to take a linear view of integration 
commitments as leading to greater and greater levels of interdependence" (Rosenthal, 1993: 16).
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progress, stagnation or regression are: (1) the implementation of the Andean mechanisms 
will be quick during progress, will be slow and delayed during stagnation, and will 
reverse or be abandoned during regression; (2) intra-Andean trade will increase every 
year during a phase of progress, will decrease in one or two years during stagnation, and 
will decrease over several years in a phase of regression; (3) during progress, stagnation, 
and regression violations to the commitments will, respectively, be few, will increase, 
and will be widespread; (4) decisions adopted by the Commission, the political unit of 
the Andean process, will deal mainly with new issues during a phase of progress; will 
deal mainly with unimportant issues, and with modifying existing decisions in a phase 
of stagnation; and will deal mainly with unimportant decisions during regression.
Indicators (1) and (2), implementation of the mechanisms and trade flows, have 
been analyzed in sections 2 of chapters IV, V, VI, and VII for each one of the five 
phases the Andean Group has undergone. Indicators (3) and (4), violations to accords and 
decisions of the Commission, have been examined in section 3 and parts of section 4 of 
the same chapters. The inquiry has shown, as expected, that from 1969 to 1973 the 
Andean Group was in a phase of progress; from 1974 to 1978 in a phase of stagnation; 
from 1979 to 1986 in a phase of regression; between 1987 and 1989 in a phase of 
stagnation; and between 1990 and 1995 in a phase of progress.
Why has the Andean process gone through these phases? According to data 
assembled in this research project the evolution of the Andean process is the product of 
the relations among the governments of the member countries. The individual 
governments attempt to achieve some of their national goals by using the Andean Pact
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as one of several tools available to them. This establishes that governments are the most 
important actors in the process, and that they determine its evolution by negotiating 
among themselves. The outcome of these negotiations depends on the power relations 
existing among the member countries over time, or at a specific moment or moments of 
the negotiations.
The Andean process progresses when all the countries find the Andean Group a 
useful tool for their respective national interests. The integration process stagnates when 
a minority of the member countries disagree with the aims and/or mechanisms of the 
agreement. Finally, integration regresses when the majority of the governments do not 
find the aims and/or the mechanisms useful and reverse prior decisions.2
This dissertation tests the above mentioned assertions in the last two parts of 
section 4 of chapters IV, V, VI, and VII. The first compares the long-term objectives of 
the governments of the member countries with the principles of the Cartagena 
Agreement. The second compares the relevant economic policies pursued by the 
government with the main mechanisms of the agreement. Other parts of section 4 analyze 
external and domestic influences affecting governments’ behavior.
2.- PROGRESS. STAGNATION AND REGRESSION IN THE ANDEAN
PROCESS: A COMPARISON OF THE INDICATORS
This section will compare the indicators of progress, stagnation and regression.
:Logically, the integration process would be terminated if none of the countries, or a majority of the 
members including all the most important units, finds the process not useful to them.
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Here we will look at the way these indicators show if a given period can be termed as 
one of progress, stagnation, or regression.
2.1.- Implementation of the mechanisms
a) Optimism and progress (1969-1973), progress (1990-1995)
The favorable conditions of the international environment in the 1960s, that is, 
the continuing growth of most of the economies, especially of the industrialized nations, 
helped the Andean countries to accelerate their economic growth, and to decrease their 
economic and political dependency on the international system. The Andean integration 
process was one tool used to achieve these aims. The creation of the Andean Group, and 
its progress between 1969 and 1973, was also possible thanks to the common import 
substitution industrialization strategy pursued by the member countries.
The deadlines established by the Cartagena Agreement to implement the 
mechanisms by the Commission were met during this phase. Approved were the different 
lists contemplated by the trade liberalization mechanism, the common minimum external 
tariff, the first Sectoral Program of Industrial Development (the Metalworking Program), 
and the common treatment of foreign investment.
Mechanisms not subject to deadlines, however, advanced little or not all, i.e.; 
planning coordination, and policy harmonization. It was not by chance that these 
mechanisms were from the beginning, the most difficult to implement.
The second phase of progress began in 1989, when the governments of Colombia, 
Peru, and Venezuela (the three most important members) rapidly converged on a new
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strategy of development: export-oriented industrialization. Once this happened, progress 
was achieved (1990-1995) based on the new aims given to the Cartagena Agreement, and 
on the reordering of the importance of the Andean mechanisms. The Andean Group 
became a tool to reverse international economic marginalization, and to increase 
production efficiency. Progress was also due to the direct support of the Andean 
presidents as evidenced in their summit meetings held between 1989 and 1991.
At the international level the phase of progress of the Andean Group was 
positively influenced by the end of the Cold War, the process of creating continental 
trade blocs; a revival of integration processes in Europe, Latin America, and other 
regions; and the creation of market economies in most of the world accompanied by the 
opening of the economies of Eastern Europe, Asia, and Latin America.
Trade liberalization was completed by the Andean nations by early 1993, and the 
CET was implemented in February 1994. Economic policy, especially of those 
instruments directly affecting trade (e.g., export subsidies, dumping, technical rules, 
etc.), began to be harmonized mostly between 1990 and 1992.
From 1992 to the present (1995), however, the process slowed down due not to 
discrepancies over the aims, but over the speed, and the depth to which the mechanisms 
were to be implemented. The divergences led to the temporary and "partial" withdrawal 
of Peru (a supporter, with Bolivia, of an ample and quick progress). Peru’s limbo 
continues. The Andean customs union is not yet a reality. The common treatment of 
foreign investment, in practice, disappeared. Finally, Industrial Programming was, for 
all practical purposes, abolished in March 1993.
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The two phases of progress of the Andean Group have in common, as expected 
by the hypothesis of this project, that they happened when governments of the member 
countries had similar strategies of development and economic policies. In the first phase 
of progress, they had just launched the Andean project and there was high hope that it 
would be a useful tool to help the countries’ development. In the second phase of 
progress, the governments changed the aims and reordered the importance of the 
mechanisms of the Cartagena Agreement, thereby giving GRAN new basis for 
usefulness.
b) Doubts and stagnation (1974-1978) and stagnation (1987-1989)
Between 1974 and 1978, the Andean process went through a phase of stagnation. 
In 1974 Venezuela became the sixth member and Chile exited in 1976. Negotiations with 
these countries absorbed much of the time of the Commission and of the Junta. 
Negotiations also allowed Colombia to voice the need for greater flexibility of the 
Sectoral Programs of Industrial Development and of the common treatment of foreign 
investment. Deadlines were not met. The Protocols of Lima (1976) and of Arequipa 
(1978) postponed deadlines, and introduced changes to the agreement.
At the international level, the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971, and 
the oil price increase of 1973 affected the economies of the Andean nations differently. 
This created a divergence of interests among the member countries, and began to put into 
doubt the usefulness of the import substitution strategy for the domestic and regional 
levels.
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The implementation of the mechanisms was delayed. The common external tariff, 
to be adopted by December 1975, was not acted on. The approval of all the Sectoral 
Programs of Industrial Development, by December 1975, was not achieved. After a five- 
year extension of Industrial Programming by the Protocols of Lima and of Arequipa, 
only 2 more programs were approved: the Petrochemical in 1975, and the Automobile 
in 1977. Decision 24, on the common treatment of foreign investment, was modified 
seven times. The process of tariff reduction for intra-Andean trade, however, continued, 
albeit with increasing delays in their implementation (see table Vm .3, column 4).
The second phase of stagnation of the process lasted between 1987 and 1989. The 
Quito Protocol, signed in May 1987, made the Andean obligations less stringent. It did 
provide the impetus to push the Andean process not from its phase of regression to a 
phase of progress, but to a phase of stagnation. The governments were still dealing with 
their debt problems, and restructuring their economies but without clear guidelines. 
During these years, they became more and more convinced that the import substitution 
strategy of development must be replaced by an export-oriented strategy.
The international system was going through important changes during these years. 
The Soviet Union was collapsing, and its Eastern European sphere of influence was 
disintegrating. The Western industrialized world, and the international economic 
institutions, especially the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, were 
pressing the debtor countries to adopt economic policies in line with a free market 
economy as a condition to deal with the debt problem.
Contrary to what was expected, after the signing of the Quito Protocol, May
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1987, the Andean countries, involved with their domestic troubles, did not make any 
attempt to revitalize the Andean process. Violations did not substantially diminish (see 
table Vm.3). Trade began to increase, but it was mostly due to the necessity of obtaining 
essential goods not locally produced. Trade flows, moreover, continued to be restricted 
by non-tariff barriers applied indiscriminately to Andean and non-Andean imports, and 
by the existing Andean bilateral trade accords. The Sectoral Programs of Industrial 
Development were forgotten, and the governments again modified their common 
treatment of foreign investment.
c) Pessimism and regression (1979-1986)
The "lost decade" caused by the international debt crisis forced the Andean 
countries to rethink their import substitution development strategy. The economic crisis 
of the 1980s also brought the military back to the barracks in Peru, Bolivia and Ecuador. 
All the members had elected civilian governments for the first time in the history of the 
Andean process. These factors, especially the first, strongly influenced the evolution of 
the Andean process: it went into a phase of regression. This phase ended with the 
adoption of the Quito Protocol in May 1987, which profoundly modified the Cartagena 
Agreement. The protocol made the agreement more flexible, and more in tune with the 
still evolving interests of the member countries.
The regression of the Andean process is clearly shown in the way the mechanisms 
were applied. The tariff reduction program was reversed by restricting (in the form of 
non-tariff barriers) the exchange of goods among the Andean countries. The Commission
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failed to adopt the CET by the deadline of December 1979, and after some efforts to do 
it, in 1981 abandoned that hope. By December 1980, the 5 additional years to approve 
all the Sectoral Programs of Industrial Development ended, and from 1978 no industrial 
program, as mandated by the Cartagena Agreement, was approved. In addition, the three 
existing industrial programs were repeatedly modified, their deadlines postponed, and 
their regulations made more lax. Finally, the common treatment of foreign investment 
was again modified, making it more flexible, and less common.
One bright spot in the Andean evolution in this phase of regression was the 
establishment of the Andean Court of Justice, of the Andean Parliament, and of the 
Andean Council of Foreign Ministers. They were heralded as signs that the Andean 
process was spreading into the political arena. A second bright spot, but short lived, was 
the adoption of common foreign economic policies. It was considered a harbinger of the 
establishment of political cooperation in the international arena. In both instances hopes 
proved to be premature. They only were attempts of the governments to pursue 
integration in new areas in order to show some progress of the process, since the main 
mechanisms were in regression.
d) The output of the Commission as a reflection of the phases of the Andean 
integration process.
Progress, stagnation and regression of the Andean Group is also correlated to the 
dynamism of the Commission or its lack of it. As proposed by this research project, 
decisions of the Commission were found to be greater in number during a phase of
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progress than in a phase of stagnation, or in a phase of regression. Decisions dealt more 
with new issues during the phases of progress. During the phases of stagnation they dealt 
with modifying existing decisions, and with unimportant issues. During the phase of 
regression they dealt more with watering down existing decisions.
Table VIII. 1 shows data which confirm that, in the main, the Commission was 
more dynamic, and its performance more effective in furthering integration during 
progress than during stagnation or regression. The average number of decisions, more 
than three per session, approved by the Commission, was the highest during the phases 
of progress, 1969-1973 and 1990-1995 (see table VIII. 1, line 5.1). The lowest average 
corresponds to the phase of regression with less than two decisions per session.
The result is similar if the data are calculated as decisions per year (see table 
Vin. 1, line 5.2). The average number of decisions approved by the Commission per year 
was the highest during the phases of progress, 16 in 1969-1973, and 23 in 1990-1994. 
The phases of stagnation, 1974-1978 and 1987-1989, show on average 11 and 14 
decisions per year being respectively approved by the Commission, while during the 
phase of regression, 1979-1986, only an average of 10 decisions per year were taken.
The hypothesis is also validated by analyzing the percentages of important and 
unimportant new issues approved by the Commission during the five phases of the 
Andean integration process. Important new issues constituted 40 percent and 28 percent 
of all the decisions made by the Commission in the two phases of progress, while they 
were 15 and 19 percent in the two phases of stagnation, and only 9 percent in the phase 
of regression. Similarly, unimportant decisions were 32 percent and 31 percent in each
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TABLE VIII. 1




















1 Decisions (2 +  3) 81 55 85 42 114 377
2. New Issues (2.1+2.21 58 36 63 29 79 265
2.1 Important 1/ 32 8 8 8 32 88
2.2 Unimportant 26 28 55 21 47 177
3.- Modifying decisions
(3.1 +  3.2) 23 19 22 13 35 112
3.1 Important U (A+B) I 7 16 10 22 56
A. Strengthening 3 4 6 10 23
B. Weakening 1 4 12 4 12 34
3.2 Unimportant 22 12 6 3 13 56
4 Number of sessions 25 19 42 15 29 130
S.- Averages
5.1 Decisions per session 3.24 2.89 1.81 2.80 3.93 2.90
5.2 Decisions per year 16.20 11.00 10.60 14.00 22.80 14.50
6.- Percentages
TOTAL (6.1 +  6.2) 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
6.1 New Issues (A+B) 71.61 65.46 74.12 69.05 69.30 70.29
A. Important U 39.51 14.55 9.41 19.05 28.07 23.34
B. Unimportant 32.10 50.91 64.71 50.00 41.23 46.95
6.2 Modifying decisions
(A +  B) 28.40 34.55 25.89 30.95 30.70 29.71
A. Important (a +  b) 1.23 12.73 18.82 23.81 19.30 14.85
a.- Strengthening 5.46 4.71 14.29 8.77 6.10
b.- Weakening 1.23 7.27 14.11 9.52 10.53 8.75
B. Unimportant 27.16 21.82 7.06 7.14 11.40 14.85
1/ Important is defined as decisions that have direct impact in the progress of the principal mechanisms of 
the Andean process.
SOURCES: See tables IV.6; V.9; VI.8: VII. 12; JUNAC, n.d.: 1-33; JUNAC, 1982c; Vinces and 
Kuljevan, 1974; Actas de la Comision.
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of the phases of progress, while they constituted around 50 percent in the phases of 
stagnation, and 65 percent in the phase of regression (see table VIII. 1, lines 6.1. A and 
B).
The highest percentage of decisions that modified important decisions in ways that 
weakened the Andean process occurred during the phase of regression (14 percent of all 
the decisions approved in this phase), while the lowest corresponded to the first phase 
of progress, 1969-1973, with one percent of the decisions (see table VIII.l, line 6.2). 
The two phases of stagnation showed higher percentages of modifying decisions 
weakening the integration process (between 7 and 10 percent) than in the first phase of 
progress. The exception to this is the second phase of progress, 1990-1992, in which 
almost 11 percent of all the decisions approved by the Commission weakened existing 
decisions. This result reflected the rapid process of weakening existing decisions related 
to import substitution (e.g., Industrial Programming and Common Treatment for Foreign 
Investments). Finally, the decisions strengthening the process were 9 percent of the total 
during the second phase of progress (see table VIII.l, line 6.2.a),3 this figure is the 
highest with the exception of the 14 percent recorded in the second phase of stagnation 
highly influenced by the 11 decisions approved in May 1987 concurrently with the Quito 
Protocol.
3During the first phase of progress, 1969-1973 no decision was approved strengthening an existing 
decision.
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2.2.- Trade among the Andean countries
According to the methodology, it was anticipated that during a phase of progress, 
trade would increase every year, that in a phase of stagnation trade would decrease in 
at least one year, and in a phase of regression trade would lessen in two or more years.
The rates of growth of exports and imports among the member countries support 
the aforementioned part of the working hypothesis. During the two phases of progress 
(1969-1973 and 1990-1992) both the rate of growth of intra-Andean exports and of 
imports increased in every year (see table Vm.2). It is also noteworthy that in this phase 
intra-Andean trade grew almost always faster than total trade. In the two phases of 
stagnation (1974-1978, 1987-1989) the rate of growth of exports and of imports 
decreased at least in one year. In the first phase of stagnation both the rate of growth of 
exports and of imports decreased in 1978. In the second phase of stagnation, the rate of 
growth of imports diminished in 1989. During the phase of regression, 1979-1986, the 
rates of exports and of imports decreased in four years. Exports lowered in 1982, 1983, 
1984 and 1986, while imports reduced their value continuously between 1983 and 1986.
2.3.- Violations of the Cartagena Agreement and of the decisions of the Commission
Violations, according to this study should be minimal in a phase of progress, 
should be more numerous during a phase of stagnation, and should be widespread in a 
phase of regression. Data analyzed in previous chapters substantiate this assertion.
The clearest evidence comes from the number of decisions not incorporated by 
the member countries into their national legislation. The lowest range (minimum and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
TABLE VIII.2
ANDEAN TRADE GROW TH: 1969-1994 1/
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Rate of growth of exports Rate of growth of imports
YEAR GRANPHASE WORLD GRAN WORLD
1970 17.43 9.56 10.5023.67
1971 31.02 -6.42 16.90 3.77
1972 7.00 5.74 9.40 7.83
1973 38.83 43.87 38.85 20.51
1974 102.64 107.73 90.80 62.80
1975 7.58 -16.67 47.98 30.48
1976 29.73 7.86 15.45 4.25
1977 34.45 10.38 31.72 38.41
1978 -17.34 3.15 -22.71 10.76ON
1979 56.41 46.17 17.90 -1.64
1980 11.50 26.95 22.95 23.01
1981 -3.93 29.97 12.79
1986 -17.81 -22.83 3.85-16.32
1987 42.37 8.34 46.11 16.15
1988 4.19 0.71-0.57 13.62
1989 6.86 23.72 -9.61 -24.32NATION
1993 28.74 4.12 29.69 9.50
1994 19.53 15.17 23.64 -4.49
YEARLY AVERAGE 1969-1994 2/ 15.4 15.4 8.8
INDEX (1969 =  100) 1994 2/ 3,613 698 3,611 828
\J Includes Venezuela from 1974 on and excludes Chile from 1976 
2/ Includes Venezuela but not Chile
SOURCES: See tables 4.3, 5.4, 6.3, and 7.7, JUNAC, 1995f: 26, 30, 46.
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maximum number) of decisions which governments did not make part of their legal 
systems corresponds to the two phases of progress. In the first phase of progress, 1969- 
1973, out of the 81 decisions adopted, a minimum of S and a maximum of 11 decisions 
did not become law in the members countries. In the second phase of progress, 1990- 
1995, of the 114 decisions approved by the end of 1994, a maximum of 8 and a 
minimum of zero decisions did not become law (see table VIII.3, column 3).
The "perfect" compliance by the governments during the second phase of progress 
1990-1995, that is, all decisions were part of their national legislation, was due to two 
facts. (1) By 1993 the Commission had abrogated all the decisions the governments were 
not in compliance with, chief among them were the decisions dealing with the Sectoral 
Programs of Industrial Development. (2) Between 1990 and 1992, the Andean presidents 
committed themselves to further the Andean integration process beyond what the Quito 
Protocol stipulated. This meant that governments were formally observing all the 
obligations included in the existing Cartagena Agreement.
During the phase of regression, 1979-1986, both the minimum and maximum 
number of decisions not incorporated into the legal systems of the countries were the 
highest: 13 and 24 respectively. The Commission adopted in this phase 85 decisions. The 
number of decisions not made part of the legislation of the member countries was greater 
during the first two phases of stagnation than during the phases of progress. They ranged 
between 8 to 14 during the first phase of stagnation (1974-1978), out of 55 decisions 
approved; and between 6 and 9 during the second phase of stagnation (1987-1989), from 
a total of 42 decisions adopted by the Commission.
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TABLE VIII.3
VIOLATIONS TO THE ANDEAN AGREEM ENT AND ITS DECISIONS
MINIMUM - MAXIMUM
Number of Delays in Number of items Number of
Decisions not implementing violating trade claims
Phase Years incorporated in decisions liberalization or made by
the domestic (months) common external the
legislation tariff countries
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Progress 69-73 5 - II 0 - 12 n.a. n.a.
Stagnation 74-78 8 - 14 0 - 4 8 66 - 2,760 n.a.
Regression 79-86 13-24 n.a. 66 - 5,337 2 7 - 141
Stagnation 87-89 6 - 9 n.a. 829 - 6,303 n.a.
Progress 90-94 0 1 00 n.a. 251 -6 ,6 9 2 1 / 2 - 1 3 1 /
1/ 1990-1992
SOURCES: See Tables IV.4; IV.5; V.6; V.7; V.8; VI.3; VI.4; VI.5; VII.8; VII.9; VII. 10
With regard to the implementation of the "automatic" mechanisms (trade 
liberalization and the common minimum external tariff), the limited amount of 
information (only for the first phases of progress and stagnation), also shows that 
postponements increased during a phase of stagnation as compared to a phase of 
progress. Delays rose from a maximum of 12 months in the first phase of progress, 
1969-1973, to a maximum of 48 months (due to Venezuela’s reluctance to comply with 
them) in the first phase of stagnation, 1974-1978 (see table VIII.3, column 4).
The range (minimum and maximum number) of dutiable items the governments 
did not comply with in the tariff reduction program and/or the common tariff does not 
fit the anticipations of this dissertation. The maximum number of violations was at its 
highest during the second phase of progress (6,692 items), while during the phase of
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regression it was only the third highest of the four phases for which information is 
available, 5,337 items, (see table Vm .3, column 5). Similarly, the minimum number of 
items violated were the lowest during the first phase of stagnation, 1974-1978, and 
during the phase of regression, 1979-1986, with only 66 items for which countries did 
not observe the agreed tariffs levels. During the second phase of progress, 1990-1995, 
the minimum number of items violated was 251, which was the third highest of the four 
phases for which there is data.
The high number of items violated during the second phase of progress 
(supposedly a phase in which compliance should be the highest) can be attributed to the 
fact that, between 1990 and 1992, the member countries were both swiftly reducing their 
tariffs to third countries, and accelerating the Andean trade liberalization process. The 
reduction of tariffs to non-member countries violated the common tariff, the Andean 
trade liberalization was not implemented by the governments as quickly as was expected, 
so the Junta’s reports showed a large number of items violating the tariff levels 
agreed.
The low level of violations during the phase of regression (when they are expected 
to be the highest) can be explained by the widespread existence of non-tariff barriers 
applied to Andean trade. Since trade flows were regulated basically through non-tariff 
barriers, violations of the trade reduction program, and to the common tariff were 
meaningless, and thus, they were low.
Finally, for the only two phases for which there is information about claims made 
by the Junta to and among the member countries themselves were, as expected, lower
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in a phase of progress than in a phase of regression. During the second phase of 
progress, 1990-1995, the minimum number of claims was two, and the maximum was 
13; while during the phase of regression, 1979-1986, the minimum was 27 and the 
maximum 141 (see table Vm.3, column 6).
2.4.- Conclusion
The indicators used in this study to find out if a given period of years in the 
evolution of the Andean economic integration process corresponds to a phase of progress, 
stagnation, or regression are basically adequate. The main mechanisms of the Cartagena 
Agreement have been more thoroughly implemented during the phases of progress than 
during the other two phases. This is also corroborated by the activities of the 
Commission. It has been more dynamic and adopted more decisions furthering integration 
during the phases of progress than in the phases of stagnation or regression.
Trade increased in all the years of the phases of progress, while it decreased in 
one year during two of the three phases of stagnation, and diminished in half of the 
number of years of the phase of regression. Finally, violations of the decisions of the 
Commission were generally low during the phases of progress, increased in the phases 
of stagnation, and were widespread during the phase of regression.
3.- EXPLAINING PROGRESS. STAGNATION AND REGRESSION
This section presents a comparison of the support given by the governments of
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the member countries to first, the aims of the Cartagena Agreement, and second, to its 
main mechanisms. The objective of this section is to show that support for the aims and 
mechanisms of the Cartagena Agreement by the governments is directly correlated with 
progress in the Andean integration process; that indifference is related to the stagnation 
of the economic integration of the Andean subregion, and that the lack of support is 
linked to the regression of the Andean process. The expected results indicate that the 
governments are the main actors behind the evolution of the Andean economic integration 
process, and that their support for the Cartagena Agreement or lack of it explains the 
phases of progress, stagnation, and regression.
3.1.- The long-term aims of the governments and the principles of the Cartagena
Agreement
As mentioned above, support by the governments for the principles of the 
Cartagena Agreement will be greater during a phase of progress than during phases of 
stagnation and regression. This greater support is the result of the perception of the 
member countries that their national objectives are better reflected by the aims of the 
Andean process during the phases of progress than during the other phases.
During the two phases of progress, governments’ support for the Andean aims 
was the highest. Out of the 18 possible results in the first phase of progress (1969- 
1973),4 14 were supportive, while only 4 were indifference. In other words, 78 percent 
of the results were in support of the aims of the Cartagena Agreement (see table Vm.4).
4Six countries times three principles equals 18 outcomes.
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In the second phase of progress, 1990-1995, of the 15 possible results,5 14 were in 
support of the Andean aims (93 percent) and only one was not supportive.
During the phase of regression, 1979-1986, of the 15 possible outcomes, 8 were 
not supportive of the aims, while 5 were supportive. This meant that 53 percent of the 
results were not in support of the aims. In this phase, as anticipated by this research 
project, the lack of support for the Andean aims was at its highest. Since the lack of 
support was only a little over 50 percent of the possible outcomes, it is safe to say that 
the survival of the Andean Group was not in peril during this phase.
In the two phases of stagnation, 1974-1978 and 1987-1989, out of the 18 and the 
15 possible outcomes respectively, the aims were supported by a little over half of them, 
56 and 53 percent respectively, while indifferent was the highest, with 28 and 47 percent 
respectively.
As anticipated by the hypothesis of this dissertation, governments’ support for the 
aims of the Cartagena Agreement was widespread in the phases of progress, 72 and 93 
percent of the outcomes. During the phases of stagnation, support diminished but was 
slightly above 50 percent of the results. In the phase of regression support was at is 
lowest with only 33 percent of the possible outcomes.
3.2.- The economic policies and the mechanisms of the Agreement
As predicted by the hypothesis of this research project, support for the main 
mechanisms of the Cartagena Agreement was at its highest during the two phases of
5Chile withdrew in 1976.
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TABLE VIII.4
SUPPORT FOR ANDEAN AIMS: 1969-1995
PHASE — > Progress Stagnation Regression
ANDEAN AIMS (1969-1986) 1969-1973 1974-1978 1979-1986
Primacy of government 6S 4S 11 IN 2S 21 IN
Import substitution industrialization 5S 11 4S 11 IN 2S 3N
Subordination of foreign investment 3S 31 2S 31 IN IS 4N
TOTALS 14S 41 10S 51 3N 5S 21 8N
PERCENTAGES 72 22 56 28 16 33 13 53
PHASE— > Stagnation || Progress
ANDEAN AIMS (1987-1995) 1987-1989 1990-1995
Primacy of market mechanisms 2S 3N 4S IN
Export-oriented industrialization 2S 3N 5S
Greater role of foreign investment 4S IN 5S
TOTALS 8S 7N 14S IN
PERCENTAGES 53 47 93 7
S =  Supportive I = Indifferent N = Not supportive
progress. In the first phase of progress, 1969-1973, all of the 24 possible outcomes were 
supportive (see table Vm.5). Within the second phase of progress, between 1990 to 
1992, support was 93 percent of the 15 possible outcomes.6 From 1993 to 1995 (slow 
progress) support diminished to 60 percent of the outcomes.
6By the second phase of progress the total possible outcomes were reduced to 15 because the Andean 
Pact had one country less, Chile, and there were only three rather than four main mechanisms.
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The lack of support for the main mechanisms was at its highest during the phase 
of regression, 1979-1986. Out of the 20 possible outcomes, 14 (70 percent) were not 
supportive of the mechanisms.
The two phases of stagnation show an intermediate degree of support. In the first 
phase of stagnation, 1974-1978, indifference was the result in 46 percent of the 
outcomes, followed by 38 percent of the outcomes being supportive. During the second 
phase of stagnation, 1987-1989, indifference was the outcome in 73 percent of the cases, 
and support happened in only 20 percent.
In short, support or lack of support for the main mechanisms of the Cartagena 
Agreement by the governments of the member countries correlates well with progress, 
stagnation and regression of the Andean integration process. There has always been 
higher level of support for the mechanisms during the phases of progress than during the 
phases of stagnation or regression.
4.- THE EVOLUTION OF THE ANDEAN INTEGRATION PROCESS IS A LONG
MARCH AND NOT A GREAT LEAP FORWARD
Of all the economic integration processes attempted in the developing world, the 
Andean Group has been the most ambitious because of its aims, and its progress.7
7”The Andean Group was bom as the most ambitious integration process in Latin America" (Aninat, 
1992: 69).
"Until the beginning of the 1980s the Andean Group was considered to be the most comprehensive 
... [and] as the most successful example of regional cooperation among developing countries" (Axline,
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TABLE VIII.5
SUPPORT FOR ANDEAN MECHANISMS: 1969-1995
PHASE - > Progress |  Stagnation Regression
MECHANISMS 1969-1973 1974-1978 1979- 1986
Trade Liberalization 6S 2S 31 IN IS 21 2N
Common External Minimum Tariff 6S IS 41 IN 5N
Industrial Programming 6S 4S 11 IN IS 11 3N
Foreign Investment 6S 2S 31 IN IS 4N
TOTALS 24S 9S 111 4N 3S 31 14N




MECHANISMS 1987-1989 1990-1992 1992-1995
Trade liberalization 3S 11 IN 4S 11 4S IN
Common external tariff 51 5S 4S IN
Policy harmonization 51 5S 41 IN
TOTALS 3S 111 IN 14S 11 9S 41 2N
PERCENTAGES 20 73 7 93 7 60 27 13
S = Supportive I = Indifferent N = Not supportive
The evolution of the Andean process demonstrates that changing external and 
domestic circumstances heavily influence individual governments, and their long- and
1994b: 193, 196).
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short-term interests.8 These influences have direct bearing on the changing usefulness 
of the Andean integration process for the governments in order to achieve their own 
goals. The changes in the perception of the member countries of the usefulness of 
economic integration, as another tool to be employed in their quest for national 
development, lead to phases of progress, stagnation, or regression of the Andean 
process.9 Thus, the straightforward implementation of the Andean mechanisms and the 
fulfillment of its aims, as expected by the existing functionalist and neo-fimctionalist 
theories of economic integration proved practically impossible.10
The lack of recognition that economic integration is not only linked to the realm 
of economics, but it is also a process in which social, cultural, and above all, political 
factors play important roles has contributed to inadequate analysis of the process 
(Aftalion, 1990: 14). It is the political factor which in the end has the last word in the 
evolution of the integration process. As such, then, the governments are the most 
important players in this process. Bargaining to achieve their national interests defines 
what route the Andean process should take for the Cartagena Agreement to continue to
’"Regional cooperation is the result of multilateral decisions taken by member countries as part of their 
individual national foreign policy processes ... which reflect their national interests, and which are 
determined by myriad political influences, both domestic and international" (Axline, 1994b: 186).
9"In virtually every case [of economic integration] it is possible to trace a pattern of establishment, 
some modest successes with respect to the original goals, but eventually failure to achieve the overall aims, 
and finally stagnation or collapse, only to emerge in a new form in the 1990s" (Axline, 1994: 5).
10"No integration process is without obstacles ... nor is their progress lineal" (Marquez, 1989: 23).
"In both economic and political terms, the Andean Group has so far not succeeded in yielding its 
long sought goal of closer regional integration. The reason for this outcome lies mainly in the fact that 
adherence to the Cartagena Agreement came into direct conflict with national ambitions" (OECD, 1993: 
60).
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be a relevant instrument of the governments in their quest for development.11
The speed and depth of the implementation of the mechanisms cannot be linear 
not only because of the changing interests of the governments, but also because 
governments do not always have a clear idea how to utilize these mechanisms. Another 
practical reason, which makes implementation of the mechanisms quite difficult, is the 
fact that negotiations are pursued in a piecemeal fashion, making it impossible for 
governments to have a comprehensive view of give and take, and of the overall effects 
of the process for the country (Tironi, 1976: 100-101; Cohen and Rosenthal, 1977: 34). 
Nevertheless, the most important reason for the lack of smooth progress of the Andean 
integration process was the dissimilarities in the strategies of development, and in the 
economic policies of the governments.12 The smooth progress of the Andean process 
requires the impossible goal of furthering more and more policy harmonization. This in 
turn means that governments should pursue more and more similar, and eventually 
identical policies with the corresponding decrease of their sovereignty.
Since the Andean process is primarily a tool for the member countries to achieve 
their national goals, governments will be interested in furthering integration only if it
""Regional cooperation is better understood as part of a development strategy, ... [and] it is apparent 
... that [it] can only be understood from the perspective of the national interests of the individual member 
states, and that the politics of regional negotiations will involve accommodating these interests from all 
partners" (Axline, 1994b: 183, 217).
12"... insofar there are substantial differences in the economic policies of the member countries of the 
Andean process, the process will not be able to achieve the objectives for which it was created" (Tafur, 
1982: 101).
"... the principal cause of the [Andean crises] was the existence of important discrepancies among 
the economic policies of the governments of the member countries ..." (Aninat, 1992: 69).
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serves them.13 On the other hand, governments only reluctantly abdicate powers to the 
community organs.14 The self-limitation of their sovereignty is accepted only when 
governments clearly find that, by doing so, important objectives can be achieved. In 
consequence, economic integration has little chance to become an important factor in the 
Andean economies. This in turn makes the governments unwilling to deepen and expand 
the integration process.
Therefore, the integration process has had, not by chance, a few years of 
progress, some of regression, and many of stagnation. This at the same time explains its 
survival. The few years during which the Andean Pact proved to be useful makes the 
governments reluctant to abandon the process. "Integration will always be an imperfect 
process whose objectives can only be achieved partially" (Peiia-Parra, 1979: 38). Most 
of the time, there are incentives to keep the integration process, but most of the time 
there are not enough incentives to keep it making progress.
Is the Andean integration process still relevant? Why is the Cartagena Agreement 
seen as useful today by the governments of the member countries?
13"Andean decisions will be adopted only if they coincide with some predefined policies" (Abusada, 
1991: 14).
"Ultimately the outcome of regional cooperation (the form it takes, its success of failure) will 
depend on its ability to respond to the interests of its member states as determined by the individual 
economic, social and political characteristic of each member state" (Axline, 1994a: 29). "And the greater 
the congruence between regional policies and mechanisms and the national interests of member countries, 
the greater will be the support for regional cooperation" (Axline, 1994b: 191-192).
14"The Andean states have not been willing to tolerate ... a greater penetration by regional authorities 
into areas subject to national control" (Middlebrook, 1979: 80).
"It is evident that the Andean institutions and inter-governmental relations have been closely 
controlled by the states" (Frambes-Buxeda, 1990: 113).
"The fundamental political problem posed by economic integration is the loss of sovereignty ... 
At some point, each member state risks being forced to ignore national interests—political, economic, 
social, or cultural—as a consequence of maintaining its international obligations. This tension between 
national interest and international obligations ... poses a severe dilemma for states which tend to value 
security and autonomy above all else" (Balaam and Veseth, 1996: 222).
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Now, more than before, due to the globalization of the economy there are few 
problems that can be solved unilaterally. Economic integration, in a rapidly changing 
world, is useful to solve common problems and to reduce the insecurity and uncertainty 
of contemporary international relations. Economic integration now serves as a means to 
facilitate an efficient integration of the Andean countries with the international economy; 
and to pool resources to increase their diminished standing in the international system.15
At the domestic level, the new objectives assigned to the Andean Pact help 
domestic production to increase their efficiency and productivity. The Andean market 
offers to local producers an experimental and safer area where they can compete under 
free trade rules.
From a different perspective, integration processes, such as the Andean Group, 
are international treaties which contain a set of ideal objectives rather than achievable 
targets. The theories of economic integration assumed that the aims were possible to 
reach, and within the agreed upon timetable. The obvious way to analyze integration 
processes, such as the Andean Group, was, then, to investigate how successfully they 
met their objectives within the agreed upon timetable. The conclusions were similarly 
disappointing. Even under their extended timetables, no integration process has been able 
to reach its goals. The Andean Pact is no exception.
The expectation that the community institutions created by the integration accords
l5"Perhaps the main [conclusion] is that, just as economic integration played a functional role in the 
import-substitution model of decades past, it can also do so in the contemporary model for enhanced 
competitiveness in the international market" (Rosenthal, 1993: 18).
"The new generation of [regional trade] agreements [RTA] aims to reap the benefits of an 
expanded domestic market in order to increase exports to the world outside. ... [they] are now portrayed 
as an ‘export platform’ ... Tariff reductions within the RTAs are merely complementary to (and slightly 
greater than) the general tariff reductions taking place under structural adjustment" (Green, 1995: 142).
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would be the harbingers of a supranational organization, as predicted by the functionalist 
and neo-functionalist theories, was unwarranted. These community organs more resemble 
international governmental organizations (IGOs) than supranational organizations16. This 
is so because the decision-making process rests in the hands of the political body 
composed of government representatives. The political body will always put the national 
interests above the community interests and benefits. As any IGO, the Andean 
community institutions will only accomplish as much as its member countries want; and 
what these members want the communal organs to do is to be a tool of achieving their 
national objectives. The powers and capabilities of the Andean community institutions 
depend more on the wishes of the member governments than in whatever powers and 
capabilities the organization’s charter might bestowed on them.17
We can see that the process of supranationalization through an integration process 
is prevented, and the stated goals of the agreements remain elusive. In practice, economic 
integration assures the supremacy of the governments and their leading role in 
determining the evolution of the process, since nations will not subordinate their national 
interests to the "common good." The process will progress, stagnate, or regress because 
of the changing interests of the governments, disregarding the common goals agreed upon
l6"We can conclude so far that IGOs will in the foreseeable future remain vehicles through which 
nations-states conduct their affairs, but they are not likely to become decision-imposing entities on their 
member states" (Feld et al., 1994: 77).
"In a world where international pressures penetrate deep into national economies, the effective 
harmonization of policies toward international transactions can be highly intrusive. Assigning extensive 
powers to an international organization would therefore create a structure that would be resisted by member 
states and rob the arrangement of credibility" (Eichengreen, 1995: 1076).
17"There is apparently some resistance to delegating authority to intergovernmental or supra-national 
agencies" (Rosenthal, 1993: 19).
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in the agreement.
Integration processes can also be seen as international regimes. The concept of 
international regimes, defined as set of "principles, norms, rules, decision-making 
procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue area" (Krasner, 
1983: 1), goes well with integration accords. It can be said that while the rules, norms, 
and regulations can be changed over time by the members, reflecting their changing 
interests, the regime changes but it still is a regime. The conceptualization of integration 
processes as international regimes supports the guiding idea of this study, namely the 
supremacy of the governments in determining the evolution of the process, or in this 
case, of the regime.
Governments are the most important actors and determine the evolution of the 
Andean process, but they are also influenced by external factors (as shown in this 
dissertation) and by domestic factors (not explicitly taken into account in this study). It 
is also pertinent to point out the relevance of the role of the presidents. Progress between 
1990 and 1992 happened in part due to the nine meetings through which the presidents 
effectively redefined the path and pace of the Andean process. This progress, however, 
was backed primarily by the similarities in the strategies of development and in the 
economic policies of the governments. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the 
presidents met eight times between August 1978 and December 1983, during the end of 
the stagnation and the first years of regression phases. Then, the presidential accords did 
not reinvigorate the process, because external and domestic factors were not supportive 
of the process.
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In both cases, nevertheless, presidential leadership shows that it could be useful 
for the Andean process to be furthered, provided that the circumstances are right. More 
importantly, the presidential meetings prove "that the Andean process is above all, a 
political project" (JUNAC, 1995g: 1).
What then can be expected from economic integration processes in general, and 
from the Andean Group in particular? The Andean Pact has shown over time it is a 
useful tool to further some national aims for some of the governments of the member 
countries for some time. As any other tool, the Andean Group will be employed when 
needed and left in limbo when not. The dynamism of the process and its progress 
principally depends on the convergence of objectives the governments want to reach 
through the integration process. Stagnation and regression of the process is a reflection 
of diminishing usefulness of the integration accord for the governments in achieving their 
national aims. Changes of the aims of the Andean Group and of the relative importance 
of the mechanisms (as well as the creation of new mechanisms), are the means by which 
governments re-tool the process and make it again useful. The survival of the Andean 
process is assured because either the governments find it useful, or the accord is 
modified by the member countries to suit their new purposes. There is little else that can 
be expected from integration besides being a tool, sometimes a very important tool, to 
help its members to achieve some of their shared goals.18 A more peaceful international 
regional or subregional system, if reached, would be only an unintended consequence,
18"There are still many difficulties—political as well as economic—in advancing Latin American 
integration efforts; but such efforts do help (although still marginally) in Latin America’s economic 
development and they do provide, albeit in small ways, a means to bring the Latin American Countries 
together" (Wiarda, 1995: 203).
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a by-product, and it would be more an intended objective of its member countries.
The Andean economic integration process, being a tool of the governments rather 
than an actor on its own, cannot evolve into a great leap forward towards 
supranationalism as predicted by economic integration theorists. Integration processes are 
most likely to evolve as a long march of non-sequential phases, as demonstrated by this 
research project on the Andean Pact. This long march leads not necessarily to officially 
stated objectives, and even less towards the disappearance of the nation-state, but in the 
directions set by the convergent interests of the member countries.
In short, economic integration processes have economic goals, and use economic 
mechanisms. They are, however, the result of political undertakings using economic 
means and goals. In these endeavors governments, and their behavior have a crucial role 
in the evolution of the integration processes, a role which has often been ignored and 
down played in the prevailing literature.
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